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Abstract 
 
Provocative recent scholarship has sought to revise, historicize, and challenge a 
commonplace of reading lyric: the illusion of personal encounter in the language of a poem.  
The work of lyric theorists has enriched and complicated potential answers to a persistent 
question: what do we encounter when we read a poem?  In The Self in the Song, I argue that 
the work of Adrienne Rich, Mark Strand, Derek Walcott, and Charles Wright formulates 
similar questions and offers complex and resonant responses.  I demonstrate the remarkable 
skepticism with which they portray the self, as an idea with political, philosophical, 
geographic, and theological implications.  In poems that enact and foreground their own 
poetics, they articulate complex theoretical concerns about the artificiality of the speaking 
“I” and the belatedness of the self with regard to language.  Moreover, I read their poetry as 
heralding and exemplifying the emergence of our complex contemporary poetics from an 
historical moment in the 1970s and 1980s when the work of poststructuralist theorists and 
practicing poets came into productive conversation, often centered around the question of 
the apparition of the self in literary language and its philosophical and political implications.  
The lasting influence of that contact demonstrates that the opposition of “experimentation” 
to “tradition,” as articulated by the Language Poets and other historical poetic avant-gardes, 
is another false binary among many that have oversimplified the multifaceted history of 
American poetry.  Although the four poets I consider have received varying degrees of 
scholarly attention, they are almost unanimously considered exemplars of what Charles 
Bernstein has dismissively called “official verse culture,” both in the praise of its cultural 
arbiters and in the oppositional avant-garde critique of that culture.  I read their work in 
and against these contexts, also using my reconsideration of their poetry as an opportunity 
to call for a fresh approach to the complexity of the illusion of personal encounter in the 
lyric poem, for new avenues to perceive the variety of writing and thinking across the 
spectrum of poetic practice in the United States, especially as we seek to understand what 
we mean by authority and identity in poetry. 
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Introduction 
       
      I celebrate myself and sing myself 
         WALT WHITMAN 
         
      I’m Nobody! Who are you? 
         EMILY DICKINSON 
 
 
 My two epigraphs inaugurate in American literature two apparently opposing 
lineages of thought about the nature of the self as we encounter it in poetry.  At one pole, 
Walt Whitman would project an expansive, permeable self among and through his fellow 
men and women, across the continent and across time; all that would belong to him, he says, 
“as good belongs to you” (1.3).  At the other pole, Emily Dickinson seems to whisper to a 
potential confidant: “Are you—Nobody—too?”—confessing the terror of being “Somebody” 
(“[I’m Nobody!]” 2, 4).  The self is oceanic; the self is a prison.  So far as Anglophone poetry 
in North America since Whitman and Dickinson has served as a stage for thinking about 
the self, that thinking has oscillated between celebration and denial, often demonstrating 
contradictory elements of one in the other.  Is it possible, our poets have asked, to be a 
celebrated, sung self and “Nobody” at the same time? 
In The Self in the Song: Identity and Authority in Contemporary American Poetry, I 
consider the idea of the self as a site where some of the most compelling debates in 
contemporary American poetry are staged.  I argue that, while in the last forty years the 
avant-garde “Language poets” have claimed as a distinctive feature of their practice a radical 
critique of the lyric “I,” similar interrogations have taken place (if by other means) in what 
Charles Bernstein has dismissively called “official verse culture.”  I examine works by 
Adrienne Rich, Mark Strand, Derek Walcott, and Charles Wright as case studies in the 
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“mainstream” poetic deployment of the self, as four eminent poets of “official verse culture” 
whose work proves all the more significant because of its unrecognized contributions to 
interrogations of the concept of selfhood.  I argue that their poems are remarkable 
particularly in the skepticism and provisionality with which they portray the self, features 
that enact complex theoretical concerns about the artificiality of the speaking “I” and the 
belatedness of the self with regard to language. 
This dissertation offers a twofold critical intervention.  Although the four poets I 
consider in my chapters have received varying degrees of scholarly attention, they are almost 
unanimously considered exemplars of “official verse culture,” both in the praise of its 
cultural arbiters and in the oppositional avant-garde critique of that culture.  By clarifying 
and emphasizing the ways in which their work, like that of the Language poets, complicates 
and enriches our idea of the self, my readings enlarge our understanding of their individual 
contributions to a broader spectrum of contemporary American poetry.  Moreover, I 
demonstrate that the opposition of “avant-garde” to “official verse culture” is a false binary 
that persists despite the passé and arbitrary rhetoric that surrounds it.  The persistence of 
this binary—like others in the history of American poetry (“formal” and “free” verse, “the 
raw and the cooked”)—diminishes our understanding of contemporary American poetry and 
poetic history.  In The Self in the Song, I acknowledge the welcome tonic the Language 
critique represented for the prevailing period style in its specific historical moment, but I 
also advocate a more inclusive picture of the varieties of our verse cultures and their 
heterogeneous approaches to the idea of the self.   
The question of the self in various guises has engaged poets as well as twentieth 
century thinkers such as Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault.  Their 
interrogations of the status of the self—and of the figure of the author in particular—have 
destabilized concepts of authority and subjectivity in ways that have proven fruitful for 
theorists and poets alike.  Barthes famously goes so far as to declare “The Death of the 
Author” (1967), arguing that “to give writing its future, it is necessary to overthrow the 
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myth: the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author”  (“Death” 148).  
“As a result,” Foucault writes, “the mark of the writer is reduced to nothing more than the 
singularity of his absence; he must assume the role of the dead man in the game of writing” 
(102-3).  Derrida’s work on the concept of authorship is characteristically evasive; 
nevertheless he lingers on the idea of the proper name as that which “says death even while 
the bearer of it is still living.  [. . . ] Death inscribes itself right in the name [. . .]” (“The 
Deaths of Roland Barthes” 34).  In this conception of language, literature, and authority, the 
author is a function of language rather than its master or marshal.  What Barthes calls “the 
prestige of the individual” is stripped from the “original” author and returned to its proper 
origin in language itself (“Death” 143).   
The poststructuralist turn to language would destabilize far more than the figure of 
the author, as Jerrold Seigel observes in his encyclopedic The Idea of the Self:  “In these 
[poststructuralist] schemas the departure or escape from the modern condition, and 
sometimes from the whole Western heritage that lay behind it, went along with attempts to 
proclaim or effect the end of the individual, the ‘death of the author,’ or the demise of the 
human self or subject” (4).  Gerald L. Bruns elaborates on the literary implications of this 
radical shift: “Poetry as a work of lyric expression that gives intentional form to experience 
now gives way to a conception of poetry as the work of language, where the words of 
language are no longer construed as signs but have become, mysteriously, agents of their 
own activity” (354).1  This shift in focus and value from the figure of the author to the idea of 
language allowed poststructuralist thinkers to claim a decentering of the author, the 
individual self, and the individual philosophical subject, all of which they identify as 
historical phenomena rooted philosophically in the Enlightenment and poetically in 
Romanticism.  But the work of destabilizing of the self, and of language itself, has been an 
                                                
1 The trouble with construing language as an agent of its own activity will manifest itself in 
challenging ways in the work of the four poets under consideration here, and particularly in the work 
of Mark Strand. 
 
  4 
implicit function of poetry at least since Aristotle identified metaphor as “the application of 
a noun which properly applies to something else” (9.3, p. 34).  If, as Aristotle argues, 
metaphor is one of (if not the) most important aspects of poetic language—that a noun can 
signify something other than itself—then poetic language is always semantically unstable 
(9.4, p. 37).  This notion is the cause of both consternation and delight.  The quality of 
poetic language that Roman Jakobson calls “poeticity”—“an element sui generis, one that 
cannot be mechanically reduced to other elements”—consists in part in this nominal 
instability, the capacity for some uses of language to say one thing, mean another, and to be 
understood as doing both at the same time (378).  Moreover, the implicit contradictions of 
figurative language provide a useful avenue for approaching the paradoxes of the self, among 
them that what so many of us feel constitutes our individual or unique essence—self, soul, 
personality—is conceivable only in relationship to others.  
 Bruns’s description of “poetry as the work of language” appears in an essay on 
Foucault, but his words might also serve as an accurate depiction of the aesthetics of the 
North American avant-garde “Language Poets.”  Lyn Hejinian, who has long been associated 
with Language writing, supposes that “writing begins not in the self but in language, which is 
far larger than the self, and prior to it.  So writing, like reading, begins at a point which is 
‘not-I’,” a point which poststructuralist theorists and Language poets alike might identify as 
language itself (“Roughly Stapled”).  Drawing on these poststructuralist critiques of notions 
of the self and authorship, some Language poets have identified the portrayal or expression 
of the self as the basis for their critique of a poetic “mainstream” that Bernstein labels 
“official verse culture” (“Academy” 248).  Oren Izenberg summarizes the Language critique 
as such:  
  a rebellion against the perceived dominance of poetic modes that emphasized  
  the fundamentally expressive and subjective nature of the art [. . .].  In   
  contrast, the Language poets emphasized the arbitrariness of signification and 
  the constructive character of meaning-making.  In their hands, [language] was 
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  neither a vehicle for the narration of selves, the communication of messages,  
  or the transmission of feelings.  It was, rather, a medium: matter to be   
  arranged, disassembled, and reconfigured [. . .]. (784) 
 The Language poets’ critique of the lyric portrayal of self was an innovative and 
compelling challenge to certain prevailing assumptions and habits of a mainstream branch of 
discursive, apparently “personal” poetry.  Their critique, however, both depends upon and 
fosters an “us and them” rhetoric that clouds our picture of contemporary poetry and of the 
Language poets’ contributions to it.  Such rhetoric is common enough among avant-garde 
movements, and may even be necessary in order to coalesce disparate poets and ideas into a 
movement.  Nor is the tendency to divide poetry into false binaries unique to avant-garde 
critiques or to the poetics of the United States.  As Izenberg writes in Being Numerous: 
Poetry and the Ground of Social Life, one can oppose “Plato’s account of the passion-driven and 
imitative poet (banished) and the properly devotional and moral poet (welcome) for 
example, or Schiller’s classification of poets and stages of culture as ‘naïve’ and immediate or 
reflectively ‘sentimental’” (5).  To those examples I would add the opposition of “the raw” to 
“the cooked” in midcentury American poetry; an “experimental lineage” against a formal 
and metrical strain; the “school of quietude” against linguistically innovative work (Lowell, 
Tobin 174, Silliman “Monday”); or even Whitman against Dickinson, the binary with which 
I begin this introduction.  Such binaries are false, but they persist because they are useful at 
least for the purposes of classification.  Nevertheless, unless we use those binaries as points 
of entry into a conversation that complicates them, they obscure our picture both of 
contemporary poetry and its genealogy by oversimplifying—or even by creating—its 
supposed “camps.”   
One of the lasting effects of such false binaries is that, thirty years after the Language 
poets first framed their critiques of “official verse culture” and twenty years after those 
poets began to be subsumed into whatever official verse culture is supposed to be, the 
culture(s) of poetry are still described as divided; books and anthologies are still marketed 
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along those imaginary lines.  We are more likely to imagine that the awarding of the 2010 
Pulitzer Prize for Poetry to “postlanguage” poet Rae Armantrout represents a détente 
between camps rather than evidence that the metaphor of “camps” fails to describe with any 
accuracy the situation of contemporary American poetry.  These issues may no longer 
dominate the pages of Critical Inquiry and Social Text, but they still insinuate themselves in 
anthologies and thus in college syllabi and the process of canon formation.  That is to say 
that even if many scholars and poets have moved on to other concerns, many others have 
not.2  Neither have the anthologists whose products still represent a powerful means of 
canon formation and transmission.  The 2009 anthology American Hybrid: A Norton 
Anthology of New Poetry, edited by Cole Swenson and David St. John, focuses on “the new 
poem—the hybrid—a synthesis of traditional and experimental styles” (Amazon.com 
tagline).  In 2013, W. W. Norton published the second edition of Paul Hoover’s Postmodern 
American Poetry, an anthology that “hopes to assert that avant-garde poetry endures in its 
                                                
2 In December 2012, for instance, Boston Review published a forum, “Opposing Terms: A Symposium 
on the Poetic Limits of Binary Thinking,” occasioned by Marjorie Perloff’s essay “Poetry on the 
Brink: Reinventing the Lyric,” published in the magazine in May of that year.  In her essay, Perloff 
reasserts her sense of the uniformity of contemporary poetic practice in the United States, 
describing a “poetry establishment” in which: 
 
Whatever the poet’s ostensible subject—and here identity politics has produced a 
degree of variation, so that we have Latina poetry, Asian American poetry, queer 
poetry, the poetry of the disabled, and so on—the poems you will read in American 
Poetry Review or similar publications will, with rare exceptions, exhibit the following 
characteristics: 1) irregular lines of free verse, with little or no emphasis on the 
construction of the line itself or on what the Russian Formalists called “the word as 
such”; 2) prose syntax with lots of prepositional and parenthetical phrases, laced with 
graphic imagery or even extravagant metaphor (the sign of “poeticity”); 3) the 
expression of a profound thought or small epiphany, usually based on a particular 
memory, designating the lyric speaker as a particularly sensitive person who really 
feels the pain, whether of our imperialist wars in the Middle East or of late capitalism 
or of some personal tragedy such as the death of a loved one. (“Poetry on the Brink”) 
 
Boston Review poetry editors Timothy Donnelly and B. K. Fisher asked eighteen respondents for 
their opinions regarding binary thinking in contemporary poetry.  I might count my own 
dissertation as, in part, a nineteenth response. 
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resistance to dominant and received modes of poetry; it is the avant-garde that renews 
poetry as a whole through new, but initially shocking, artistic strategies” (Hoover xxxii).  
The impetus for each anthology proceeds from the premise that American poetry is 
separated into separate camps of traditionalists and experimentalists.  Moreover, as 
Izenberg demonstrates, the persistence of the premise of opposing camps extends itself 
from the classification and interpretation of poetry into the poetic practice itself: “What 
began as a description of the art has been adopted by the artist as an obligation; the poet’s 
felt need to find a productive community and a usable past has turned into the demand to 
pick a side; and style has become less a way of solving artistic problems than a declaration of 
allegiance” (8).   
Nevertheless, dissatisfaction with the persistence of the oppositional model has 
begun to coalesce.  In a recent essay on Louise Glück, Reena Sastri notes the enduring 
presence of the false binary model of contemporary poetics.  “In the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries,” she argues,  
it can be difficult to recognize the complexity of a poem [. . .] whose 
metalinguistic and metafictional reflexivity remerges through spare, 
deceptively plain language and whose philosophical curiosity resides in the 
company of psychological insight and emotional immediacy. [. . .] Poetic 
practices that disrupt, interrupt, or refuse the fiction of voice can seem the 
only alternatives to indulging a naïve belief in the author’s speaking presence 
in the poem.  Such a stark choice obscured the varied possibilities for 
contemporary poetic practice and makes rich and flexible theorizations of 
lyric the exception. (188) 
Similarly, in a review of Hoover’s anthology, Michael Robbins draws on Izenberg’s argument 
(and on John Guillory’s Cultural Capital and Alan Golding’s From Outlaw to Classic) to 
illustrate just how anthologies such as Hoover’s, Eliot Weinberger’s American Poetry since 
1950: Innovators & Outsiders, and Douglas Messerli’s From the Other Side of the Century: A New 
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American Poetry 1960—1990 create a binary system of poetry stars even as their editors claim 
only to be observing and collecting them:  
The editors imagine that what they are doing is collating the productions of 
alternative traditions that already exist within the poetic field, that subvert 
and threaten the field’s dominant modes of writing and thinking.  Each of the 
above projects is explicitly predicated upon the notion that there is a 
“mainstream,” an establishment, usually figured as “academic,” against which 
the anthologized poets are bravely swimming. [. . .] 
 In fact, it is closer to the truth to say that this anthology, and others 
like it, have created the “other traditions” of “postmodern American poetry,” 
“avant-garde poetry,” “outsider poetry,” “new American poetry,” and the like.  
If the avant-garde historically represents a struggle against the institutional 
forms of cultural domination [. . .], what must we conclude about an “avant-
garde” that is completely absorbed by and into those very institutions?  Both 
Guillory and Golding argue persuasively that canons are made in and by the 
university—their mode of transmission is the syllabus.  And these days you’re 
as likely to see Rae Armantrout as Mary Oliver on a course syllabus in 
contemporary poetry (or in the pages of the New Yorker).  (388) 
I quote Robbins at length to illustrate and also to expand upon his claim that the editors of 
these anthologies create the mainstream the same mainstream their anthologies implicitly 
critique.  More generally, to critique “official verse culture” is to create “official verse 
culture.”  Even if that phrase no longer offers any descriptive work, it survives as a cultural 
marker.  (“You will note the absence of a Norton Anthology of Mainstream Poetry,” Robbins 
continues [389]).  Indeed you may be “as likely to see Rae Armantrout as Mary Oliver on a 
course syllabus for contemporary poetry,” but you are far less likely to find them both in the 
same anthology.  Those anthologies that do attempt such aesthetic inclusiveness are 
marketed as such: we would have no need for an American Hybrid if we did not already take 
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for granted two separate genealogies that we suppose to be inevitable and potentially 
irreconcilable.3  It should—but too often does not—go without saying that the sort of 
“hybrid” poem St. John and Swenson describe is neither new nor distinctively American.  
One would be hard pressed to find a poem in the English language—just to limit the 
search—that does not “hybridize” tradition and experimentation, naturalism and artifice, 
the pure sounds of language and their referential valences.  One certainly finds such work 
among the poets of “official verse culture,” the Language critique of it notwithstanding.  
In what follows, I shall examine the work of Adrienne Rich, Mark Strand, Derek 
Walcott, and Charles Wright as case studies, four poets who have established significant 
presences in the “official verse culture” of Anglophone poetry over the last sixty years, and 
whose work deserves further recognition for its contributions to the theoretical 
problematizating of the idea of the self.4  When we argue about the self in poetry, we are 
also arguing about what we believe poetry ought to do—how we read it, how we write it, 
                                                
3 I want to emphasize that editors and commentators can participate in and perpetuate such binary 
thinking even as they critique it.  To her credit, Cole Swenson remarks in her introduction to 
American Hybrid: 
 
The notion of a fundamental division in American poetry has become so ingrained 
that we take it for granted. [. . .]  This anthology springs from the conviction that the 
model of binary opposition is no longer the most accurate one and that, while 
extremes remain, and everywhere we find complex aesthetic and ideological 
differences, the contemporary moment is dominated by rich writings that cannot be 
categorized and that hybridize core attributes of previous “camps” in diverse and 
unprecedented ways. (xvii) 
 
I wholeheartedly agree with Swenson’s claim that we take for granted a model of binary opposition 
that does not accurately reflect the life/lives of poetry in the United States.   I do not believe, 
however, that the work of poetic “hybridity” as represented in American Hybrid is unprecedented.  
On the contrary, the hybridization of influences, forms, techniques, and ideologies in American 
poetry is as old as American poetry. 
 
4 Although I hope to illuminate some of the inaccuracies in Bernstein’s and others’ portrayal of this 
“official verse culture,” I adopt the term here and throughout not only to dispense with the 
quotation marks but also because it provides a useful figure for the way Language writers viewed 
poetic culture at large, and in many cases for how the citizens of official verse culture viewed 
themselves. 
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and what social purpose(s) poetry might or should serve.  The poets I study in my four 
chapters share these concerns and enact them in their poems.  I do not seek to use their 
work to refute the Language critique of self, but to complicate it and illuminate its varieties 
beyond the front lines of the poetic avant-garde.  Whether terms such as “mainstream” and 
“avant-garde” remain relevant in contemporary poetry, the practices of reading and writing 
suggested by such terms are richer for the enduring presence of Language writing as well as 
the poets of official verse culture whose work explores similarly “avant-garde” concerns.  
The work of the four poets under discussion here represent an “alternate route,” as Jerome 
McGann once described Language poetry, to an enlarged and enriched conception of the 
idea of the self in poetry.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 I refer to McGann’s seminal essay on Language poetry, “Contemporary Poetry, Alternate Routes” 
(1987). 
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INCOMPATIBLE MUSICS 
 
 To a reader unfamiliar with the debates in Anglophone poetics of the last forty years, 
the term “Language poetry” may simply seem redundant.  No one, we imagine, would 
quarrel with the idea that poetry is made of language.  One of the recurring issues in 
Language poets’ writing, however, is that the language of which poetry is made (and, for that 
matter, of which speech, writing, and thought itself are made) had become taken for granted 
in the poetics of the American mainstream.  They perceived the dominant poetics of the 
1970s and 1980s as one in which the ideal of poetic language was transparent, speech-based, 
“naturalistic”—a vehicle for the speaker of the poem to express the tension of a particular 
situation in his or her “own voice.”  The transparent language of these “workshop poems” 
took for granted the materiality of language, using language instead to portray or express the 
experience of the self, another concept too easily taken for granted.   
For the Language poets, these habits and assumptions represented an abandonment 
of Modernist values and, moreover, a capitulation to the forces of American commercial 
capitalism.6  Bernstein, for instance, associates such “‘common voice’ poetry” with 
“bestsellers,” “TV,” and other products of “the ideological strategy of mass entertainment [. 
                                                
6 In “Aesthetic Tendency and the Politics of Poetry: A Manifesto,” Ron Silliman et al. write: 
 
On analogy to the visual arts, where the ‘avant-garde’ is felt to be a virtual 
commonplace, the situation of poetry is as if the entire history of radical 
modernism—Joyce, Pound, and Williams notwithstanding—had been replaced by a 
league of suburban landscape painters.  The elevation of the lyric of fetishized 
personal “experience” into a canon of taste has been ubiquitous and unquestioned—
leaving those writing in other forms and to other ends operating in a no-man’s land 
in terms of wider critical acknowledgment and public support. (262) 
 
The authors of the manifesto equate the aesthetic “suburban landscape painters” of official verse 
culture to a sexual predilection here, and elsewhere to sociopolitical oppression: “These reactions of 
the new right (referring to “red-baiting” essays in Commentary and The New Criterion) attest to a 
hysteria that is now part of the dominant literary code; in a larger sense, a delimitation of the 
aesthetically possible that has political implications—in the exclusion of difference from normative 
forms of communication and action” (263). 
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. .]” (“Artifice” 55).  The parade of scare quotes is required here because the Language poets 
challenged these very notions as the normative language of American poetry; language, they 
believed, must not be reduced to a medium of mere referentiality.  Marjorie Perloff writes: 
“Here, in a nutshell, is the still largely misunderstood animus of the movement: poetic 
language is not a window, to be seen through, a transparent glass pointing to something 
outside of it, but a system of signs with its own semiological ‘interconnectedness’” (“After 
Language Poetry”).  In stressing the materiality and ultimate strangeness of language, as 
Perloff observes, the Language poets owe much to the Russian Formalists and to the French 
poststructuralists.  Because I am primarily concerned with the Language poets’ conception 
of self, and particularly with their critique of the self as manifested in “official verse culture” 
or what Ron Silliman calls “normative writing,” I will emphasize their debt to 
poststructuralist thought, and in particular to the strain of anti-authorialism in the work of 
Barthes, Derrida, and Foucault (“Language, Realism, Poetry” xvi).  The efforts of Language 
poets to trouble the normative assumption of a single subjective speaker of a poem derive 
from and reflect poststructuralist efforts to destabilize the figure of the author itself.  For 
the Language poets, the issue at hand is not just that the language of a poem is not a window 
through which the speaker views the world, but that the entire notion of the linguistically 
mediated “persona” who speaks the poem is a similarly unchallenged assumption accepted 
as a poetic truism since the Romantic period. 
 Since much of what follows concerns the Language critique of a lyric “I” that is 
supposed to correspond to and express the feelings of a coherent, if imagined, speaker, I 
should first offer the caveat that there is no single such critique, nor even consistent 
agreement as to what the self is, just as there is no single entity or practice named by the 
term “Language poetry.”  In what follows, I speak of the self most basically as the object of 
one’s own consciousness, whether given or constructed—an essence often considered to be 
unique to each human.  This, I recognize, is an oversimplification of a concept of 
remarkable complexity, but such an oversimplification is necessary in order to treat with 
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any clarity the sense of self we encounter in poetry.  That self may seem to be far more than 
the object of one’s consciousness, as in Whitman’s understanding, or as in Dickinson’s, far 
less.  J. Wentzel van Huyssteen and Erik P. Wiebe address this issue lucidly and succinctly: 
“Simultaneously, it seems, the self is both ‘me’ and ‘I’; it is both the object of experience and 
the experiencing subject; it is both the source and product of identity; it is immanent and 
physiological yet transcendent and immaterial; it is unique, singular, and individual, but also 
universal, plural, and relational” (Introduction 10).   
In poetry, the concept of self is closely related, but not necessarily identical, to 
“speaker” or “persona,” in the sense that we tend to perceive the language of a text as 
originating in the consciousness of a single unified person or entity.  While this notion 
differs, too, from the concept of “author,” “self” and “author” are inextricably tied in the 
work of the poststructuralist thinkers and Language poets whom I consider here, 
particularly as they both emerge from the “prestige of the individual,” in Barthes’s phrase or, 
in George Hartley’s, “the key ideological concept of bourgeois society: the self-sufficient, 
self-determined individual free to participate in the marketplace” (37, qtd. in Lazer 66).  In 
their manifesto, “Aesthetic Tendency and the Politics of Poetry” (1988), Ron Silliman et al. 
address the Language writers’ attempt to divert the apparent confluence of “self,” “speaker,” 
and “author”:  
the self as the central and final term of creative practice is being challenged 
and exploded in our writing in a number of ways. What we mean by the self 
encompasses many things, but among these is a narrative persona, the fictive 
person (even in autobiography) who speaks in his or her poem about 
experience raised to a suitably aestheticized surface.  (263) 
That this understanding of self is taken for granted in “official verse culture,” and that, 
moreover, this understanding of self is fundamental to the terms of such a culture, 
represents one of the bases of the Language critique of normative writing.   
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Rooted in this critique, the term “Language poetry” and its related practices emerge 
as an avant-garde from the broader poetic culture of the 1970s and early 1980s, a culture 
which they oppose on aesthetic and ideological grounds.  About this culture Charles 
Bernstein writes: “There is of course no state of American poetry, but states, moods, 
agitations, dissipations, renunciations, depressions, acquiescences, elations, angers, 
ecstasies; no music to our verse but vastly incompatible musics [. . .]” (“State of the Art” 1).7  
Similarly, one of the stated “projects” of Bob Perelman’s The Marginalization of Poetry “is to 
unravel recent received ideas of language writing as a uniform practice” (11).  One of my own 
projects here is to unravel parallel ideas of “official verse culture” or “normative writing” as a 
uniform institution or practice.  Nevertheless, I recognize that generalizations of such  
“musics” are necessary, however troublesome, if one is to present a workable picture of the 
practices and philosophies that make them incompatible (if indeed they are).  Just as my 
attempt to distill a unified Language critique of the self must represent one such 
generalization, the opposition to a monolithic “official verse culture” represents another, as 
if that title suggested a single official culture rather than several.  It is difficult, as Perelman 
admits, to offer a positive definition of the “socially and aesthetically complex and in places 
strained or contradicting” practices of Language poetry.8  He suggests, rather, that “the 
                                                
7 I find this comment of Bernstein’s far more productive for thinking about the entire scope of 
contemporary American poetry—if such a consideration is even possible—than his division of the 
poetic realm into “official verse culture” and experimental writing.  Since the term “official verse 
culture” has become something of a commonplace in Language writing about “normative writing,” I 
quote from his “The State of the Art” in part to emphasize that Bernstein more often than not does 
justice to the complicated picture of the “state(s)” of American poetry. 
 
8 Alternatively, I would offer the following quotations, all of which seem to me succinct and 
accurate synopses of the work of Language writing: 
 
  Here, in a nutshell, is the animating principle of much of the poetry to come: poetic  
  language is not a window, a transparent glass to be seen through in pursuit of the  
  ‘real’ objects outside it but a system of signs with its own semiological relationships.  
  [. . .]  {Ed] McCaffery himself points to the Russian Formalists, to Wittgenstein,  
  Barthes, Lacan, and Derrida as sources of his theory, and indeed language poetics, in  
  this first stage, owes a great debt to French poststructuralism. 
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movement has been more united by its opposition to the prevailing institutions of American 
poetry” (12).  Even as Language poetry itself has become more integrated into “official verse 
culture” (as Perelman notes in his book), the institutions against which the Language poets 
defined themselves and the aesthetic practices of those institutions remain difficult, if not 
impossible, to separate.  This entanglement represents one of the objects of the Language 
critique.9   
Those institutions, assumptions, and practices do not receive the name “official verse 
culture” until Charles Bernstein’s 1983 lecture “The Academy in Peril: William Carlos 
Williams Meets the MLA,” in which Bernstein defends Williams as a poet too radical to be 
accepted by such a culture: 
                                                                                                                                                       
(Perloff, “Avant-Garde Community and the Individual Talent” 8) 
  
  [. . .] the self as the central and final term of creative practice is being challenged  
  and exploded in our writing in a number of ways.  What we mean by the self   
  encompasses many things, but among these is a narrative persona, the fictive person  
  (even in autobiography) who speaks in his or her poem about experience raised to a  
  suitably aestheticized surface.  (Silliman, et al. 263) 
 
One of the cardinal principles—perhaps the cardinal principle—of American 
Language poetics (as of the related current in England, usually labeled ‘linguistically 
innovative poetries’) has been the dismissal of ‘voice’ as the foundational principle of 
lyric poetry. (Perloff, “Language Poetry and the Lyric Subject” 405) 
 
[. . .] a loose set of goals, procedures, habits, and verbal textures: breaking the 
automatism of the poetic ‘I’ and its naturalized voice; foregrounding textuality and 
formal devices; using or alluding to Marxist or poststructuralist theory in order to 
open the present to critique and change [. . .] Thus—to be schematic about it—
language writing occupies a middle territory bounded on one side by poetry as it is 
currently institute and on the other by theory.  Language writing contests the 
expressive model emanating from workshops and creative-writing departments; but 
its potential rapprochement with post-structuralist theory and cultural studies has 
been slowed due to the specific histories of poetry it presupposed. 
(Perelman 12-13, 15) 
 
9 See also Andrew Epstein’s “Verse Vs. Verse” for a more detailed narrative on the conflicts arising 
from the assimilation of the Language avant-garde into the institutions of “official verse culture,” 
particularly concerning the Marxist origins of the Language poets’ critiques and practices. 
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  Let me be more specific as to what I mean by ‘official verse culture’—I am  
  referring to the poetry publishing and reviewing practices of The New York  
  Times, The Nation, American Poetry Review, The New York Review of Books, The  
  New Yorker, Poetry (Chicago), Antaeus, Parnassus, Atheneum Press and all the  
  major trade publishers, the poetry series of almost all of the major university  
  presses (the University of California Press being a significant exception at  
  present).  Add to this the ideologically motivated selection of the vast   
  majority of poets teaching in university writing and literature programs and of 
  poets taught in such programs as well as the interlocking accreditation of  
  these selections through prizes and awards judged by these same individuals.   
  Finally, there are the self-appointed keepers of the gate who actively put  
  forward biased, narrowly focussed [sic] and frequently shrill and contentious  
  accounts of American poetry, while claiming, like all disinformation   
  propaganda, to be giving historical or nonpartisan views.  [. . .]  What makes  
  official verse culture official is that it denies the ideological nature of its  
  practice while maintaining hegemony in terms of major media exposure and  
  academic legitimation and funding.     (248, 249) 
For the Language writers, mainstream poets’ claims to objective authority—perhaps, rather, 
their failure to make such claims as the result of their presumption to objective authority—
were among the most alarming and damning tendencies of “normative writing.”  The claim 
to exclusive legitimacy was so fundamental to official verse culture as to be overwhelmingly 
ignored by the officials making (often implicitly) such claims. 
 Language poets sought to undermine official verse culture’s assumption of its own 
meritocratic objectivity in order to expose the instability of that culture’s foundations and 
of the notion of objectivity itself.  Consider, for example, Hank Lazer’s quotation of and 
response to J. D. McClatchy’s White Paper: On Contemporary Poetry, a book of essays that 
Lazer takes as exemplary of the assumptions of “official verse culture”: “McClatchy (1989) 
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claims, ‘I bear no ideological grudges.  In fact, my brief is against those who would make 
American poetry over into images of any narrow critical orthodoxy.  Ours is a heritage of 
heresies’ (viii).  And the ideology of no ideology is one such heresy” (57, my emphasis).  Language 
poets have also identified this “ideology of no ideology” in the perceived resistance of 
mainstream poetry to literary theory, which Perelman identifies as one of the wedges 
between “official verse culture” and Language writing:  
  Many features of this literary battle were reproduced on a wider scale by the  
  introduction of poststructuralist thought into the American academy.  While  
  both were housed in universities, creative writing  departments and English  
  departments generally had nothing to do with one another; the advent of  
  theory made the separation wider.  Language writing was easy enough to  
  subsume under the category of theory of postmodernism as part of a large  
  tendency attacking self, reference, and history.  [. . .] The mainstream poet  
  guarded a highly distinct individuality; while craft and literary knowledge  
  contributed to poetry, sensibility and intuition reigned supreme.  The   
  mainstream poet was not an intellectual and especially not a theoretician. 
            (13, 12) 
I find much of Perelman’s argument here convincing, although the stance that the 
mainstream poet was not an intellectual seems to me difficult to defend unless one 
deliberately conflates “intellectual” with “theoretician.”  But the latter noun is more relevant 
here: in the early Seventies, the reigning theory of reading and interpreting poetry remained 
the New Critical model of T. S. Eliot, John Crowe Ransom, and Yvor Winters, among 
others, propagated by their students and students’ students in the ascendant workshops and 
creative writing programs that Bernstein and others identify as the incubators of “official 
verse culture.”  Perelman’s hypothetical mainstream poet was not a theoretician but a New 
Critic, if only by default, and New Criticism was so entrenched in the academic 
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interpretation of poems as to be no longer a theory but an unquestioned, even invisible 
dogma.   
 I will return to the poetic habits these workshops also incubated, the models for 
which were New Critical “close readings” of poems, as these habits and practices represent 
vulnerable and even necessary targets of the Language critique.  In the meantime, since 
Language writing has been so closely associated with French poststructuralism (an 
association I continue here) and so opposed to a verse culture rooted in New Criticism, I 
want to turn to the intersection of New Critical orthodoxy and the advent of 
poststructuralist theory in the seminar and workshop.10  Of particular interest here is the 
status of the figure of the author—and by extension, of the self—in both methodologies.  If 
we apply a loose definition of “critical theory,” by which we mean the rigorous interrogation 
of one’s own assumptions of belief and practice, then mainstream poetry was certainly not 
particularly “theorized.”  More accurately, the theorization represented by the midcentury 
advent of the New Criticism had become received, unquestioned practice to the extent that 
a fresh challenge to that theory seemed anathema not only to the method but to the entire 
spirit of reading poetry.  
 Because the reading practices of both the New Critics and the French 
poststructuralists attempt to marginalize the figure of the author from consideration of a 
text, it may be useful here to sketch some of the affinities and differences, both 
philosophical and methodological, in their approaches.  I refer specifically to the principle 
                                                
10 To my mind, the most succinct statement of this association is Marjorie Perloff’s in “Language 
Poetry and the Lyric Subject”: 
 
[. . .] the critique of voice, self-presence, and authenticity, put forward in [Charles 
Bernstein’s] Content’s Dream, as well as in such related texts as Ron Silliman’s own The 
New Sentence (1987) or Steve McCaffery’s North of Intention (1986), must be 
understood as part of the larger poststructuralist critique of authorship and the 
humanist subject, a critique that became prominent in the late sixties and reached its 
height in the U.S. a decade or so later when the Language movement was coming 
into its own. (406-7) 
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of New Critical “close reading” that excludes the historical, biographical author from a 
reading of a text, as opposed to the more radical, poststructuralist announcement of the 
“death of the author,” the influence of which persists still.  As recently as 2001, Michael 
North has called Barthes’s “obituary” for the author “the single most influential 
contemporary statement on authorship,” an essay that “transformed the New Critical 
distaste for the biographical into an ontological conviction about the status of language [. . 
.]” (1377).  Barthes’s obituary nonetheless demonstrates certain similarities, worth noting 
here, to W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley’s caution against “the intentional fallacy” in 
their seminal New Critical essay of that name.  “The poem is not the critic’s own and not 
the author’s,” they argue, “(it is detached from the author at birth and goes about the world 
beyond his power to intend about it or control it.)  The poem belongs to the public.  It is 
embodied in language, the peculiar possession of the public, and it is about the human 
being, an object of public knowledge” (1234).  This sounds rather Barthean in its emphasis 
on the public quality of language, the privileged position of the audience, and the 
obsolescence of the author following the creation of a text.  Gerald Graff has written, 
similarly, that 
the New Critics anticipated structuralism in their insistence that, as Eliot put 
it, ‘the poet has, not a “personality” to express, but a medium,’ and in their 
tendency to see the operations of this medium as eternal and ahistorical.  If 
we follow this line of reasoning far enough, we arrive at the view that it is 
language that writes the poem, not the poet.  
(“What Was New Criticism?” 139)  
Graff’s argument for the affinities between New Criticism and structuralism (and, 
eventually, poststructuralism) is useful in its demonstration that these theories of poetry and 
authorship were not as distinct as the supporters or detractors of any one theory would have 
one believe, especially in so far as they conceive of the role of “personality” in poetry.  On 
the other hand, Graff fails to characterize the importance of the break from New Criticism 
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represented in the view that language, not the poet, “writes” the poem.11  The difference I 
would emphasize here is less methodological than ideological: although Wimsatt and 
Beardsley claim that “critical inquiries are not settled by consulting the oracle,” they 
nonetheless refer to the author, however potentially ironically, as “the oracle” (1246).  In 
marginalizing the historical author from discussion of the text itself, the New Critics also 
managed to set the figure of the author above the proverbial fray of interpretive debate, 
reserving to him a certain honored status even while seeming to discredit the relevance of 
authorial “intent.”  Excused from history and even his own biography, the author becomes 
not a person but a myth.  This is the myth that Barthes and others would dispel; “we know,” 
he says, “that to give writing its future, it is necessary to overthrow the myth: the birth of 
the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author” (“Death” 148).   
 The New Critics’ bracketing of the biographical facts of the author’s life in a 
discussion (or, later, a workshop) of the poetic text may have successfully marginalized the 
historical author in a discussion of any individual poem, but the figure of the author was still 
regarded as the subjective source—the genius—of the text.  North and others identify the 
cult of the original genius with the “Romantic authors, most notably Wordsworth,” despite 
the poet’s cognizance of “poetic ventriloquism” as he expresses in the preface to Lyrical 
Ballads (North 1381, Stillinger 5-6).12  Denis Brown identifies this Wordsworthian model of 
                                                
11 Although I criticize Graff’s argument here, I am sympathetic to his attempt to break down some 
of the illusory distinctions between literary camps and periods.  To my mind, his argument in “The 
Myth of the Postmodern Breakthrough,” another essay collected in Literature Against Itself, is more 
convincing, and of particular relevance to a consideration of postwar avant-garde claims for novelty 
in literature and the arts. 
 
12 Wordsworth is a popular choice as the “source” of the modern self, at least as we read the self in 
and into poetry.  Robert Langbaum’s argument in The Mysteries of Identity is emblematic:  
 
Wordsworth establishes, on naturalistic, psychological grounds, a self as 
transcendent as the old Christian self created and sustained by God.  He establishes 
a new certainty about self and the self’s perceptions, after the dissolution of the old 
Christian certainty had been articulated by Locke and the other empiricists. [. . .]  
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the unified self as an opposition to “the skepticism of Locke and Hume,” arguing that 
Wordsworth’s “model of the organically unified, developmental self provides merely a fuller 
and more humanized version of the integral self of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.  It is this unified transcendent ‘soul’ which Modernist poetic texts like The Waste 
Land and the Pisan Cantos radically dismantle” (4).  Moreover, this unified soul in the figure 
of the author represents the “prestige of the individual” to which Barthes and other 
poststructuralists object.  “The author is a modern figure,” Barthes writes, “a product of our 
society insofar as, emerging from the Middle Ages with English empiricism, French 
rationalism and the personal faith of the reformation, it discovered the prestige of the 
individual, of, as it is more nobly put, the ‘human person’” (“Death” 142-3).  Writing two 
years later, Foucault identifies the “coming into being of the notion of ‘author’” as “the 
privileged moment of individualization in the history of ideas, knowledge, literature, 
philosophy, and the sciences” (101).   
 The poststructuralists’ emphasis on the concept of the author as an historical 
phenomenon rather than a transcendent concept allows them to argue against its usefulness 
entirely.  In their avoidance of biographical criticism concerning the historical author of a 
text, the New Critics honor the eminence of the author as a figure.  In their elegiac 
revisions of the idea of textual authority, the poststructuralists transfer authorial eminence 
to the phenomenon of language, which, to return to Lyn Hejinian, is “far larger than the 
self, and prior to it.”  The question of priority seems of particular importance here.  The 
thinking self emerges from language and thinks (homo sapiens) language; the Cartesian cogito 
holds only as the thinker articulates its existence in the moment of the linguistic act.  Seán 
Burke argues: 
  Barthes, Foucault, and Derrida were not content with simply sidelining the  
  authorial subject as in earlier formalisms.  A phenomenological training had  
                                                                                                                                                       
Wordsworth establishes the model of the modern self-creating, self-regarding 
identity, which draws its vital force from organic connection with nature. (46, 47) 
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  taught them that the subject was too powerful, too sophisticated a concept to 
  be simply bracketed; rather subjectivity was something to be annihilated. [. . .]  
  An era of theory is underway in which language is ‘the destroyer of all   
  subject’—the author of literary studies, the transcendental subject of   
  philosophies of consciousness, the subject of political theory, psychoanalysis,  
  anthropology.  [. . .]  Man can no longer be conceived of as the subject of his  
  works, for to be the subject of a text, or of knowledge, is to assume a post  
  ideally exterior to language.  (14) 
In such an “era of theory,” the role of language is not merely the medium of human 
knowledge and communication, but the basis and the limit of human knowledge and human 
existence.  Ludwig Wittgenstein—another thinker the Language poets claim as an 
intellectual ancestor—famously observes that “the limits of the language [. . .] mean the 
limits of my world” (5.62, p. 63).  If the human subject is indeed subject to—“thrown 
under”—language itself, then the human subject cannot be the ultimate source of the most 
“expressivist” genre in literature, the lyric poem.  Such a notion allows the Language poets 
to argue against the aesthetic excesses of a “transparent lyric” that privileges the perceived 
individual voice of a thinking, speaking self.  In doing so they also challenge the very 
foundations of the idea of the self in the poem.  Barthes’s opening question in “The Death 
of the Author”—“Who is speaking thus?”—must be asked anew (142). 
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NEW CRITICISMS 
 
 I will return to the issues and complications in theorizing the lyric and to their 
implications for the poetry seminar and the poetry workshop, between which, as Perelman 
suggests, a theoretical gulf had opened.  At the same time, I want to be careful not to draw a 
false analogy in which New Critical interpretive practice is to its poststructuralist 
counterpart as New Critical poetic practice—the ironic, impersonal “well-wrought urn” of 
Cleanth Brooks and others—is to Language poetry.  Here the history of poetic and 
critical/theoretical production are not quite parallel.  Rather, at approximately the same 
time the poststructuralist death of the author had begun to trouble the New Critical waters 
in the United States (Barthes’s essay first appears in Aspen in 1967), the more personal and 
expressive Confessional mode was coming to prominence in American poetry as the period 
style of the workshops, magazines, and prizes that Bernstein would later call official verse 
culture.  Susan Rosenbaum observes the emergence of Confessional poetry  
as part of a more general resurgence of neoromantic poetics and a turn to 
autobiographical practices after World War II.  Allen Ginsberg’s effort in 
Howl to ‘stand before you speechless and intelligent and shaking with shame, 
rejected yet confessing out the soul’ spelled an end to poetic impersonality 
(Eliot) and the New Critical bias against intention and affect. (296) 
This New Critical bias, as David Perkins writes, had come to seem “repressive and elitist, 
and the dense, intellectual idiom and closure of New Critical poetry seemed artificial.”  
Moreover, Perkins writes, the classroom was both nursery and tomb for the New Criticism.  
“Once it was being taught to students as dogma, it was doomed” (348).  The New Criticism 
may have been “doomed” as an interpretive dogma, but the close reading practice of 
bracketing the author endured in the poetry workshop, even as—and, as I shall argue, 
because—the poems produced in those workshops were blurring the lines between the 
supposedly irrelevant “author” and the all-important “speaker” of a poem.  
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 The poetry workshop presents a peculiar laboratory for both the New Critical claim 
for the obsolescence of the historical author and the poststructuralist argument for the 
death of the author.  The primary method of the creative writing workshop remains the 
close reading of poems as derived from New Critical practice, emphasizing poetic 
techniques from title to closure with a mind to evaluation in addition to interpretation.13  
Given the author’s physical presence at the moment of his or her poem’s critique by the 
instructor and other members of the workshop, a methodological separation between the 
author of the poem and the speaker of the poem was a useful stance as a matter of 
interpretation and evaluation and, less theoretically, as a matter of tact.  Indeed, the 
physical presence of the author in the poetry workshop may have contributed to the 
alienation between theorists for whom the death of the author constituted a valuable 
interpretive method and poets for whom the very idea seemed pedantic at best and absurd 
at worst.   
 That the conventions of the workshop—New Critical in spirit if not in letter— 
coalesced at the same time the “Confessional” poems of W. D. Snodgrass, John Berryman, 
Sylvia Plath, and others were gaining praise and winning prizes helped to install this 
“workshop poem” as a period style that has endured, in some branches of the mainstream, 
to this day.14  The persistence of workshop axioms like “find your voice” and “write what 
you know” testifies to the premium placed on an author’s individual “style” (McGurl 23).  In 
an era that valued the “first thought best thought” experience of poetic composition in 
                                                
13 The “standard form of the workshop,” as Mark McGurl describes it in The Program Era, “consists 
of students sitting around a table discussing each other’s stories, with the professor sitting in as a 
moderator and living example of an actual author” (4).  As McGurl admits, his study focuses 
exclusively on fiction, although in this case, “stories” and “poems” would be more or less 
interchangeable. 
 
14 That all three of my examples of Confessional poets were involved in workshops in the Fifties and 
Sixties as students or instructors is as much a testament to the emergence of the workshop as part of 
the process of accreditation for poets as it is to the emergence of the Confessional aesthetic within 
the workshop institutions. 
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addition to the product of that composition, the concept of style might have seemed to 
extend beyond the words on the page to the author’s experiences themselves.  In the 
context of such muddying of personal experience and authorial craft, the workshop 
separation between “author” and “speaker”—even when simultaneously reading the two as 
versions of each other—seems an almost Trinitarian article of faith, more often professed 
than explained.  No matter whose voice was perceived as the “voice” of the poem, the 
Confessional poem was also unmistakably lyric (at least per a New Critical understanding of 
the genre), in the sense of “a kind of poetry that expresses personal feeling [. . .] in a 
concentrated and harmoniously arranged form [. . .] and that is indirectly addressed to the 
private reader [. . .].” (Jackson, “Lyric,” 826).  What was sanctioned aesthetically became 
canonized logistically: the major institutions for accrediting poets, from the graduate 
workshop to the glossy magazines (and even among many of the “little” magazines), also 
privileged the lyric form because of the economic concerns of time and space.  In 
circumstances where a workshop may allow thirty minutes to read and critique a poem, or 
where a magazine can offer a page or less to print a poem, the lyric benefits from both the 
rule of convention and the law of scarcity. 
 This picture of the Confessional lyric as the default mode of the workshop and its 
debt to the New Critical model must be further complicated, however, by attending to what 
Virginia Jackson and Yopie Prins have called “lyricization”—the modern tendency to read 
all poems as generically lyric.  “In Western poetics,” Jackson writes, “almost all poetry is 
now characterized as lyric [. . .].  Over the last three centuries, lyric has shifted its meaning 
from adjective to noun, from a quality in poetry to a category that can seem to include 
nearly all verse” (“Lyric” 826).  I have argued above that the Confessional period style 
emerged from a reaction against the aesthetic values of the New Critics as well as the New 
Critical practice of close reading in the poetry workshop.  In her Dickinson’s Misery and 
elsewhere, Jackson claims that even as the New Criticism fell from favor in its conception 
of the poem as object and the poet as oracle, its reading practices helped to install the lyric 
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as a genre that stood for all poetry.  If the lyric came to stand for all poetry, then the 
Confessional poem came to stand, if not for all poetry, then for the normative mode of a 
verse culture in the process of becoming official.  Jackson writes: 
  [I]n the consolidation of 20th-c[entury] lit[erary] crit[icism] [. . .] the process  
  of lyricization was accomplished, and a broad idea of the lyric became   
  exemplary for the reading of all poetry.  That example emerged from and was  
  reflected in the predominance of the New Criticism, which took up a model  
  of the personal lyric close to Eliot’s as the object of close reading.  In   
  different ways, Am[erican] critics [associated with the New Criticism]   
  assumed Eliot’s definition of the personal lyric and used I. A. Richards’s focus 
  on individual poems in his “practical criticism” to forge a model of all poems  
  as essentially lyric.  That model was primarily pedagogical, but it became a  
  way of reading that, in turn, influenced the way poems were written, and it  
  remains the normative model of the production and reception of most  
  poetry.15        (“Lyric” 832-3) 
That the poem should seem to represent the experience of a single, subjective lyric speaker 
is a symptom of postromantic and neoromantic poetics in general, but it is more 
immediately a consequence of a multifaceted privileging of the short lyric coincident with 
an aesthetic of individual experience and feeling.  It is to this aesthetic—“poet after poet 
writing his or her ‘sincere,’ sensitive, intimate, speech-based lyric”—as well as to the 
ideology of its poetics, that the Language poets objected so vehemently and, to my mind, 
often quite effectively (Perloff, “Avant-Garde Community”).  When one considers these 
contributing factors, it is much easier to sympathize with the Language poets’ view that to 
                                                
15  For Jackson, this model of interpretation was so powerful as to extend well beyond poetry: 
“[Yvor] Winters’s lyricization of poetry [. . .] thus extended to a lyricization of literature tout court, 
with the result that the reading of lyric became for Winters, as for New Criticism generally, the test 
case, the zero-sum game, of literary interpretation, and literature became the test case of cultural 
interpretation” (Dickinson’s Misery 93). 
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undermine a particular aesthetic might mirror or even enable the undermining of everything 
from official verse culture to consumer capitalism itself.  
 It must be noted, though, that critiques of the normative mode arose from within 
official verse culture as well as from without.  Notable among these critics were Donald 
Hall, who argued against the homogenization of poetry resulting from academic 
institutionalization, and the New Formalists, who based their arguments for a “new 
narrative” on their sense of the monotony of the free verse personal lyric.  What Language 
writers called “transparent,” “naturalistic,” and “expressivist” Donald Hall called the 
“McPoem” (7).  Of the “official verse culture” institutions of poetry and their effects on the 
production of poems, Hall was even more succinct (10): “Iowa delenda est!”  What the 
Language poets perceived as a problem of aesthetics and philosophy Hall understood as a 
problem of mass production and professional (as opposed to aesthetic) ambition: 
  At sixteen the poet reads Whitman and Homer and wants to be immortal.   
  Alas, at twenty-four the same poet wants to be in The New Yorker.  [. . .] 
  We write and publish the McPoem—ten billion served—which becomes our  
  contribution to the history of literature as the Model T is our contribution to  
  a history which runs from bare feet past elephant and rickshaw to the vehicles 
  of space.  [. . .]   
   To produce the McPoem, institutions must enforce patterns,   
  institutions within institutions, all subject to the same glorious dominance of  
  unconscious economic determinism, template and formula of consumerism. 
            (4, 7-8) 
Mark Jarman and Robert McDowell, two poets associated with the New Formalism of the 
1980s and 1990s, offer a similar critique to different ends in their essays for The Reaper.16  In 
their manifesto, “Where The Reaper Stands,” they write: 
                                                
16 Although the most famous New Formalist critique of official verse culture remains Dana Gioia’s 
“Can Poetry Matter?” (1991), in which Gioia condemns the academic institutionalization of poetry, 
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  Most contemporary poets have forgotten [the Reaper].  Navel gazers and  
  mannerists, their time is running out.  Their poems, too long even when they  
  are short, full of embarrassing lines that “context” is supposed to justify,  
  confirm the suspicion that our poets just aren’t listening to their language  
  anymore.  Editors and critics aren’t listening much, either.  Despite their best, 
  red-faced efforts, their favorite gods—inaccuracy, bathos, sentimentality,  
  posturing, evasion—wither at the sound of The Reaper’s whetstone singing. 
            (1) 
Elsewhere, Jarman and McDowell are more specific about the shift they propose, one that 
includes a new emphasis on narrative rather than the ubiquitous free verse lyric of the 
workshop and little magazine, such poems “too long even when they are short.”  “American 
poetry has become anecdotal,” they write; “short narratives concerning interesting or 
amusing events are sprinkled through meditations.  These small stories are objects of the 
poet’s beguilement. [. . .]  But the poet who beguiles the reader with the story itself will 
answer that need in all of us—to learn about and understand our lives” (“The Elephant Man 
of Poetry” 46, 45).   
 A reader sympathetic to the Language critique might seize upon this last 
assumption—that the crafting of a narrative somehow offers genuine understanding rather 
than an artificial and illusory coherence—to suggest that what the New Formalists offered 
as an alternative to the institutional lyric was just another permutation of the same.  The 
same reader might also argue that Hall’s argument about poetic (as opposed to professional) 
ambition simply represents the replacement of one temporary canon with another that 
seems more permanent only because the assumptions that hold it in place are even more 
thoroughly internalized among poets and readers.  My point here is not to endorse any one 
of these critiques of the dominant mode of the time, nor do I wish to defend that mode in 
                                                                                                                                                       
Jarman and McDowell focus their critique more narrowly on the aesthetic excesses they find in the 
period style of the Seventies and Eighties, and on proposing a “new narrative” as an alternative. 
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its own right.  I want to emphasize, rather, that the Language critique of official verse 
culture was one, if more radical and more lasting, among several.  This critique persists not 
only because of its salience, but also because this salience allowed Language poets, allied 
with theoreticians in literature departments, to remake in their image the verse culture they 
had so successfully critiqued.17  The Language poets’ critique of self and their poems 
themselves have come to share the contemporary canon with the objects of their critique.  
This uneasy relationship is the subject of Andrew Epstein’s “Verse vs. Verse,” which 
explores the potential issues implicit in the absorption into official verse culture of so 
forceful a critique of that culture.  I am more interested here in demonstrating that one 
reason official verse culture could absorb (to an extent) Language poetry was that the 
Language poets’ critique of self was being enacted in some aspects of that culture, that 
Language poetry’s proximity to theory provided a vocabulary for the investigations of 
selfhood I shall examine in the work of Rich, Strand, Walcott, and Wright. 
 My claims for the variety in official verse culture should not threaten the power of 
the Language critique of self, even as I would challenge its uniqueness.  In fact, I believe 
that the Language poets’ welcoming of critical theory into their own poetics has allowed us 
to see more clearly these theoretical issues at play in the work of other poets.  Indeed, I 
want to stress that a poet need not imagine her- or himself to be writing “theoretical” work 
in order for that work to contribute to an ongoing theorization of the self or of poetry.  
Official verse culture was (and mostly remains) predicated on the “prestige of the 
individual,” an idea that continues to be ratified in the poems official verse culture produces, 
publishes, and canonizes.  This fact does not dismiss poststructuralist or Language claims 
for the decentering of the self; rather, it should demonstrate just how great was the 
Language poets’ challenge in their attempt to explode the self “as the central and final term 
of creative practice” (Silliman et al. 263).  For the Language poets, the self as presented and 
                                                
17 For a detailed account of this process, I recommend Bob Perelman’s The Marginalization of Poetry 
and especially Andrew Epstein’s “Verse Vs. Verse.” 
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privileged in official verse culture and throughout bourgeois society was at best an illusion 
and at worst a mechanism of oppression.  Nevertheless, as Burke has shown, the more one 
attempts to jettison terms like “self” and “author,” the more inevitably these figures haunt 
our discussions of literature.18  Just as Eliza Richards contends that “it is difficult to imagine 
how one would go about discussing poetry if we were forbidden to use the terms voice, 
speaker, and other vocal terms [. . .],” it remains difficult to contemplate or discuss ourselves 
in poetry without also speaking of our selves (1525).  If nothing else, the Language critique 
bares the mechanism of self-craft in our poetry.  In order to assess more accurately the 
specific import of that contribution, we must acknowledge when and how other poetic 
practices accomplish similar ends by different means.  We must also credit the work—and 
the problematizing—of self-fashioning in the official verse culture that once seemed a music 
incompatible with Language poetry. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
18 This apparent paradox has proved especially troublesome as Language poets and poets who bear 
their influence have begun to receive more and more prestigious recognition for their individual 
work, most notably the awarding of the Pulitzer Prize for Poetry to Rae Armantrout’s volume Versed 
(2009).  To her great credit, Perloff has addressed the troublesome persistence of the self and the 
“prestige of the individual.”  In “Language Poetry and the Lyric Subject,” she writes that 
 
contemporary poetics has not satisfactorily resolved the relation of what [Fredric] 
Jameson calls the “new depthlessness” to the “genius” position now occupied by 
those evidently deep (read complex, difficult) theorists, whose word is all but law. 
[. . . ] If genius theory is passé, if there is no such thing as unique style or authorial 
presence, why are these names [Adorno, Althusser, Freud, Lacan, Hegel, Nietzsche, 
Lyotard, Laclau, Marx] so sacred?  If Foucault has pronounced so definitively on the 
author, why are we always invoking the name of the author Foucault?  Again, if in the 
current climate we dare not claim canonical status for Beckett or Brecht, why does 
Walter Benjamin enjoy that status so readily?  (410) 
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WHO SPEAKS WHOM 
 
 Despite Charles Bernstein’s claim that “official verse culture is not mainstream, nor 
is it monolithic, nor uniformly bad or good,” Language writers and their advocates have 
tended too often to treat the poetry of “official verse culture” as mainstream, monolithic, 
and uniform all at once (“The Academy in Peril” 248).  This is certainly an understandable 
tendency: an avant-garde must align itself against a prevailing sensibility, not a multitude of 
them.19   Moreover, the tendency among Language writers to underestimate official verse 
culture was mirrored in that culture by a phobic skepticism that treated the Language 
project as a unified and pernicious threat to the mainstream ideal of poetry.  Language 
writers have themselves criticized this tendency in official verse culture more piquantly than 
I might here.  For my purposes I shall linger on the idea that, Bernstein’s caveat 
notwithstanding, Language writers and those sympathetic to them have neglected poetic 
innovations in official verse culture with which they might otherwise sympathize, even in 
some of the very poets named as exemplars of the Language critique.  Consider Marjorie 
Perloff commenting on Charles Wright:   
  What is different [between Silliman or Howe’s treatment of autobiographical  
  material and Charles Wright’s treatment of same] is not expressivity or  
  subjectivity as such but the authority ascribed to the speaking voice [. . . .]   
  There is no way Silliman or Howe could write such a poem [Wright’s “Disjecta 
  Membra”] because there is not a romantic Einfuhlung into the external—is  
  there an external?—world.  And, in this respect, we can differentiate quite  
                                                
19 Perloff is especially perceptive on this point in her observation that the arguments of some 
Language poets “testif[y] to the characteristic avant-garde need to transform one’s immediate 
adversary—in this case the ‘natural’ speech-based poetry dominant in the sixties—into a permanent 
condition and to make the case for one’s own oppositional circle as having some sort of avant-garde 
purity and priority” (“Avant-Garde Community and the Individual Talent”). 
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  readily between their ethos and that of such mainstream postromantic poets  
  as Charles Wright or Mark Strand or Louise Gluck [sic]. 
     (“Language Poetry and the Lyric Subject” 432, 433) 
Perloff’s bias toward Language poetry recommends her as one of the most important and 
eloquent prophets of the “movement;” however, she fails in this case to see the values she 
expounds in Language poetry—for instance, as we shall see, a poetry that “incorporates its 
own poetics”—at work elsewhere (“Avant-Garde Community and the Individual Poet”).  As 
for Perloff’s critique of Wright, I doubt there is a contemporary poet more skeptical than 
Wright is of the authority of the speaker or the self.  But Wright’s doubts do not easily fit 
into a Language schema; the episteme and poetics of his work owe as much to medieval 
apophatic theology as they do to poststructuralism.  I attend to Wright’s vocabulary of 
doubt in more detail in my second chapter.  For now I hope this example will illustrate a 
“theoretical” concern in official verse culture that the Language poets have too rarely 
credited.  This fact, too, should call to mind that the various factions of the poetic spectrum 
are divided along so many narcissisms of the small difference.  Moreover, their movements 
among and against each other occur more gradually than the sudden coups we may in 
hindsight imagine them to have been. 
 We may note such geographical metaphors in Bob Perelman’s mapping of Language 
writing as “a middle territory bounded on one side by poetry as it is currently instituted and 
on the other by theory” (15).  In a similar spirit, Perloff writes that one consistent “principle” 
among the many variations of Language writing  
is that poetry incorporates its own poetics, that it has a theoretical base.  
Perelman’s own “Marginalization of Poetry,” Bernstein’s “Artifice of 
Absorption,” Susan Howe’s My Emily Dickinson and Melville’s Marginalia, 
Rosmarie Waldrop’s Reluctant Gravities—all these are works that use poetic 
figuration and structure to present a particular poetics as well.  As such, theorypo 
or poetheory as we might call it, was positioned as the very antithesis to the 
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epiphanic lyric of the Writing Workshop.  
    (“Avant-Garde Community and the Individual Talent”) 
 
Although Perelman and Perloff are certainly both correct in their claims for the importance 
of critical theory to Language poetry, their adjectives here are too limiting.  Language poets 
may credit the notion of a theoretical base underlying their own poetics more readily than 
would the authors of the “epiphanic lyric of the Writing Workshop,” but this no more 
qualifies the Language poem as unique than it disqualifies a theoretical basis for the 
workshop poem.  Again, neither poet nor reader needs to identify as theorist in order to 
engage issues relevant to critical theory.20   
 When we read poetry of any style or movement with its theoretical implications in 
mind, no matter the poet’s apparent affinity or distaste for critical theory, we can see more 
clearly how the question of the self is posed across the poetic spectrum.  In the study that 
follows I focus on four poets of official verse culture because I believe that their 
contributions to these challenging theoretical issues have been underestimated or altogether 
ignored.  In their work we may observe the persistence of the idea of self, of speaker and 
author, despite their skeptical and provisional portrayals of the self.  In general among these 
poets, the self persists as Silliman describes it in “Who Speaks,” as “a relation between 
writer and reader that is triggered by what [Roman] Jakobson called contact, the power of 
presence.  There is no subject that is not, strictly speaking, intersubjective” (373).  Silliman 
elaborates: “Neither the spoken voice, nor the ‘I’ that speaks graphemically on a sheet of 
paper, nor the body of the reader in front of an audience can ever truly be the self of the 
poem.  What you or I or any other reader or listener might bring to the text [. . . ] 
participates in that construction” (372).  If we agree to Silliman’s account of the poetic self, 
then this is true of the construction of all poems.  Silliman might argue that Language 
                                                
20 A self-identifying theorist may agree more readily with this proposition in reverse: that a theorist 
who writes a performative or exuberant prose—Jacques Derrida, say—might rival many poets for 
wordplay, metaphor, and even emotive power. 
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poetry allows the self-as-relation as a basis for the construction of the poem, while official 
verse culture seems to ignore the matter altogether.  I argue that Rich, Strand, Walcott, and 
Wright employ the figure of the self with comparable skepticism but by different means.  It 
has become a commonplace of the commentary on Language poetry that the practices of 
Language writing allow the reader or audience to participate more actively in the 
construction of the poem.21  In this model of poetic creation, the mechanism of self-
fashioning is laid bare; the reader creates the poem and its author as he or she reads; the self 
in the poem is between them.  Far from being unique to Language poetry, though, we shall 
note a similar technique at work in Mark Strand’s The Monument (1978), in which the sense 
of the poetic self persists between an assumed author and a hypothetical translator, or in 
Adrienne Rich’s radical call for a more inclusive, Whitmanesque “we” to replace the “I” of 
patriarchal society. 
 The sense of self as crafted in the contact between one being and another forms an 
aspect of the model of selfhood Paul Ricoeur proposes in Oneself as Another (1990).  Ricoeur 
argues “that the selfhood of oneself implies otherness to such an intimate degree that one 
cannot be thought of without the other, that instead one passes into the other [. . .]” (3).  
Ricoeur’s sense of a relational self extends as well to the relations between the different 
versions of self in one biological person, relations that constitute what he calls “narrative 
identity” (“Narrative Identity” 73, Oneself as Another 113-68).  Ricoeur asks: 
 [D]o we not consider human lives to be more readable when they have been  
                                                
21 For instance, Marjorie Perloff: “the constructivist aesthetic of Language poetry insisted on the 
making process itself, in all its anti-closure, incompletion, ad indeterminacy [sic]” (“Avant-Garde 
Community and the Individual Talent”).  Charles Bernstein: “—In the end, a result of this conscious 
constructing is that of ‘making strange’, the ‘alienation effect’: To be able to see and feel the force 
and weight of formations of words, dynamics that otherwise go unnoticed; to feel it as stuff, to 
sound the language, and in doing so to reveal its meanings” (“Thought’s Measure” 74).  Hank Lazer: 
“[Lyn Hejinian’s Writing Is an Aid to Memory] provokes in the reader a self-consciousness about how 
we do go about constructing (or taking or granted) continuities in the poem.  And while the poem 
no longer offers us a single topic that it is ‘about,’ the poem does involve us in a dialectical tradition 
between possible continuities and radical discontinuities” (41). 
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interpreted in terms of the stories that people tell about them?  And are not 
these life stories in turn made more intelligible when the narrative models of 
plots—borrowed from history or from fiction (drama or novel)—are applied to 
them?  [. . . S]elf-understanding is an interpretation; interpretation of the self, in 
turn, finds in the narrative, among other signs and symbols, a privileged form of 
mediation; the latter borrows from history as well as from fiction, making a life 
story a fictional history or, if one prefers, a historical fiction, interweaving the 
historiographic style of biographies with the novelistic style of imaginary 
autobiographies. (Oneself as Another 114) 
It is not difficult to trace Ricoeur’s proposal for a self crafted in relational, narrative space 
back to the model of self-fashioning through self-doubt that Wordsworth offers in The 
Prelude, especially if we consider Ricoeur’s comment that “in many narratives the self seeks 
its identity on the scale of an entire life [. . .]” (115).  If we do, we find that even the 
constructed, constructive “self” of the poem as proposed by Silliman and others inevitably 
shares a great deal of ground with the “tidy” (though they are often anything but) narratives 
of poems, novels, fictions, and even of our own inner logic of experience.  To be fair, 
Silliman himself admits the insufficiency of his own position:  
while I personally agree with Bob Perelman that ‘the represented self . . . centered 
within a nest of moral, thematic, and metaphorical coherence,’ presenting a 
‘prefabricated, conventional unity,’ suppresses much of what I consider to be 
most important about living in the real world, I explicitly want to reject 
proposing that my own solution to this quandary of the writer might be 
generalizable and of prescriptive value to others.  Any solution to the problem of 
ventriloquism and the crisis of the self in the poem is not to be found in writing 
as I do.  What does seem evident is that evading the question altogether 
represents an even worse alternative. (“Who Speaks” 369) 
Far from evading the question, the ideas of self, voice, identity, authority, and subjectivity 
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are being engaged productively throughout our various verse cultures, among our supposedly 
incompatible musics, as we shall see in the work of the four poets under consideration in 
this study. 
 I would endorse a reframing of what Silliman calls the “crisis of the self in the poem.”  
What may seem an immediate crisis in need of a solution might be more productively 
figured as a question—in Barthes’s phrase, “Who is speaking thus?”—that modern poets and 
audiences have asked themselves in various terms at least since Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s 
objections to the ventriloquism he perceived in Wordsworth.  The shift in terms from 
speaker to language may foreground our sense of the force and priority of language, but it is 
less successful in killing the myth of the author, subject, or self in literature.  In Gerald 
Bruns’s account of the poststructuralist decentering of the author, he writes that “the words 
of language [. . .] have become, mysteriously, agents of their own activity” (354).  When I 
first quoted Bruns’s passage on Foucault, I emphasized its applicability to the aesthetic of 
the Language poets.  Returning to it now, I wish to stress Bruns’s adverb mysteriously, for the 
argumentative move to suggest language as the agent of its own activity remains as 
troublesome as it is provocative.  Seigel addresses this move in his consideration of 
“Derrida’s conclusions about selves and subjects,” which he calls “tautological deductions 
from his initial, and unsustainable, presumption that language can be conceived as active 
and operative in the absence of subjects who speak it [. . .]” (632).22  Susan Stewart offers a 
useful compromise between the oracle of the author and the cult of the text: 
  Language exists before our individual existence: language, a thing made of our  
own nature, is at the same time our vehicle of individuation.  When we express 
our existence in language, when we create objective linguistic forms that are 
                                                
22 Seigel’s commentary on Derrida is especially interesting for my purposes because of his claim that 
“the cultural and political power Derrida attributes to deconstruction, namely to be the vehicle of a 
permanent promise of liberating transformation, has its roots in a place he sought to empty of 
meaning, namely the Kantian transcendental subject, reconceived as a source of transcendence by 
Schopenhauer, and transmitted by Nietzsche and Heidegger” (632). 
 
  37 
intelligible to others and enduring in time, we literally bring light into the 
inarticulate world that is the night of preconsciousness and suffering. (3) 
I find Stewart’s final claim here to be a bit grandiose, but I would endorse and underscore 
the paradoxical notion—and its implications in the poems under discussion here—that 
language precedes us, is larger than us, and yet is a thing made of our own nature.  Apart 
from its users, language exists only in the abstract, despite claims for the “anonymous” 
language of the THANK YOU on cafeteria garbage bins (Silliman, “Who Speaks” 361), the 
STOP signs at our intersections. That we cannot locate the source of language in a particular 
instance —whether it be speaker or scriptor—does not necessarily imply the lack altogether 
of such a source. 
  Whatever the validity of its theoretical premises, the most important and lasting 
contribution of Language poetry, to my mind, has been the restoration of attention to the 
materiality of language in the poem, no matter whether the language of the poem is 
construed as a vehicle for the expression of a self.  The Language writers’ complication of 
the normative, discursive mode of the Sixties and Seventies has proven a boon for the 
poetries of the avant-garde and of official verse culture as well.  But I must temper my praise 
for the lasting influence of Language poetry as it has manifested (married to a post-New 
York School mannered insouciance) in the “Elliptical” poetry that emerged in the Nineties 
and ascended to the level of a period style in the Oughts.  Tony Hoagland summarizes this 
mode as “the mimesis of disorientation by non sequitur,” and supposes that “if the Plath 
generation was obsessed with psychological extremity, and the eighties generation with 
narratives of self, the generation of the oughts has been obsessed with exposing the 
fallibilities of perspective” (441, 444).23  What was, in the work of the best Language poets, a 
                                                
23 Hoagland elaborates on the aesthetic of the Elliptical poem, proposing the following five “features 
of a period style”: 
 
1. A heavy reliance on authoritative declaration. 
2. A love of the fragmentary, the interrupted, the choppy rhythm. 
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radical challenge to some of the most fundamental assumptions of normative poetry has 
become (as is often the fate of the avant-garde) in its less imaginative heirs a faddish 
impersonality wholly dependent upon the conventions and institutions the Language poets 
had originally sought to undermine.  I want to suggest that my study of the work of Rich, 
Strand, Walcott, and Wright also represents an opportunity to reconsider the reductive 
binary logic with which contemporary poetry has been judged.  Certainly no one would 
mistake their poetic practices for those of Language poets, but neither should we mistake 
their poetics for perpetuations of the same unexamined, authoritative “I” called into 
question in the Language critique.  Their use and reappropriation of conventions common 
in official verse culture articulate and enact complex theoretical questions should testify to 
the aesthetic and intellectual force of their poetry.   
 In my first chapter, “The Nothing That I Am: Mark Strand,” I argue that Strand’s 
poetry celebrates and denies the self at the same time, as if he were responding to Hamlet’s 
question “To be or not to be” with the answer “Both and neither.”  The self in Strand’s 
poems an empty vessel, personality reduced to commodity.  Much of the available criticism 
on Strand remarks upon the quality of self-denial or even self-annihilation in his work; I 
argue that the more Strand’s poems strive to “evacuate”—to undo those characteristics that 
constitute—the self as portrayed in poetry, the more they affirm the self in its apparent 
absence.  This chapter represents a necessary critical intervention, since much of the 
available scholarship on Strand’s work limits itself to his early poetry, published between 
1964 and 1980.  Moreover, far too little of this criticism has addressed The Monument (1978), 
a work I read as Strand’s magnum opus and the lens through which to view his early work as 
                                                                                                                                                       
3. An overall preference for the conceptual over the corporeal, the sensual, the emotional, the 
narrative, or the discursive. 
4. A talent for aphorism. 
5. Asides which articulate the poem’s own aesthetic procedures, premises, and ideas.  (448) 
Of these features, we may note the influence of Language poetry in a love of the fragmentary, an 
overall preference for the conceptual, and especially the articulation of a poem’s own aesthetics. 
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reflected, complicated, and even parodied in his recent work.  Throughout the chapter, I 
demonstrate that what has been read as mere solipsism in Strand’s work is a more 
complicated, often paradoxical, grappling with the idea of the self, an attempt to affirm and 
deny the self at the same time. 
 My second chapter, “This This: Charles Wright,” argues that Wright’s poetry, in its 
attempt to transcend human solitude in pursuit of the divine, constitutes its own evacuation 
of the self.  Wright’s poems have articulated the notion that to transcend this solitude in 
pursuit of the divine would require transcending the limited self—a possibility he doubts 
even as he attempts to enact it.  Whereas other readers have considered Wright’s poetry as 
a form of spiritual autobiography (Andrew Mulvania), as a via negativa (Bonnie Costello), or 
as an enactment of negative capability through formal organization (Stephen Cushman), I 
synthesize these readings to describe what I call Wright’s “apophatic poetics.”  By this I 
imply not only Wright’s debt to the medieval vocabularies of doubt about the 
unknowability of God, but also the concerns he shares with poststructuralist thinkers about 
the fallibility of language.  Wright’s poems represent a bridge between the particular 
theological and epistemological doubts of medieval Christian mystics and poststructuralist 
concerns with the arbitrariness of linguistic signification.  Wright’s apophatic poetics 
attempts to use language to evacuate the self into divinity, despite his belief that the divine 
and linguistic foundations of human existence are both fundamentally unknowable. 
My third and fourth chapters shift from the individual philosophical and theological  
interrogations of selfhood in the work of Strand and Wright to the broader political 
underpinnings of the self as manifested in the poems of Adrienne Rich and Derek Walcott.           
Although the political concerns of both poets—from Rich’s feminist critique of patriarchal 
society to Walcott’s postcolonial critique of empire and their shared skepticism of 
capitalism—seem to align with the political sympathies of the Language critique, Rich and 
Walcott’s choices to write in “traditional” poetic forms complicate their political and poetic 
identities.  My third chapter, “In Which Our Names Do Not Appear: Adrienne Rich,” 
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argues that the self as conceived of in Western culture—that is to say, in patriarchy—is a 
privileged position from which women have been systematically excluded.  Rich aspires to 
nothing less than a new conception of the self, and her poems enact her ongoing 
interrogation of what such new conception might or ought to entail.  Moreover, those 
poems often demonstrate the complex intellectual and ethical entanglements associated 
with such a radically ambitious project.  Rich chooses, for instance, to write “in the 
oppressor’s language,” opening what Marjorie Perloff perceives as a lacuna between Rich’s 
politics and her poetics.  I argue, however, that this apparent contradiction between radical 
politics and traditional poetics is the very source of the power of Rich’s poems to claim “I 
am she: I am he” or “We are, I am, you are” as the same state of being.   
 Derek Walcott, similarly, has been criticized for choosing “Western” literary 
forms—iambic pentameter, the sonnet, the Homeric epic—over the dialects and forms of 
his native West Indies.  For Walcott, however, the violent yoking of one island’s “standard 
English” and another’s “patois” derives from his own mixed ancestry and his itinerant sense 
of home.  In “Divided to the Vein: Derek Walcott,” I argue that Walcott portrays the self  
as divided and ambivalent, a flux between places, ancestries, languages and poetic forms.  
“[E]ither I’m nobody, or I’m a nation,” he writes, even as his poems challenge a simplistic 
either/or definition of selfhood.  In order to clarify Walcott’s complex literary fashioning of 
an identity for himself and his homeland, I adapt the term “chorography” from Richard 
Helgerson’s work on Early Modern English maps and chronicles.  To comprehend 
Walcott’s relationship to place, it is necessary to illuminate the intimate—to the point of 
inseparability—relationship between this poetic chorographer and the place(s) he maps.  
That said, the inclusion of Derek Walcott in a study of “American” poets may seem 
incongruous.  I might defend the inclusion by saying that Walcott has lived and worked in 
the United States for much of his life, and that his influence on the poets and poetics of the 
United States continues unabated.  Certainly I believe that these statements are accurate.  I 
am more interested, however, in the idea that Walcott sees himself as both American and 
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not American, both troubling and troubled by the range of that adjective’s associations and 
his sense of his own identity as fluid.  Walcott, like Rich, Strand, and Wright, works to 
define the self in his own poetic terms even as his poems undermine any stable definition.   
The paradox is appropriate: as we shall see in the case studies that follow, we often 
approach the concept of the self most successfully by tangling ourselves in paradox.  To 
commodify, efface or mock the self only masks its endurance in poetry and thought.  To flee 
the self for the promise of divinity only renders the self more achingly present.  To seek to 
define the self as a collective entity, to trouble the binaries between self and other, risks 
erasing the very differences—some oppressive, some precious, some both—by which we 
have defined ourselves.  To aspire to an idea of the self founded upon place and history is to 
risk losing all of the above.  Paradox makes sense of contradictions via poetic logic: through 
the peculiar power of metaphor to reveal by obscuring.  Despite the significant aesthetic, 
political, and personal differences among them, these four poets, as much as any other 
movement, have inherited the sometimes celebratory, sometimes skeptical concerns with 
selfhood of Whitman and Dickinson, and of Barthes, Derrida, and Foucault.  In their 
poems we find the self to be as rich and troubled a concept as it was when Whitman 
proclaimed himself “a kosmos,” when Dickinson supposed “Ourself behind ourself, 
concealed—” (Whitman 24.1, “[One need not be a Chamber—]” 13). 
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Chapter One 
 
The Nothing That I Am: Mark Strand 
 
 If indeed American poets since Emily Dickinson and Walt Whitman have asked 
whether it is possible to be at once “Nobody” and a celebrated, sung self, then Mark Strand 
has answered: “Yes and no.”  The self in Strand’s work is an empty vessel, a pure poetic 
commodity, which makes it the perfect speaker for poems that dwell on and in the idea of 
nothing.  Strand presents a self that is mere gesture, a parody of personality so fragile—
“what I wake up into and fall out of when I go to sleep”—that it constantly threatens to 
withdraw into the naught from which it has inexplicably emerged, the “blank” which is the 
final term of a poetry of simultaneous egotism and egolessness (Personal interview).  Strand 
fetishizes the idea of nothingness because the idea, like his deployment of the self, is itself 
paradoxical: one cannot neither imagine nothing, nor—despite the obsessive reductions of 
Strand’s poems—can one be nothing.  Strand is always weighing Hamlet’s great question, not 
as a decision to be made but as a consequence to be understood; his poems imagine a world 
where to be and not to be can both be accomplished at the same time.  In Strand’s work, 
the self is an illusion, but it is an illusion necessary to fashion coherence out of inchoate 
existence, to fashion poems out of the language that creates us, through which we create a 
fleeting, illusory identity we call the self. 
Many critical responses to Strand’s work have emphasized his apparent retreat from 
the world and from the self.  In “Negative Capability” (1981), her seminal essay on the first 
half of Strand’s poetic career, Linda Gregerson writes: “When Mark Strand reinvented the 
poem, he began by leaving out the world.  The self he invented to star in the poems went on 
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with the work of divestment: it jettisoned place, it jettisoned fellows, it jettisoned all 
distinguishing physical marks, save beauty alone” (5).  In Mark Strand and the Poet’s Place in 
Contemporary Culture (1990), the first critical monograph on Strand’s work, David Kirby 
remarks: “Both the pleasure and the paradox of reading Mark Strand lie in the realization 
that the Strand persona, even though he seems at first to be withdrawing into the cocoon of 
self, is in fact stepping away from the self, away from the Technicolor cartoon of 
contemporary life [. . .]” (3).  Peter Stitt writes (1983) that “so deeply does the speaker feel 
the ugliness of reality, its power to render death and destruction upon him, that he attempts 
to retreat farther and farther from it.”  But such a retreat is inevitably compromised if the 
speaker also finds himself to be “a void, a nothingness” (“Stages” 202).  In a more recent 
monograph, Reading Mark Strand (2007), James F. Nicosia argues that “Strand is a perpetual 
elegist of the self, not so much for himself as a person, but for himself as a poet [. . .].  
Throughout his career, Strand reveals a single persona who sees himself as two versions of 
himself, as someone else, or as no one at all” (ix, 15).  Of these readings, I find Gregerson’s 
and Kirby’s most convincing, as their essays on Strand’s work pay due attention to the wit, 
paradox, and complexity of Strand’s apparent withdrawals.  But even these readings are 
between twenty and thirty years old; the evolution of Strand’s work (and of the poetic 
cultures of the United States) since then demands a more timely examination than 
Gregerson or Kirby can offer and a more thorough assessment than recent scholarship on 
Strand allows.  Nicosia’s monograph, despite numerous keen insights and sensitive readings 
of Strand’s work, is too compromised by the anxiety of its Bloomian influence, insisting on 
reading Strand through his “precursor” Wallace Stevens, and it ignores almost altogether 
The Monument (1978), a hybrid work that I consider the ultimate expression of Strand’s 
poetics (ix).  Moreover, Strand’s work—and especially The Monument—requires fresh 
attention not just for its aesthetic achievements but also for its unheralded contributions to 
theoretical interrogations of a decentered self.  
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In this chapter I shall argue that Strand’s early poems evacuate the speaking self of 
the poem so completely that what remains is a mere performance of the self marked by 
existential angst and a smirking wit.  In these poems, Strand’s speaker seems to strive 
toward apparent—and often ironic—self-annihilation: “In a field / I am the absence / of 
field.”  (“Keeping Things Whole” 1-2).  “I empty myself of the remains of others.  I empty 
my pockets. / [. . .] I empty myself of my life and my life remains”  (“The Remains” 1, 12).  “I 
give up my clothes which are walls that blow in the wind / and I give up the ghost that lives 
in them. / I give up.  I give up”  (“Giving Myself Up” 13-14).  “More is less. / I long for more”  
(“The One Song” 15-16).  In my reading of Strand’s early work I introduce a previously 
unremarked parallel between Strand’s poetry and the philosophical thought of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, whose claims about the self echo through Strand’s poems.  Although Strand’s 
dialogue with Wittgenstein remains implicit (as opposed, for instance, to his imagined 
conversation with Jorge Luis Borges in “Translation,” a more recent poem), it also presents a 
resonant example of Strand’s engagement with and enactment of philosophical and 
theoretical concepts.   
This first phase of Strand’s career reaches its apex, and its logical endpoint, in The 
Monument, a poem that defies its own status as a poem, an epitaph for “no one,” and a text 
that would “unwrite” itself even as it is written.  One of this chapter’s contributions to the 
available scholarship on Strand is to position The Monument as the center of Strand’s body of 
work, and as the lens through which to view the rest of his career.  The speaker of The 
Monument dedicates / addresses / dictates the work “to the translator of THE MONUMENT in 
the future,” whose task it becomes to translate the text—and to perpetuate its author—into 
that same future.  In a career throughout which he has engaged, commodified, and parodied 
the idea of the self, The Monument is Strand’s most salient meditation on, his satire of, and 
his striving for literary and literal immortality.  After The Monument, Strand found himself 
unable to write poems that satisfied him, and he did not publish a book of new poems 
between Selected Poems (1980) and The Continuous Life (1990) (Aaron).  By then, Strand’s 
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approach to the self—and to poetry itself—had changed.  If evacuating the self proved 
impossible, Strand would parody it instead.  Strand’s early poems mock the idea of the self 
by emptying it of individual attributes, introducing it to similarly empty doppelgänger 
figures, claiming that the self is nothing whatsoever.  The speaker of these early poems is far 
too deadpan ever to engage in the sort of buffoonery that marks his later career, in which 
Strand sends up the idea of the self by mocking the idea of himself, satirizing the persona of 
the famous poet and refashioning it as a subject for his poems.  If Richard Howard is right 
that Strand’s early poems “narrate the moment when Strand makes Rimbaud’s discovery, 
that je est un autre [‘I is an other’], that the self is someone else, even something else,” then in 
the early poems the Strand persona both courts and rejects itself (594).  And in the later 
poems the Strand persona mocks the persona of Mark Strand. 
Strand’s most recent—and, he claims, his last—book, Almost Invisible (2012), is a 
testament of the textual figure of the author watching its originating intelligence, the 
historical author, disappear (Personal interview).1  The “I” of the self—what Whitman called 
“the Me myself”—disappears in inverse proportion to the emergence of the textual 
inscription “Mark Strand” (74).  Or, in the words of Jorge Luis Borges: “I am destined to 
perish, definitively, and only some instant of myself can survive in [Borges].  Little by little, 
I am giving over everything to him [. . .].  Thus my life is a flight and I lose everything and 
everything belongs to oblivion, or to him” (“Borges and I” 246-7).  I choose the comparison 
to Borges strategically, and not only because of Borges’s acknowledged influence on Strand.  
Borges is increasingly admired for the contributions to literary theory represented by his 
poems, “fictions” and “nonfictions.”2  Although Strand is too prominent a citizen of official 
                                                
1 Even in speculating in conversation about whether Almost Invisible will be his last book, Strand 
exhibits the deadpan wit of his poems: “Well, I may write a sequel,” he has said.  “If I do, it won’t 
come out until after I’m dead, and it will be called Invisible” (Personal interview). 
 
2 See Emir Rodríguez Monegal, “Borges and Derrida: Apothecaries;” Herman Rapaport, “Borges, De 
Man, and the Deconstruction of Reading,” and Edna Aizenberg, “Borges and the Hebraism of 
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verse culture to be adopted by the poets and theorists friendly to any “official theory 
culture,” his work resembles Borges’ in its philosophical and literary theoretical 
implications.  The detached persona of Strand’s poems would never deign to descend with 
the Language Poets to an explicit, prosaic critique of the idea of the self.  Strand’s approach 
is more tangential; like Borges, he enacts complex theoretical ideas in his texts instead.  
Strand’s early poems perform a version of the bourgeois self so completely that his portrayal 
becomes an implicit critique of the idea.  From The Monument onward, through parody and 
mockery, Strand “unwrites” the commodified self he spent the first half of his career 
fashioning.  The language of his poems always risks—always courts—canceling itself just as 
it is written; perhaps more accurately, it cancels itself in being written.  The poetic ideal to 
which Strand aspires is “the text already written, unwriting itself into the text of promise” 
(The Monument 38).  Only in the tightening knot of such a paradox is it possible for Strand to 
realize the great achievement of his poetry: the synthesis of the said and the unsaid, of being 
and nonbeing, of everything and nothing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Contemporary Literary Theory” (all collected in Aizenberg’s Borges and His Successors); see also 
Michael Wood’s “Borges and theory” in The Cambridge Companion to Jorge Luis Borges. 
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I AM THE ABSENCE 
 
 Strand’s early poems appeared amid the great flourishing of American “Confessional” 
poetry.  W. D. Snodgrass’s Heart’s Needle and Robert Lowell’s Life Studies were published in 
1959, Anne Sexton’s To Bedlam and Part Way Back in 1960, as Strand, then in his twenties, 
began to publish in journals and magazines.  Strand’s first book, Sleeping with One Eye Open, 
appeared in 1964, the same year that John Berryman brought out 77 Dream Songs, for which 
he would receive the Pulitzer Prize.  Sylvia Plath—a poet of Strand’s own generation—had 
written Ariel primarily in the winter of 1962-63; the book was published posthumously in 
1965.  Like any period style, Confessional poetry began to engender contrary reactions just 
as it became solidly entrenched as a dominant mode.  Confessional poetry had arisen—or at 
least benefited—from a widespread rejection of “the ethos of New Criticism” which, as 
David Perkins writes, had come to seem “repressive and elitist, and the dense, intellectual 
idiom and closure of New Critical poetry seemed artificial.”  Moreover, Perkins writes, the 
classroom was both nursery and tomb for the New Criticism.  “Once it was being taught to 
students as dogma, it was doomed” (348).  Numbering Strand among a group of “better 
Surrealist poets,” Perkins notes that “Surrealism also appealed to American poets as an 
alternative to the Confessional style—general where it was particular, cool where it was 
strident, impersonal and mythical where it was personal” (560).  While I differ from Perkins 
in identifying Strand as a surrealist (Strand has in fact identified himself as a “fantasist” 
rather than a “surrealist”), I would emphasize that Strand’s early work indeed seems cool, 
impersonal, and—if vaguely—mythological or fantastical (Cellar Door).3  Whatever the most 
                                                
3 Asked to compare his version of surrealism with that of James Tate, Strand replied: 
 
I don’t think of myself as a surrealist.  I think of myself as a fantasist.  Surrealism was 
 a social and political movement as well as a literary movement.  We use the word 
 “surreal” rather loosely.  I consider myself a fantasist because I'm not really part of a 
 program.  There’s no social program behind my aesthetic.  (Cellar Door) 
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accurate label—if a label is required—for Strand’s early work, the distinction between his 
poems and Confessional poetry is especially relevant.  Strand’s poems perform the gestures 
of the Confessional mode so well that they undermine them in their portrayals of a 
coherent, dramatized lyric speaker.  When the speaker of Robert Lowell’s “Commander 
Lowell” recalls: “Anchors aweigh, Daddy boomed in his bathtub,” we tend not to doubt 
(even if we should) that this is Robert Traill Spence Lowell IV speaking of Commander 
Robert Traill Spence Lowell III (35).  Strand’s speaker is unidentifiable as an historical 
person in this way because Strand has stripped from the speaker any potentially 
individualizing qualities.  Instead of dramatizing events that have already happened, Strand’s 
speaker—urbane, ironic, detached to the point of solipsism—portrays “events” that have 
not happened or that are imagined happening.  The tone of Strand’s early poems is both 
anxious and resigned to the inevitable realization of his worst fears.  In Strand’s first two 
books this angst is palpable but remains undefined.  Not until Darker (1970) does Strand 
seem to make the “discovery” Howard describes, that he becomes faced (I use the word 
deliberately, given Strand’s interest in the image of the mirror) with the notion that the self 
is something other than what it seems.  Yet a vague sense of division troubles him from the 
first pages of his first books.  The epigraphs of Strand’s first two books help to demonstrate 
this sense of a schism within, or a reflected double of, the self: “Let one eye his watches 
keep / Whilst the t’other eye doth sleep”—suggests a separation necessary for survival in a 
dangerous world (Beaumont and Fletcher 27-8).  But such a separation also usurps the unity 
of the self, as is further demonstrated in the epigraph to Reasons for Moving (1968), from 
Borges’s story “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius:”  “—while we sleep here, we are awake 
elsewhere and that in this way every man is two men” (10).  This movement, from a single 
                                                                                                                                                       
The temptation to label Strand a surrealist may reasonably follow the dreamlike, allegorical poems of 
his early books.  In Strand’s poems, however, this tendency is less a matter of following the 
subconscious, associative logic of dreams and more a method of articulating the schism within the 
self, a division to define his career. 
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self both awake and asleep to the status of “every man [as] two men,” defines the movement 
of Strand’s early poems. 
 The first (and title) poem in Strand’s first book, “Sleeping with One Eye Open,” 
demonstrates the foreboding of Strand’s early poems, an ominous view of the world that 
Strand will come to temper with a humor so wry it too often goes unnoticed.  The speaker 
of “Sleeping with One Eye Open,” like the speakers of Strand’s epigraphs, lies with one eye 
in the world of the waking and the other in the world of those asleep.  Just as the shadow of 
the earth divides the face of the moon in half, the speaker too feels unnervingly divided:  
It’s my night to be rattled, 
  Saddled 
  With spooks.  Even the half-moon 
  (Half man, 
  Half dark), on the horizon, 
  Lies on 
  Its side casting a fishy light 
  Which alights 
  On my floor, lavishly lording 
  Its morbid 
  Look over me.   
[. . .] 
The shivers 
  Wash over 
  Me, shaking my bones, my loose ends 
  Loosen, 
  And I lie sleeping with one eye open, 
  Hoping 
  That nothing, nothing will happen.   (15-25, 31-7) 
 
Strand’s sleeper at once sleeps and wakes, inhabiting and speaking through the fugue state 
of Beaumont and Fletcher’s shepherd and Borges’s divided sleeper.  The music of “Sleeping 
with One Eye Open” consists in Strand’s formal enactment of that fugue: in these uneven 
couplets, every second line rhymes with its predecessor so closely that the rhymes are 
nearly—but necessarily not exact—echoes.  The echo effect is amplified by the fact that 
each matching rhyme arrives immediately in the following line rather than being delayed by 
the four intervening iambic feet of the heroic couplet.  Strand’s technique does not allow 
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the ear time enough to forget and remember the sound of the rhyme; instead, the instant 
juxtaposition of the rhyming words emphasizes the similarities and differences that 
constitute the rhyme.  A closing triplet (open/hoping/happen) resonates further in its two 
slight variations, disrupting the poem’s otherwise even balance of couplets.  The cumulative 
effect recalls the technique of W. B. Yeats’s “Man and the Echo,” in which the speaker 
hears the spectre of his own voice calling back, disembodied and utterly changed: “[Man.] 
And all seems evil until I / Sleepless would lie down and die.  // Echo.  Lie down and die” (17-
19).  In the apparently negligible distance of a line break (in Strand’s case, or a stanza break 
in Yeats’s), the speaker’s voice returns as someone else’s voice or, just as unsettlingly, as 
one’s own voice speaking unfamiliar words.  The formal control of “Sleeping with One Eye 
Open” belies and amplifies the ambiguities of its speaker.  These ambiguities—and the 
anxiety and wit that arises from them—will come to define Strand’s career. 
 Other early poems are similarly dark, occupying the Rilkean space between beauty 
and terror.4  Strand’s ominous, foreboding lines carry the anxiety of what cannot be 
communicated because it cannot be known, but only anticipated.  Stitt writes:  
What we see [in Strand’s early poems] is a dissociation of sensibility not 
unlike that which Eliot used to speak about, in which the mind feels alienated 
from the ‘body’ (meaning the flesh or material substance, as opposed to the 
                                                
4 In “Violent Storm,” for instance, Strand writes: “For [those asleep], 
 
  The long night sweeping over these trees 
  And houses will have been no more than one 
  In a series whose end 
  Only the nervous or morbid consider.  [my emphasis] (9-12) 
 
Similarly, in “Old People on the Nursing Home Porch,” he watches as 
 
    the evening 
  Reaches out to take 
  The aging world away. 
 
  And soon the dark will come [. . .]  (22-4) 
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spirit).  [. . . T]he central issues in Strand’s early poetry are psychological and 
depend far less on reality-states than on the impressions, feelings, and beliefs 
of a single, perhaps atypical, perceiving mind.  (“Stages” 201)   
Denis Donoghue criticizes this tendency in Strand’s early poems, which Donoghue 
characterizes as “giving hypotheses exactly the same status as facts.  The immediate result is 
that both worlds are equally sinister. [. . . T]he trouble is that a poet who cries wolf must 
offer more evidence than the cry itself.  Mr. Strand asserts menace, but the evidence does 
not appear” (“Objects”).  Nicosia offers a slightly different reading: “Strand is preoccupied 
with the power of the malevolent world to insinuate itself between himself and his goals, 
whether the latter be unity with nature, communication, friendship, love, or even sleep” (19-
20).  Both Donoghue’s and Nicosia’s readings assume that the poet “crying wolf” recognizes 
the source of his fear.  On the contrary: Strand’s early poems cry out because he does not 
know what approaches, whether wolf or anything else.   
Nor is Strand willing to particularize the figure that is threatened, the figure of the 
self.  When Strand does define the self, he does so negatively.  Instead of saying what the 
self is, he says what it is not, as in “Keeping Things Whole.”  Perhaps Strand’s most 
succinct—and certainly his best known—articulation of his idea of the self, “Keeping 
Things Whole” also represents Strand’s most overt engagement with Wittgenstein’s early 
theses on the self and solipsism.  This context for Strand’s poems has gone too long 
unexamined in readings of the poet’s work.  In introducing it here, I am less interested in 
remarking upon Strand’s debt to Wittgenstein than I am in demonstrating a context in 
which philosophy (or “theory”) and poetry are engaged in similar work.  Some of 
Wittgenstein’s propositions from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus even read like a primer 
for Strand’s portrayal of liminality in “Keeping Things Whole” and other early poems.  
“That the world is my world,” Wittgenstein writes, “shows itself in the fact that the limits of 
the language (the language which only I understand) mean the limits of my world [. . .].  The 
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subject does not belong to the world but it is a limit of the world” (5.62, 5.632, pp. 63, 64).5  
In “Keeping Things Whole,” Strand’s speaker explores what a literal enactment of 
Wittgenstein’s thinking might entail: 
In a field 
  I am the absence 
  of field. 
  This is 
  always the case. 
  Wherever I am 
  I am what is missing.  (1-7) 
These lines represent not only the intersection of self and world but also of ideas and things.  
Strand’s choice of articles is important here, as he blurs the boundaries between the abstract 
and the concrete even as he delineates the apparently precise boundaries of the self.  In a 
field—that is, in any such specific, physical space—the speaker is the absence of field(ness), 
so to speak.   
Wittgenstein is careful to distinguish between “my world” (emphasis his)—the limits 
of which are one’s own language—and “the world” (emphasis mine).  If the subject does not 
belong to the world but represents a limit of the world, then the subject who moves through 
a field will always represent both “the absence of field” and of that particular field.  
Moreover, if the subject does not belong to the world, and (as Wittgenstein asserts) “the 
world is everything that is the case,” then the subject himself is not the case (1, p. 5).  His 
identity, whatever it is, must be defined negatively.  He must understand and represent 
himself in terms of what he is not (“I am the absence,” “I am what is missing”) by limning 
the boundaries between the self and the world, the self as idea and the self as experiential 
phenomenon.  In “my world,” the self is all, as it separates me from “the world,” but the 
phenomenon of the self is only an interruption—and a brief one, at that—in the continuity 
of the surrounding world.  As the speaker remarks in the second stanza: 
                                                
5 My citations from Wittgeinstein refer both to specific propositions in the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus and the relevant pages numbers in the volume to which I refer, Major Works. 
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 When I walk  
 I part the air 
 and always 
the air moves in 
to fill the spaces 
where my body’s been.  (8-13) 
 
In the first stanza, the speaker distinguishes “field” from “a field,” the general from the 
particular.  Here a similar tension obtains between “I” and “my body”: it is the “I” who 
actively walks and parts the air; when the air rushes in to occupy the vacuum the speaker has 
left, it fills “the spaces / where my body’s been.”  The shift in Strand’s nouns suggests a 
question the poem does not answer: is there a difference between “I” and “my body”?  Given 
that language can be both bodily (as in speech) and unembodied (as in the written word), 
how do we then determine the role of the body in mapping where the self ends and the 
world begins?  Although the poem does not address these issues, they recur in Strand’s 
work, most notably in The Monument, in which the Strand speaker imagines being 
perpetuated into the future via textual translation.  In its closing lines, the poem does offer 
something between an ars poetica and an ethics: 
We all have reasons  
for moving. 
I move 
to keep things whole.   (15-18)  
 
Just what the speaker keeps whole by his continuous movement is unclear, nor do we learn 
which of those “things” he moves from or moves toward.  What is clear in “Keeping Things 
Whole” is Strand’s portrayal of the self as a provisional figure, defined only by what—and 
where—the world is not.  This is a self utterly divided from the world even as he longs for 
wholeness, even as he moves in an attempt to achieve it. 
 Other poems in Sleeping with One Eye Open and Reasons for Moving (1968) portray still 
more radical—and increasingly farcical—divisions within the self.  In a number of poems in 
these first two books, the Strand speaker portrays himself as visited, haunted, or even 
attacked by various visitors and interlocutors.  These poems snicker at their own anxieties, 
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complicating their Rilkean fear with laconic humor, a winking acknowledgment of their 
own absurdities.  In doing so Strand manages to avoid the airless earnestness that 
characterizes and compromises too many lesser poems in the Confessional mode.  In such 
poems—“The Accident,” “The Mailman,” “Poem,” The Tunnel”—the anxiety of what may 
happen becomes the absurdity of what does happen.  What happens is more absurd yet 
because of the speaker’s alternately slapstick reaction or utter indifference to events.  In 
“The Tunnel,” for instance, the speaker performs various conventions of fear and grief to 
the point of nonsense; gesture follows gesture with such escalating intensity that it becomes 
impossible to read them seriously: 
  I weep like a schoolgirl 
  and make obscene gestures 
  through the window.  I 
  write large suicide notes 
  and place them so he  
  can read them easily. 
  I destroy the living 
  room furniture to prove 
  I own nothing of value.  (19-27) 
    
The illusion of individual personality that we often read into the speakers of poems is 
undercut in such lines, in which all that we might think of as constituting a self is either 
abandoned or parodied.  When the speakers of these poems are dismembered by intruders 
(“Poem”) or run over by trains (“The Accident”), we do not sense that anything individual 
has been attacked.  What might otherwise be destroyed in these incidents—“places,” 
“fellows, all distinguishing physical marks” in Gregerson’s words—has always been already 
evacuated from the poem.  I follow Gregerson’s reading, in which she observes that this 
“self divided itself for dialogue: the I became an I and a you, an I and a mailman, an I and an 
engineer; the face appeared on both sides of a mirror, both sides of a printed window, both 
sides of a printed page” (6).  I would go further, however, to argue that these interlocutors 
act as doppelgängers, as harbingers who either mediate between the divided self of the 
    
 55 
speaking persona or who represent another aspect of the persona’s self.  They bring 
messages to—and of—the speaker.  Or, more hauntingly, they themselves are the messages. 
 Through the majority of Strand’s first two books, he represents the Rimbaudian self-
as-other as a literal other, an ominous (if absurdist) doppelgänger.  These visitors are 
ominous and alien because they are visions of the self who exist in the world of which, to 
follow Wittgenstein’s argument, the speaker himself is not a part.  If the speaker recognizes 
himself in these others and the others as himself, he does not consciously betray this fact in 
the course of the poems.  This changes with “The Man in the Mirror,” the concluding poem 
of Reasons for Moving.  In “The Man in the Mirror,” the Strand speaker must face himself as 
other and understand the other to be himself.  He makes a discovery similar to what Borges 
reports in “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius:”  “We discovered,” Borges’s narrator reports, “(such 
a discovery is inevitable in the late hours of the night) that mirrors have something 
monstrous about them” (3).6  The “something monstrous,” as it is articulated in Strand’s 
poems, is the mirror’s reflection, its apparition of the self.  The arc of Reasons for Moving 
dramatizes the eventual, if inexplicit, realization—itself portrayed in “The Man in the 
Mirror”—that these uncanny others who visit the Strand speaker and engage him in the 
dialogue that become the poem are, in fact, the self itself.   
“The Man in the Mirror” achieves Strand’s fullest articulation of his aesthetic to this 
point in his career.  Harold Bloom calls the poem “at once phantasmagoria and simple 
narcist [sic] self-confrontation, an inescapable, daily, waking nightmare” (“Dark and 
Radiant” 136).  The waking nightmare to which Bloom refers, and which “The Man in the 
Mirror” articulates, is the horror and hilarity of the self that is and the self that is reflected, 
the self that sleeps and the other, Borgesian self that is awake elsewhere.  What begins as a 
                                                
6 The word “monstrous” is a significant choice of words in translation (monstruoso in the original 
Spanish), the word “monstrous” meaning grotesque but also suggesting admonitory, coming from the 
same Latin root as the word “monument,” which will play its own significant role in Strand’s poetics 
(OED).   
 
    
 56 
comic love poem to the self in the mirror becomes complicated as the speaker sees himself 
reflected and understands himself—and not simply the reflection of himself—to be other: 
 I remember how we used to stand 
 wishing the glass 
 would dissolve between us, 
 and how we watched our words 
 
 cloud that bland, 
 innocent surface, 
 and when our faces blurred 
 how scared we were. 
  But that was another life.  (21-9) 
This speaker, like those of other poems in Sleeping with One Eye Open and Reasons for Moving, 
feels irreparably separated from himself.  Here, however, the mirror that separates him from 
his reflection also allows him to sympathize with it; the “you” in the opening lines of the 
poem becomes a “we” in this memory.  What allows the speaker to see himself also 
undermines that sense of self.  Thus, what Bloom calls “simple narcist self-confrontation” is 
hardly simple: it is the confrontation of one’s waking self with the fact of the self’s 
artificiality, and its legibility, as facilitated by the intervention of the mirror as well as the 
language of the poem.  As Gillian White remarks, “What makes oneself legible as a concept 
is also what undermines the very idea of wholeness; this idea is literalized by the mirror” 
(Message).  Moreover, when “our words” fog the mirror’s glass and blur the figures’ 
reflections, we understand that language, like the mirror, acts both as a tool for connection 
and the agent of rupture. 
 The introduction of a fantastical element into the poem—the departure of reflection 
from the mirror—allows Strand to literalize the conceptual concerns of the poem: “The 
mirror was nothing without you” (60).  When the reflected figure does returns, diminished 
“under layers of heavy skin, // [its] body sunk,” its apparition is still more unnerving (76-7).  
The poem reaches a sort of climax with the speaker’s confession: “I look at you / and see 
myself / under the surface” (105-7).  The modifier “under the surface” complicates this 
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already-complicated moment of epiphany: the most literal reading of this line assumes, to 
paraphrase, that the speaker sees himself under the surface of the mirror.  But it may also be 
that the speaker sees in his reflection what is under the surface of himself.  Either prospect 
is terrifying, for the self seen in the reflection is “like a shade [. . .] / frail, distant, older / 
than ever” (113, 115-6).  The mirror allows one, over the course of a lifetime, to watch oneself 
age and decline.  One may well believe that the self is something other or more than the 
body, but the mirror argues otherwise.  David Pears’s study of Wittgenstein (a passage 
Bloom quotes in his own review of Reasons for Moving) is especially relevant here: 
  But what is this unique self, of whose existence he feels assured?  It is neither  
  his body nor his soul nor anything else in his world.  It is only the   
  metaphysical subject, which is a kind of focal vanishing point behind the  
  mirror of his language.  There is really nothing except the mirror and what the 
  mirror reflects.  So the only thing that he can legitimately say is that what is  
  reflected in the mirror is reflected in the mirror.  (75) 
 If the self is indeed an illusion, then the mirror is an illusion of an illusion; to glance 
into the mirror is to step into a hall of mirrors in which, appropriately reflexively, what is 
reflected is what is reflected.  Strand’s speaker comes to understand: 
  It will always be this way. 
  I stand here scared 
  that you will disappear, 
  scared that you will stay.   (117-20) 
 
Strand concludes Reasons for Moving with these lines, establishing the problem that—now 
recognized—must be dealt with in his subsequent work.  The confrontation of “The Man in 
the Mirror” surfaces the angst that everything one believes constitutes the self is as 
intangible and provisional as the face in the glass.  Jacques Lacan anticipates the unsettling 
experience of the self confronting itself:  “The point is not to know whether I speak of 
myself in a way that conforms to what I am, but rather to know whether, when I speak of 
myself, I am the same as the self of whom I speak” (430).  In Strand’s poetry, however, 
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simply to speak of the self is to invent or project a new self, and so the desire for sameness 
that Lacan articulates—the desire for wholeness that Strand himself has articulated—is 
impossible to attain.  “Some things I wish I could forget,” the speaker says in “The Man in 
the Mirror,” almost offhandedly (88).  None more than the self. 
  Having established the essential problem of his worldview and of his aesthetic in his 
first two volumes, in Darker (1970) the Strand speaker can now begin his idiosyncratic 
project of divestment, seeking to become nothing as Whitman seeks to become all.  “I am 
beginning / again without anything,” he writes in “Giving Myself Up” (16-17).  But  
one cannot be without anything and still exist; to begin again is to foil the speaker’s own 
drive toward nothingness.  This tension, latent in Sleeping with One Eye Open and Reasons for 
Moving, becomes acute in Darker and chronic for the rest of Strand’s career.  Among the 
poems of Darker, the this tension is most acute in “My Life” and “My Life By Somebody 
Else.”  The more the speaker finds literal divestment (emptying his pockets, his shoes) 
insufficient, the more he relies on the act of writing as the only way to proceed with the 
figurative deprivation of “giving up” the self.  The wickedly titled “My Life” portrays a 
passive, practically inanimate speaker whose “life” can hardly be said to be his: “The huge 
doll of my body / refuses to rise. / I am the toy of women” (1-3).  Three such women appear 
in the poem, representing different generational categories but, like the speaker, absent of 
any real life of their own.  Although the speaker portrays himself as a “doll” and a “toy,” he 
also reduces the figures of mother, wife, and daughter to archetypes significant only in their 
relationships to the speaker.  Having attempted to give up his possessions and empty 
himself, he now empties all the figures in the poem of any distinguishing characteristics.  
First, the speaker’s mother “props” him up “for her friends,” begging, “Talk, talk” (5-6).  “I 
moved my mouth,” he recalls, “but words did not come” (7-8).  The image of the speaker is 
that of a ventriloquist’s dummy, a second self who one pretends is speaking—and whom, 
often enough, one can blame for saying the dangerous words voiced by the true speaker.   
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In the small space between third and fourth stanzas, the figure of the mother 
disappears and is replaced by the figure of the wife, the second of the poem’s three women 
who make the speaker their toy.  The dummy-speaker claims to be unable to speak, but he 
continues to narrate: 
  My wife took me down from the shelf. 
  I lay in her arms.  “We suffer     
  the sickness of the self,” she would whisper. 
  And I lay there dumb.    (9-12) 
 
Although voiced by the figure of the wife, “the sickness of the self” articulates in a phrase 
the central concern of Strand’s poetry as a whole.  If knowledge of the world begins with 
knowledge of the self, then to discover, in Howard’s words, that the self is someone or 
something else alienates us from even our most basic assumptions.  To be aware of the self’s 
artificiality and yet to be unable to inhabit anything other than that construct defines the 
Strandian sickness of the self.  In “My Life” the speaker—his lines having already been read 
on his behalf—“[lies] there dumb,” and remains so as the third woman of the poem—the 
daughter—offers “a plastic nurser / filled with water” (13-14).  Here the speaker is quite 
literally infantilized: “‘You are my real baby,’” the daughter tells him (15).  Finally the 
speaker seems to come alive with an exclamation of sympathy (17): “Poor child!”  He is able 
to act now, if only to 
         look into the brown 
  mirrors of her eyes 
  and see myself  
  
  diminishing, sinking down 
  to a depth she does not know is there.     (18-22) 
  
Little in Strand’s poetry, of course, cannot become a mirror.  The eyes of the daughter 
literally reflect the speaker’s image as he peers into them; more importantly, they manifest 
the person into which the speaker’s identity—his very genetics—will disappear.  The line 
and stanza break present this understanding with cold exactness, severing the potential 
moment of tenderness between father/baby and daughter/mother.   
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 Not only does “My Life” function as a merciless parody of a family dynamic, it also 
satirizes the portrayals of family politics central to many poems in the Confessional mode.  
“My Life” offers none of the specific domestic traumas of Plath or Lowell or their imitators; 
the poem’s characters are little more than props.  We do not suppose that any of the events 
of “My Life” have actually taken place any more than we assume that the three “women” in 
the poem are actual women.  In fact, these three figures are as interchangeable in their 
control of the speaker as the speaker is objectified in his passivity.  The portrayal of 
ventriloquism works at two different removes, as the speaker finds himself “toyed with” by 
women who, if we extend to them the assumption of anima we grant the speaker, become 
the toys of the hand writing the poem.  The true ventriloquist wrestles himself out of the 
poem by depicting himself as helpless within it.    
 The desperate courtship of “My Life By Somebody Else” resembles that of “The 
Man in the Mirror” but raises the stakes so that self-as-other evolves into self-as-muse.  In 
doing so the self splits (again) into one figure who does the writing and another who is the 
writing.  The longing that animates the poem echoes the division and reunion of “The Man 
in the Mirror” so closely that the final stanza of “The Man in the Mirror” could stand as an 
epigraph for “My Life By Somebody Else”: 
  It will always be this way. 
  I stand here scared 
  that you will disappear, 
  scared that you will stay.  
 
Likewise, the opening line of “My Life By Somebody Else”—“I have done what I could but 
you avoid me”—recalls the essential conflict of “The Man in the Mirror” (1).  In this way the 
poems mirror each other.  Here is “My Life By Somebody Else” in full: 
  I have done what I could but you avoid me. 
  I left a bowl of milk on the desk to tempt you. 
  Nothing happened.  I left my wallet there, full of money. 
  You must have hated me for that.  You never came. 
 
  I sat at my typewriter naked, hoping you would wrestle me    
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  to the floor.  I played with myself just to arouse you. 
  Boredom drove me to sleep.  I offered you my wife. 
  I sat her on the desk and spread her legs.  I waited. 
 
  The days drag on.  The exhausted light falls like a bandage    
  over my eyes.  Is it because I am ugly?  Was anyone     
  ever so sad?  It is pointless to slash my wrists.  My hands 
  would fall off.  And then what hope would I have? 
 
  Why do you never come?  Must I have you by being 
  somebody else?  Must I write My Life by somebody else? 
  My Death by somebody else?  Are you listening?     
  Somebody else has arrived.  Somebody else is writing.   (1-16) 
 
The speaker courts an elusive muse, an undefined other whom he seems to need.  Why he 
needs such a muse is unclear until the final stanza, where the speaker asks, as if only as a last 
resort, “Must I have you by being / somebody else?”  The implication is that the speaker 
knows he can have the muse this way, but would prefer an easier route.  He would prefer not 
to “write My Life by somebody else [. . . ,] / My Death by somebody else,” but he seems not 
to have a choice.  All other methods have failed.   
Significant, too, is the poem’s departure from the domestic dynamic of “My Life,” 
where the speaker claimed to be the “toy of women.”  Here he maintains absolute 
possession over the figure of the wife.  The speaker “offers” the wife to his muse as one 
would offer an object; he “s[its] her on the desk and spread[s] her legs,” only for nothing to 
happen.  The archetypal female figures of “My Life” remain objects here, to be possessed 
sexually but ultimately to be passed over.  The wife—to write “his wife” would overstate the 
agency the speaker “allows” her—is no muse compared to the muse of self; she becomes  
bait for the fish he wishes to catch.  The self is muse and lover; the self is all, but the self is 
nothing.  The concluding quatrain flails in desperation.  Unlike the denouement of “The 
Man in the Mirror,” with the continuing uneasy presence of the reflection, here the speaker 
laments that his muse never comes.  Until he does, of course, and matters become still more 
complicated: “Somebody else has arrived.  Somebody else is writing.”  In this ambiguous last 
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line, we cannot be sure if the speaker is addressing his muse, or if his gambit has worked and 
that the “Somebody else” who has arrived and writes is the longed-for muse.  And of course 
the poem we are reading is “My Life By Somebody Else.”   
The self of the Strand poem—whoever it is—is no longer the passive figure of 
Sleeping with One Eye Open and Reasons for Moving.  Darker—especially in “My Life by 
Somebody Else”—marks a new point of departure, as Strand will increasingly speak of the 
self as something that is written.  Writing becomes an act that creates the self and, in 
theory at least, an act that can erase it.  “Somebody else is writing,” the speaker says at the 
end of “My Life By Somebody Else.”  The poems of The Story of Our Lives (1973) enlarge 
these themes, as if actually producing the work itself that “My Life By Somebody Else” 
suggests.  Somebody else is writing the poem(s), and the writing itself is somebody else.  The 
“stories” in The Story of Our Lives unwrite themselves in the process of their writing; that is, 
their erasure (and the self’s erasure) is written into them.  Or, in Gregerson’s phrasing, 
“[E]ach poem contains a story which contains a poem which steadily dismantles 
containment” (16).  Containment might be dismantled as the poems proceed, but the self 
remains both within and without the poem.  There is no story outside the story; there is no 
life outside the story.  “This morning I woke,” says the speaker of the title poem, 
       and believed 
  there was no more to our lives 
  than the story of our lives. 
  When you disagreed, I pointed 
  to the place in the book where you disagreed.    (3.1-5) 
 
If there is no more to life—“theirs” or “ours”—than the story of the life, then the act of 
writing petrifies as it creates.  Writing enables existence but traps those who exist within 
the limits of what is written.  Even he who writes the story is trapped within the story: if he 
writes, he writes because it has been quite literally dictated that he do so.  Roland Barthes 
articulates a variation of this notion in “The Death of the Author”: “As soon as a fact is 
narrated no longer with a view to acting directly on reality but intransitively, that is to say, 
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finally outside of any function other than that of the very practice of the symbol itself, this 
disconnection occurs, the voice loses its origin, the author enters into his own death, 
writing begins” (142).  
The act of writing memorializes, and the written story becomes monument instead 
of life.  The speaker can now recognize: “It was words that created divisions in the first place, / 
that created loneliness” (6.8-9).  For a self whose existence depends on words, which is in fact 
predicated on language, words create not only loneliness but everything else as well.  Strand 
himself has remarked, in an interview with David Brooks: “I often feel that words get in the 
way, but then I have nothing but words” (qtd. in Kirby 8).  Strand might have said, just as 
accurately, I am nothing but words.  His speaker finds: “The book will not survive. / We are 
living proof of that” (7.1-2).  And as the story of which he is made concludes, the poem 
reveals echoes of Strand’s words from earlier poems, earlier books.  He and his companion 
“look into the mirror across the room. / [. . .] The book goes on” (6.3-4).  The book goes on 
with its presumptive author helpless within it.  As Barthes articulates the “return” of the 
author: “It is not that the Author may not ‘come back’ in the Text, in his text, but he then 
goes so as a ‘guest.’  If he is a novelist, he is inscribed in the novel like one of his characters, 
figured in the carpet [. . .].  He becomes, as it were, a paper-author” (“From Work to Text” 
1329-30).  An author in Strand’s poetics especially can never be more than a paper author, a 
paper self.  As Strand has said: 
  Another set of obligations occurs when you write.  [. . .] If you’re writing  
  poetry, the ideas of lineation, meter, et cetera; all this takes you away from  
  the informing experience, and so the experience of writing becomes the   
  experience.  It’s not simply representing or abstracting from that initial  
  experience.  It becomes a participation and a creation: participating in,  
  creating the poem, if indeed you’re writing poetry.  In other words—I’ve said  
  this in my poems too—the poem erases the world, erases the experience.  In  
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  order for a poem to have primacy it has to relinquish whatever hold the initial 
  experience, the informing experience might have had. (Personal interview) 
Here and throughout The Story of Our Lives, the story takes precedence over the lives it tells; 
but as with any of Strand’s works of erasure or “untelling,” only a self can write.  No matter 
how many times the speaker attempts to rewrite the story, he only undoes the story by 
doing so.  Strand’s poetry from Sleeping with One Eye Open to The Story of Our Lives builds as 
an unlikely Künstlerroman, the story of which is the artist continuously attempting to 
abscond not only from his art but from himself.  None of it so far has succeeded.  In order 
to undo the self, Strand must build himself a monument. 
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THE MONUMENT 
 
 
 Perhaps it is appropriate that most succinct and salient commentary on The 
Monument—a letter from Octavio Paz to Strand—has never been published.  The letter, 
dated 17 January 1978, is archived among Strand’s papers at the Lilly Library at Indiana 
University.  “I [. . .] entered the monument,” Paz writes, 
and, while I was visiting it, walking through the corridors, circles, arches, 
terraces, gates, walls, passages, bridges, cells, underground gardens, 
Labyrinths, I wondered—[is it] a mausoleum, a cenotaph, a burial urn, a pyre, 
a pyramid?  No: it is a Text.  It is not a place but a house of words where the 
meanings and its tribes (feelings, visions, impressions, echoes) appear and 
disappear and reappear again. . . I love very much your text, shifting and ever 
changing shape, refusing to reveal itself, poem perpetually undone, always in 
the blessed state of “almost unfinished” [. . .].  (Letter) 
Paz’s paradox—“almost unfinished”—is appropriate for the paradox that is The Monument.  
Strand’s Monument, as Paz notes, is neither monolith nor memorial, but a Möbius strip 
continuously turning upon itself, or the point of the ouroboros that is both tongue and tail.   
The 52 short prose sections of The Monument thread quotations from other authors—among 
them Sir Thomas Browne, Friedrich Nietzsche, Miguel de Unamuno, and most notably 
Walt Whitman—amid Strand’s own “blank prose” (47).  Dedicated and addressed “to the 
translator of THE MONUMENT in the future,” the premise of The Monument is to discover a 
way for the author’s work—for the author himself—to be translated into the future, into a 
provisional eternity.  Just as it defines itself, it defies itself, “the text already written, 
unwriting itself into the text of promise” (38).  “I speak for nothing,” its speaker says, “the 
nothing that I am, the nothing that is this work.  And you shall perpetuate me not in the 
name of what I was, but in the name of what I am” (9).  The Monument is Strand’s song of 
myself, of many selves, of no self at all. 
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If The Monument is Strand’s inversion of Whitman’s “Song of Myself,” it is also 
Strand’s most coherent version of an ars poetica.  The speaker who wishes to be translated 
into the future simultaneously “translates” other authors into the text to be translated, 
placing himself among the “immortals” in the process.  These sections ruminate on 
nothingness, and often on the impossibility of imagining the nothing from which we come 
and to which we return.  All poets write against various disappearances: the nothing of 
silence, of nonbeing, of being forgotten, of never being recognized at all.  These, too, are the 
fears against which Strand has shored his monument, mocking the authorial desire for 
immortality even as he enacts it.  He tells us that the Monument itself “is a void, artless and 
everlasting” (9).  But the Monument—the collaboration between speaker and translator—is 
the speaker’s only chance for survival.  “In what language do I live?” he asks.  “I live in none.  
I live in you” (6).  Much as the theoretical writings of some critical theorists—Jacques 
Derrida, for instance—might called “performative” or even “poetic,” Strand’s poem / prose / 
Monument represents a poetically inflected enactment of salient and persistent theoretical 
questions of identity, authority, textuality, translation and lyric voice.  Strand’s text—that 
“house of words where the meanings and its tribes [. . . ] appear and disappear and reappear 
again”—constructs and nullifies its own poetics, often on the same page.   
The word monument derives from the Latin verb monere: to advise or remind (OED).  
A monument may stand, monolithic, but its standing presence also “speaks” to those who 
need advising or reminding, who have forgotten or who never knew in the first place.  
Likewise a monument marks an absence; in standing and speaking it is the metaphorical 
presence of the absent.  This is in fact the method by which the monument warns: Siste, 
Viator—stop, traveler—and consider that toward which you travel.  The absence marked by 
a monument can also be, as Derrida has argued, a condition of writing itself.  “For a writing 
to be a writing,” Derrida claims, 
it must continue to “act” and to be readable even when what is called the 
author of the writing no longer answers for what he has written, for what he 
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seems to have signed, be it because of a temporary absence, because he is 
dead or, more generally, because he has not employed his absolutely actual 
and present intention or attention, the plenitude of his desire to say what he 
means, in order to sustain what seems to be written “in his name.” 
(“Signature Event Context” 8) 
As we shall see, exactly what is meant by “in his name” becomes its own matter of 
complexity in the course of The Monument.  The writing of The Monument, in order to 
continue being a writing and to continue the being of its author, must not only be readable 
in his absence but writeable as well.  Although the name “Mark Strand” appears as the 
author of the book entitled The Monument, “mark”ing the work as it would mark the place of 
burial, The Monument as it is spoken of in the text is authorless, anonymous.  It 
perpetuates its lost author in that it perpetuates language, which is all that remains of the 
self who created it.  As such it also perpetuates its translator, who allows the original 
language to continue in recreating it.  Derrida might argue that this continuation of the 
original language is characteristic of all texts, but what distinguishes The Monument is its 
overt concern, its textual (rather than contextual) concern with this (not only) Derridian 
idea.  Both author and translator function here as Barthesian “scriptors,” “agent[s] of 
language” “rather than [. . .] controlling consciousness[es]” (Bennett 15).  And since it is 
language that has created the self, to act as an agent for the language here is also to act as an 
agent for the original authoring self.  “Mark Strand” must mark the text and be demarcated 
by it even after Mark Strand has vanished from it.    
 Consider, for instance, the status of the texts from which Strand quotes throughout 
The Monument, the original authors of most of which had vanished well before The Monument 
appeared.  At first glance these quotations serve as epigraphs to what will follow in Strand’s 
text.  However, the word epigraph—with its sense of standing outside the writing itself—is a 
misnomer in this instance, given that the quotations are presented without immediate 
    
 68 
attribution7 and are separated from each other or from the author’s words only by the blank 
space of a paragraph break.  As such they become “translated” into The Monument via a 
mechanism similar to that by which, as we shall see, the author hopes that his (and his 
translator’s) words will translate himself into the future.  The promise of the future is that 
existence should go on indefinitely, that the future will always be available to become the 
present.  The premise of The Monument—to discover a way for the author to be translated 
into the future—is central as well to “Summa Lyrica,” Allen Grossman’s own eccentric 
meditation on poetic immortality, and a work that can seem written with The Monument in 
mind.  “The function of poetry,” Grossman writes, “is to obtain for everybody one kind of 
success at the limits of the autonomy of the will [. . .] The kind of success which poetry 
facilitates is called ‘immortality’” (209-10).  According to Grossman, poetry facilitates 
immortality via “the convergence of meaning and being in presence” (210).  Such a 
convergence, both authors concur, is possible only in the reader or translator.  Grossman 
argues that “at any moment of reading, the reader is the author of the poem, and the poem 
is the author of the reader.  The honor of creation is not with one or the other, but among 
them” (214).  Thus, although Strand writes that “my voice is sufficient to make The 
Monument out of this moment,” the voice is sufficient only insofar as it is heard, or read, or 
translated into another moment, the moment in which both author and translator write.  
Author and translator, writer and reader, are not only immortalized—monumentalized—by 
the work, but created by it.  The act of creation is not a matter of a first cause or unmoved 
mover, but the ongoing work of both creator and created. 
 While Derrida, Grossman, and others can illuminate The Monument just as other 
writers cast shadows on it, The Monument demands especially to be read in the context of 
Walt Whitman’s “Song of Myself.”  Kirby writes that “of all the poets who hover over The 
Monument, Whitman is the one whose spirit is most pervasive” (57).  Similarly, Bloom reads 
                                                
7 These quotations are unattributed in the immediate text, although their authors and sources are 
credited in a section of notes that concludes the book. 
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The Monument as “gently parodying” “Song of Myself” (“Review” 29).  In my view, although 
Whitman inspires and haunts Strand throughout the text, there is nothing gentle about the 
relationship between The Monument and “Song of Myself.”  Although The Monument fulfills 
the etymological root of the word “parody” by singing alongside or parallel to Whitman, 
Strand’s range of reactions against Whitman varies from parody to elegy to specific 
antithesis (OED).  In The Monument, as nowhere else in his poetry, the Strand persona 
directly addresses and challenges Whitman’s egotistical sublime with a solipsistic, nihilistic 
sublime of his own. 
 One can spend all of one’s energy in reading The Monument trying to discern just what 
The Monument is.  It is first reported as something momentary, made by a voice (2).  It is a 
phenomenon reported in either hemisphere (13) or “affirmed in heaven” as clouds drawn on 
the page, fluffy and cartoonish (20).  It may be counterfeited: “Do not be taken in,” the 
author warns, “by structures that call themselves The Monument” (15).  The Monument is 
scourged by “an army of angry poets” in #27.  They return to chip away pieces of The 
Monument to study it, like grave-robbers plundering the riches of the pyramids.  But none 
of these descriptions, finally, will suffice.  As the Strand persona tells us, “Only this 
luminous moment has life, this instant in which we both write, this flash of voice (3).  As 
with Descartes’ cogito, which proves one’s existence only as one thinks it, The Monument 
exists only as the author and the translator write. 
 “Let me introduce myself,” the author begins.  “I am . . . and so on and so forth.  
Now you know more about me than I know about you” (1).  In these ellipses Strand’s 
existentialist and Vaudevillian impulses meet; he offers an introduction that introduces 
nothing.  Of course, this is exactly the point.  The author, especially as he reaches across the 
abyss between past and present, is nothing more than ellipses, something so irrelevant as to 
be nothing.  At the same time, he also affirms his existence by declaring nothing more than 
I AM, like the voice from the burning bush or as in the Cartesian cogito (Exod. 3:14, 
“Meditations on First Philosophy” 24).  The affirmation of existence—whether it be past, 
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present, future, or purely theoretical—is the only essential of introducing the self.  In fact 
the word essential, with its roots in the Latin infinitive to be (esse), reminds us that existence 
itself constitutes essence, as the voice from the burning bush or the speaker of this section 
both affirm (OED).  Everything else can be dismissed as “and so on and so forth.”  To be is 
the essence of the Monument, and the essence is impossible. 
 In the second section, the author complicates the already-tricky assumptions of who 
he may or may not be by introducing the first of many quotations from other writers.  The 
quotations appear in italics but are unattributed until the end of the book.  As such, to call 
these snippets of language “quotations” is to understate their role in this text.  These lines 
appear as epigraphs to the various sections of The Monument, but since no attribution 
appears in the text itself, the lines lack the originating identity suggested by the word 
“quotation;” instead, they exist purely as language.  Their status between their original text 
and the texts they introduce here parallels the “between” status of both the speaker and 
translator of The Monument, and of the writers he (they) quote(s) as well.  These quotations 
appear as examples of Borges’s dictum that “what is good belongs to no one, not even to 
[Borges], but rather to the language and to tradition” (“Borges and I” 246).  And these ideas 
are reflected in the “quotation” itself, lines from Octavio Paz: “I am setting out from the 
meeting with what I am, with what I now begin to be, my descendant and my ancestor, my father and 
my son, my unlike likeness (“Old Poem” 106-7).  If the language of the past survives into the 
future, it also survives its speaker.  Language is the “unlike likeness” of the self. 
 “I might have had my likeness carved in stone,” the author writes in the subsequent 
section, “but it is not my image that I want you to have, nor my life, nor the life around me, 
only this document.  What I include of myself is unreal and distracting.  Only this luminous 
moment has life, this instant in which we both write, this flash of voice” (3).  The section 
begins with a somewhat Shakespearean refutation of statuary monuments.8  In 
                                                
8 “Not marble nor the gilded monuments / Of princes shall outlive this powerful rhyme [. . .]” 
(Shakespeare 1-2). 
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Shakespeare’s 55th sonnet, however, the survival of the “powerful rhyme” is sufficient to 
confirm that the addressee, and the poet, existed.  In The Monument, “to have existed” is 
insufficient.  As the translator of The Monument writes, s/he perpetuates the words of the 
original author, recovering him in the present tense.  To write—or to have written—and to 
translate (and to be translated) collapse the abyss between the dead and the living, uniting 
them in “this luminous moment” in which both exist as one writer, a congruence as brief 
and tenuous as the binding of any metaphor. 
 It is, of course, nothing new for a writer to claim that his work will stand as his 
memorial for time immemorial.  The Monument diverges from a Shakespearean claim for 
literary transcendence in order to wrestle with Whitmanesque bodily transcendence.  The 
Monument is, like “Song of Myself,” remarkable because of the particular intimacy Strand 
proposes between writer and reader, and remarkable in its own right for the explicitness and 
humor “with which its speaker exposes the will-to-immortality as a death grip” (Gregerson, 
Message).  Both The Monument and “Song of Myself” require their addressees to interact 
with the speakers themselves, to go beyond the reader’s basic engagement with the text.  
The translator of The Monument must do more, as much as The Monument has done for the 
translator: “This work has allowed you to exist, yet this work exists because you are 
translating it” (4). 
  Or let me put it this way.  You must imagine that you are the author of this  
  work, that the wind is blowing from the northeast, bringing rain that slaps  
  and spatters against your windows.  You must imagine the ocean’s swash and  
  backwash sounding hushed and muffled.  Imagine a long room with a light at  
  one end, illuminating a desk, a chair, papers.  Imagine someone is in the chair.  
  Imagine he is you: it is long ago and you are dressed in the absurd clothes of  
  the time.  You must imagine yourself asking the question: which of us has  
  sought the other?        (5) 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
    
 72 
The translator is one with the author as author of the work, as the work “is a thing made 
which makes its maker,” as “every atom belonging to [Whitman] as good belongs to you” 
(“Summa Lyrica” 260, “Song of Myself” 3). 
 It is not enough that the luminous flash of voice should preserve only the Strand 
persona’s work.  In that convergence the author seeks his own individual survival as well; 
like Woody Allen, he is less interested in living on in his work than in living on in his 
apartment.  The immortality of one’s work offers little to the creator of the work (or, 
despite Shakespeare, to its addressee) unless it prevents him or her from disappearing from 
the work and, eventually, from the world.  The author’s disappearance is necessary in 
Derrida’s criteria for “a writing” to become a writing, but Derrida’s interest is in the status 
of the writing.  Strand’s author is concerned with the status of his individual being as writing 
would perpetuate it.  When, in the hilarious arrogance of section 4, he claims that his “work 
has allowed [his translator] to exist, yet this work exists because [s/he is] translating it,” he 
neglects to mention the matter of existence that concerns him most: his own.  An excerpt 
from Miguel de Unamuno’s essay “The Secret of Life,” quoted in the fourth section of The 
Monument, articulates this need, if more earnestly, on the speaker’s behalf: 
  And the secret of human life, the universal secret, the root secret from which all other  
  secrets spring, is the longing for more life, the furious and insatiable desire to be   
  everything else without ever ceasing to be ourselves, to take possession of the entire  
  universe without letting the universe take possession of us and absorb us; it is the desire  
  to be someone else without ceasing to be myself, and continue being myself at the same  
  time I am someone else. . . .     (qtd. in The Monument 4) 
 
In the original passage, Unamuno continues: “it is, in a word, the appetite for divinity, the 
hunger for God” (200).  In other words, Strand does not say all that Unamuno claims: that 
the hunger to be others is the same as the hunger for God, even the hunger to be God.   
 This particular yearning for the divine resembles the difference Graham Greene 
articulates in The End of the Affair between unhappiness and happiness, pain and joy: “In 
misery we seem aware of our own existence, even though it may be in the form of a 
monstrous egotism: this pain of mine is individual, this nerve that winces belongs to me and 
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to no other.  But happiness annihilates us: we lose our identity” (36).  Again, the word 
“monstrous” suggests both the grotesque and the admonitory: too much attention to one’s 
individual existence can divert one from the absolute existence of the divine.  But Greene’s 
lines also suppose that misery makes us aware of our individual existence and not, as 
Strand’s work suggests, that our individual existence makes us laughably miserable.  The 
hunger for God that Unamuno and Greene describe is the hunger for the divine anonymity 
of pure being (“I AM”), the wish to cure the sickness of the individual self by dissolving it 
into a universal, infinite self.  (We shall see a similar desire for divinity at work in the poetry 
of Charles Wright.)  The Monument strives toward a similar status as both personal and 
impersonal, a work that is “neither/nor,” appearing to strive toward infinite nullity rather 
than infinite being.  In Strand’s formulation, a work of art is only perfect—is only The 
Monument—when it is nothing, “the nothing that I am, the nothing that is this work,” yet 
such a work of art also betrays the egotism of its creator (9). 
 It is, of course, a logical absurdity to be perpetuated in the name of nothing.  
Nothing is nothing; everything else is something.  Strand’s author nods in this direction when 
he says: 
  The objects you see from where you sit may be “anything.”  “Anything” may  
  be “nothing,” depending on what your feeling is.  If “nothing” conveys the  
  wrong idea, use “something.”  By all means, use “something” if you agree with  
  the poet who shrieks, “There is not nothing, no, no, never nothing.” (14) 
 
The poet who “shrieks” as much is Wallace Stevens, perhaps the most pervasive influence 
on Strand’s aesthetic.  Stevens cries out—to “Mother of heaven, regina of the clouds, / O 
sceptre of the sun, crown of the moon”—that “there is not nothing, no, no, never nothing” 
(“Le Monocle de Mon Oncle” 1-2, 3).  But he is the same poet who supposes that “one must 
have a mind of winter” to “[listen] in the snow, / And, nothing himself, [behold] / Nothing 
that is not there and the nothing that is” (“The Snow Man” 1, 13-15).  Only in poetry or in 
the mind can the nothing that is there also be something.  Here then is the crucial paradox 
of The Monument: one can aspire to nothingness, but one can never be at once one and 
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nothing, or one and everything, as in Unamuno’s “hunger for God.”  One divides by two and 
two and two, approaching nothing but never reaching it.   
 The author then must wallow in the same “sickness of the self” that earlier Strand 
poems have portrayed with varying degrees of directness.  Even aspiring to the 
“monumental” anonymity of nothingness makes a particular demand for the self.  As 
William Gass has observed, “Anonymity can be chosen by the poet because it is a humbling 
or self-mortifying condition.  One wishes to give up the selfish self and become a selfless 
self.  Selflessness is the highest form of selfishness there is because of the demands ‘it’ makes 
upon others” (footnote to 273).  In order to remain “anonymous” and in order to attain 
immortality, the speaker of The Monument—or even The Monument itself—demands the 
attention, demands the very being of his translator.  Gass’s use of “humbling” and “self-
mortifying” suggest the humus of burial earth, the posthumous existence of the work of art 
by which the poet, to modify W. H. Auden’s phrase about W. B. Yeats, becomes his 
admirers (“In Memory” 17).   
 Not his admirers, for Strand, but his translator.  “Through you,” the Strand persona 
says,  
  I shall be born again; myself again and again; myself without others; myself  
  with a tomb; myself beyond death.  I imagine you taking my name; I imagine  
  you saying “myself myself” again and again.  And suddenly there will be no  
  blue sky or sun or shape of anything without that simple utterance. (8) 
 
Here again is the impulse toward divinity, the impulse that there can be nothing—“no blue 
sky or sun or shape of anything without that simple utterance.”  Here language becomes not 
only prior to the self, as in Lacan’s formulation, but prior to all creation, as in Genesis and 
the Gospel of John.  The God of Genesis creates through speech, through successions of 
“Let there be,” a hortatory phrase that, as spoken by the creator himself, is purely self-
reflexive, an essential instance of what speech act theorists have called illocutionary 
declaration (Gen 1:3, Searle and Vanderveken 57).  Or, in the Gospel of John: 
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  In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word  
  was God.  The same was in the beginning with God.  All things were made by  
  him; and without him was not any thing made that was made.  In him was life; 
  and the life was the light of men.  And the light shineth in darkness; and the  
  darkness comprehended it not.      (John 1:1-5) 
Strand’s creation, by contrast, is a darkness that comprehends and envelops, but which the 
light of creation itself cannot comprehend.  The hermeneutical connotation of 
“comprehend”—the world as a text written and read—is especially germane to Strand’s 
Monument.  As Stanley Rosen writes in “The Limits of Interpretation”: 
  The initial purpose of hermeneutics was to explain the word of God.  This  
  purpose was eventually expanded into the attempt to regulate the process of  
  explaining the word of man.  In the nineteenth century, we learned, first from 
  Hegel and then, more effectively, from Nietzsche, that God is dead.  In the  
  twentieth century, Foucault informed us that man is dead, thereby opening  
  the gates into the abyss of postanthropological deconstruction.  As the scope  
  of hermeneutics has expanded, then, the two original sources of   
  hermeneutical meaning, God and man, have vanished, taking with them the  
  cosmos or world, and leaving us with nothing but our own garrulity, which we  
  choose to call the philosophy of language, linguistic philosophy, or one of  
  their synonyms.  If nothing is real, the real is nothing; there is no difference  
  between the written lines of a text and the blank spaces between them.  (228) 
Putting aside Rosen’s tendency here to caricature Foucault’s work in destabilizing 
anthropocentric philosophy, his sense of the equivalence of “the written lines of a text and 
the blank spaces between them” is of particular value in considering Strand’s aesthetic.  
Indeed, for Strand the lack of difference between speech and silence the written lines of a 
text and the blank spaces between them” is a paradox necessary to create The Monument: 
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  The Monument is a void, artless and everlasting.  What I was I am no longer.  
  I speak for nothing, the nothing that I am, the nothing that is this work.  And 
  you shall perpetuate me not in the name of what I was, but in the name of  
  what I am.           (9) 
 
Grossman’s conception of the poem as “a thing made which makes its maker” here meets 
the Strandian view of all creation—the thing made, the maker, the making itself—as 
destined for nothingness, as already nothing.  They must be “perpetuated”—literally, “to 
cause or continue to endure indefinitely”—not as the makings that they were, but as the 
nothing that they are (OED). 
 Not that this should by any means be easy.  As a reading of Strand’s early books 
demonstrates, the self—for all its elusiveness, for even its theoretical non-existence—is a 
difficult thing to be rid of.  And though the act of writing, for Strand, has become an act of 
“untelling”—or, as he articulates here, “the text already written, unwriting itself into the 
text of promise”—the act reaffirms the self it would evacuate (38).  “In speaking the poem,” 
Grossman writes, “the speaker of the poem reacquires selfhood by serious reciprocity with 
another self.  He or she reenters the situation of humanity, becoming conscious of it once 
again as if for the first time and without dismay” (258).  Grossman’s qualifying “as if” is 
important in this context, for only a self would need to acquire (or to reacquire, with its 
sense of having suffered a loss) selfhood.  Similarly, although The Monument “dwells on the 
absence of a self,” it still requires a self to do the dwelling (22).  The Strand persona seeks 
both to preserve his selfhood indefinitely and to be perpetuated by his translator in the 
name of nothing. 
 Utterly aware of having asked the impossible of a translator he only imagines, the 
speaker invents a speech for his translator to deliver to himself/herself.  Appropriately, it is 
to “be delivered into the mirror”: 
  The author is the opposite of a good author, allowing no people in his work,  
  allowing no plot to carry it forward.  Where are the good phrases?  They’re  
  borrowed!  It all adds up to greed—his words in my mouth, his time in my  
  time.  He longs to be alive, to continue, yet he says he is nobody.  Does he  
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  have nothing to say?  Probably not.  Anonymous, his eyes are fixed upon  
  himself.  I grow tired of his jabbering, the freight of his words.  My greatest  
  hope is his continued anonymity, which is why I bother to finish The   
  Monument.         (31) 
 
Despite the translator’s suspicion to the contrary, the author indeed has “‘nothing’ to say,” 
and says it again and again, metamorphosing the nothing into something.  It is perfectly 
appropriate to this Monument that the only words “spoken” by the translator are in fact the 
author’s.  It is just as appropriate that the translator chooses to “bother to finish The 
Monument” in order to perpetuate its original author’s “continued anonymity.”  “The honor 
of creation,” Grossman writes, “is not with one or the other, but among them.”  The honor 
of negation, of decreating, is among them as well. 
 Strand’s author needs to be translated in order to have written (and thus to have 
existed) in the first place.  His existence precedes him, however: “I imagine you taking my 
name,” the speaker says, as if the translator were to be the bride to his bridegroom, giving 
up his/her identity and assuming his own.  “And what I assume you shall assume,” as 
Whitman writes (2).  Strand’s speaker would see the Whitmanesque “Me myself” become 
the substance of others as well: he writes “myself myself” in order to imagine his translator 
“saying ‘myself myself’ again and again.”  When the speaker in section 39 feels “a surge of 
power,” he worries—if only for a moment—that his identity will be too strong to allow The 
Monument to come to be.  He identifies (betrays) himself as “a single strand, upright, 
making translation less and less possible” (39).  If the self exists at all for Strand, it may exist 
only in the slippery second connotation of a pun, of “a single strand.”  The work of a pun, 
like the work of metaphor, takes place in the space between strata of signification.  For 
Strand, such space is where the most important poetic work occurs; this is the space that 
defines the self in relation to the world, or for that matter, that defines the self against 
itself.  The pun amplifies the signifying power of language even as it is created through the 
power of language to conflate significances.  In a pun—as in the named anonymity of The 
Monument, or in the spaces between words and lines that become equivalent to the text 
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itself—the Strand speaker can at once be and not be.  This pun on his name 
notwithstanding, Strand’s insistence on the omission of personal detail differs substantially 
from Whitman, who identifies himself from the beginning by age (“now thirty-seven years 
old” [8]) and by name (“Walt Whitman, a kosmos, of Manhattan the son” [497]).  Always 
seeking to re-ravel his own fraying paradoxes, Strand emphasizes his omission of personal 
detail by including the personal detail he had decided not to include, using “paragraphs from 
an abandoned autobiography” (21) to show such a project’s futility.  We can assume that this 
work was abandoned because autobiography will not do.  Personal detail will not do.  Only 
The Monument will do. 
 In this section the Strand persona imagines a personal, familial history of tragicomic 
proportions.  He recalls having invented, as a child, the story that his grandfather had fallen 
into a vat of molten metal and was “now part of a Cleveland skyscraper” (21).  This eerie 
detail is still more than the speaker claims to know of his paternal grandmother, who died 
giving birth to the speaker’s father.  If we read these “autobiographical details” as we read 
the Strand persona’s own desire for survival through translation, then the grandfather has 
been translated—carried over—as part of a different monument, of steel and concrete.  The 
grandmother dies as the father begins to live; what she was lives in him.  The author, for his 
part, claims to remember almost nothing about either, yet he perpetuates them in the 
language that constitutes the monument of this work.  But what business has any of this in a 
document that is supposed “to dwell on the absence of a self”?  The author mentions his 
grandmother, for instance, only to say that he knows nothing of her.  Perhaps this 
knowledge itself, or the lack thereof, is the perfect Strandian Monument, and any living self 
is sufficient memorial to those who have come before.  Recall Section #44 of “Song of 
Myself”: 
Immense have been the preparations for me, 
Faithful and friendly the arms that have help’d me. 
 
[. . .] 
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They sent influences to look after what was to hold me. 
 
Before I was born out of my mother generations guided me, 
 
[. . .] 
 
All forces have been steadily employ’d to complete and delight me, 
Now on this spot I stand with my robust soul.   (1157-1169) 
 
 Whitman’s autobiography is the biography of the universe.  He speaks of the cosmos 
as a family that has nurtured him since long before his conception; he embodies traces of 
their cosmic genetics:  “I find I incorporate gneiss, coal, long-threaded moss, fruits, grains, 
esculent roots, / And am stucco’d with quadrupeds and birds all over” (670-671).  The 
singular self of Whitman is large enough to incorporate—literally, to take into his body—
this miscellany of the natural world.  Strand’s response is his most direct and defiant 
rejoinder to “Song of Myself”: 
SONG OF MYSELF 
 
   First silence, then some humming,  
   then more silence, then nothing, 
   then more nothing, then silence, 
   then more silence, then nothing. 
   
  Song of My Other Self: There is no other self. 
 
  The Wind’s Song: Get out of my way. 
 
  The Sky’s Song: You’re less than a cloud. 
 
  The Tree’s Song: You’re less than a leaf. 
 
  The Sea’s Song: You’re a wave, less than a wave. 
 
  The Sun’s Song: You’re the moon’s child. 
 
  The Moon’s Song: You’re no child of mine.  (35) 
 
Here Strand’s author—nihilistic and orphaned—sounds like the addressee of Whitman’s 
question (1144), “Were mankind murderous or jealous upon you, my brother, my sister?”  
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How startlingly Strand’s words depart from and defy the optimism of “Song of Myself,” in 
which the universe seems to have conspired on behalf of the speaker.  The sprawl of 
Whitman—across the page, across the continent and thousands of other selves—is met by 
“less than.”  The reductive, laughable self of Strand’s song exists only to be told that its 
existence does not matter.  Such alienation seems irreconcilable with “For room to me stars 
kept aside in their own rings” or “All forces have been steadily employ’d to complete and 
delight me” (1160, 1168).   
 The self that persists in The Monument—“single, upright”—cannot be completely 
jettisoned or translated.  Whitman, as if echoing Strand as his own future translator, had 
reported: “I too am not a bit tamed, I too am untranslatable” (1332).  But where Whitman 
invites (“Stop this day and night with me and you shall possess the origin of all poems” [33]), 
equating the Self with the Other (“every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you” [3]),  
Strand commands the reader, who is in fact the translator: “Say I predicted it.  Write it 
here” (26).  “Translate.  Translate faster” (39).  Whitman mitigates his egoism with supreme 
selflessness, as if the body were a permeable membrane across which the self and others 
flow.  Strand mitigates his absence and anonymity with the egotistical desire—not for a 
monument, but for The Monument—and a relationship with his translator that ultimately 
negates them both.  “Some will think I wrote this,” he says, “and some will think you wrote 
this.  The fact is neither of us did.  There is a ghostly third who has taken up residence in 
this pen, this pen we hold” (38).  The ghostly third is The Monument, which has given us 
The Monument.    
 Strand’s ghostly third haunts the locus of its onetime presence.  Whitman’s soul 
pervades everything, like its own holy ghost, expressing (here both “to press out” and “to 
portray, represent”) an expansive self that is “not contain’d between my hat and boots” 
(OED, “Song of Myself” 133).  Whitman betrays no anxiety about personal extinction, for “to 
die is different from what any one supposed, and luckier” (130).  It’s Whitman, remember, 
who “bequeath[s] himself to the dirt to grow from the grass I love, / If you want me again 
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look for me under your boot-soles” (“Song of Myself” 1339-1340).  Extinction is inevitable, 
and in Whitman it is triumphant, but in The Monument it becomes an event that must be 
circumvented, and paradoxically can be circumvented only in submission to nothingness.  
Whitman’s reach across the void of time seems a gesture of goodwill, but Strand’s persona 
acts from a sardonic arrogance.  He commands the reader because he requires the reader in 
order to exist; he must be translated to flame again among the living.  And as Whitman 
bequeaths himself to the dirt, Strand quite literally dedicates his work, which is himself, to 
“the Translator of THE MONUMENT in the future.”  This is egotism confessed and satirized; 
even those writers whose names “were writ in water” dream of being written in stone or, 
better yet, written in other writers. 
 The ultimate destiny of Strand’s author is in other writers, both future and past.  As 
he adds sections to The Monument, approaching its conclusion (but not necessarily its 
completion), he “subtract[s himself] from [his] words.”  “My blank prose travels into the 
future,” he writes, “its freight the fullness of zero, the circumference of absence.  And it 
misses something, something I remember I wanted.  Soon I shall disappear into the well of 
want, the lux of lack (47).  He anticipates the extinction that will complete him, that will 
allow him, in Borges’s words, “to know who I am” (“In Praise of Darkness” 46, qtd. in The 
Monument 18).  Once having imagined his translator taking his name, he now muses: 
  If I were to die now, I would change my name so it might appear that the  
  author of my works were still alive.  No I wouldn’t.  If I were to die now, it  
  would be only a joke, a cruel joke played on fortune.  If I were to die now,  
  your greatest work would remain forever undone.  My last words would be,  
  “Don’t finish it.”        (51) 
 
And they are.  With these words the speaker will say no more.  The rest is left both to the 
future and the past.  The speaker leaves The Monument unfinished, and it is completed not 
by his translator but by Walt Whitman, as if the great poet had indeed stopped somewhere 
waiting for him: 
  O living always, always dying! 
  O the burials of me past and present, 
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  O me while I stride ahead, material, visible, imperious as ever; 
  O me, what I was for years, now dead, (I lament not, I am content;) 
  O to disengage myself from the corpses of me, which I turn and look at where I cast  
   them, 
  To pass on, (I living! always living!) and leave the corpses behind.  
        (1-6, qtd. in The Monument 52) 
 
 If my reading of The Monument is correct, Strand sets out to challenge “Song of 
Myself,” only to be undone by Walt Whitman himself.  Perhaps the Strand persona would 
not have it any other way.  Whitman disperses himself as if to fulfill Unamuno’s secret of 
life, to become everything else while still remaining himself: 
I depart as air, I shake my white locks at the runaway sun, 
I effuse my flesh in eddies, and drift it in lacy jabs. 
 
I bequeath myself to the dirt to grow from the grass I love, 
If you want me again look for me under your boot-soles. 
    
You will hardly know who I am or what I mean, 
But I shall be good health to you nevertheless, 
And filter and fibre your blood. 
 
Failing to fetch me at first keep encouraged, 
Missing me one place search another, 
I stop somewhere waiting for you.     (1337-1346) 
 
Whitman’s dispersals are nothing for the poet to lament.  In “Song of Myself,” the self is 
immortal, and so it does not matter if it is human, or grass, or air.  But extinction in The 
Monument is inevitable, an event that paradoxically must be circumvented and yet can be 
circumvented only by submission to nothingness.  Even the titles enforce these paradigms: 
Whitman sings of and celebrates the self, fluid and inclusive.  A song acts on and modulates 
the air through which it moves.  Strand’s experiments in self-negation bring us to stone.  A 
monument is solid, inexplicable, but in Strand’s case, as evasive as the self.   
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Whatever monument The Monument creates, it stands for Strand, for his imaginary 
future translator, and for the Whitman whom Strand translates into The Monument.9  If what 
an author creates belongs to language or to the tradition, as Borges argues, then, as Borges 
argues, “[. . .] every writer creates his precursors.  His work modifies our conception of the 
past, as it will modify the future” (“Kafka and His Precursors” 201).  The same is true of the 
individual author’s past and future.  In my own view, The Monument is nothing less than the 
lens through which to consider all of Strand’s work.  Better yet, it is a mirror reflecting the 
first half of his career in the second.  “If it is a mirror to anything,” Strand’s speaker says, “it 
is to the gap between the nothing that was and the nothing that will be.”  For the poet and 
for us that gap is filled by the self, no matter our feelings about it.  The Monument is a mirror 
that reflects earnestness as satire, egomania as self-effacement.  It reveals the necessary 
absurdity of any work beginning with “I,” and the impossibility of any that would not. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
9 This is an idea Strand will adopt and explore in “Translation,” in which he imagines a conversation 
with Borges himself: “‘Say,’ I said.  ‘If translation is a kind of reading, the assumption or 
transformation of one personal idiom into another, then shouldn’t it be possible to translate work 
done in one’s own language?  Shouldn’t it be possible to translate Wordsworth or Shelley into 
Strand?”  Borges responds, as the author of The Monument might have, that “it is you who must be 
translated” (54, my emphasis). 
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NONE OTHER THAN MYSELF 
 
 If the self could not be unified, jettisoned, or translated, it could, at least, be 
mocked.  The latter phase of Strand’s career turns upon the commodified poetic self the 
first phase had created.  The self that appears or absconds ominously in early Strand poems 
now returns anticlimactically as the Strand speaker’s deadpan existential angst becomes 
further tempered with absurdist humor.  From The Continuous Life onward, Strand’s 
relationship with the self becomes more similar to the relationship Jorge Luis Borges 
describes in “Borges and I”: “I know of Borges from the mail,” he writes, “and see his name 
on a list of professors or in a biographical dictionary.  I like hourglasses, maps, eighteenth-
century typography, the taste of coffee and the prose of Stevenson; he shares these 
preferences, but in a vain way that turns them into the attributes of an actor” (246).  
Borges’s metaphor of the actor is apt in considering this phase of Strand’s career: the self 
remains on stage—the “bare stage, first stage” of The Monument—but the drama has become 
a farce (42). 
 Where in The Monument and other poems the Strand speaker wrestled with the 
dramatized figure “Mark Strand,” whose name marks the texts he speaks, Strand’s speaker 
now satirizes that figure, portrays him in his new poems as a subject to be parodied.  The 
divested, commodified self of Strand’s early poems represents one strategy for baring the 
mechanism of the lyric speaker.  In the second half of his career, Strand’s treatment of the 
idea of the lyric speaker—and of himself as that speaker—is more explicitly parodic, even 
clownish.  This is the means by which, as Nicosia writes, Strand becomes a poet who can 
“confront the anxiety of his own influence [. . .],” whose “anxiety of creation originates in 
himself, in his own success”  (6, 15).  The notion of a poet confronting his or her own 
influence is a wonderfully Strandian revision of Harold Bloom’s theory of influence, and 
although I would resist Nicosia’s Bloomian terms, I think he is correct that Strand comes to 
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write against his own career and the public self created by that career.10  Moreover, Strand 
chooses this conflict as a specific alternative to the conflicts of the apparently 
autobiographical poems he had published toward the end of the first phase of his career.  At 
the time of their publication, however, these poems suggested a new direction for the poet, 
who seemed to be turning from cold, ironic solipsism toward a warmer, more “humane” 
aesthetic.  Critics welcomed the turn, but like the personal detail considered and discarded 
in The Monument, autobiography still would not do. 
 Critics tend to agree that Strand’s turn toward domestic themes in The Story of Our 
Lives and, further, in The Late Hour and Selected Poems, signaled a profound change in his 
aesthetic.  Strand seemed to have arrived at a warmer, more personal aesthetic, the narrative 
went, and his critics thoroughly approved.11  The narrative caught on except, apparently, 
with Strand, who in the second half of his career rejects these experiments with 
autobiographical themes.  Jonathan Aaron describes the crisis in Strand’s aesthetic: “After 
                                                
10 Nicosia considers Strand’s confrontation with the anxiety of his own influence to be the central 
tension of Blizzard of One, while I read this tension as exemplary of the entire second half of Strand’s 
career. 
 
11 Kirby writes, for instance, that for all the similarities between Strand’s early work and a new poem 
such as “Leopardi,” the new work differs “from those [early] poems in that it is cast in these new, 
midcareer terms of childhood memory.  It is as though that old troublesome business of the self has 
reemerged only to be attacked with a different strategy.  What makes these poems different is that 
the problem of self is considered in the context of younger and older speaker as well as younger 
speaker and parent” (66-7).  Kirby is correct that this quality differentiates these poems from 
Strand’s earlier work; indeed this same quality will lead Strand to abandon poetry for nearly a decade 
(Aaron). 
 
Stitt, too, compares such poems favorably to Strand’s earlier work, contending that Strand’s “retreat 
into a world of the mind” was “accompanied by such extreme reductiveness” that “the method does 
not so much liberate the imagination as confine it.”  “It is this fact,” Stitt continues, “that accounts 
for the feeling of sterility one has when reading the early Strand [. . .].  Conversely, this fact also 
helps to explain why the later poems in [Selected Poems] are so especially satisfying—they please not 
just intellectually, as the early poems do in abundance, but emotionally, humanly, and warmly as 
well” (205).  Gregerson is most circumspect of these three readers: “In his earliest poems, the 
memory Strand was interested in was the memory he could engineer, the memory he come become.  
In poems written since the late 1970s, he grants some affection to the merely historical, some 
credence to the merely found, and he diversifies the methods of provoking recognition” (26).   
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Selected Poems came out in 1980, Strand hit something of a wall.  “I gave up [writing poems] 
that year,” he says, looking back.  “I didn’t like what I was writing, I didn’t believe in my 
autobiographical poems” (Aaron).  As the poems of The Continuous Life and later collections 
demonstrate, Strand breaks through the limitation of potential self-parody by engaging in a 
deliberate parody of the idea the self, and especially of himself.  These later poems still 
demonstrate the wry apprehensiveness that had become Strand’s trademark, but he had 
honed and expanded his gallows humor to lend the work a richer emotional range. If 
Strand’s poetry has always considered Hamlet’s great question, then the later poems manage 
to marry the Prince’s conundrum with the dark humor of Macbeth’s Porter. 
Although this phase of Strand’s career begins in force with The Continuous Life, traces 
of self-parody (as opposed to self-effacement or –negation) are evident in earlier poems, 
particularly in “The Story,” from The Late Hour (1978), a book that also contains several of 
the autobiographical poems that critics praised and Strand abandoned.  “The Story” reads 
like a parody of an early Strand poem or a sarcastic answer to Yeats’s late question “What 
can I but enumerate old themes” (9).  Here is Strand’s poem in full: 
  It is the old story: complaints about the moon 
  sinking into the sea, about stars in the first light fading, 
  about the lawn wet with dew, the lawn silver, the lawn cold. 
 
  It goes on and on: a man stares at his shadow 
  and says it’s the ash of himself falling away, says his days 
  are the real black holes in space.  But none of it’s true. 
 
  You know the one I mean: it’s the one about the minutes dying, 
  and the hours, and the years; it’s the story I tell 
  about myself, about you, about everyone.    (1-9) 
 
In typical Strandian fashion, “The Story” negates the story of Strand’s work while at the 
same time affirming it, retelling “the story I tell / about myself, about you, about everyone.”  
Here Strand dramatizes his own sense of poetic belatedness, and especially his belatedness 
in relation to himself and his own poems.  In a 1998 interview with Wallace Shawn for The 
Paris Review, Strand returns to the fear of repetition and self-parody: 
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[F]inally—despite experimentation and all the self-righteousness attendant 
on experimentation—it’s more of our own poems that we want to write, more 
of our own poems, poems that sound like they were written by us.  [. . . A] poet 
whose vocabulary is very reduced—say, limited to words like glass, dark, 
stone—those were my words for years— [. . .] would conjure up the same bleak 
landscape again and again.  I felt I had to sort of break through that 
limitation.      (“The Art of Poetry” 171) 
His solution is typically Strandian: as “The Story” and later poems demonstrate, Strand 
breaks through the limitation of potential self-parody by engaging in a deliberate parody of 
the idea and the legacy of the poetic self.   
It is no surprise, then, to find in The Continuous Life a poem entitled “To Himself.”  
What surprises, instead, is the calm of the visit, the relative ease of the interaction between 
self and self.  “So you’ve come to me now without knowing why,” the speaker begins, as if 
astonished that after all this time—after all these poems—the self should finally come 
unbidden to him (1).  And the speaker’s response to the self’s arrival, rather than revulsion or 
terror, seems to be a mellowing sympathy: “Nor why you have chosen this moment to set 
the writing of years / Against the writing of nothing [. . .]” (4-5).  Anyone who would write 
must always “set the writing of years / Against the writing of nothing.”  In a Strand poem, 
however, the two have often enough turned out to be roughly equivalent, although the 
momentary act of writing also turns out to be the only viable protest—if not defense—
against encroaching nothingness.  In “To Himself,” instead of becoming the “Someone Else” 
writing the poem, as in “My Life By Somebody Else,” the other self speaks to the speaker: 
  You were mine, all mine; who begged me to write, but always 
  Of course to you, without ever saying what it was for; 
  Who used to whisper in my ear only the things 
  You wanted to hear; who come to me now and say 
  That it’s late, that the trees are bending under the wind, 
  That night will fall . . .      (7-12) 
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This visiting self says many of the same things Strand speakers have said over the years, but 
tenses seem to have shifted.  Instead of losing sleep over the dreadful that may happen, the 
Strand speaker seems resigned to the nothing that has happened, and resigned as well to 
himself.  Whether his attitude is resignation or sympathy, the Strand speaker can laugh at 
himself more openly than ever, and his laughter allows for a more complex engagement with 
his intimations of his—and others’—mortality. 
 The question of how to live with others, with oneself, pervades The Continuous Life 
from its title onward.  Despite its deliberate engagement with literary history and culture 
(including riffs on Virgil, Kafka, Chekhov, and Borges), the book’s concerns are more 
domestic than those of any work since The Story of Our Lives.  Instead of attempting versions 
of poetic autobiography, Strand concerns himself with the nature of the story itself.  
Consider “Fiction,” which itself seems a revision of “The Story of Our Lives,” now written 
from outside rather than from within the story: 
  I think of the innocent lives 
  Of people in novels who know they’ll die 
  But not that the novel will end.  How different they are 
  From us.  Here, the moon stares dumbly down, 
  [. . .] 
  And somebody—namely me—deep in his chair, 
  Riffles the pages, knowing there’s not 
  Much time left [. . .].     (1-4, 6-8) 
 
Strand’s speaker reminds that one can know only one’s own world and not the place of that 
world in the context of others.  When the speaker says “How different they are from us,” 
neither he nor we should believe it.  The story of our own lives frames the story of the lives 
we read about in fiction, and in “Fiction,” but what frames our lives?  In whose story do we 
exist?  Strand’s generalities here—“the soldiers,” “the trees that line / The river,” “the cities 
of the interior”—suggest the minutiae of these (or our own) individual lives (12-13, 14). 
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One cannot be outside one’s own life, but here, for a moment, it is as if the Strand speaker 
has finally found a fixed point from which to consider the entirety of reality, no longer 
encumbered by the difficult relativity of living the story he is trying to write.  
 In “Fiction,” the Strand speaker becomes the visitor in someone else’s story, the 
potentially ominous observer of other characters or, in later poems, even their interlocutor 
in the mode of earlier Strand poems.  This new strategy for interlocutor poems persists 
through The Continuous Life, Dark Harbor (1993), Blizzard of One (1998), and Man and Camel 
(2006). Often, as in “To Himself,” the Strand speaker will encounter someone who speaks in 
a suspiciously Strandian idiom.  In “I Will Love the Twenty-first Century,” from Blizzard of 
One, a man at a boring party turns to the speaker and says: 
         “Although I love the past, the dark of it, 
  The weight of it teaching us nothing, the loss of it, the all 
  Of it asking for nothing, I will love the twenty-first century more, 
  For in it I see someone in bathrobe and slippers, brown-eyed and poor, 
  Walking through snow without leaving so much as a footprint behind.”12 
            (6-11) 
 
Here is the Rimbaudian moment Howard has described and Strand has so often portrayed, 
become wickedly comical, the Grand Guignol doppelgänger poems of his early career revised 
as Vaudeville.  Instead of meeting this situation with horror or revulsion, or even old-
                                                
12 For more evidence of the interlocutor’s Strandian idiom, compare the speech of the man in “I 
Will Love the Twenty-first Century” with that of the speaker of the first section of “What It Was,” 
also from Blizzard of One: 
 
  It was impossible to imagine, impossible 
  Not to imagine; the blueness of it, the shadow it cast, 
  Falling downward, filling the dark with the chill of itself, 
  The cold of it falling out of itself, out of whatever idea 
  Of itself it described as it fell; a something, a smallness, 
  A dot, a speck, a speck within a speck, an endless depth 
  Of smallness; a song, but less than a song, something drowning 
  Into itself, something going, a flood of sound, but less 
  Than a sound; the last of it, the blank of it, 
  The tender small blank of it filling its echo, and falling, 
  And rising unnoticed, and falling again, and always thus, 
  And always because, and only because, once having been, it was . . .   (1-12) 
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fashioned existential angst, the Strand speaker’s response is:  “‘Oh,’ I said, putting my hat 
on, ‘Oh’” (12).  In the twenty-first century, it seems, one will respond to meeting oneself 
with a shrug, with the donning of a hat.  In these new visions of old Strandian situations, the 
speaker uses such chance meetings as occasions to mock his own ego as well as the 
increasingly prominent status of the poet Mark Strand.13  These new interlocutor poems, in 
which the Strand speaker himself becomes an unexpected or unwelcome visitor (or even 
becomes an animal), parody the notion and taunt the ego of the “great poet.”  In and after 
The Continuous Life, the Strand speaker finds mirrors conveniently set up in the woods so 
that he may admire himself (“Old Man Leaves Party”) or finds himself the obsessive subject 
of others’ admiration and affection, as in “Translation,” in which the speaker is repeatedly 
seduced in the midst of theoretical conversations about the nature of poetic translation. 
 “Translation” reads like an epitaph to the epitaph that is The Monument, a satire of 
that self-satire.  Again Strand’s speaker questions what it means to translate and to be 
translated, the role of language in both distinguishing and extinguishing identity.  In this 
poem, however, most of the questioning comes from other characters—a son, a son’s 
teacher, a teacher’s husband, a language professor.  In these characters’ voices Strand 
ventriloquizes various straw man theories about the nature of translation.  At the same time, 
each character wants something of the Strand speaker—attention, seduction, affirmation.  
In the voices of his speaker and these characters, Strand can inhabit and satirize the 
theories and the archetypical characters who speak them; more importantly, he can inhabit 
and satirize the figure of “the poet” whom these characters seek.  From the poem’s second 
section: 
  My son’s nursery school teacher came over to see me.  “I don’t know   
  German,” she said, as she unbuttoned her blouse and unsnapped her bra,  
                                                
13 Although already a significant figure in contemporary poetry when his Selected Poems was published, 
Strand’s reputation grew remarkably in the Eighties and Nineties, during which he received a 
MacArthur “Genius” Fellowship (1987), the Bollingen Prize (1993) the Pulitzer Prize (for Blizzard of 
One, 1999), and served as Poet Laureate of the United States (1990-91). 
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  letting them fall to the floor.  “But I feel that I must translate Rilke.  None of 
  the translations I’ve read seem very good.  If I pooled them, I’m sure I could  
  come up with something better.”  She dropped her skirt.  “I’ve heard that  
  Rilke is the German Gerard Manley Hopkins, so I’ll keep ‘The Wreck of the  
  Deutschland’ on my desk as I work. [. . .]”  She took off her panties.  “Well,  
  what do you think?” she asked as she stood naked before me.  (49) 
 
This encounter might seem merely exercise for the ego were it not for the swelling absurdity 
of the next section, in which the teacher’s husband arrives for a similar conversation with 
similar, if more surprising, acts of affection and seduction.  First “he [dabs] his sweaty upper 
lip with a crumpled hankie,” then, after some more talk of translation, dabs the speaker’s 
upper lip with the hankie “and brush[es his] cheek with the back of his hand” (50, 51).  The 
ridiculous series of conversational seductions and the theoretical nature of the 
conversations they interrupt act as the poem’s yin and yang, the lowbrow absurdity of one 
allowing the conceptual absurdity of the other.  
 The various absurdities of these encounters likewise allow the imaginative 
grandiosity of the poem’s final visitation, from Jorge Luis Borges, with whom the Strand 
speaker engages in the longest debate of the poem.  Translation, they speculate, has less to 
do with choosing particular words as substitutes for other words, and everything to do with 
becoming somebody else entirely.  The Strand speaker, for instance, suggests that “if 
translation is a kind of reading, the assumption or transformation of one personal idiom 
into another, then shouldn’t it be possible to translate work done in one’s own language?  
Shouldn’t it be possible to translate Wordsworth or Shelley into Strand?”  In the midst of 
this conversation with an imagined Borges, the Strand speaker returns to the essential 
assumption of the translation project at the heart of The Monument, and a question essential 
to Strand’s entire oeuvre: is it possible to translate more than one’s language?—to translate 
oneself?  To what extent is the self constituted through language, and might it be possible 
for that language (and thus, that self) truly to be translated?  The imagined conversation 
with Borges allows Strand to translate himself into Borges and Borges into Strand, which 
    
 92 
exactly what the envisioned Borges claims is necessary.  “You will discover,” Strand’s Borges 
says to Strand’s speaker,  
  that Wordsworth refuses to be translated.  It is you who must be translated,  
  who must become, for however long, the author of The Prelude.  That is what  
  happened to Pierre Menard when he translated Cervantes.  He did not want  
  to compose another Don Quixote—which would be easy—but the Don Quixote.   
  His admirable ambition was to produce pages which would coincide—word  
  for word and line for line—with those of Miguel de Cervantes.  The initial  
  method he conceived was relatively simple: to know Spanish well, to re- 
  embrace the Catholic faith, to fight against the Moors and Turks, to forget  
  European history between 1602 and 1918, and to be Miguel de Cervantes.  To  
  compose Don Quixote at the beginning of the seventeenth century was a  
  reasonable, necessary, and perhaps inevitable undertaking; at the beginning of 
  the twentieth century it was almost impossible.    (54) 
     
Borges the character’s lines in Strand’s “Translation”—about Menard’s work coinciding 
“word for word and line for line”—happen to coincide nearly word for word and line for line 
with Borges the author’s words in his own short story “Pierre Menard, Author of the 
Quixote.”14  Earlier in the poem, the Strand speaker ventriloquizes various theories about 
translation, inevitably discarding each as insufficient.  In the poem’s final section he 
ventriloquizes Borges by quoting Borges, and specifically a Borges story about a character 
“translating” Don Quixote by quoting it verbatim.  The moment affirms poet and translator at 
least inasmuch as it affirms language itself.  The speaker of the text has come to an end, but 
the text itself—to return to Derrida’s notion of what qualifies as “a writing”—abides.  It is 
only the ego of the writer that considers the text equivalent with its originator; likewise it is 
the ego of the writer that wishes for the text to survive its originator.  No one in 
“Translation” escapes the satire of Strand’s speaker, least of all Strand himself. 
                                                
14 In James E. Irby’s translation: 
 
He did not want to compose another Quixote—which is easy—but the Quixote itself.  
Needless to say, he never contemplated a mechanical transcription of the original; he 
did not propose to copy it.  His admirable intention was to produce a few pages 
which would coincide—word for word and line for line—with those of Miguel de 
Cervantes.  (39) 
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 Several sections of the book-length poem Dark Harbor continue the trend toward 
self-aggrandizement for the purpose of self-effacement.  Loosely rooted in the myth of 
Orpheus, Dark Harbor is a quasi-allegorical pseudo-narrative of an ersatz pilgrimage, in 
which the poet becomes (if briefly) the poet of myth.  Several of the poem’s 46 sections take 
place in a nameless, static milieu, a “night without end” where “[i]t has been / Years since 
the stores in town were open, / [. . .] Since the cloud behind the nearby mountain moved” 
(I.1, XIV.21-2, 24).  Such a condition of stasis amplifies the importance of the poet’s task to 
create song out of the events of the past and out of the possibilities of the imagination.  The 
few events that do take place in the poem tend to occur in the speaker’s imagination, or in 
his memory, in the “place that is not a place” (IX.4).  As in in “Translation,” some of these 
events are sexual escapades which begin in boasting and end in self-mocking or mere 
absurdity: 
    Madame X begged to be relieved 
  Of a sexual pain that had my name 
 
  Written all over it.  Those were the days 
  When so many things of a sexual nature seemed to happen, 
  And my name—I believed—was written on all of them. 
 
  [. . .] 
 
    Did I suffer,   
  Knowing that I was wanted for the wrong reasons? 
  Of course, and it has taken me years to recover.  (XXII.2-6, 10-12) 
 
Such a lover—a human, remembered lover—is insufficient to the speaker.  In the poem’s 
eighth section, then, the speaker imagines an encounter with the only lover who could 
possibly satisfy him.  Here is Strand at his most grandiose and most self-effacingly comedic: 
  The harmonies of wholesomeness have reached their apogee, 
 
  And I am aquiver with satisfaction, and you look 
  Good, too.   
  [. . .] 
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    O my partner, my beautiful death, 
  My black paradise, my fusty intoxicant, 
 
  My symbolist muse, give me your breast 
  Or your hand or your tongue that sleeps all day 
  Behind its walls of reddish gums. 
 
  Lay yourself down on the restaurant floor 
  And recite all that’s been kept from my happiness. 
  Tell me I have not lived in vain, that the stars 
 
  Will not die, that things will stay as they are, 
  That what I have seen will last, that I was not born 
  Into change, that what I have said has not been said for me. (VIII.9-24) 
 
The speaker’s “you look / Good, too” at first seems to refer to a woman, a Madame Y who 
attracts the speaker as much as he, “aquiver with satisfaction,” attracts himself.  But women 
and men, like autobiography, cannot do.  Instead, the speaker describes the lover in the 
surreal imagery of an early Strand poem—a female personification of Death who goes on 
dates, who shares her lover’s soup.  The section shifts drastically from the exhibitionistic 
“lay yourself down on the restaurant floor” to the more plaintive “recite all that’s been kept 
from my happiness.”  Alone with Death, the speaker asks his impossible requests, as 
Orpheus might have done, but as in “I Will Love the Twenty-first Century” or even in “My 
Life,” the speaker appears to surrender the most charged lines to another voice.  His 
imperative “Tell me” tells us all we need to know about what he wants and what he knows 
cannot be without him taking responsibility for the conjecture.  Nothing can be assured: the 
stars will die, and the speaker as well, having been “born / Into change.”  What he has seen 
may not last, but what he has said—more accurately, the act of saying—may. 
 Strand continues his speaker’s love affair with Death in Man and Camel, and 
especially in “2002.”  In this poem, a personified Death appears as a fan of Strand’s poetry, 
pining for the poet as the Strand persona once pined for himself.  Death, it turns out—like 
the interlocutor of “I Will Love the Twenty-first Century”—speaks in the mode of the 
Strand speaker, and longs for his arrival in “the city of souls” (7).  Like so many poems from 
    
 95 
Strand’s latter phase, “2002” pushes the egotism of the “great poet” so far into absurdity 
that the egotism dissolves in laughter; in that laughter the egotism can be forgiven.  In 
“2002” the Strand speaker goes one step beyond Orpheus: instead of the poet singing to 
move Death to pity, Death himself now sings of his longing for the company of “Strand.”  I 
quote in full: 
  I am not thinking of Death, but Death is thinking of me. 
  He leans back in his chair, rubs his hands, strokes 
  His beard and says, “I’m thinking of Strand, I’m thinking 
  That one of these days I’ll be out back, swinging my scythe 
  Or holding up my hourglass to the moon, and Strand will appear 
  In a jacket and tie, and together under the boulevards’ 
  Leafless trees we’ll stroll into the city of souls.  And when 
  We get to the Great Piazza with its marble mansions, the crowd 
  That had been waiting there will welcome us with delirious cries, 
  And their tears, turned hard and cold as glass from having been 
  Held back so long, will fall, and clatter on the stones below. 
   O let it be soon.  Let it be soon.”     (1-12) 
 
It seems entirely appropriate that Death should sing his love song to Strand in a Strandian 
idiom.  The exaggerated importance of this “Strand” suggests that Death desires the author 
rather than the historical person, but it is the figure of the author who will survive the death 
of the historical person.  In fact, as the prose poems of Almost Invisible demonstrate, the 
death of the person can be envisioned as the final triumph of the author, the ultimate 
solution to the problem of the self.  As in “2002,” the Strand speaker turns his imminent 
extinction into an imagined apotheosis.  But the apotheosis is reserved for “Mark Strand,” 
the author figure who emerges as the person begins to disappear. 
 The speakers of Almost Invisible wish for impossible journeys, to be “[led] away from 
all [they] had known” (“The Students of the Ineffable,” 11).  These journeys would not 
distance the travelers from any particular place but, perhaps inevitably, from themselves.  In 
“Once Upon a Cold November Morning,” such a journey leads the speaker away from his 
“daily life” to a place where he discovers, 
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  in all its chilly glory, the glass castle of my other life.  I could see right through 
  it, and beyond, but what could I do with it?  It was perfect, irreducible, and  
  worthless except for the fact that it existed.     (27) 
 
I read this “other life’ as roughly equivalent with the textual “life” of the author.  In this way 
“Once Upon a Cold November Morning” sets the “sunlit fields of my daily life” against the 
“glass castle of my other life,” recalling Borges’s distinction between the “I” who likes 
“hourglasses, maps, eighteenth-century typography, the taste of coffee and the prose of 
Stevenson” and the “he” who “shares these preferences, but in a vain way that turns them 
into the attributes of an actor.”  Borges’s speaker finds that “Borges” “has achieved some 
valid pages, but those pages cannot save me [. . .] I am destined to perish, definitively, and 
only some instant of myself can survive in him” (246).  That instant is nothing more than the 
name from which Borges’s—or Strand’s—speaker will soon disappear.  Strand’s speaker 
finds that the other life is both perfect and worthless: worthless in that it cannot save the 
speaker, but perfect in the fact of its existence, which may persist even after the speaker 
(and the person) has died.  In fact the status of that other life’s writing, to return again to 
Derrida, becomes “a writing” only when the person who created it has disappeared from it. 
 If indeed Almost Invisible proves to be Strand’s last book, then his poetic career 
concludes as it began—with his speaker in bed, pondering the divisions within himself, 
imagining what may happen.  In “Sleeping with One Eye Open,” the sense of fugue brought 
on by such divisions finds its formal enactment in the poem’s echoing rhymes.  In “The 
Minister of Culture Gets His Wish” and “When I Turned a Hundred”—indeed, throughout 
Almost Invisible—the fugue of the self is enacted in the troubled genre of the prose poem.  
Like The Monument created in the author’s and translator’s simultaneous act of writing, 
like the poet who both exaggerates and satirizes his own significance, and like the self that 
both is and is not, these texts enact the paradoxes they pose: “[s]ometimes appearing as 
pure prose, sometimes as impure poetry [. . .]” (Jacket copy).  The genre itself is another 
instance of the Strandian “neither/nor.”  The speaker who lay in bed hoping that nothing 
will happen has become a speaker who gets his wish: 
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  He lies on his bed and tries to think of nothing, but nothing happens or, more 
  precisely, does not happen.  Nothing is elsewhere doing what nothing does,  
  which is to expand the dark.  But the minister is patient, and slowly things  
  slip away—the walls of his house, the park across the street, his friends in the  
  next town.  He believes that nothing has finally come to him and, in its absent 
  way, is saying, “Darling, you know how much I have always wanted to please  
  you, and now I have come.  And what is more, I have come to stay.” (8) 
 
Nothing comes to the minister lovingly, as Death moons over the Strand speaker in “2002,” 
and in the end of the poem the Minister of Culture and Nothing are brought together in 
the matrimony of invisibility.  Similarly, the speaker of “When I Turned a Hundred” wants 
“to go on an immense journey [. . .] until, forgetting my old self, I came into possession of a 
new self.”  The self here is something to be possessed, something that can be changed and 
exchanged.  It is something less than Whitman’s more essential “Me myself,” yet it persists 
as something that the Strand speaker cannot be rid of: only a new self can forget the old self. 
 Nevertheless, in these last lines, Strand once more enacts the paradox inherent in the 
statement “I am not.”  “I was gone,” the speaker says in the past tense, implying his 
continuing existence in some other state.  If the speaker is to be believed, then he has 
traversed the gap between “almost invisible” and “invisible.”  He speaks from nothingness; 
he speaks as nothing, and as such he speaks from the center of the Strandian paradox.  The  
Möbius strip continues its endless turning, the ouroboros swallows its tail, and he remains, 
more or less, where he began.  It is impossible, as Strand has demonstrated, both to be and 
not to be.  Very well then, Strand’s poems contradict themselves; they dwell in the 
possibility of this impossibility, as if one could be nothing and still be, as if nothing could 
have another name.  
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Chapter Two 
 
This This: Charles Wright 
 
 “The love of God is the loneliest thing I know of,” Charles Wright has said  
(“Halflife” 31).  Phrased differently, nothing makes one more painfully aware of one’s own 
human solitude than an attempt to communicate with—or merely to contemplate—the 
divine.  Throughout his career Wright has addressed that solitude and articulated the 
longing to transcend it.  He has also expressed his conviction that to transcend solitude in 
pursuit of the infinite divine would require transcending the finite, limited self.  Wright’s 
desire to transcend the self, however, concurs paradoxically with a religious penitentiary 
need to “confess” and extricate the self.  As we shall see, even his attempts at such 
transcendence result in telling the story of—thus, in creating—the self, and in reinforcing 
the distance between that self and the longed-for divine.  Wright doubts the possibility of 
these varieties of transcendence even as he attempts them in his poems.  In Wright’s 
apophatic theology, one can perceive the absence of or the ache for God, but one cannot 
conceive of the God for whom one aches.  Any human conception of God is insufficient to 
the nature of the absolute, since the absolute is necessarily inconceivable.  Since the limited 
self cannot be transcended and the infinite cannot even be contemplated, Wright’s poetry 
instead “work[s] in the synapse” between them (“Halflife” 35).    
 The unspeakable absolute remains the implicit subject behind and beyond Wright’s 
stated subject matter—“landscape, language, and the idea of God” (“Bytes and Pieces” 81).  
These subjects, Bonnie Costello writes, “form, of course, one trinitarian subject.  Language, 
especially metaphoric language, introduces the negative principle into landscape because it 
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creates a difference from the seen world, which allows us to view it in a symbolic aspect, and 
it is in this difference that ‘the idea of God’ takes shape” (329)1  The idea takes shape not 
only in the difference between the seen world and the figured world, but in the difference 
between the intelligence that describes the world and the world itself, as in the difference 
between “the idea of God” and God.  The spaces between idea and word, word and flesh, 
between the desire to transcend and the (in)ability to do so are the loci of Wright’s poetry.  
As Costello suggests, Wright’s poetry represents a via negativa, an attempt to describe in 
terms of negation, given the understanding that one cannot speak directly of the 
unspeakable.  The fallible, fungible medium of human language cannot adequately speak of 
the absolute, but it can acknowledge its own failures; it can be used to enact the inadequacy 
of our own fallible, fungible condition and the desire to transcend it. One can read Wright’s 
career—as a number of commentators have done—as “an effort to construct a spiritual 
autobiography.”  In this sense, Andrew Mulvania describes Wright’s work as a form of 
“confession,” both as “a practice of scrutinizing one’s life for spiritual meaning and for the 
more secular purpose of the artful construction of some version of the self” (“Confessions”).2  
Such a binocular view of “confession” places Wright’s work in the theological tradition of 
Augustine of Hippo as much as in the poetic tradition of Robert Lowell, Sylvia Plath, and 
others.  I would align Wright more closely with Augustine in that Wright’s poetry confesses 
                                                
1 Costello also points out—and I emphasize this in my own discussion of Wright’s subject 
matter(s)—that “[t]he ultimate unit of ‘something infinite behind everything’ is Wright’s only 
subject, endlessly renewed as his capacious mind confronts the landscape” (326).  To this I would add 
that the subject is renewed as he confronts his stated subject matter, “landscape, language, and the 
idea of God,” all of which represent the speakable manifestations of the unspeakable “infinite 
behind everything” which, to complete the lines from which Costello quotes, “appears, / and then 
disappears” (“The Other Side of the River” 32). 
 
2 For other readings of Wright’s project as spiritual autobiography, see Bonnie Costello, “Charles 
Wright’s Via Negativa: Language, Landscape, and the Idea of God;” Kevin Hart, “La Poesia è Scala a 
Dio: On Reading Charles Wright;” James McCorckle, “‘Things That Lock Our Wrists to the Past’: 
Self-Portraiture and Autobiography in Charles Wright’s Poetry;” Andrew Mulvania, “Confessions of 
St. Charles: Confession as Spiritual Autobiography in the Work of Charles Wright;” Lee Upton, 
“The Doubting Penitent: Charles Wright’s Epiphanies of Abandonment.”   
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the self—“to acknowledge, own, avow”—as a theological apologia, in an attempt to get 
beyond it (OED).  If Wright’s career represents a spiritual autobiography, the autobiography 
is not the story of the self, but the story of “[u]ndoing the self,” a task that Wright says “is a 
hard road” (“Ostinato and Drone” 1).  Wright’s poems do not so much seek to express or 
absolve the self as they seek to dissolve it into the absolute.  As such he is not necessarily 
interested—as both Augustine and the Confessional poets are—with narrating significant 
events in his own life for the purpose of attributing to them some spiritual or secular 
significance.  To the extent that Wright’s poems narrate anything, they narrate a conversion 
experience figured in his depictions of landscape and meditations on language, time and 
memory.  By “conversion” I intend the more obvious spiritual connotations of the word as 
well as the sense of an alchemical conversion, a transformation (or even transubstantiation) 
of the evanescent self into language, landscape, and time, all of which become Wright’s 
finite suggestions of the infinite.  As he writes in “April”: 
  I count off the grace and stays 
  My life has come to, and know I want less— 
 
Divested of everything, 
A downfall of light in the pine woods, motes in the rush, 
Gold leaf through the undergrowth, and come back 
As another name, water 
Pooled in the black leaves and holding me there, to be  
Released as a glint, as a flash, as a spark . . . .  (5-12) 
The speaker of these lines supposes that to be less than oneself is somehow to be more; 
one’s self must be dissolved, transformed, in order to become something more essential.  As 
we shall see, Wright’s alchemical tools are not the crucible and alembic of the hermetic 
tradition, but poetic form as he perceives it, form as structural principle, form as ritual. 
 For Wright, the unnegotiable distance between the finite and infinite is also the 
distance between the self and the divine, between the present and the past, and between the 
visible world and the invisible.  “The invisible,” Costello writes, “is not a vague presence or a 
ghostly absence, but a quality formed by our desire for absolutes, which in turn gives 
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contour to the finite world we see and recall” (325).  I want to emphasize the word recall 
here, as Wright’s poems themselves linger on the idea of memory as the fallible but 
necessary record of a coherent self and of the various landscapes through which the self is 
understood.  As Wright attempts to recall his past into his poems, he finds that just as the 
divine remains beyond the reach of human temporal and linguistic limitations, so do the 
various human experiences through which he would constitute himself.  These experiences 
include the various landscapes he describes, both observed and remembered, especially 
Appalachian Tennessee and North Carolina, Italy, California, Montana, and Virginia.  As 
Costello writes, “landscape is not a home [. . .] but a mediation of self and void” (326-7).  
Such mediation, however, would depend upon our own power to mediate landscape within 
the limits of human language.  Moreover, in Wright’s poems, memory itself is a type of 
landscape, and landscape a medium for attempting to remember where—and what—one has 
been.  Ultimately, landscape, memory, and language all fail: he cannot employ them to 
constitute, confess, or transcend the self, but these failures instead become Wright’s 
method of silhouetting the unimaginable divine. 
 Wright’s poetic method also includes the rigorous if idiosyncratic formal structure 
that his poems have demonstrated for about the last thirty years.  “Each line should be a 
station of the cross,” Wright has written, and as such he has established the “stations” of his 
own poetic line by adhering to odd numbers of syllables (“Improvisations” 5).  Wright has 
remarked in conversation, for instance, that a line of an odd number of syllables is less likely 
to fall into a simple tetrameter or pentameter (“Conversation”).  Thus, Wright suggests that 
an odd number of syllables in a line maintains the tension of his free verse lines against what 
T. S. Eliot called “the ghost of some simple meter [lurking] behind the arras” (187).  I want 
especially to emphasize the ritualistic aspect of these syllable counts: for Wright, the 
enumerative ritual becomes a temporary stay against time itself.  Similarly, his evolving 
sense of the page as its own landscape becomes a method for approximating the nonverbal 
    
 102 
structures of the natural world in the words and lines on the page, and in the spaces between 
them.  The borders between subject and technique blur; Wright works within their margins.  
 These uses of formal organization are most functionally apparent in The Southern 
Cross (1981), which represents a pivotal point in Wright’s career as a poet.  As concerned 
with memory as Wright is, his early poems treat specific memories in a private, almost 
encoded language.  The poems of The Southern Cross, Wright’s fifth collection, mark a shift 
from the imagistic, airtight lyrics of his early career to a longer, more meditative (and more 
consistently syllabic) line.  They also mark the beginning of his consistent use of the 
dropdown hemistich (the “low rider,” as he calls it) that extends Wright’s free verse line 
across the page, expanding the shape of the printed poem and allowing more blank space 
within it (“Halflife” 33).  Wright’s elliptical version of poetic autobiography relaxes as he 
elongates his poetic line.  Where an earlier Wright poem may have offered an image 
without a specific referent, resulting in an almost inscrutable, hermetic language, the poems 
of and after The Southern Cross often include dates and references to proper names of people 
and places.  Wright comes to treat these specific references according to his observation 
that “all tactile things are doors to the infinite” (“Halflife” 28).  The various nouns of the 
visible world, he finds, are ways to approach the divine rather than distractions from it.  At 
the same time, as Wright’s language of landscape and memory becomes more specific, he 
finds the possibilities of language, landscape, and memory more suspect themselves.  Along 
Wright’s via negativa, he finds the failure of language to describe the absolute as well as its 
inability ultimately to depict landscape or even the self.  Nevertheless, Wright’s laments for 
the inadequacy of language are composed in language of lush descriptiveness, emphasizing 
the beauty as well as the inadequacy of language.  If the attempt to transcend the self and 
approach the divine must necessarily fail, then Wright will make his poetry out of the 
failure instead. 
 My claims about Charles Wright’s poetry draw on readings of his work as via 
negativa (Costello), as a form of Augustinian confession (Mulvania), as an “abandoning [of] 
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the limited confines of the self” (Upton 24), as an attempt to “access [. . .] spiritual 
wholeness” through devotion to landscape (Spiegelman 83), and as an enactment of negative 
capability through formal organization (Cushman).  Each of these critics offers compelling 
readings of a facet of Wright’s poetry, but none of these accounts represents a 
comprehensive whole.  My own treatment of Wright’s work synthesizes and expands these 
readings to demonstrate how Wright’s poetry links the apophatic theologians’ vocabularies 
of doubt about the knowability of God with the language of poststructuralist doubts about 
the stability of language and knowledge.  If Wright’s poetry represents in part a spiritual 
autobiography in the Augustinian tradition, his use of landscape to figure that elliptical 
narrative is indebted to the self-fashioning impulse and natural theology of William 
Wordsworth.  At the same time, Wright’s collagist technique, the associative logic of his 
images, and the ritualistic aspect of his formal method represent debts to the Modernist 
aesthetic of his acknowledged master, Ezra Pound.  Wright’s revision of Pound’s dictum—
“make it new” remade as “make it old”—represents one example of Wright’s assimilation, 
his “transubstantiation” of these influences into a poetics distinctly his own (The Cantos 
53.67-9, “Looking Around” 18).  Wright’s poetry is Romantic in subject matter, Modernist in 
method, and both medieval apophatic and poststructuralist in its doubting approach to 
language and knowledge.  As Wright has said: 
  The battleground is always Language.  It is not forms, or narrative, or the  
  image (although these are constant individual skirmishes).  The Language  
  Poets, to their credit, understand this dogma.  Their problem is that they  
  can’t, or refuse, to see the battleground for the war.  The war is never won,  
  and is eternal.  It is the battleground that must be ordered and set to rights  
  every so often.  Language has reference to a larger whole.  The battleground  
  has reference to a larger war. (“Halflife” 39) 
Doubt—regarding the reliability of language and the knowability of the divine—lies at the 
heart of Wright’s poetics.  Wright is not merely a religious poet in a supposedly secular age; 
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he is a poet whose work illuminates the indebtedness of poststructuralist linguistic, 
epistemological doubt to the medieval vocabularies of apophatic doubt regarding the nature 
of the divine and the foundations of human knowledge.  In this chapter, then, I seek to 
understand Wright’s poetry as a multi-faceted attempt—despite his doubts about the 
possibility of doing so—to approach the divine through language, landscape, memory, and 
by attempting and failing to transcend the individual, finite self. 
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IT WILL NOT REVEAL ITS NAME 
  
 For all Wright’s emphasis on the unspeakable, he is remarkably forthcoming about 
the goals of his own work.  These claims may not constitute a coherent system, but the 
themes of articulating and of extricating the self resound among them:  “What do I want my 
poems to do?  I want them to sing and to tell the story of my life” (“Halflife” 23).  “I write 
poems to untie myself, to do penance and disappear / Through the upper right-hand corner 
of things, to say grace” (“Reunion” 4-5).  “The poem is a self-portrait \ always, no matter 
what mask / You take off and put back on” (“Roma II” 8-9).3 
  I write, as I said before, to untie myself, to stand clear, 
  To extricate an absence. 
  The ultimate hush of language, 
         (fricative, verb, and phoneme), 
  The silence that turns the silence off.  
        (“There Is a Balm in Gilead” 13-16) 
 
Implicit in these excerpts is the sense that, for Wright, to portray the self—to attempt to 
fix the self even temporarily in the language of a poem—is to work toward “undoing the 
self,” toward “untying” or “extricating” the self from its own limits.  In Andrew Mulvania’s 
reading of Wright’s “autobiographical project,” these simultaneous treatments of the self 
identify Wright’s work as not merely autobiographical but as confessional:   
If Wright’s autobiographical project is confessional, it is so in this 
Augustinian sense of the evolution of a self.  Though Wright questions the 
very notion of a unified self that could undergo such an evolution [. . .] and 
eschews the possibility of fixing that self in time or language [. . .], he must 
nevertheless perform a ritualistic gesture, however artificial, of supplication to 
those objects whose function it is to shore up a notion of an authentic self.  
                                                
3 Here and throughout, I indicate Wright’s use of the dropdown hemistich, the “low rider,” with a 
forward slash (“\”), although I count the material on either side of this forward slash as a single line. 
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(“Confessions”)    
Mulvania’s phrase “ritualistic gesture” emphasizes the Augustinian sense of confession, the 
quality that renders the act of confession in symbolic terms.  Indeed, as Garry Wills argues, 
Augustine’s own Confessions must be understood in such symbolic terms rather than as mere 
autobiography, as even “the first autobiography”: 
  [Confessions] does not fit into that genre [autobiography].  God does not need  
to learn anything about Augustine’s life.  Augustine is trying to acknowledge 
the sacred graces that make his life part of sacred history—whence the 
constant use of Scripture.  [. . . Confessions] stands closer to Pilgrims Progress, or 
even to The Divine Comedy, than to Rousseau’s Confessions.  It is a theological 
construct of a highly symbolic sort.  [. . .]  We are not in the realm of 
autobiography but of spiritual psychodrama. (22-3, 25) 
Augustine’s “constant use of Scripture” and his frequent quotations from other thinkers 
represent both an attempt to “make his life part of sacred history,” but also to use the words 
of others in crafting a coherent self. “[B]y a paradox,” Wills writes, “Augustine’s use of other 
people’s words (the sacred authors’) helps him speak most authentically as himself” (9).  
Wright employs a similar method, especially in and after The Southern Cross, quoting from or 
replying to Chinese philosophers and poets, Christian mystics and doubters, blues and 
bluegrass musicians.  In both Augustine and Wright we find that, whatever else the self is, it 
is a composite of others, and a composite less narrated than performed.   
The notion of performativity—specifically the role of ritual performativity in 
articulating or extricating the self—returns us to Wright’s idea of the poetic line as a 
“station of the cross,” the symbolic reenactment of Christ’s progress to crucifixion at 
Golgotha.  The segmenting of Christ’s original experience into reproducible “stations” 
orders the physical and meditative experience of the penitent pilgrim, who would 
commemorate Christ’s Passion as well as atone for his own symbolic role in the Passion.  
Moreover, the symbolic transference of one physical place into another (Christ’s steps in 
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Jerusalem “transferred” to the nave of a cathedral, for instance) allows the pilgrim 
metaphorically to transcend space and time.  Wright’s use of the phrase to describe his 
sense of the poetic line suggests specific forms and structures become sanctified, as well as a 
process through which individual parts become significant in themselves and in relationship 
to a larger whole.  In the words on a page, a reader of Augustine’s Confessions can occupy the 
roles of both penitent and confessor, reading Augustine’s words as Augustine’s, but also as if 
they were one’s own.  The reader of a poem, similarly, “travels” the landscape of the poem 
from line to line: the Italian word stanza, meaning stopping place or room, preserves this 
spatiotemporal metaphor, and derives from the same Latin root—stare, or to stand—in which 
“station” originates (OED).  If each line is a station of the cross, then each line contributes 
to a structure that allows a commemorative, reiterative experience for the reading audience.   
 The performative qualities of Augustine and Wright’s works notwithstanding, I find 
that Wills’s reading of the symbolic quality of the Confessions underestimates the life of the 
book among its mortal audiences.  Augustine explicitly addresses his Confessions to his God, 
but he also asks: “Why, then, do I tell you all these stories of mine?  Surely not that you 
should learn them from me.  Rather I raise up towards you my mind and the minds of those 
who read all this, so that together we may say: Great is the Lord and worthy of high praise [. . .]” 
(11.1.1).  So of course Augustine is aware that human readers form a secondary but necessary 
audience, and the “spiritual psychodrama” that results between the book’s author and its 
primary audience plays out as we secondary readers read.  As such we “overhear” Augustine’s 
address to the omniscient in much the same way John Stuart Mill suggests that an audience 
“overhears” the speaker of a lyric poem.  As Mill distinguishes between “eloquence” and 
“poetry”: 
eloquence is heard, poetry is overheard.  Eloquence supposes an audience; the 
peculiarity of poetry appears to us to lie in the poet’s utter unconsciousness of 
a listener.  Poetry is feeling confessing itself to itself, in moments of solitude, 
and bodying itself forth in symbols which are the nearest possible 
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representations of the feeling in the exact shape in which it exists in the 
poet’s mind. (11-12) 
Mill imagines poetry as a self-reflexive confession: the statement for the statement’s sake, or 
even, I would suggest, as a form of ritual.  Of course, Mill’s understanding of “moments of 
solitude” must be modified to “apparent solitude” if we listeners are to overhear anything.  
Thus we are privy to the address of the lyric poem—“feeling confessing itself to itself”—as 
we are privy to the “spiritual psychodrama” of Augustine’s Confessions and of Wright’s 
“confessional” project. 
 My formulation of Wright’s “confessional” method, then, synthesizes these versions 
of overhearing, in both of which the ritual or performance of saying is of equal or greater 
precedence than the content of what is said.  Narrative is incidental but also inevitable.  We 
readers impose a narrative on what we read just as the autobiographer imposes an artificial 
narrative—even if only for the sake of the clarity of repeatability—out of a life of lived 
moments.  Or, as Wright has said in similar terms: “Form is nothing more than a 
transubstantiation of content” (“Improvisations” 3).  Indeed, the mystery at the heart of the 
notion of transubstantiation—the bread and wine of the Eucharist become the body and 
blood of Christ—resembles the mystery of transformation at the heart of the poem, as the 
visible world becomes the verbalized world, the lived life the inscribed life.4  The 
metamorphic process allows Wright to downplay the importance of his specific biography 
in favor of the autobiographical act: “My biography is pretty much the biography of 
everyone here,” he remarks (“At Oberlin College” 60).  “Everyone’s life is the same life \ if 
you live long enough” (“The Southern Cross” 130).  If Wright’s claim about autobiography is 
true, then the autobiographical project must be justified not only in terms of 
                                                
4 Stephen Cushman understands the process as vectored in the opposite direction: “[I]f I follow 
[Wright’s] formulations about content, subject matter, and form, the real ‘content’ of any poem, or 
at least any poem by Charles Wright, is the mystery of how the bread and wine of lines of verse 
become the body and blood of the universe” (207).  Ultimately, I think, the fact of changeability 
matters more than the direction of the change. 
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transforming—“transubstantiating”—the content of lived life into a literary life, but lived 
life as form into literary form.5  Wright’s version of Augustinian confession takes on just this 
task, but where Augustine affirms his faith, Wright affirms only the forms of faith.  “All my 
poems seem to be an ongoing argument with myself about the unlikelihood of salvation,” he 
writes, and out of this quarrel with himself—to paraphrase William Butler Yeats—Wright 
makes his poetry (“Halflife” 37, Yeats 331).  Wright’s autobiographical, confessional project 
also represents an apophatic poetics, as Wright dramatizes the “ongoing argument” with 
himself as one that can yield no answers, but only suggestions. 
 Although the terms apophaticism and via negativa are borrowed from theology, they 
are particularly germane to a consideration of Charles Wright’s poetry, not only because of 
Wright’s spiritual concerns but especially because of their suggestions regarding the limits 
of language and the limits of knowledge.  Denys Turner offers a succinct explanation and 
summary of apophaticism: 
  ‘Apophaticism’ is the name of that theology which is done against the   
  background of human ignorance of the nature of God.  It is the doing of  
  theology in the light of the statement of Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth  
                                                
5 Wright has been emphatic about his own view of the separation of “form” and “content.”  In a 1986 
interview with Carol Ellis, Wright says: 
 
  [Philip] Larkin’s comment was ‘Form means nothing to me.  Content is everything.’   
  My comment would be that content means nothing to me.  Form is everything.   
  Which is to say, to me that most vital question in poetry is the question of form.   
  Form lies at the heart of all poetical problems.  I don’t mean ‘forms’—I don’t mean  
  sonnets, sestinas, rondeaus, quatrains, triplets.  I mean Form.  UFO—Ultimate  
  Formal Organization, if you wish.  That may be extrapoetical in some sense.  But I’m 
  concerned with form and structures, the architecture of form. 
         (“With Carol Ellis” 153-4) 
 
Wright clarifies the point in another 1986 interview, with Stan Sanvel Rubin and William Heyen: 
“Form means everything to me, content is nothing.  I don’t believe that, of course, but it’s a 
provocative thing to say, because people say, ‘What do you mean?’  My point is that once you know 
your content, the way Larkin knew his forms, then it’s not something you have to think about 
anymore” (“‘Metaphysics of the Quotidian’” 32). 
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  century, that ‘we do not know what kind of being God is’.  It is the   
  conception of theology not as a naive pre-critical ignorance of God, but as a  
  kind of acquired ignorance, a docta ignorantia as Nicholas of Cues called it in  
  the fifteenth century.  It is the conception of theology as a strategy and  
  practice of unknowing, as the fourteenth-century English mystic [the author  
  of the Cloud of Unknowing, hereafter “Cloud Author”] called it, who, we might  
  say, invented the transitive verb-form ‘to unknow’ in order to describe   
  theological knowledge, in this its deconstructive mode.  Finally,   
  ‘apophaticism’ is the same as what the Latin tradition of Christianity called  
  the via negativa, ‘the negative way’.  (19) 
“Unknowing,” as Turner has described it in the terms of the Cloud Author, has to do with 
“unsaying,” the limits of one’s language, which—as we have seen in our consideration of 
Strand and Wittgenstein—describe the limits of one’s world.  One can speak of God only 
insofar as one can say what God is not; whatever one might name “God” cannot, by virtue of 
being named, be God.  Our ability to transcend is limited by our (in)ability to name.  Or, as 
Wright observes, “We who would see beyond seeing \ see only language, that burning field” 
(“Looking Outside the Cabin Window” 17).   
 It is significant, too, that Wright should call language “that burning field,” that he 
should imagine language as landscape.  In Wright’s poetry landscape becomes an obsessive 
subject for the descriptive powers of language that fail to describe the Absolute.  Landscape 
(as opposed to “nature”), in being described (literally, written down or written off) by language, 
becomes with language a stand-in for the absolute (OED).6  Landscape represents the limits 
                                                
6 In the commonplace journal published as “Bytes and Pieces,” Wright distinguishes “landscape” 
from “nature” metaphorically:  
  
  —The heart of nature is nature, the heart of landscape is God.  Which is to   
  say, the heart of nature is disease (and disease), and the heart of landscape is   
  design (dasein). 
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of what one can see; language represents the limits of what one can say or know.  Moreover, 
speaking of landscapes—both those perceived and those remembered—becomes a way of 
speaking about the self.  “Landscape was never a subject matter,” the Wright speaker says in 
the recent poem “The Minor Art of Self-Defense,” “it was a technique, / A method of 
measure, \ a scaffold for structuring” (1-2).  The subject matter is and “was always” language, 
“the idea of God / The ghost that over my little world / Hovered [. . .]” (4-6).  But this 
distinction complicates matters rather than clarifying them.  For Wright, landscape is both 
technique and subject matter, just as language is both technique and subject matter.  
Landscape and language are methods for picturing the invisible “ghost,” “the idea of God,” 
the self’s relationship to God and to the idea of God.  As perceivable changes in landscape 
seem to point outward, to the unperceivable, they can also point inward, to the perceiver 
himself, and to his understanding of himself as within the landscape or separate from it.  
Here it is worth repeating Costello’s formulations that “landscape  [mediates] self and void,” 
and that “[l]anguage, especially metaphoric language, introduces the negative principle into 
                                                                                                                                                       
  —Landscape is something you determine and dominate; nature is something   
  that dominates you. 
 
  —Nature is inherently sentimental, landscape is not. 
 
  —Landscape is a “distancing” factor (description of same, identification of   
  self in same) as regards the “self,” the “I” in poetry.  Nature, on the other   
  hand, is quicksand. (85) 
 
Wright returns to the subject in section 14 of Littlefoot: “—The language of nature, we know, is 
mathematics. / The language of landscape is language, / Metaphor, metaphor, metaphor, \ all down 
the line” (29-31).  Wright’s distinctions, for all their figurative vividness, are more poetic than 
specific.  A sense of the history of these words in English may help illuminate Wright’s own 
distinctions.  Although the earliest definition (ca. 1275) for “nature” in the Oxford English Dictionary 
concerns “senses related to physical or bodily power, strength, or substance,” the word derives from  
its French cognate, nature, meaning the “active force that establishes and maintains the order of the 
universe” (OED).  “Landscape” is a more recent addition to the language (1598), derived from the 
Dutch landschap, meaning “landship,” but having in English a specific connotation of artistry: “A 
picture representing natural inland scenery, as distinguished from a sea picture, a portrait, etc” 
(OED).  The history of “landscape” in English, then, supports Wright’s sense of it as “something you 
determine and dominate” and as an artistic “‘distancing’ factor.” 
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landscape because it creates a difference from the seen world, which allows us to view it in a 
symbolic aspect, and it is in this difference that ‘the idea of God’ takes shape” (326-7, 329).   
 The idea may take shape, but the shape is never sufficient to the phenomenon it 
would describe.  Although I borrow the terms “apophaticism” and “via negativa” from 
theology in order to characterize Wright’s poetry, Wright’s sense of his own condition is 
distinct from the Christian mystics’ thought, in which these terms take on their present 
valence.  Turner points to an “apophatic anthropology” in the thought of the fourteenth-
century mystics Meister Eckhart, the Cloud Author, and St. John of the Cross, calling this 
sense of anthropology 
  as radical as their apophatic theology, the one intimately connected with the  
  other.  All three in some sense deny that I am ‘a self;’ or at least, they appear to 
  say that whatever may be the proper description of the fullest union of the  
  human self with God, there is no distinction which we are able to make  
  between that ‘self’ and the God it is one with.  Nor are they alone in this, Julian 
  of Norwich, Catherine of Genoa, and Teresa of Avila being three others who  
  say the same.  (5-6) 
In Wright’s poetry, such thinkers and their notions of unity become both ideal and foil for 
the doubting, “Christ-haunted” speaker, and apparently strange bedfellows for 
poststructuralist thinkers whose own doubts about language and knowledge become 
another context for Wright’s concerns (Smith).  Wright’s poems, however, make apparent 
the linkages between the Christian mystics’ sense of the unknowability of God and the 
poststructuralists’ sense of the instability of language and knowledge.  In the recent poem 
“The Ghost of Walter Benjamin Walks at Midnight,” Wright says: 
  The world’s an untranslatable language  
       without words or parts of speech. 
  It’s a language of objects 
  Our tongues can’t master, 
      but which we are the ardent subjects of. 
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  If tree is tree in English, 
         and albero in Italian, 
  That’s as close as we can come 
  To divinity, the language that circles the earth 
        and which we’ll never speak.    (1-6) 
The poem’s title and its references to translatability allude to Benjamin’s “The Task of the 
Translator,” in which Benjamin writes: 
The relationship between life and purposefulness, seemingly obvious yet 
almost beyond the grasp of the intellect, reveals itself only if the ultimate 
purpose toward which all single functions tend is sought not in its own sphere 
but in a higher one [my emphasis]. All purposeful manifestations of life, 
including their very purposiveness, in the final analysis have their end not in 
life, but in the expression of its nature, in the representation of its 
significance.  Translation thus ultimately serves the purpose of expressing the 
central reciprocal relationship between languages. (72)   
Benjamin’s phrase “not in its own sphere but in a higher one” is an apophatic gesture: the 
“purpose toward which all single functions tend” is ultimately, and necessarily, beyond their 
reach.  If “[a]ll poems are translations,” as Wright says, then all poems express the 
ultimately unspeakable relationships between languages and between poems (“Halflife” 33).  
As Wright “translates” Benjamin into this poem, translation is as close as the human can 
come to the unspeakable language of divinity, but translation, being a function of fallible 
human language, necessarily fails the world and fails the divine.  “As close as we can come” is 
not especially close after all, but the resulting gap between the one and the other remains 
the space in which Wright’s work abides.  Benjamin identifies translation as issuing from 
the afterlife of the original—an appropriate metaphor here, given that Wright’s poem 
introduces Benjamin as a walking ghost, and acts in its own right as a kind of translation, a 
kind of afterlife both for the original author (cf. Derrida’s axiom regarding “writing”) and of 
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the original work.7  Not only the ghost of Benjamin, but the ghost of language walks in 
Wright’s poem, because “[i]n all language and linguistic creations there remains in addition 
to what can be conveyed something that cannot be communicated [. . .]” (Benjamin 79). 
 Wright wants what the Christian mystics want, but his “ongoing argument with 
[him]self” is “about the unlikelihood of salvation” (my emphasis).  Despite his hostility toward 
the idea of deconstructionist criticism, his doubts are poststructuralist doubts.8  As Costello 
has suggested, however, desire for absolutes—not realization of them—gives contour to our 
finite world and, for Wright, lends shape and tension to his poems.  As he writes in “Clear 
Night”: 
  I want to be bruised by God. 
  I want to be strung up in a strong light and singled out. 
  I want to be stretched, like music wrung from a dropped seed. 
  I want to be entered and picked clean. (5-8) 
 
As vivid and violent as these images are, I locate the animating force of these lines in the 
anaphora of “I want,” the articulation of the speaker’s desire that also speaks to his lack, 
especially given that each “I want” is followed by the infinitive “to be.”  And yet I cannot 
read “Clear Night” without recalling the similarly erotic violence of John Donne’s “[Batter 
my heart, three-personed God”]: 
  Batter my heart, three personed God; for, you 
  As yet but knock, breathe, shine, and seek to mend; 
  That I may rise, and stand, o’erthrow me, and bend 
  Your force, to break, blow, burn, and make me new. 
                                                
7 Derrida articulates this criterion in “Signature Event Context”: 
 
For a writing to be a writing, it must continue to “act” and to be readable even when 
what is called the author of the writing no longer answers for what he has written, for 
what he seems to have signed, be it because of a temporary absence, because he is 
dead or, more generally, because he has not employed his absolutely actual and 
present intention or attention, the plenitude of his desire to say what he means, in 
order to sustain what seems to be written “in his name.”  (8) 
 
8 In “Bytes and Pieces,” for instance, Wright notes: “A deconstructionist critic writing about 
Language Poetry is like a dog eating its own vomit” (80). 
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  [. . .] 
  Take me to you, imprison me, for I 
  Except you enthral me, never shall be free, 
  Nor ever chaste, except you ravish me.  (1-4, 12-14) 
 
As much as the two poems can speak to one another, I present Donne’s poem alongside 
Wright’s with the specific caveat that the Donne speaker asserts himself toward his God in 
imperatives, petitioning these responses from the divine, speaking of them as if the petition 
had already been answered in the affirmative.  Wright’s speaker, by contrast, wants an 
interaction with his God but cannot establish real dialogue with him or his creation: 
  And the wind says “What?” to me. 
  And the castor beans, with their little earrings of death, say “What?” to me. 
  And the stars start out on their cold slide through the dark. 
  And the gears notch and the engines wheel. (9-12) 
 
The stars, the gears, the engines say nothing back to the speaker, but simply go through 
their own motions.  The wind and the castor beans do speak, but what they say—“What?”— 
indicates only mishearing or misapprehension.  
 To be bruised, to be strung up, to be stretched, to be entered—the speaker seems to 
desire these experiences because they are violent, as if such violence offered an opportunity 
to feel the presence of the divine in an undeniable way.  But, as the second stanza of “Clear 
Night” demonstrates, the speaker cannot close the gap between himself and the divine.  He 
can, however, describe that separation as a kind of communicative lacuna, a gap across 
which he or the divine might reach, but cannot or does not.  I would correlate these 
unbridged metaphysical chasms with the liminal spaces Wright describes as “synapses.”  
Although “synapse” refers anatomically to “the junction, or structure at the junction, 
between two neurons or nerve-cells,” Wright uses the figure of the synapse as a metaphor 
for the completion of an aesthetic circuit (OED).  “Art tends toward the condition of 
circularity and completion,” he writes.  “The artist’s job is to keep the circle from joining—
to work in the synapse” (“Halflife” 35).  In Wright’s sense, the unbridged separation or the 
unsparked synapse connotes the tension of the unfulfilled, which Wright understands as a 
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tension crucial to his artistic project, and which, as I argue here, is the central tension of his 
theology as well.  In Wright’s notion of the artist’s task, to present the circuit as joined is 
not only aesthetically deficient but theologically dishonest as well.  Who would follow the 
via negativa follows because he or she understands that the infinite cannot be described in 
the finite.  For Wright, then, the via negativa is both, and inseparably, a theological and a 
poetic method. 
 Wright’s “The New Poem” establishes, more than any other early poem, his via 
negativa as a poetic analogue to his vision of apophatic theology.  In “The New Poem” we 
find negative affirmation: the title implies that the new poem exists, or will exist, but the 
poem itself offers only negation, defining “the new poem” by saying what it will not be.  As 
T. R. Hummer has remarked, “What will The New Poem be?  X, it would seem” (34). 
  It will not resemble the sea. 
  It will not have dirt on its thick hands 
  It will not be part of the weather. 
 
  It will not reveal its name. 
  It will not have dreams you can count on. 
  It will not be photogenic. 
 
  It will not attend our sorrow. 
  It will not console our children. 
  It will not be able to help us.  (1-9) 
Robert Pinsky writes of “The New Poem” in The Situation of Poetry: “This is the trite style 
and doctrine of nominalism unexamined and self-satisfied [. . .].  The poem, new or old, 
should be able to help us, if only to help us by delivering the relief that something has been 
understood, or even seen, well” (118).  But Pinsky’s reading of “The New Poem” seems 
insufficient to me because he treats the poem purely in terms of its apparent argument, as 
straightforward rhetoric, and not as the conflicted text it is, in which the argument of the 
poem wrestles with the poem-as-argument.   
 The speaker of “The New Poem” argues for what the new poem cannot do, but his 
use of poetic language simultaneously, paradoxically demonstrates what the poetic art can 
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accomplish.  The poetry of the new poem is located in the gap between what the speaker 
says The New Poem will not do and what “The New Poem” does.  This is the method by 
which “The New Poem” enacts in poetic terms the theological via negativa.  In and out of 
the poem, what is seen may limn the unseen.  Kevin Hart identifies the image itself as 
“otherworldly and ultimately apophatic,” referring to Wright’s middle period poem 
“Chinese Journal,” the speaker of which refers to Giorgio Morandi, who “[p]enciled these 
bottles in by leaving them out, letting / The presence of what surrounds them increase the 
pressure / Of what is missing, \ keeping its distance and measure” (K. Hart 189, “Chinese 
Journal” 2-4).9  Costello articulates a similar sentiment in terms that will recall Strand’s 
poetic privileging of the unwritten silence against the written word: “In the practice of the 
via negativa, of course, poetry is the negative of writing: ‘Poetry’s what’s left between the 
lines— / It’s all in the unwritten, it’s all in the unsaid’ (Negative Blue 94).  We come full 
circle, then, and the cause (the unsaid, the supernatural) is identified with the effect (the 
unsaid, poetry) that arises out of written lines” (337).  Costello quotes from the late “Poem 
Almost Wholly in My Own Manner,” in which Wright’s speaker goes on to claim an 
existential significance to the unwritten and the unsaid:  “And that’s a comfort, I think, \ for 
our lack and inarticulation.  /  For our scalded flesh and our singed hair. // [. . .] a comfort, 
perhaps, but too cold [. . .]” (29-30, 35).  The accomplishment of Wright’s poetry, if cold 
comfort, is often its enactment of the poet’s doubts about what poetry can accomplish. 
 To keep the circle from joining, to work in the synapse may, as Wright argues, be the 
task of the artist, but the Wright speaker is also a pilgrim, as Kevin Hart and others have 
                                                
9 Hart here quotes from Wright’s “Narrative of the Image: A Correspondence with Charles Simic,” 
in which Wright says: “The true image rises out of the darkness—sometimes it stays there and only 
its luminous outline is traceable, a pentimento against the seen world.  The true image belongs to 
neither Imagism nor Surrealism.  It belongs to the Emptiness.  Which is to say its power is 
otherworldly and ultimately apophatic, a luminous outline above the tongue” (59). 
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written, and the task of a pilgrim is to journey (180).10  The idea of the negative way implies 
a path; journeys and paths imply both the space (landscape) and the time through which the 
pilgrim-poet travels.  So far I have sketched a general hypothesis of the role of time and 
space in Wright’s apophatic poetics, and I will return to these subjects in an extended 
reading of “The Southern Cross,” which seems to me a fulcrum point in Wright’s evolving 
treatment of both memory and landscape.  Such a reading, however, may be informed by an 
understanding of Wright’s autobiographical method as influenced by and distinct from 
those of two other autobiographers, Augustine of Hippo and William Wordsworth.  Both 
of these writers attempt to characterize the role of time and memory in creating the self, 
with Augustine attempting to understand the self especially in terms of its relationship to 
the divine, and Wordsworth attempting to understand the self especially in terms of its 
relationship to nature and landscape.  Wright’s obsessive concerns with memory and 
landscape are concerns with articulating the self; here I intend “articulate” both as a speaker 
articulates his or her thoughts in speech and as a scientist or taxidermist articulates various 
bones into a recognizable skeleton, a part that suggests the whole (OED).  Wright delves 
into memory to confess the self, but he also needs memory in order to constitute the self.  
As we shall see, spatiotemporal existence allows the creation of memory, and the creation of 
the self from memory, but spatiotemporal existence separates the self irreconcilably from 
the divine. 
 Wright’s apophatic poetics, and the theology from which it emerges, derive in part 
from Augustine’s notion of our existence in time.  Being in time separates us from the 
                                                
10 Kevin Hart writes: “This is not the poetry of an angel or prophet but of a pilgrim” (180).  Costello 
argues that “the pilgrim in Wright pursues disappearances, not presences [. . .]” (345).  The Wright 
speaker has referred to himself as “Pilgrim” as well, as in these lines from “Skins”: 
 
  And what does it come to, Pilgrim, 
  This walking to and fro on the earth, knowing 
  That nothing changes, or everything; 
  [. . .] 
  It comes to a point.  It comes and goes. (20.9-11, 14) 
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eternal; in fact, our being in time contributes to our inability even to consider the divine.  
As Linda Gregerson writes, this “temporal embeddedness [. . .] makes human beings 
particularly unqualified to comprehend eternity.  Time is motion: the human mind cannot 
comprehend eternity directly because, says Augustine, it cannot hold still (Confessions 11.11).  
So the mystery of eternity, and He who dwells in it, can only be imagined in opposition to 
that which it is not: to temporality” (“Telling Time” 1).  I would emphasize Gregerson’s 
phrase “can only be imagined”: the issue of temporality is, for Augustine and for Wright, 
not only that the eternal can be imagined only in opposition to temporality, but also that 
the eternal cannot even be imagined.  When Augustine imagines being asked, “‘What was 
God doing before he made heaven and earth,’” he imagines responding: “‘What I don’t 
know, I don’t know,’” although “What I cannot know, I don’t know” might be the more 
appropriately apophatic response (11.12.14, p. 269).  Wright, similarly, tries to imagine a time 
outside of time, but he cannot untangle such a vision from its own temporal embeddedness.  
As he writes in “January”: 
  In some other life 
  I’ll stand where I’m standing now, and will look down, and will see 
  My own face, and not know what I’m looking at. 
 
  These are the nights 
  When the oyster begins her pearl, when the spider slips 
  Through his wired rooms, and the barns cough, and the grass quails.     (1-6) 
 
The poem attempts to reach beyond time by locating itself in time, in an unspecific 
“January,” among the human measurements of the months.  Its primary concern, however, is 
the even more nebulous “some other life” the speaker introduces in the first line, and in 
which he imagines himself so alienated or extricated from himself that he could look—more 
specifically, “look down”—at his “own face, and not know what [he’s] looking at.”  In the 
next stanza the speaker shifts from the somewhat Strandian doppelgänger encounter to 
more physical statements about the visible world, specific images of the act of creation 
among them.  “These are the nights,” the speaker says, though the antecedent of “these” is 
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unclear.  Which nights: of this January, of this life? or of the other life about which the 
speaker can only speculate?  I read this “other life” as the life of the poet looking at the life 
of the self through images of the oyster and spider—mysterious, worldly makers in their 
own right.  Both creatures create from their bodies, an act which, as we shall see, becomes 
for Wright an ideal for organic form and structure.  This seems to be too tidy an 
equivalence for Wright, however; his speaker imagines not only oyster and spider in the act 
of creation, but also barns and grass in the process of decline.  The simultaneous sense of 
accretion and decay will also prove a useful analogue for the structures Wright develops as 
his poems evolve.  To the more immediate point, however, creation and destruction are 
temporal, if mysterious, phenomena.  Divine creation—creation outside of time—remains 
inconceivable except in terms of earthly processes.  Likewise the speaker of “January” 
cannot imagine “some other life” in any form other than other, earthly lives.   
 Even the illusory timelessness of writing is insufficient.  To return to Derrida, a 
writing must survive the disappearance of its originator, but even that which survives the 
disappearance of a consciousness from its temporal existence remains itself a temporal 
phenomenon.  The words inscribed on the page survive long after the voice that would 
sound them aloud has fallen silent, but the meanings of the words themselves may change so 
significantly that what survives cannot be understood as the writer had understood them—a 
fact that Benjamin acknowledges in his meditation on translation, in which he writes: “Even 
words with fixed meaning can undergo a maturing process.  [. . . ]  To seek the essence of 
such changes, as well as the equally constant changes in meaning, in the subjectivity of 
posterity rather than in the very life of language and its works, would mean [. . .] to confuse 
the root cause of a thing with its essence” (73).  It is not simply time, then, that thwarts the 
transcendence Wright seeks, but language too, and the fact that language is not fixed but 
living (and dying) in time.  His doubts about human language—“that burning field”— echo 
Augustine’s comparison of human words to the divine, generative logos:  “But how did you 
speak?” Augustine asks, and considers: 
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  Surely not in the way that the voice came from the cloud saying, ‘This is my  
  well-beloved Son’  (Matt. 3.17, 17.5, Lk. 9.35)?  That speech was uttered and  
  passed away; it began, and ended.  The syllables rang out and passed on, the  
  second after the first, the third after the second and so on in sequence, until  
  the last succeeded the rest, and silence the last.  Hence it is clear and   
  apparent that this speech was uttered by some movement of your creation,  
  obedient to your eternal will, yet temporal.  These words, made in time, were  
  reported by the outward ear to the mind that foresaw them, whose inward ear 
  is inclined to hear your eternal Word.  (11.6.8, p.265) 
The voice from the cloud speaks in temporal words that temporal beings can hear.  Its 
speech is the divine word become fleshly words, and as such it is not the logos of creation, 
which was “spoken” by the creator unto the creator.  That “speech” did not create; it is 
creation.  So limiting is our human, temporal finitude, however, that we are unable to 
imagine the logos, the divine, the eternity in which it abides as anything other than the 
words we would speak or write ourselves. 
 We are not suited to comprehend eternity, nor are we particularly well suited to 
comprehend the temporality in which we exist.  Here too the concept of the via negativa is 
of particular importance, as Augustine suggests that time itself is something we can sense, 
can “know” by impression, but cannot articulate in language:  “What, then, is time?  As long 
as no one asks me, I know; but if someone asks me and I try to explain, I do not know” 
(11.14.17, p. 271).11  Moreover, even those temporal, spoken words of ours cannot be truly 
measured in the time in which they occur.  “What is it, then, that I measure?” Augustine 
asks.  “Where is the short syllable by which I measure?  Where is the long syllable that I 
                                                
11 Wright’s explanations are more poetic if no more clarifying: “Time is your mother in a blue dress” 
(Littlefoot 7.19).  Or, in the titles of three poems from Sestets: “Time Is a Graceless Enemy, but Purls 
as It Comes and Goes;” “Time Is a Dark Clock, but It Still Strikes from Time to Time;” and “Time 
Is a Child-Biting Dog.” 
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measure?  Both have sounded, flown away, past on, no longer exist.  Yet measure I do. [. . .]  
It is in you, my mind, that I measure time” (11.27.35-11.27.36, p. 282).  For the human in the 
finite, passing present, the past and future can only be remembered or imagined.  “The 
present has no duration,” Gregerson continues, [. . .] no dimensions proper to itself.  It is 
thinner than the razor’s edge.  And yet it is full, is indeed the only fullness we shall ever in 
this life have” (“Telling Time” 1-2).  When we remember, we create an illusion of the past as 
the experienced present.  This illusion, for Augustine and for Wright, creates the self that 
would attempt to understand eternity beyond the limits of human illusion.  As each writer 
writes of the past, he creates himself in the present.  As Turner writes: 
any autobiography which offers more than a mere sequence of isolated events 
at once tells of a self and constructs the self it tells of.  Unless I am a self, there 
is no story to be told.  [. . .]  And the mechanism of this retrieval of my 
selfhood is memory, the power, as we might put it, of selective, meaningful 
personal continuity.  It is in memory that I am what I am, for it is there that 
this continuous “I” who writes the autobiography is also constructed by the 
autobiography it writes.  (56, 60-1) 
This fact creates the paradox Wright’s poetry enacts even as it tries to escape it: the self is 
necessary to tell the story of itself, even to tell the story of an attempt to dissolve or 
transcend the self.  In the process of constructing the story, the story constructs the self, 
and in doing so it also deepens the self’s separation from God. 
 In Wright’s poetry, the separation between self and God is mediated in part by 
landscape, the “tactile things [which] are doors to the infinite.”  These tactile things are also 
the doors to the self.  “Landscape is,” Wright says, “a ‘distancing’ factor [. . .] as regards the 
‘self,’ the ‘I’ in poetry,” and this distancing factor allows one to use landscape to speak of 
oneself (“Bytes and Pieces” 85).  If indeed “it is in memory that I am what I am,” then the 
“what” of “what I am” must also be considered in terms of the physical settings in which one 
is what one is.  In other words, where one is or has been must be understood in order to 
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understand what one is or has been.  Along this path the guide is William Wordsworth, 
specifically the autobiographical speaker of The Prelude who “thought nature itself led him 
beyond nature,” as Geoffrey Hartman writes.  “[S]ince this movement of transcendence, 
related to what mystics have called the negative way, is inherent in life and achieved without 
violence or ascetic discipline, one can think of it as the progress of a soul which is naturaliter 
negativa” (Wordsworth’s Poetry 33).  Hartman’s sense of the via negativa as naturaliter—
“natural”—differs from the sort of “acquired ignorance” Turner observes in the thought of 
the medieval mystics, but more important here is Hartman’s use of the language of 
apophaticism, his sense that for Wordsworth (as for Wright), landscape points beyond 
landscape.  If, as Hartman argues, nature leads Wordsworth “beyond nature,” it does so only 
to the extent that nature can be gotten beyond at all.   
In Wright’s poems (as in The Prelude), nature supplements the language of the 
imagination and activates the imagination into memory.  The speakers of these poems 
explore memory to find the origins of the imagination, and to locate the emergence of the 
self from those origins.  To search for the source of the self is to understand again what 
Wordsworth means when he writes that the “child is father to the man” (“[My heart leaps 
up]” 7).  In finding—or constructing—continuity between the past and present, however, 
the poetic autobiographer also feels the separation implied in the distance between “child” 
and “man”: 
     [. . .] so wide appears 
  The vacancy between me and those days 
  Which yet have such self-presence in my mind, 
  That musing on them, often do I Seem 
  Two consciousnesses, conscious of myself 
  And of some other Being [. . .]   (The Prelude II.28-33) 
 
The sense of having fallen into self-consciousness blesses and curses us with two instances of 
knowledge, of what the self is and of what the self once had been.  “I can’t remember the 
colors I said I’d never forget / On Via Giulia at sundown,” Wright acknowledges in “The 
Southern Cross” (193-4).  “I can’t remember enough” (233).  One can read The Prelude, and 
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much of Wright’s poetry as well, as attempts to understand how what the self was forms 
what the self is, if it can be said to do so at all.  In this sense the poem is an apologia pro vita 
sua, in fact requiring an investigation of what the self was in order to justify what the self is.12  
One way for Wordsworth—and for Wright—to begin the work of doing so is to reanchor 
himself through these otherwise unremarkable “spots of time.”  “The metaphysics of the 
quotidian was what he was after,” Wright remarks in “Tomorrow” (1).  Wright envisions 
these visible things as doors at which to knock, if not to pass through.  As Henry Hart 
argues, “Working against Wright’s Buddhist acceptance of things-as-they-are is an 
unquenchable desire for a Dantesque paradise or mystical sublime beyond landscape, 
beyond language, beyond thought, and even beyond God” (327).  In his own words, Wright 
has striven to see “the secret landscape behind the landscape we look at here” (“Thinking 
about the Poet Larry Levis” 14).  For Wordsworth the grandness that transforms a trite or 
private happening into a subject worthy of poetry—and epic poetry at that—is the power of 
imagination.  In fact Wordsworth offers a kind of riposte to such a critique of his “moods of 
exaltation”: 
   —These feelings, in themselves 
  Trite, do yet scarcely seem so when I think 
  On those ingenuous moments of our youth 
  Ere we have learnt by use to slight the crimes 
  And sorrows of the world.     (VII.329-33) 
 
The power these “ingenuous moments” supply for Wordsworth is not in what they were but 
in how they feel.  Or, perhaps more precisely, how they feel is now what they were and are.  
The feeling itself confirms for him, however dubiously and however temporarily, the 
continuity of the self.  Here we return to the confluence of imagination and nature.  As 
Hartman reads this convergence, “the child does not know that what he sees and feels is an 
                                                
12 Although the phrase apologia pro vita sua is primarily associated with Cardinal Newman, I use it 
here with Wright in mind.  Wright has used the phrase as the title of the opening poem of Black 
Zodiac, in which he considers time as “the source of all good, \ time the engenderer / Of entropy and 
decay, / Time the destroyer, our only-begetter and advocate” (I.73-5). 
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effect of the power of his imagination.  The impact of the scenes on him is inseparable from 
overwhelming sense-impressions.  For the retrospective poet, however, the power that 
belonged to the external world is now seen to have belonged to the mind” (WP 215).  
Imagination as we see it act in the poem is born in the co-incidence of a former self and 
those spots of time—that is, particular times and places—that are now available to the 
speaker exclusively through the imaginative act of remembering.  Wright, unsurprisingly, 
phrases the matter in the terms of a religious contemplative: 
  The past is a stained glass window.  We see through the door of our monk’s  
  cell, so brilliant, so out of reach on the church wall.  Beyond it, in the dark,  
  when the light comes through at the proper angles, the colors are   
  unimaginably luminous, the scenes of our various selves unspeakably clear,  
  evocative and unbroken. (“Bytes and Pieces” 80) 
Even here, in his imaginings of the brilliance of the remembered past, Wright speaks in 
terms of the via negativa: the colors are luminous beyond imagination, the scenes clear 
beyond the reach of language.  Language remains the elegy to imagination and memory, to 
landscape as well; it remains the imperfect record of a self whose existence nature—and its 
extension, the divine—both endows and disregards.  So language and landscape continue to 
point beyond themselves, toward the form and structure that may prove all one can grasp of 
the absolute:  “Everything flows toward structure, \ last ache in the ache for God” (“As Our 
Bodies Rise” 12). 
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THE FORM INSIDE THE FORM INSIDE 
 
 Whatever else this doubting mystic cannot trust, Charles Wright’s faith in his 
conceptions of form and structure is absolute, and similarly so his sense that the essence of 
form and structure lies beyond our ability to comprehend.  Wright imagines poetic form to 
be as organic as the spider spinning her web, the structure of her existence, from her own 
body: “I think one’s poems should come out of one’s body—and life—the way webbing 
comes out of a spider” (“With Sherod Santos” 178).13  But form is also a temporary stay 
against those same organic processes; form and structure—especially in poetry—mark time 
against the entropic vicissitudes of time.  Form, for Wright, is ritual, and authentic ritual 
must arise organically: 
  Time and light are the same thing somewhere behind our backs. 
  And form is measure. 
     Without measure there is no form: 
  Form and measure become one. 
  Time and light become one somewhere beyond our future. 
  Father darkness, mother night, 
           one and one become one again. 
       (“Meditation on Form and Measure” 21-5) 
 
The ritual of counting, for instance—syllables, feet, lines, stanzas—becomes an example of 
Wright’s Augustinian concern with time.  Who would count would measure, and by 
measuring would seem to master the counted quantity, but Augustine and Wright both give 
the lie to this attempt at mastery even as they engage in it.  In attempting to measure, to 
“tell time,” as Gregerson writes, Augustine “invokes, repeatedly, what he takes to be the 
foundational units of language: syllables long and short, the metrical foot, the poetic line.  
We do not measure a poem by pages, says Augustine, for that would be to measure in terms 
                                                
13 The image of the spider’s web is one of Wright’s favorite figures for poetic form and structure, 
and a frequent image in his poems, as well.  Wright has remarked: “Like the spider’s web that is tight 
in its individual parts, but expandable in its larger structure, the entire poem trembles when any area 
is touched” (“The Art of Poetry” 201).   
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of space (Confessions 11.26).  Poetry, it seems, is language acutely, perhaps uniquely, wedded 
to time” (“Telling Time” 2-3).  Allan Grossman claims a similar force for poetry in the 
Summa Lyrica, arguing not only that poetry is wedded to time but that it becomes, if briefly, 
a measure against time:  “Prosodic utterance insofar as it is ‘numerous’ is an imitation of 
time.  Incorporating time, it triumphs over time” (240).  But Wright doubts that time—and 
the death that stops an individual’s time even as time itself continues on its endless way—
can be overcome.  “In the work of Charles Wright,” Stephen Cushman argues: 
the paradox is that the insistence on uncertainty or mystery situates itself in 
structures which are anything but uncertain or mysterious.  In order to 
approach Negative Capability, Wright structures his poems according to an 
extreme form of Negative Incapability.  Every element in a poem must be 
counted, ordered, and planned in order to reveal the limits of counting, 
ordering, and planning.14      (212) 
One’s provisional victories over time (specifically, through “telling time” and through 
imaginative memory) and time’s ultimate victory over us are subjects in all of Wright’s 
poetry, although in “The Southern Cross” these tensions become explicit rather than 
implied: “Time is the villain in most tales, / and here, too,” Wright says (52).  Not only the 
villain of the tale, I would add, but the medium, and the phenomenon that makes possible 
the telling. 
 Moreover, the evolution of Wright’s formal poetics includes the emergence of his 
understanding of the page as a landscape just as significant as the observed fields near the 
Yaak River or the remembered piazzas of Venice.  Here Wright even enacts Augustine’s 
notion that to measure a poem in pages would mean to measure it in terms of space.  The 
outlines of the written/printed poem come to define the limits of the page’s blankness and 
to emphasize the spaces between, just as the visible world of landscape comes to suggest the 
                                                
14 Cushman seems to intend “Negative Capability” here both as John Keats intended the term and 
as I have adopted the terms “apophaticism” and “via negativa,” as ways of knowing by unknowing. 
 
    
 128 
invisible “landscape behind the landscape we look at here.”  Wright has suggested that this 
sense of landscape arises as a poetic analogue to the formal, painterly concerns of Paul 
Cézanne.  As Wright records in his commonplace notebook, “‘I have my motif,’ Cézanne 
said, speaking of Mt. S. Victoire.  And I have mine—the architecture of the poem, the 
landscape of the word” (“Halflife” 33-4).  In the same notebook, he writes: “My poems are 
put together in tonal blocks, in tonal units that work off one another.  Vide Cézanne’s use 
of color and form.  I try to do that in sound patterns within the line, in the line within the 
stanza, and in the stanza within the poem.  Tonal units of measure, tonal rhythms in time” 
(20).15  These “tonal units” are apparent in lines from “Lonesome Pine Special,” in which 
Wright uses the “low rider” as a device to bring certain phrasal units into both visual and 
thematic tension with surrounding words: 
  It’s true, I think, as Kenkō says in his Idleness, 
  That all beauty depends upon disappearance, 
  The bitten edges of things,  
      the gradual sliding away 
  Into tissue and memory,  
     the uncertainty 
  And dazzling impermanence of days we beg our meanings from, 
  And their frayed loveliness.      (93-8) 
“Lonesome Pine Special” is one of the most overt examples of Wright’s use of landscape as a 
catalyst for memory and meditation: the poem is in part a litany of Wright’s favorite 
specific landscapes, “curve[s] in the road,” “[p]asture on both sides of the road and woods on 
the easy slopes” (1, 47).  Wright uses the “low rider” throughout the poem to various effects, 
but I want to highlight its function in these six lines to distance “the gradual sliding away” 
and “the uncertainty” from the rest of the stanza to which they belong.  The appearance of 
these phrases on the page, separated slightly from the rest of the left-justified lines, suggest 
                                                
15 In another commonplace notebook, Wright uses Cézanne as an example of his own sense of the 
difference between poetic forms (especially received forms such as the sonnet or sestina) and poetic 
“Form”: “Cézanne became a great painter when he deserted forms and discovered structure—when 
he stopped paintings figures from his imagination and discovered his motif, the landscape.  He 
needed to abandon forms to find Form” (“Bytes and Pieces” 79). 
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lacunae that their semantic content makes explicit.  Wright is by no means the first poet to 
use his poetic structures to enact the experience of being in time, nor is he original in using 
lineation and pagination to extend the visual experience of the poem across the whole page.  
Wright’s distinctive place among such poets derives from his use of “time-telling” to suggest 
an unimaginable eternal, his use of the landscape of the visible world to suggest the 
irreconcilable invisible. 
 Although Wright has been concerned with memory and landscape throughout his 
career, the formal characteristics I identify as parallels to his thematic concerns come into 
clear relief in and after The Southern Cross.  As I have suggested, the changes in Wright’s 
formal method (notably, the regularizing of odd syllable counts, the elongation of his poetic 
line and the introduction of the dropdown hemistich) accompany changes in his thematic 
method, an opening of his work to specific references to people and places from both past 
and present.  As Wright has remarked: “Since the poem, ‘The Southern Cross,’ I’ve been 
doing a kind of ghost graft: splicing real situations and incidents (language, even) onto an 
imaginary ‘tree’ until the ‘tree,’ by virtue of its appendages, has materialized into a whole, a 
recognizable thing.  A sort of grafting onto the invisible until one gets an outline or two 
from its invisible garden.  A gardener of the infinite . . . .” (“Halflife” 32).  To continue 
Wright’s metaphor, I want to suggest that Wright’s later work allows the “outline or two 
from [the] invisible garden” he mentions, where his early work’s lack of “real situations and 
incidents” prevents even the illusion of envisioning the invisible.  I want to look at two 
poems, from early and later in Wright’s career, as exemplars of the difference in his method, 
and in anticipation of an extended reading of “The Southern Cross,” which I consider to be 
the poem that best exemplifies the formal concerns of Wright’s maturity and, more broadly, 
the apophatic theological concerns under discussion here. 
 The twentieth and final section of “Skins,” collected in Bloodlines (1975), 
demonstrates what I have called the “airtightness” of Wright’s early work.  Quoting in full: 
  You’ve talked to the sun and moon, 
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  Those idols of stitched skin, bunch grass and twigs 
  Stuck on their poles in the fall rain; 
  You’ve prayed to Sweet Medicine; 
  You’ve looked at the Hanging Road, its stars 
  The stepstones and river bed where you hope to cross; 
  You’ve followed the cricket’s horn 
  To sidestep the Lake of Pain . . .  
  And what does it come to, Pilgrim, 
  This walking to and fro on the earth, knowing 
  That nothing changes, or everything; 
  And only, to tell is, these sad marks, 
  Phrases half-parsed, ellipses and scratches across the dirt? 
  It comes to a point.  It comes and it goes.   (1-14) 
 
The poem is an address to the self, couched in the second person except in the ninth line, 
when the speaker addresses himself as “Pilgrim.”  As such, the poem charts a pilgrim’s 
progress, but through a landscape that remains inscrutable.  Nor is this inscrutability 
entirely countered by reading the poem in the context of the nineteen preceding sections of 
“Skins.”  “#20” acts as a summation of the series and represents a cyclical return to its 
beginnings, but one does not gain sufficient context to illuminate some of the more obscure 
references in the poem.  “Skins #20” exhibits some characteristics of Wright’s early work, 
including what I would call a certain imagistic hermeticism.  Later in his career, Wright will 
often refer to specific names and places, as in the poems “Thinking about the Poet Larry 
Levis One Afternoon in Late May” and “The Southern Cross,” readings of which I will offer 
below.  Much of Wright’s early work, however, demonstrates an inscrutability exemplified 
by the three capitalized phrases in “Skins #20”: “Sweet Medicine,” “the Hanging Road,” and 
“the Lake of Pain” (4, 5, 8).  It is unclear why these are proper nouns while other, similar 
phrases—“the cricket’s horn,” for instance—are not (7).  Their roles in the poem, however, 
are as landmarks in the private geography of this pilgrim’s travels.  They serve to mark the 
speaker’s pilgrimage through a landscape the reader is not privy to; whatever significance 
these images hold for the speaker is sealed off from our own perception.   
 Other lines suggest their points of reference more clearly: “And what does it come 
to, Pilgrim, / This walking to and fro on the earth” recalls Satan’s reply to the Almighty in 
    
 131 
the Book of Job: “And the LORD said unto Satan, Whence comest thou?  Then Satan 
answered the LORD, and said, From going to and fro in the earth, and from walking up and 
down in it” (1:7).  What end this echo serves is unclear, though the allusion suggests that the 
speaker understands the Pilgrim’s road as something that may be as vulgar as it is sacred.  
The sense of the poem, and of such “going to and fro,” is that one arrives where one began, 
or that the progress that this pilgrim has imagined proves to be either cyclical or illusory.  
“And what does it come to,” he asks himself, and answers: “It comes to a point.  It comes 
and goes” (9, 14).  This reading of the poem partially echoes Wright’s claim that “‘Skins’ is 
about such things as truth, beauty, the eventual destruction of the universe, metamorphosis, 
that kind of thing.  [. . .] The structure of the poem is a ladder.  Ten up, ten down.  It starts 
at point A, and comes back to point A.  Number 1 is the Situation: what you are is what you 
will be. [. . .]  Number 20 is the Situation again, point A” (“At Oberlin College” 67, 75).  
Although I read “Skins” as too hermetic, too airtight, to allow enough narrative purchase for 
readers to collaborate in or even follow along with the speaker’s meditation, I concur with 
Wright’s claim for the cyclicality of the series.  The poem’s penultimate line seems to 
acknowledge the obscurity of these images: “And only, to tell is, these sad marks, / Phrases 
half-parsed, ellipses and scratches across the dirt [. . .]” (12-13). 
 Unlike the organization of later poems, the structural elements of “Skins #20” do 
not necessarily parallel the thematic content of the poem.  As of the publication of 
Bloodlines, in 1975, Wright was not yet working in nearly exclusively odd-syllabled lines, as we 
can see from a count of each line here: 
1. 7 
2. 10 
3. 8 
4. 7 
5. 9 
6. 12 
7. 7 
8. 7 
9. 8 
10. 11 
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11. 9 
12. 9 
13. 14 
14. 9 
 
Indeed, the majority of these lines do consist of odd numbers of syllables but, given that five 
of the poem’s fourteen lines consist of an even number, one cannot read the method as the 
definite form that emerges in Wright’s later work.  Moreover, the range of syllables per line 
(seven to fourteen) and the number of even-numbered lines result in a more metrically 
regular prosody.  Several lines fall into a near-iambic meter (“You’ve LOOKED | at the 
HANG | ing ROAD, | its STARS”).16  As a result, the iambic ghost lurks more obviously 
behind this particular Eliotic arras than in Wright’s later poems, where his more varied 
linear and syllabic forms produce a more idiosyncratic prosody and appearance on the page.  
Similarly, the poem’s fourteen left-justified lines, as well as a recognizable volta at line 9 
(“And what does it come to, Pilgrim”) identify it even more strongly with the sonnet form 
than with the spider web of Wright’s formal ambition.   
 The entire sequence of “Skins” can be read as an ingenious variation on the sonnet 
sequence, much as the fifteen-line poems of “Tattoos,” the companion sequence to “Skins,” 
vary on John Berryman’s own variation of the sonnet sequence.  My interest here is not in 
evaluating the poems as aesthetic objects (although such evaluation is inevitable in 
discussing the relative achievements of their formal organization) but in understanding 
Wright’s process of discovering “organic” form and structure, a sense of organization that 
offers a (potentially illusory) glimpse of order in the midst of apophatic chaos.  Wright has 
                                                
16 Other lines read as similarly near-iambic: 
 
 “You’ve FOL | lowed the CRIC | ket’s HORN 
 To SIDE | step the LAKE | of PAIN . . . 
 And WHAT | does it COME | to, PIL | grim [. . .]”     (7-9) 
 
 “PHRA ses | half-PARSED, | el LIP | ses and SCRA | tches a CROSS | the DIRT? 
 It COMES | to a POINT.  | It COMES | and GOES.”     (13-14) 
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said that he hopes to “make structures, poetic structures, that haven’t been made before,” 
and that “I would like to be able—if you put ten poems on the wall as they do paintings in a 
museum—you’d be able to say, ‘Oh, that’s the one by Charles Wright’” (“Halflife” 29, 
“‘Metaphysics of the Quotidian’” 34).  When Wright begins to make a ritual of his own 
form, his syllable counts stabilize—to borrow a phrase from another early poem—“like 
beads from a broken rosary” (“Childhood” 12).  The structures that Wright makes his own 
are those he develops in The Southern Cross and after, as ritualized as the rosary and as 
organic as the spider web. 
 The poem “Thinking about the Poet Larry Levis One Afternoon in Late May,” 
collected in Appalachia (1998), exemplifies the metrical-temporal and linear-spatial concerns 
of Wright’s mature style.  An elegy for Larry Levis, who died from a heart attack on May 8, 
1996 at the age of 49, the poem follows the example of many Anglophone elegies in 
becoming an elegy for the self (“Larry Levis, 49”).  The poem marks the time since Levis’s 
death—“three weeks now”—but is otherwise more interested in time beyond time (1).  
Similarly, the descriptions of the day’s rain become the premise for considering rain as both 
literal and figurative event.  The fact of Levis’s death appears in the title and in the first line, 
and then nowhere else in the poem.  The speaker offers neither details of Levis’s life nor the 
circumstances of his death.  Rather, in the majority of the poem, the speaker considers the 
weather outside his window and within himself—rain outside, confusion within—as part of 
a meditation on mortality.  In the last line of the poem, elegy and self-elegy, outer and inner 
weather converge: “Part of the rain has now fallen, the rest still to fall” (18).  In this last line 
the image of the rain becomes a measure of time (between “fallen” and “still to fall”) as well 
as an instance of physical and figurative landscape.  One death allows the speaker an illusory 
glimpse of Death; one day’s observable landscape and weather silhouette the invisible, the 
unknowable. 
 The poem opens with an example of Wright’s characteristic elision of a main verb 
from a descriptive sentence, in this case divided among the opening two-and-a-half lines: 
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“Rainy Saturday, Larry dead \ almost three weeks now, / Rain starting to pool in the low 
spots / And creases along the drive” (1-3).  Moments of description in Wright’s poetry often 
arrive without a main verb; I count at least three such instances in “Thinking about the Poet 
Larry Levis.”  Among the several effects of this technique is the emphasis of the line (and of 
the image) over the sentence (and the phrase): the language of the poem builds image by 
image rather than idea by idea or clause by clause, as in Ezra Pound’s foundational Imagist 
text “In a Station of the Metro”: “The apparition of these faces in the crowd; / Petals on a 
wet, black bough” (1-2).  At the same time he emphasizes the line, however, Wright also 
complicates the function of the line with the introduction of the poem’s first dropdown 
hemistich.  In its first instance here, the “low rider” functions as a provisional line break, 
“pausing” the line without breaking it completely: 
Rainy Saturday, Larry dead 
almost three weeks now, 
Rain starting to pool in the low spots 
And creases along the drive. 
      Between showers, the saying goes [. . .] 
In using the half-lines in such ways, Wright allows himself a wider range of punctuative 
possibilities than line and stanza breaks traditionally provide.  The second “low rider,” 
within line three, functions more as a minor stanza break, allowing a thematic shift from the 
place-setting of the opening lines to a more intense meditation on rain as meteorological 
fact and rain as metaphor: “Between showers, the saying goes, / Roses and rhododendron 
wax glint / Through dogwood and locust leaves, / Flesh-colored, flesh-destined, spring in 
false flower, goodbye” (3-6). 
 The next stanza offers an excellent example of Wright’s use of the “low rider” to 
modulate tone.  The stanza opens with the declarative, almost melodramatic “The world 
was born when the devil yawned,” but the speaker immediately tempers the assertion with 
the dropdown line, “the legend goes,” foregrounding the legend itself but distancing himself 
from the assertion (7).  The half-endorsement of the legend allows the speaker to ask, in the 
following line, “And who’s to say it’s not true” (8).  In a single breath (and in two lines) the 
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speaker can repeat the legend, doubt it, then discredit the certainty of the skepticism.  The 
structure of Wright’s lines here supports the sense of what his speaker asserts in the closing 
stanza: “We haven’t a clue as to what counts / In the secret landscape behind the landscape 
we look at here” (13-14).  As if to emphasize the point, the subsequent “low rider” separates 
the half-line “May dull and death-distanced,” the outer landscape “distanced” by the 
speaker’s preoccupation, the half-line distanced—dropped and indented—from the 
remainder of the left-justified stanza.  The poem concludes with two declarative sentences, 
notable for the fact that, unlike Wright’s descriptive fragments, both contain main verbs: 
“It’s all the same dark, it’s all the same absence of dark.  / Part of the rain has now fallen, the 
rest still to fall” (17-18).  One of Wright’s self-admonitions dictates that “[i]f you end a poem 
with a statement, it should come as though forced naturally through the funnel of the poem, 
and not as though it had been stuck at the end to cover up a hole” (“Halflife” 35).  Although 
Wright is speaking here of rhetoric rather than of form, I would extend his point to suggest 
that the artifice of form must succeed such that it belies the form’s artificiality.  Here, the 
rain must function as literal rain, as figurative, apocalyptic rain, and at a tertiary level, as rain 
again.17  The language that contains the metaphor must use metaphor to point beyond the 
limits of language. 
 At the levels of stanzaic, linear, and syllabic structure, the poem is divided into three 
sestets, and demonstrates the later Wright’s strict adherence to lines of odd numbers of 
syllables.  Some of these lines sound more metrically regular than others—“It’s all the same 
                                                
17 Here I allude to a commonplace of Zen Buddhism Wright records in one of his own 
commonplace notebooks, a parable that suggests the simultaneous multiplicity of meanings at work 
in figurative language: 
 
  —“Before I began studying Zen, I saw mountains as mountains, rivers as rivers.   
  When I learned some Zen, mountains ceased to be mountains, rivers ceased to be  
  rivers.  But now, when I have understood Zen, I am in accord with myself and again I 
  see mountains as mountains, rivers as rivers.”  
     —Saisho, as quoted in Milosz [sic], Unattainable Earth 
          (“Bytes and Pieces” 78) 
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dark, it’s all the same absence of dark” falls into a roughly anapestic line with an opening 
iamb—but none of them fall into a definitive accentual-syllabic meter.18  Even the ghost of 
anapestic structure in the penultimate line does not betray the usual triple-meter bounce, 
due in part to its placement among seventeen other lines of “unmetrical” free verse.  A 
count of the syllables in each line gives us the following structure:  
1. 8\5 = 13 
2. 9 
3. 7\8 = 15 
4. 9 
5. 7 
6. 13 
7. 9\4= 13 
8. 7 
9. 13 
10. 7 
11. 13 
12. 9 
13. 9 
14. 9 
15. 7\6= 13 
16. 7 
17. 13 
18. 13 
 
The lines range in length from seven to fifteen syllables, with eight of the poem’s eighteen 
lines consisting of thirteen syllables.  As such, “Thinking about the Poet Larry Levis” 
demonstrates what Cushman has called Wright’s “triskaidekaphilia.”  Cushman notes that a 
13-syllable line “gives a free verse poet the same number of stresses as the iambic 
pentameter, which often wavers between four and five prominent stresses, at the same time 
that it loosens the pentameter up with three extra syllables.  But it is hard to escape all 
suspicion that Wright’s triskaidekaphilia reflects some numerological significance the 
number 13 holds for him” (209).  One can speculate about the exact significance of the 
                                                
18 I read the line as having the following stress pattern: “It’s ALL | the same DARK, | it’s ALL | the 
same AB | sence of DARK.” 
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number 13 here, but again, I would point to the fact of the ritual as more important than its 
content.  The trained ear hears the iambic pulse of, say, a pentameter line, but Wright’s 
conception of poetic form is idiosyncratic and almost private.  Wright’s form acts neither as 
mnemonic nor homage.  “There is an organization to the universe,” Wright has said, “but 
it’s not personal” (“Improvisations on Form and Measure” 5).  Nevertheless, the syllabic 
forms and structures of his own lines are as personal as a confession.  Only the concluding 
lines of the poem show consecutive numbers of syllables—again, thirteen and thirteen—as if 
Wright were writing a sort of couplet invisible to the reader’s eye, like the spider web that 
appears invisible until one walks into it.   
 “Thinking about the Poet Larry Levis” also exhibits Wright’s mature management of 
the poem’s visual aspects, the appearance of the lines and of blank space on the page.  
Wright’s employment of four “low rider” hemistiches spreads the poem across the page in a 
way that both uses and allows more space than the poem would if each line were left-
justified.  Costello argues that such employment of negative space demonstrates  
that the negative principle can have content.  Double negatives, of course, 
produce positives, in math and in language—hence Wright’s many variations 
on absence within an absence: the inside of the inside, metaphor of metaphor 
[and, I would add, ‘the form inside the form inside.’].  And negative space in 
painting (black in chiaroscuro, or light areas behind foregrounded outlines, 
the sculpted space of Chinese painting), like white space in writing, is a force 
in the composition [. . .].  (334) 
If we consider the poem as paginated landscape, we can consider its appearance—its use of 
negative and positive space—as well as its sound.  For my purposes here I want to present 
the poem as lines on a page devoid of semantic meaning: 
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 xxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxx xxxx 
     xxxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxx 
 xxxx xxxxxxx xx xxxx xx xxx xxx xxxx     
 xxx xxxxxxx xxxxx xxx xxxxxx   
               xxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxx xxxxxx xxxxx 
 xxxxx xxx xxxxxxxxxxxx xxx xxxxx    
 xxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxx xxxxxx xxxxxxx 
 xxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxx xx xxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxxx 
  
 
 xxx xxxxx xxx xxxx xxxx xxx xxxxx xxxxxxx 
       xxx xxxxxx xxxxx 
 xxx xxxxx xx xxx xxxx xxx xxxxx 
 xxxxx xx xxxxxx xxxx xxxxx xxx xxxxxx xxxxx xx xxxxxx 
 xxxx xxxx xxxxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx 
 xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxx x xxxxx xxxx xxxxxx xxx xxxx xxxxxx 
 xxxx xxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxxx xxx 
   
 xx xxxxxxx x xxxx xx xx xxxx xxxxxx 
 xx xxx xxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxx xxx xxxxxxxxx xx xxxx xx xxxxx 
 xx xxxx xxxxx xxxx xxxx xxxxxxxx 
            xxx xxxx xxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
 xxx xxxxxxxx xxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx            
 xxxx xxx xxx xxxx xxxxx xxxx xxx xxx xxxx xxxxxxx xx xxxxx 
 xxxx xx xxx xxxx xxx xxx xxxxxxx xxx xxxx xxxxx xx xxxxx   
 
 
 
With the four dropdown hemistiches, one becomes more aware of the poem as a spatial 
entity than one is with a poem such as “Skins,” each section of which appears as a solid 
block of left-justified text.  Here the horizontal “axis” of the poem becomes emphasized 
along with its vertical correspondent.  The spaces created by dropping half-lines create the 
illusion of additional stanza breaks; the stanzaic structure of the poem becomes “hidden” 
within its own linear structure. 
 Wright also varies his use of the dropped line throughout the lines themselves, so 
that although, for instance, three low rider lines contain thirteen syllables, these lines are 
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divided 8/5, 9/4, 7/6.  As such, the long/short pattern of these lines exemplifies one of 
Wright’s stated uses for the dropdown hemistich:  
One of the purposes (one of several) of writing the two-step line I have used 
on and off since 1978, the low-rider, whatever you want to call it, was to be 
able to keep the line from breaking under its own weight.  In other words, my 
line began to get longer and more ‘conversational’ as I tried to push it as far 
toward prose as I thought I could and still maintain it as a verse line.  So I 
began to break the line, in order to keep it whole.  It is always one line, not 
two, and broken in a particular place to keep the integrity of the single line 
musically. (“Bytes and Pieces” 79)  
None of these subtle prosodic devices may matter much to the reader who does not stop to 
count the syllables, and even the reader who does stop to count the syllables per line in 
“Thinking of the Poet Larry Levis” may think the odd count a trivial, chance fact.  The 
structure’s near-invisibility is also its ultimate strength: one cannot hear the meter here the 
way one hears the famous “tee TUM tee TUM” of an iambic line.  Wright’s notion of 
breaking the line “in order to keep it whole” echoes and revises Pound’s declaration that “to 
break the pentameter [. . .] was the first heave” (“Canto LXXXI” 54).  Wright’s rhetorical 
paradox here mirrors his form’s paradoxical effects: the verse appears “free,” ungoverned by 
form and structure, but such an appearance is made possible only by Wright’s rigorous, 
idiosyncratic principles of ordering. 
 Ultimately for Wright, form and structure, like language and landscape, become 
stand-ins for the absolute, ways for the mortal human to glimpse the “landscape behind the 
landscape we look at here.”  But form and structure lie beyond—even as they give shape 
to—language and landscape; they are perhaps the only attributes of the absolute that, via 
the apophatic path of language and landscape, the Wright pilgrim may access.  Wright’s 
ongoing argument with himself may concern the unlikelihood of the possibility of personal 
salvation, but he is more confident in a godlike order and structure to the universe: “I still 
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think of [God] as a profound notion.  Although I don’t think he exists other than in a 
harmony, the geometry and physics of whatever it is that holds the universe together” 
(“With Sherod Santos” [1981] 109).  The organization of the universe is not personal, 
Wright claims, but his own sense of formal organization governs the intensely personal 
spiritual, autobiographical, and confessional concerns of his poetry.  As I hope to have 
shown, those concerns grow into the mature method demonstrated in “Thinking about the 
Poet Larry Levis,” a method that we may first recognize in a few poems (or sections thereof) 
from Bloodlines and China Trace, and especially in Wright’s transformative volume, The 
Southern Cross.  The “organization to the universe,” as Wright sees it, may not be personal, 
but Wright reaches his poetic maturity when he manages to recast the organizing principles 
of his poetry in such a way that he opens the universe of the self to the universe itself, and 
vice versa.  The poetry of Wright’s maturity simultaneously demonstrates the impossibility 
of knowing—or escaping—the infinite divine or even the finite self.  As Henry Hart has 
written:  
Wright can no more shed concepts and language than he can shed his skin.  The 
paradox, which is at the core of Eastern and Western mystical literature, is also at 
the core of Wright’s [poetry].  In his poems about language, landscape, and God, he 
bemoans the futility of poetry, the deceptions of language, the fleeting beauties of 
landscape, and the obsolescence of God.  He knows that he will never be able to fly 
from his linguistic and conceptual labyrinth—at least not for long—without plunging 
back into it.  Language and concepts”—and, I would add, form and structure—“are 
the ineradicable stuff of his poetic imagination.  (328) 
 The poems of The Southern Cross reveal that poetic imagination at its most powerful, which, 
as Wright acknowledges, is never powerful enough. 
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YESTERDAY’S NOISE 
 
 
 If Wright’s hypothetical museumgoer can in fact identify this structure, this style as 
uniquely that of Charles Wright, he or she is likely reading a poem from or after The 
Southern Cross.  Not only do the stylistic changes Wright establishes in The Southern Cross 
pervade the rest of his career to date, one can also observe these changes taking place over 
the course of The Southern Cross itself.  Turning through the first sections of the book, one 
finds a dropped-line hemistich here or there, hanging like a typesetter’s widow or orphan.  
As one reads through a section of self-portraits and turns to a section of more abstract 
landscapes, one finds that the landscape of the poems shifts from left-justified cinquains 
reminiscent of “Tattoos” to the airier “step-down” lines I have described in my reading of 
“Thinking of the Poet Larry Levis.”  One notes throughout the volume a linguistic pattern 
perhaps reminiscent of the blocks of color in a painting by Cézanne, to whom Wright pays 
homage in the book’s opening poem.  These poems build by accretion: the blocking of 
description atop diaristic notation, followed sometimes by quotation, sometimes by 
aphorism, other times by negation of what’s come before.  Like Cézanne’s paintings, 
Wright’s poems suggest parts of landscapes—both physical exterior and emotional 
interior—without depicting a unified whole.  Like Cézanne and like Giorgio Morandi, who 
“[p]enciled these bottles in by leaving them out,” Wright’s work in The Southern Cross 
emerges as a poetry of the presences suggested by absence, an apophatic poetics that abides 
in the synapse between the self and the divine. 
 Wright has remarked that his poems changed around the time of The Southern Cross 
in part because his method of composing them changed: “I do drafts of stanzas now,” he 
says in a 1981 interview, “I don’t do drafts of poems.  I’ll get a stanza the way I want it, and 
by the time I’ve got that stanza I pretty much have an idea of what I want the poem to be   
[. . .]” (“With Sherod Santos,” 1981, 107).  “As the stanzas got larger and looser,” he says 
elsewhere, there still maintained the idea of a stanzaic or patterned organization” 
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(“Metaphysics of the Quotidian” 32).19  What Wright omits in these statements is that the 
stanzas get “larger and looser” because he elongates his poetic line and maintains its 
suppleness by incorporating frequent dropped lines.  Willard Spiegelman observes, similarly, 
that “the stanza itself (a staple of Wright’s poetry in Country Music: Selected Early Poems) has 
begun an inexorable breakdown and expansion.  From The Southern Cross on, the line and the 
paragraph will replace the pretty stanzaic rooms that have started to crumble.  Like the 
series of self-portraits by Francis Bacon on which this sequence [the series of five poems in 
The Southern Cross entitled “Self-Portrait”] is based, Wright’s collection dramatizes the loss 
of the self as a means of building it up” (87).  I hesitate to endorse Spiegelman’s emphasis of 
“paragraph” over “stanza;” it is not simply that the “pretty stanzaic rooms” of Wright’s early 
poetry “have started to crumble,” but that he has begun to build them differently, allowing 
simultaneously what Spiegelman calls “inexorable breakdown and expansion.”   
 The breakdown and expansion Spiegelman describes is not limited to Wright’s 
stanzas, but extends as well to his treatment of self, language, landscape, and the divine.  
Spiegelman argues that Wright “enacts a pilgrimage toward self-portraiture (which means 
self-understanding) by painting himself into the landscape.  In The Southern Cross, [the self-
                                                
19 Wright elaborates on this change in his compositional method in another interview:  
 
  When my son was born, the first several years were very hectic and there wasn’t a lot  
  of free time to do things.  I would start a poem and I’d get the idea, and maybe a  
  stanza, and then I’d have to rush off to do something else.  The next day I’d come  
  back to it and write another stanza.  After a period of time, I started to realize that  
  the stanzas were all cohering to the title, but they weren’t necessarily following each  
  other. 
   This was a great discovery for me, because it went back to my original idea of 
  how things worked in my mind, which was synaptically, and I’d been trying to force  
  myself into a logic of narrative, just because I thought I should learn how to do it.   
  Unbeknownst to myself, I was breaking back out into where I should have been in  
  the first place.  But with the great exception that I had learned that the organization  
  was very important as well, so I was leading from organization instead of leading  
  from chaos.  As the stanzas got larger and looser, there still maintained the idea of a  
  stanzaic or patterned organization.     
        (“Metaphysics of the Quotidian” 31-2) 
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portrait series], along with “Portrait of the Artist with Hart Crane” and “Portrait of the 
Artist with Li Po,” impart a vision of Wright, the man and the poet, just at the moment 
before he transforms his style from the stanzaic poems of the earlier volumes to the jagged, 
long-lined meditations of the journals.  We observe, in other words, the poet on the verge of 
breakup, sparagmos, and poetic reconstitution” (84-5).  I am particularly drawn to 
Spiegelman’s use of the Greek word sparagmos, which refers to the ritual dismemberment 
and reconstitution of a god (such as the Ancient Egyptian Osiris, the Ancient Greek 
Orpheus, or the Eucharistic Christ).  In the myths of sparagmos, the god must be 
dismembered before the veneration of the mutilated god “re-members” him.  If Spiegelman 
is correct that The Southern Cross depicts the “poet on the verge of breakup, sparagmos, and 
poetic reconstitution,” as I believe he is, then it is necessary to add that that the attempt at 
reconstitution—reassembly, “rememberment”—cannot allow complete return to the 
original, perhaps illusory, whole.  Wright has said: “To me, the sum of parts is always more 
interesting than the whole.  It’s how you keep the parts together and how you keep them 
from becoming a whole that fascinates me” (“With Carol Ellis” 157).  This preference makes 
sense for a pilgrim along a poetic via negativa: the whole is unknowable, but the attempt to 
sum its parts is the proper apophatic method of “knowing” the whole by “unknowing” it.   
 Before turning to the title poem, the exemplar of Wright’s apophatic poetics, I want 
to look briefly at “Homage to Paul Cézanne” and the series of self-portraits as indications of 
the shift from Wright’s early work to his mature work, a shift that we can observe as we 
read through this single volume of poems.  “Homage to Paul Cézanne” is a poem of 131 lines 
divided among eight unnumbered sections, each of which is allotted its own page.  Except 
for three dropped lines, the poem adheres to the left-justified, clearly delineated stanzaic 
format of Wright’s early poems.  The speaker of the poem articulates with apparent 
certainty what would certainly lie beyond his capacity to know: the “lives” of the dead.  “At 
night, in the fish-light of the moon, the dead wear our white shirts [. . .]” (1).  “Each year the 
dead grow less dead [. . .]” (17).  “The dead fall around us like rain” (99).  As the speaker 
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speculates about what the dead do, he also seems to suggest that these lines are mere 
projection, or wishful thinking—the wish of the living never to be dead.  “Remember me, speak 
my name” is the wish of the living; the wishes of the dead are beyond our knowledge (45).  In 
the final section, then, the speaker turns to the first person plural of the living: “We’re out 
here, our feet in the soil, our heads craned up at the sky” (116).  “A more normal mode of 
discourse would have posited the dead as objects,” says David Young, “imagined by us as 
subjects.  Wright’s move is to start with the dead as subjects who are different from 
ourselves and then generally subtract the differences” (43).  This method of “blur[ring] and 
merg[ing] irreconcilable points of view,” as Bruce Bond writes, “[. . .] testifies to his negative 
capability: how poem after poem, the dead see as the living, the living as the dead, the 
skeptic sees as the metaphysician, and so on—all in an effort to enlarge our range of feeling, 
to contain and be vitalized by contradiction” (225).   
 The primary method Wright uses to blur these subject/object distinctions in 
“Homage to Paul Cézanne” is to project the wishes and worries of the living onto the tabula 
rasa of the dead.  In fact this indirect treatment of his own emotions, which Wright 
employs throughout The Southern Cross, becomes in poems to come a way to treat more 
directly the events of his own life.  By applying poetic imagination and figurative language to 
an indifferent landscape, Wright integrates his attempt toward spiritual autobiography with 
a biography of the visible world.  This apparently simple method of emotional projection 
becomes, in other poems in The Southern Cross, one of the staples of the new Wright poem.  
Wright’s speakers in these poems project their own intellectual and emotional states on 
bodies of water, on stretches of byways, on different shades of sunlight.  Poems throughout 
The Southern Cross demonstrate Wright’s treatment of landscape as a counterpoint to the 
depiction of specific events in his own life, as we shall see most clearly in “The Southern 
Cross.”  Wright’s method here may resemble the meditative, associative deep image mode 
of Robert Bly, Galway Kinnell, and James Wright.  Although Charles Wright has been 
identified both as working with and against the deep image mode, I want to distinguish his 
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method from that of the deep image poets by emphasizing the explicitly theological—
Christian and natural theological—character of its meditations.20  The pseudo-surrealist 
apparitions of deep image poems seem to aspire to the dissociative quality of a dream, often 
giving the impression of dissolving the self into a collective (non)identity.  Even when 
Wright’s images are similarly surreal, they aspire to the reconstructive quality of memory.  
As I have argued, Wright too wishes to “undo” the self, but even as he projects the self onto 
landscape, he doubts the possibility of doing so. 
 We may also see him developing the method in the series of self-portraits that 
comprise the second section of The Southern Cross.  One of these self-portraits, for instance, 
depicts only “[p]laces and things that caught my eye,” including “Marostica, Val di Ser.  
Bassano del Grappa.  / Madonna del Ortolo.  San Giorgio, arc and stone.  / The foothills 
above the Piave” (4, 1-3).  In such a poem, Wright develops a poetic analogue to his theory 
of Morandi’s drawing: what’s left out (here, himself) “appears” indirectly through what’s 
included.  The presence of what is not-self allows him to glimpse the self, but as he finds in 
“The Southern Cross,” more than a glimpse of the self is difficult to attain.  McCorckle 
reads this method as an extension of Wright’s extended line: “The long lines [in the five 
self-portraits] quite literally explore the edge, the frame, and the boundary of self, language, 
and page; this active form tests and pushes against the margins of the page and against form 
itself [. . .]” (159).  As McCorckle observes, the sequence of self-portraits display the same 
stanzaic form as the earlier “Tattoos” (and of other poems in The Southern Cross too), yet 
they also demonstrate the evolution of Wright’s longer line, his attempt to expand the 
scope of his vision while still maintaining a tight focus, a Poundian emphasis on the image.  
Moreover, in places they demonstrate Wright’s willingness to undercut his own statements 
and conclusions, a strategy that becomes Wright’s method of marrying his skeptic’s 
                                                
20 Perkins, for instance, includes Wright among a group of “deep image” poets in describing the 
period style of the 1970’s (562).  Contrarily, Gary L. McDowell goes so far as to call Wright’s “The 
New Poem” “a stance-taking moment in his rally against the prescriptive poetries of deep-imagists 
and American Surrealists [. . .]” (McDowell). 
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dubiousness to his metaphysical concerns.  The speaker of “Portrait of the Artist with Li 
Po” says, for instance: “The distance between the dead and the living \ is more than a 
heartbeat and a breath,” as if conceding that the blurred distinctions of  “Homage to Paul 
Cezanne” must themselves be interrogated (15).  The exemplar of these emerging techniques 
is the title poem, which concludes the volume, and most definitively establishes the style 
that has characterized Wright’s work ever since.  The title of “The Southern Cross” echoes 
Wright’s structural and spiritual axiom that “each line should be a station of the cross.”  The 
stations in themselves are parts of a whole, but Wright demonstrates consistently that he is 
more interested in the parts, and the spaces between parts, than in any whole they may 
comprise.   
Although Wright identifies Cézanne as the presiding spirit of the entire volume, I 
want to reintroduce Wordsworth here, and in particular Geoffrey Hartman’s reading of the 
“mazy motion of Wordsworth’s Prelude (“Halflife” 33-4, Hartman 54).  “The Southern Cross” 
exemplifies my claim that Wright’s poetry transubstantiates Wordsworth’s subject matter 
and Pound’s Modernist collagist method into an apophatic, poststructuralist poetry of 
doubt.  When Wright remarks that he uses “the architecture of the poem, the landscape of 
the word” as Cézanne uses blocks of color, to “reassembl[e] Mt. S. Victoire,” he is only half-
joking  (“Halflife” 33-4).  Wright is attempting to use language to reconstruct memories of 
landscape, landscapes of memory, and though them the self, in an ultimate attempt to 
dissolve the world of language, landscape and self into the divine.  “The Southern Cross” and 
subsequent poems of Wright’s accrete image by image, memory by memory, and (especially 
in his recent work) quotation by quotation.  As in The Prelude, we find spots of time in 
Wright’s poem that occur and recur, transfigured on one side of a description of landscape 
from what they had been on the other.21  “Things that divine us we never touch,” the poem 
begins, emphasizing the passivity or inefficacy of human ability by delaying the subject of 
                                                
21 Wright has remarked that “all [his] long poems are short poems in disguise” (“Halflife” 29.)   
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the sentence until its second clause. We are being divined—with all the verb’s connotative 
history of “supernatural or magical insight [. . .] unintelligible to ordinary faculties”—but we 
cannot touch what “make[s] out or interpret[s]” us (OED).  In other words, we cannot 
divine the things that divine us.  But in the episteme of the poem, those things can at least 
be named, an act that brings them almost within our reach: 
  Things that divine us we never touch: 
 
  The black sounds of the night music, 
  The Southern Cross, like a kite at the end of its string, 
 
  And now this sunrise, and empty sleeve of a day, 
  The rain just starting to fall, and then not fall, 
 
  No trace of a story line.    (1-6) 
 
To append “no trace of a story line” to the preceding description of the rain is somewhat 
disingenuous: the trace of a story line is present, but the trace is ours (much as we have seen 
in Wright’s uses of intermittent rain in “Thinking about the Poet Larry Levis”).  The 
imagination—and the imaginative act of remembering—creates a story out of the facts of 
the world or the facts of one’s own life.  This idea is emphasized in the next line, which 
begins a new section of the poem: “All day I’ve remembered a lake and a sudsy shoreline, / 
Gauze curtains blowing in and out of open windows all over the South” (7-8).  The memory 
is at once specific and vague, moving from the singular “lake” and “shoreline” to the plural 
“curtains blowing [. . .] all over the South,” as if the memory were simultaneously personal 
and collective. 
 When the speaker says, in the next line, “It’s 1936, in Tennessee.  I’m one,” 
wrenching the autobiographical past into the present tense, the memory itself—however 
specific or vague—becomes suspect (9).  Whether the speaker can reliably remember 
anything from the first year of his life is less the point, though, than the feeling of memory 
that takes precedence here, as memories become interchangeable.  As the speaker 
continues: 
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  Or it’s 1941 in a brown suit, or ’53 in its white shoes, 
  Overlay after overlay tumbled and brought back, 
  As meaningless as the sea would be 
      if the sea could remember its waves . . .   (13-15) 
 
Here the simultaneous importance and interchangeability of memories lead the speaker to 
refuse any possible Wordsworthian sublimity, instead undercutting the memory’s 
importance.  He almost scolds himself over the nostalgia that generates these images:  “How 
sweet the past is, no matter how wrong, or how sad.  / How sweet is yesterday’s noise” (21-2).  
The sweetness of these memories seems a sickness or affliction, as the Ancient Greek root 
of nostalgia (nostos, meaning home; algos, “denoting [a type] of pain”) suggests, but also an 
indulgence for which the speaker requires confession (OED).  Wordsworth conveys the 
same sense of indulgence, but without the same reproach, in his description of childhood in 
Book Fifth of The Prelude: “Our childhood sits, / Our simple childhood, sits upon a throne / 
That hath more power than all the elements” (V.507-9).  In Wordsworth’s sense of things, 
as in Wright’s, landscape activates the power of memory, and the memory itself becomes an 
act of devotion—to landscape and to the past self, whose presence in the current self is 
questionable in Wordsworth and more dubious yet in Wright.  Wordsworth considers the 
memory of childhood more powerful “than all the elements,” while Wright will admit: “I 
can’t remember enough” (233).  The power to remember occupies a mysterious, almost 
magical status in both Wordsworth’s astonishment at his own capability to remember and 
in Wright’s obsessive concern about his incapability to remember enough.  If Wordsworth 
discovers himself through “spots of time,” Wright discovers himself only partially, and 
through the silhouettes of half-remembered spots. 
 The Wright speaker’s complicated attitude toward memory and landscape is 
especially apparent in the subsequent section, in which he uses the figurative force of 
language to conflate time and space:  
  All day the ocean was like regret, 
     clearing its throat, brooding and self-absorbed. 
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  Now the wisteria tendrils extend themselves like swan’s necks under Orion. 
 
  Now the small stars in the orange trees.    (23-5) 
 
It is not the ocean, of course, but the speaker who is “brooding and self-absorbed.”  The 
speaker’s projection of his own state of mind onto a personified sea which “clear[s] its 
throat” demonstrates the depth of the speaker’s integration of what he sees before him with 
what he feels within him.  For Wright’s brooding mind, the waters are Heraclitean: they are 
universal only in their inconstancy.  In the first thirty lines of “The Southern Cross,” the sea 
cannot remember its waves, but the ocean can be “like regret, \ clearing its throat, brooding 
and self-absorbed” (23).  At once, then, landscape reflects and deflects him, resembling 
ourselves just as it reminds us of its utter difference from us, its indifference to us.  If an 
ocean can be brooding and self-absorbed, would it not also be able to remember its waves?  
The question is a fair one, but a logical answer may not be available.  It makes perfect poetic 
sense that the sea should be so protean, remembering itself at one moment and unable to do 
so at another, because its inconstancy reflects the speaker’s (and, by extension, our own) 
uncertain relationship with landscape.22  As it reflects and deflects us, we can feel—almost 
in a single moment—both at one with nature and, as Woody Allen apocryphally said, “at 
two with nature.”  We may observe, similarly, the feeling of the speaker as he contemplates 
the infinite divine or the seemingly infinite past: he may believe that he belongs to the 
divinity, yet may simultaneously feel utterly separated from the divine.  He may believe that 
he is now the same self he was then, despite the feeling that, in Wordsworth’s phrasing, 
      so wide appears 
  The vacancy between me and those days 
  [. . . that]   often do I Seem 
  Two consciousnesses [ . . .]    (The Prelude II.28-9, 32-3) 
                                                
22 One can imagine Wright’s personified, inconstant sea quoting Walt Whitman: “Do I contradict 
myself? / Very well then I contradict myself, / (I am large, I contain multitudes)” (51.6-8). 
 
    
 150 
 The next lines of Wright’s poem emphasize the mystery of his speaker’s relationship 
with landscape and the animating power of his imagination, as “the wisteria tendrils extend 
themselves like swan’s necks under Orion.  / Now the small stars in the orange trees.”  
Wright’s speaker can observe wisteria tendrils in the act of extending themselves no more 
than Wordsworth’s can observe the active decay of a growth of woods.  The imagination 
allows the observation as assertion but not as observable phenomenon.  The processes of 
vegetal growth and decay occur so slowly that we are incapable of seeing them as they 
happen.  We can only reconstruct, through memory of what was set against observation of 
what is and imagination of what will be, the processes the poets would depict.  So the 
imagination also allows the movement (the “mazy motion”) from the now of the present to 
the landscapes of the past, as the scene of the poem shifts from the seaside California of the 
here and now to a remembered scene of Italy: 
  At Garda, on Punto San Vigilio, the lake, 
  In springtime, is like the sea, 
  Wind fishtailing the olive leaves like slash minnows beneath the vineyards, 
  Ebb and flow of the sunset past Sirmio, 
       flat voice of the waters 
  Retelling their story, again and again, as though to unburden itself 
 
  Of an unforgotten guilt [. . .]    (26-31) 
 
The absolutely specificity of time and place in these lines, as compared to the “Lake of 
Pain” in “Skins #20,” illuminates the dramatic shift in Wright’s method.  The 
personification of the waters here, their “flat voice” “[r]etelling their story,” continues 
Wright’s complicated treatment of landscape in “The Southern Cross.”  Where earlier 
waters could not remember their waves or brooded in self-absorption, now Lake Garda 
seeks “to unburden itself // Of an unforgotten guilt.”  The sea, needless to say, does not 
brood or remember, forget or regret.  These are human acts, and in our own inability to 
grasp the vastness of landscape (or seascape), all we can do is attempt to translate the 
incomprehensible into our own terms, as Augustine tries to understand eternity in terms of 
human temporality.  The poet may turn to figurative language to try to touch, like the 
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Apostle Thomas, the intangible, but a poet as probing as Wright cannot but call his own 
language into question too. 
 Here I would return to Spiegelman’s notion that Wright “enacts a pilgrimage toward 
self-portraiture [. . .] by painting himself into the landscape” in order to argue that Wright’s 
method of self-portraiture also requires painting the landscape into himself, or as a 
reconstruction of himself.  As Wright has said, “Poetry is not a reflection, of course, the 
famous mirror held up to Nature.  It is a reconstruction, which is why style is so important: 
as you rebuild, you rebuild in your own way.  And which is why nothing is ever ‘this’ or ‘that’ 
but is ‘toward this’ or ‘in the direction of that.’  Rearrangement and reassembly” (“Halflife” 
36).  Or, as Spiegelman puts it, sparagmos and revivification.  The remembered scene of 
Punto San Vigilio, in this case, allows Wright to reconstruct, at least partially, landscape and 
self through memory.  As such the image maintains the same resonance for Wright that 
Wordsworth’s spots of time provide for him.  Such moments allow Wordsworth an 
“exaltation” in the power of imagination.  For Wright, though, “[t]he landscape was always 
the best part” (156).23  When Wordsworth’s imagination colors the natural world he 
observes, the emphasis is unifying: “nature remains in Wordsworth’s view the best and 
gentlest guide in the development surpassing her” (WP 54).  Wright cannot surpass nature; 
as the poem continues, language and memory become the tools that fail him in his attempt 
to do so:  
  River of sighs and forgetfulness 
            (and the secret light Campana saw), 
  River of bloom-bursts from the moon, 
       of slivers and broken blades from the moon 
  In an always-going-away of glints . . .     (39-41) 
 
Whether sea, lake, or river, the speaker of “The Southern Cross” seems unable to dissociate 
waters from memory or the failures of memory.  What light the speaker finds here arrives in 
                                                
23 Wright echoes this idea in his notebook “Halflife”: “There is nothing so beautiful as the country is, 
when the country is good” (25). 
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“bursts” or “broken blades;” this light is, like memory, “an always-going-away of glints.”  The 
parts allow the semblance of the whole, but nothing more. 
 The speaker’s references to other poets further complicate his sense of his own 
inability to remember or to describe, and his sense of belatedness as compared to the great 
dead.  When he mentions the Italian poet Dino Campana (whose Orphic Songs Wright has 
translated), he refers to “the secret light” that Campana saw—and which, we might assume, 
Wright does not see.  “Dante and Can Grande [Cangrande della Scala, patron of Dante 
Alighieri] once stood here,” his speaker considers (40), and  
     Before that, in his marble tier, 
  Catullus once sat through the afternoons.   
  Before that, God spoke in the rocks . . . 
 
  And now it’s my turn to stand 
  Watching a different light do the same things on a different water, 
  The Adige bearing its gifts 
     through the April twilight of 1961.  (43-8) 
 
The speaker ends the series of predecessor poets with God; moreover, this God is the only 
figure mentioned in the series who acts the poet’s role, who speaks.  Campana sees, Dante 
stands, Catullus sits, and the speaker watches, but “God [speaks] in the rocks.”  Such a line 
of comparison would make any poetic speaker feel belated and inadequate, but of course the 
speaker has invented this line for himself and placed himself at its most recent end.  The 
thought of his great (or even divine) predecessors worries the speaker, but it also inspires 
him:  “Thinking of Dante, I start to feel / What I think are wings beginning to push out 
from my shoulder blades,” he writes (55-6).  This is a moment of apparent poetic grandiosity, 
but the speaker undercuts this angelic metamorphosis with the qualifying phrase “I think.”  
He feels, he thinks, but is not and cannot be sure; to be sure is mistakenly to arrogate the 
otherworldly (“the things that are God’s”) to the finite world (“the things which are 
Caesar’s”) (Matt. 22:21).  The moments of ambitious fancy are wrenched back to earth in an 
intercalary section concerning the speaker’s parents: 
  They’re both ghosts now, haunting the chairs and the sugar chest. 
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  From time to time I hear their voices drifting like smoke through the living  
   room, 
  Touching the various things they owned once. 
  Now they own nothing 
     and drift like smoke through the living room. (51-4) 
 
These beloved, specific dead resemble the anonymous, vague dead of “Homage to Paul 
Cézanne” who, in the speaker’s imagination at least, “grow less dead every year.”  
Throughout these cuts between now and then, here and there, the worldly points the 
speaker toward the otherworldly, but it cannot get him there or return the lost to him.  
“Thinking of Dante,” the speaker says—implying by synecdoche thinking of Campana and 
Catullus, his mother and father—“is thinking about the other side, / And the other side of 
the other side.  / It’s thinking about the noon noise and the daily light” (61-3).  One cannot 
know the other side, much less the other side’s other side, but the speaker acknowledges 
that thinking about it means meditating on this side.  The quotidian “noon noise” allows 
him to consider “yesterday’s noise.” 
 Wright muses on “how sweet is yesterday’s noise,” but the word noise makes the 
sweetness of the musing rather bitter.  The sound the past makes is not music but noise, a 
static that prevents the poet from hearing just what he listens for.  We can see this tension 
in the poet’s vacillation between remembering a specific event or incident and then 
lamenting his inability to remember more, or remember others, and sometimes in the same 
line.  “After twelve years,” he says,  “it’s hard to recall / That defining sound the canal made 
at sundown, slap / Of tide swill on the church steps [. . .]” (79-81).  Difficult though it may 
be, the poet has at least accomplished the onomatopoeic task of making those sibilant and 
plosive sounds—“slap” of “tide swill” on “steps”—available to us if not completely to 
himself.  Here we may observe again an instance of the principle of the via negativa: one can 
remember a sound, but whatever is remembered is not heard, and cannot be the sound 
which, as Augustine observes, has sounded and is gone.  Wright amplifies the 
Wordsworthian anxiety about the continuity of the self in a different form: “the vacancy 
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between me and those days,” the latter writes, makes himself seem “[t]wo consciousnesses, 
conscious of myself / And of some other Being.”  In Wright’s case, we have at most one-
and-a-half consciousnesses, because “[p]laces swim up and sink back, and days do, / The 
edges around what really happened \ we’ll never remember / No matter how hard we stare 
back at the past [. . .]” (157-9.  As the poem continues and the speaker recites a litany of 
memories, his sense of the failures of memory simultaneously increase, becoming in his 
failure to remember a past self a betrayal of both that and the present self.  Not only does 
he betray the past and present selves, but he doubts the idea of the individual self:  “As 
always, silence will have the last word [. . .] // Everyone’s life is the same life \ if you live long 
enough” (130).  At its core, the speaker suggests, the self is somehow not-self:  
  There is an otherness inside us 
  We never touch, 
          no matter how far down our hands reach. 
  It is the past,  
    with its good looks and Anytime, Anywhere . . .  
  Our prayers go out to it, our arms go out to it 
  Year after year, 
  But who can ever remember enough?   (137-42) 
    
This is the fear against which Wordsworth composes The Prelude—that in seeking to 
understand his growth into what he is he may find himself alien—and which, through 
violent but unifying power of nature, he finds unfounded. 
 The “otherness” of the self as Wright portrays it in “The Southern Cross,” and 
through his career afterward, is the self lost in the ungraspable past, a time we can neither 
inhabit nor accurately remember, but which is nevertheless the source of the self one has 
become.  “I can’t remember,” he writes, “the colors I said I’d never forget / On Via Giulia at 
sundown” (183-4).  At the same time, the otherness of the self reminds him of the otherness 
of the divine, which “‘is neither imaginable nor conceivable, but is the ground and condition 
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of all existence and knowledge” (Mink xvi, qtd. in “Halflife” 37).24  The failures of Wright’s 
stated subjects become their own litany: the power of landscape to generate memory, the 
power of memory to recollect the scenes of landscape and the self who experienced it, the 
failure of language reliably to communicate any of it: 
  Time is the villain in most tales, 
            and here too, 
  Lowering its stiff body into the water. 
  Its landscape is the resurrection of the word, 
  No end of it, 
    the petals of wreckage in everything. (212-15) 
 
As I have said above, time is the villain in this tale, but time also makes the tale possible.  
Its personification here allows the poet to bring together his vital concerns in a single 
image, “[time’s] landscape [as] the resurrection of the word.”  Physical landscape is already 
time’s landscape, changing as time changes it, but time’s landscape is also memory and the 
half-remembered landscapes the speaker has been trying, and failing, to recollect.  The 
landscape of memory resurrects the word—the word of the poem, of course, but with the 
inevitable echoes of the word of God made flesh, crucified and buried, and resurrected.  But 
these various parts cannot cohere; the speaker offers no unifying logic for them.  All he can 
wrench from this dense image is another image: “the petals of wreckage in everything,” after 
which he shifts again from hazily remembered scenes of Italy to more specific (and thus, for 
the speaker, less trustworthy) scenes of a Tennessee childhood: 
  I can’t remember enough. 
 
  [. . .] 
  The hard pull of a semi making the grade up U.S. 11W, 
  The cold with its metal teeth ticking against the window, 
  The long sigh of the screen door stop, 
  My headlights starting to disappear  
       in the day’s new turning . . .   
                                                
24 In his notebook, Wright cites “St. Augustine” as the source of this quotation, but the original 
source, as far as I can tell, is Louis Mink’s introduction to the Gateway Edition of Augustine’s Of 
True Religion (1959). 
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  I’ll never be able to.      (233, 242-6) 
 
If one does not entirely trust the line “I’ll never be able to” (emphasized in being allotted a 
stanza of its own) as a moment of epiphany, perhaps this is because the speaker has been 
arguing for the failures of memory with every memory he dredges up.  Near the end of the 
poem, he confesses: “All we remember is wind,” a line that resonates in two grammatical 
senses (264).  We seem to remember nothing but the wind, but all that we are capable of 
remembering at all is wind.  When he writes: “It’s what we forget that defines us, and stays 
in the same place, / And waits to be discovered,” he utters in fungible language what the 
equally fraught glimpses of memory have been demonstrating throughout the poem (266-7).   
 In “The Southern Cross” and in Wright’s poems that follow, we stare back at the 
past as we stare at nature, as “the small stars [appear] in the orange trees,” but neither can 
tell us enough about who we are or what the world is.  Neither confirms “this this,” as 
Wright has called it in another poem (“Tom Strand” 15).  Instead, as he concludes “The 
Southern Cross”: 
  Somewhere in all that network of rivers and roads and silt hills, 
  A city I’ll never remember, 
      its walls the color of pure light, 
  Lies in the August heat of 1935, 
  In Tennessee, the bottomland slowly becoming a lake. 
  It lies in a landscape that keeps my imprint 
 
  Forever, 
   and stays unchanged, and waits to be filled back in. 
  Someday I’ll find out 
  And enter my old outline as though for the first time, 
 
  And lie down, and tell no one.     (266-76) 
 
The end to which Wright aspires here is less Wordsworthian transcendence than a silence 
that, in keeping with Wright’s apophatic poetics, “will have the last word” (117).   
 The great irony of reading Charles Wright’s poems as “an ongoing argument with 
[him]self about the unlikelihood of salvation” is that, despite the poet’s doubts about the 
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possibility of his own immortality, the poems in which he expresses those doubts constitute 
a likely vehicle for some kind—if not personal—survival.  They cannot apprehend the divine 
any more than the Creator’s logos can be understood in terms of human language.  As David 
Young writes, “where other mystics finally find God, Wright more often finds just himself 
or his sense of his own limits or his rueful acknowledgment that he is somehow terribly 
separate from the world he loves” (44-5).  Wright’s poems will not free the person from 
himself so that he might approach the divine, nor can they return him to unity with a lost, 
whole version of the self or of the world.  They abide instead as sparks in the synapse—
lonely though it is—between what is and what cannot be imagined. 
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Chapter Three 
 
In Which Our Names Do Not Appear: Adrienne Rich 
 
In my opening opposition of Walt Whitman’s and Emily Dickinson’s senses of 
selfhood, I wrote: “The self is oceanic; the self is a prison.”  The poetry of Adrienne Rich 
has demonstrated that before the self can be either or neither of these, it first is a condition 
of privilege.  Rich understands the self to be inextricably political, not by choice or 
predilection, but by the inheritance of being born male or female into a patriarchal society.  
For Rich, for women, and subsequently for the woman poet living in patriarchy, there is no 
self without politics and struggle.  Similarly, there can be no person or poetry outside of 
history, which has meant a history of patriarchy.1  Rich sees the self as it has been 
formulated under patriarchy as an individual pursuit, a corollary of bourgeois capitalism and 
of what Roland Barthes calls “the prestige of the individual.”  Moreover, this prestige—and 
the privilege to seek it—has been reserved exclusively for men, especially men born white 
and wealthy.  Rich believes that the capitalist society that nourishes and is nourished by 
                                                
1 Here and throughout, I shall defer to Rich’s definition of patriarchy as articulated in Of Woman 
Born:  
 
Patriarchy is the power of the fathers: a familial-social, ideological, political system in 
which men—by force, direct pressure, or through ritual tradition, law, and language, 
customs, etiquette, education, and the division of labor, determine what part women 
shall or shall not play, and in which the female is everywhere subsumed under the 
male. (57) 
 
Rich offers a more detailed analysis of the “characteristics of male power” in her “Compulsory 
Heterosexuality and Lesbian Experience” (1980); I use her definition from Of Woman Born for its 
succinctness (“Compulsory” 36-9). 
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such a model of selfhood has proven destructive to women, to persons of color, to persons 
living in poverty, and to the earth itself.  Rich’s poetry attempts to articulate a new 
conception of self, not only in the lines of the lyric poem but in the day-to-day lives of 
women and men.  What the self might be, whom it might include or exclude, and how it 
might be achieved remain in question.  These questions, as I shall argue in this chapter, 
animate Rich’s poetry and destabilize traditional conceptions of individual and community, 
tradition and innovation, self and world. 
In both her poetry and prose, Rich attempts to question—even to overturn—the 
abiding politics and poetics of the self and its correlative ignorance or denial of history.   
The problem Rich addresses is not simply poetic or political.  In order to reconceive (of) the 
self, Rich proposes nothing less than a reevaluation of language and thought themselves:  
Masculine intellectual systems are inadequate because they lack the 
wholeness that female consciousness, excluded from contributing to them, 
could provide.  [. . .] Truly to liberate women, then, means to change thinking 
itself: to reintegrate what has been named the unconscious, the subjective, the 
emotional with the structural, the rational, the intellectual [. . .] and finally to 
annihilate those dichotomies.2  
Rich and other radical feminists are “speaking in terms of ‘feminist revolution,’” she 
continues, “of a ‘post-androgynous’ society, of creating a new kind of human being” (Of 
Woman Born 81).  Poetry can prove to be a mode of such creation, Rich insists, because 
language is fundamental to all varieties of making: “Only where there is language is there 
world,” she writes in “The Demon Lover” (92).  Joanne Feit Diehl understands Rich’s 
project as “merging Whitmanian power with the legacy of Dickinson’s alternative Sublime.”  
Diehl surveys what she calls “Rich’s attempt to construct a single-sex, feminist poetics and 
                                                
2  In her “Sorties,” Hélène Cixous too identifies some of the oppositions by which, she says, 
“thought has always worked,” though she is careful, too, to identify these as “dual, hierarchized 
oppositions,” in which the male is always superior to the female (90-1). 
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her subsequent repudiation of the exclusionary aspects of that poetics in favor of a more 
inclusive yet specifically female-identified vision” (143).  Diehl’s chronology of events seems 
right to me in that Rich develops an individual feminist poetics before turning to the 
inclusive grammars of a “common language,” but I would qualify her formulation of 
“construction” followed by “repudiation.”  My caveat may seem a semantic quibble, but I 
think it is crucial to recognize that Rich does not resolve intellectually the intellectual 
tensions in her work.  Throughout her career, both her poetry and prose present competing 
visions of feminist poetics, of language, and of the self.  Just as “I” and “we,” “she” and “he” 
bleed into each other in Rich’s work, so do binary notions such as construction and 
repudiation.  Rich makes her poems—to revise W. B. Yeats’s remark—of the ongoing 
quarrel with others and with ourselves (331).  These tensions, because they remain 
unresolved, animate “the quarrel with oneself” of her poems. 
At the crux of such conflicts is the question of whether the new selfhood Rich 
proposes should be more inclusive and communal—exemplified in the experience of 
motherhood (which Rich opposes to the “institution” of motherhood in Of Woman Born 
[1976])—or whether it should mean access for women to the freedom of individual selfhood 
that under patriarchy has been delegated exclusively to men.3  In neither Rich’s poetry nor 
her prose does her thinking develop sequentially from one to the other; rather, her writing 
throughout her career enacts the tension between these two possibilities and seeks a 
synthesis.  This tension in Rich’s work, between a new “I” and a new “we,” has troubled the 
poet as well as some of her critics, including those who object to the political implications 
of any first person plural and those who object to the aesthetic choices Rich has made in her 
attempt at “a common language.”  Although many critics have focused on issues of identity 
in Rich’s work, the available scholarship has for the most part treated “identity” as 
                                                
3 The institution of motherhood, as Rich understands it, is a creation of patriarchy that “demands of 
women maternal ‘instinct’ rather than intelligence, selflessness rather than self-realization, relation 
to others rather than the creation of self” (Of Woman Born 42). 
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something argued for in Rich’s work rather than a concept constantly being made and 
remade.  I argue, conversely, that Rich’s poems represent a fluid process of making and 
remaking identity, constantly criticizing, seeking to overthrow, seeking to recreate the bases 
on which we establish who “I” and “you,” “we” and “they” are. 
I frame these issues in grammatical terms because the English language is, for Rich, a 
manifestation of the values of patriarchy, a mode of enforcing and perpetuating those 
values, as well as an opportunity for her and others to challenge those values in favor of a 
new language, a new mode of society.  If Rich debates herself about how to forge a new self 
and what that self might be, she is constant in her understanding of the foundational role of 
language in constituting selfhood and the world in which the self exists.  Terence Des Pres 
quotes from Rich’s “The Demon Lover”—“Only where there is language is there world”—in 
order to draw a parallel to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s conception of language, self, and world in 
Philosophical Investigations.   As Des Pres writes:  
To imagine a language befitting a feminist form of life is, I take it, Rich’s 
“dream.”  Wittgenstein also says that “the speaking of language is part of an 
activity,” a specific way of taking place in the world.  He adds that “only those 
hope who can talk.”  [. . .]  Language and world together make up “the weave 
of our life,” as Wittgenstein puts it.  And when, finally, he observes that “the 
totality of our linguistic milieu consists of language and the actions into which 
it is woven,” he endorses Rich’s fundamental belief as an activist-poet: “Poetry 
never stood a chance / of standing outside history.”  
(Des Pres 222-3; Wittgenstein PI 15, 183, 183, 8; Rich, “North  
American Time” 16-17)4 
                                                
4 To be precise, Wittgenstein does not assert but asks.  “Can only those hope who can talk?  Only 
those who have mastered the use of a language.  That is to say, the phenomena of hope are modes of 
this complicated form of life” (PI 183).  I use the fourth edition of the Anscombe et al. translation of 
Philosophical Investigations, so the exact phrasing departs somewhat from that of Des Pres’s quotation. 
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If language establishes the boundaries and even the fact of one’s world, then a patriarchal 
language, as Rich and other radical feminists view English as they have received and used it, 
can describe only a patriarchal world. 
To forge a new language, for Rich, first means identifying the proper origins of the 
language that has become the oppressor’s.  Rich’s call for a “common language” derives in 
part from the feminist theology of Mary Daly, who writes in Beyond God the Father (1973) 
that 
[. . .W]omen have had the power of naming stolen from us. [. . .] Women are 
now realizing that the universal imposing of names by men has been false 
because partial.  That is, inadequate words have been taken as adequate. [. . .]  
To exist humanly is to name the self, the world, and God.  The 
“method” of the evolving spiritual consciousness of women is nothing less 
than this beginning to speak humanly—a reclaiming of the right to name.  
The liberation of language is rooted in the liberation of ourselves. (8) 
Similarly, Rich identifies the real source of naming, myth, and poesis as matriarchal: “Thus, 
the mother’s telling, if not the mother tongue, is the source of literature” (Of Woman Born 
xxviii).  Before a new language can come into being, however, one may speak of it only in the 
old language, in what Rich has called “the oppressor’s language” (“The Burning of Paper 
Instead of Children” 39).  As we shall see, this fact poses another productive conflict for 
Rich, as a writer who—her politics notwithstanding—has been estimated from the 
beginning of her career as a poet of what has come to be called “official verse culture.”  As 
Judith McDaniel claims, “The phenomena Rich wishes to describe—a new female identity, 
the nuances of a male/female relationship—make impossible demands on a limited and 
sexist vocabulary” (7).  For Rich, the choice is not simply between old and new, oppressor 
and oppressed.  If Rich’s project is both Whitmanian and Dickinsonian, it is also Eliotic in 
its attempt to shore usable fragments against the ruins of (in Rich’s case, patriarchal) 
culture. 
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Although Rich’s political concerns align with the ideological sympathies of the 
Language Poets’ critique of bourgeois capitalism and official verse culture, her choice to 
write in “traditional” poetic forms, in “the oppressor’s language,” complicates her political 
and poetic identity, opening what Marjorie Perloff perceives as a lacuna between Rich’s 
politics and poetics.  Rich’s feminist “call to action,” Perloff writes, 
is undermined [. . .] by [her] conservative rhetoric, a rhetoric indistinguishable 
from that of the Male Oppressor.  It is as if Rich, the radical lesbian poet, 
cannot shed the habit, learned by the time she was 21, a Radcliffe graduate 
and the winner of the Yale Younger Poets Award for A Change of World, of 
having to write poetry that would win the approval of the judges.  (131-2) 
Perloff’s anti-“elitist,” anti-“establishment” biases may well disqualify her critique without 
my help, but Perloff’s misreading of Rich’s poetry also illuminates similar and ongoing 
misapprehensions of Rich’s poetics and her place in our picture of contemporary poetry.  
Writing in 1988, Craig Werner observes: “Critics with an interest in literary theory evince 
almost no interest in her work.  Those who do [. . .] frequently present Rich’s use of a 
discursive voice in her lesbian-feminist poetry as a retreat from the radical implications of 
deconstruction (or other post-modern insights into the nature of language)” (126).   
Readings of Rich’s work have changed all too little in the intervening years.  
Assessing Rich’s career in 2013, Ange Mlinko remarks that “if Rich’s impact on her fellow 
feminists was huge, her impact on poets of the last couple of generations has been weak” 
(36).  When Mlinko cites Perloff’s critique of Rich, she does so in part to call attention to 
its flaws, but also to offer her own dismissal of Rich’s “sincer[ity]”: “Though they can make 
for good rhetorical occasions, there are few surprises in grandmother poems or poems 
against torture or war” (37).  Neither Perloff nor Mlinko grasp that the force of Rich’s 
rhetoric is her interrogation of its sincerity, her constant questioning of the power of 
language to represent, compel, and oppress.  Nevertheless, Perloff’s point about the conflict 
between “conservative rhetoric” and a liberating rhetoric is worth further attention.  I shall 
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argue that this apparent contradiction between radical politics and “conservative rhetoric” is 
the very source of the power of Rich’s poems.  To claim “I am she: I am he” or “We are, I 
am, you are” as the same state of being is all the more radical because these claims seem to 
violate our understanding of grammatical number and gender (“Diving into the Wreck” 77, 
78).  Thus Rich reveals that the old language, insufficient and patriarchal as it is, is 
something to be salvaged rather than discarded.  As Rich articulates in “Power,” a poem 
ostensibly about Marie Curie, “her wounds came from the same source as her power” (17). 
Language, for Rich, is both the wound and the stitching: at issue is more than the 
grammatical shift from I to we as the ostensible speaker(s) of a certain poem, but a larger 
consideration of language, society, and selfhood.  To dream of a common language is to 
dream a new self, located between the various pronouns through which we address the 
world. 
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INTO THE WRECK 
 
 W. H. Auden’s famously condescending introduction to Adrienne Rich’s first 
volume, A Change of World (1951), now seems more a challenge to the younger poet than an 
endorsement of her work.  Auden was perceptive enough to see the remarkable talent and 
promise in his selection for the Yale Series of Younger Poets.  In hindsight, however, it 
seems inaccurate to describe “Miss Rich” as a writer whose poems “are neatly and modestly 
dressed, speak quietly but do not mumble, respect their elders but are not cowed by them, 
and do not tell fibs [. . .]” (11).  These words are familiar to anyone who has followed Rich’s 
career enough to know just how severely Rich’s course diverged from Auden’s plot.   
Another observation of Auden’s is less frequently quoted, but more prescient.  
Referring to “the great figures in ‘modern’ poetry, novels, painting, and music, the 
innovators, the creators of the new style,” he writes:  
Before a similar crop of revolutionary artists can appear again, there will have 
to be just such another cultural revolution replacing these attitudes with 
others.  So long as the way in which we regard the world and feel about our 
existence remains in all essentials the same as that of our predecessors we 
must follow in their tradition; it would be just as dishonest for us to pretend 
that their style is inadequate to our needs as it would have been for them to 
be content with the style of the Victorians.  (9) 
If Rich’s early poems do not openly dissent from the style or attitude of their predecessors, 
the rest of her career has taught us to see in them the seeds of the revolution to come.  Even 
Rich’s earliest work displays a profound concern for the lives of women, especially how 
those lives are affected by patriarchal forces both overt and covert.  At stake in her work 
from its first page is the idea of the self as a process, a realization of one’s potential as a 
human being, and how this process has been denied to or stunted in women by a society 
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that privileges males and masculinity.  In “Aunt Jennifer’s Tigers”—the title refers to figures 
that Aunt Jennifer is sewing into a screen— 
the massive weight of Uncle’s wedding band 
Sits heavily upon Aunt Jennifer’s hand. 
 
When Aunt is dead, her terrified hands will lie 
Still ringed with ordeals she was mastered by. (7-10) 
 
Aunt Jennifer’s hand bows under the weight of her husband’s—significantly, not her—ring.  
The subjugation of women, as Rich demonstrates here, is insidious in its subtlety.  Its 
outward sign is not a chain but a ring, and a gift at that.  Its “heaviness” is both the 
indication of Uncle’s wealth and subsequently of her “worth” as a wife, as well as the yoke of 
the patriarchal institution of marriage as property exchange.  The institution and 
constraints of marriage weighing upon her, Aunt Jennifer practices an art proper to women 
of her station.  She sews.  Her hands are mastered by such ordeals even as they master this 
particular art.  In portraying her sewing, the speaker places Aunt Jennifer in the tradition of 
other female mythic makers, from the Norns who spool and clip the thread of human life to 
Penelope and Arachne, whose respective skill at the loom helps the former survive her 
suitors and dooms the latter in her contest with Athena.  But the speaker is also quick to 
distinguish Aunt Jennifer’s fate from those of the male culture heroes of classical epics or 
even the mythic female figures who appear among the constellations.  “The skies are full of 
them,” Rich’s speaker remarks—women as warnings, women as curses—in “Planetarium,” to 
which I will return (3).  But Aunt Jennifer’s death will be as quiet and unremarked as the 
prancing tigers in her sewing. 
 “So long as the way in which we regard the world and feel about our existence 
remains in all essentials the same as that of our predecessors we must follow in their 
tradition,” Auden writes, but “Aunt Jennifer’s Tigers” demonstrates that Rich’s regard for 
the world differs from that of her predecessors.  The poem heralds Rich’s lifelong attention 
to the lives of women which, in patriarchy, both are and are not their own.  We know what 
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Aunt Jennifer’s art has produced because the poem has told us.  The poem does not say—it 
cannot speculate—what Aunt Jennifer or any other woman might produce, might become 
in a society that understands and values them as the equals of men.  “[I]t would be just as 
dishonest for us,” Auden continues, “to pretend that [our predecessors’] style is inadequate 
to our needs as it would have been for them to be content with the style of the Victorians.”  
In the rhymed and metered poems of her early period, Rich turns the predecessors’ style 
against the predecessors with such skill that the change may be difficult to note. As she 
develops as a poet from this point, Rich continues to explore the lives of women who suffer 
under and survive the injustices of patriarchy.  She comes to understand and articulate 
language as one of the foundations of that injustice.  The changes necessary to correct such 
injustices must begin with language, and a change of language is a change of world. 
“Snapshots of a Daughter-in-Law,” the title poem of her third collection (1963), 
marks a change in form and tone from Rich’s previous work.  Marilyn Hacker calls 
“Snapshots” “Rich’s first overtly feminist poem,” distinguishing it from earlier work 
(including “Aunt Jennifer’s Tigers”) on the basis that in “Snapshots” Rich “not only 
considered the question of women’s aspirations and achievement directly, she placed it 
within defining social and cultural contexts which would be equally characteristic of her 
ongoing poetic/political project [. . .]” (16).  Albert Gelpi refers to the volume itself as “the 
transitional book in Adrienne Rich’s development,” in which 
her themes—the burden of history, the separateness of individuals, the need 
for relationship where there is no other transcendence—begin to find their 
clarifying focus and center: what she is as a woman and poet in late-twentieth-
century America.  [. . .]  The psychological and artistic point which the 
Snapshots volume dramatizes is Adrienne Rich’s rejection of the terms on 
which society says we must expend our existence and her departure on an 
inner journey of exploration and discovery.  (285, 289) 
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Snapshots of a Daughter-in-Law appeared in the context of other notable breaks from New 
Critical, impersonal formality and toward “open form,” as apparent in W. S. Merwin’s The 
Moving Target, Ann Sexton’s All My Pretty Ones, and James Wright’s The Branch Will Not 
Break, all published in the same year.  Robert Lowell’s Life Studies (1959) looms in this 
context, too, as will John Berryman’s 77 Dream Songs (1964) and Sylvia Plath’s posthumously 
published Ariel (1965).  That these names coincide with those poets I have counted as 
pioneers of the Confessional mode suggests the frequent association of open form with a 
new openness about speaking from and about personal experience.   
I will return to the ramifications of the Confessional context for Rich’s work; for 
now I want to emphasize, first, that the formal change in her poems resembles others in a 
period of general movement toward open form(s).  More important for my immediate 
purpose, though, is the correlating change Hacker notes in Rich’s portrayal of other women 
and, eventually of herself, a process observable in “Snapshots of a Daughter-in-Law.”  As we 
shall see in subsequent sections, the ability to write directly about other women’s 
experiences will eventually embolden Rich to write about her own, and will raise the 
question of on whose behalf a poet is entitled to speak.  Rich’s concern in both “Aunt 
Jennifer’s Tigers” and “Snapshots of a Daughter-in-Law” is for individual women, whether 
the familiar mothers and aunts or the more metaphorical sisterhood of her fellow female 
writers.  But “Snapshots” also demonstrates Rich’s emerging attempt to write about the 
general conditions as she understands them of women living in patriarchy.  Rich’s speaker in 
“Snapshots” begins with anger and pity for a familial mother figure, then widens her scope 
to seek to understand such intimate female relationships in the context of a patriarchal 
literary history. 
Despite its title, the poem opens not with a daughter- or mother-in-law but with a 
“you,” an address to an older woman whose familial status is not offered here.  The opening 
section confirms and confounds potential associations with the Confessional mode: the 
poem portrays a domestic, potentially taboo conflict between family members, but the 
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Confessional “I” is conspicuously absent.  Instead, the figures of the opening sections are 
presented either in the third person or through the “you” with which the poem begins.  The 
speaker portrays this addressee as a quondam debutante, only to turn violently on 
recollection of her past beauty to describe, with a pity approaching contempt, her fading 
mind: 
  Your mind now, moldering like wedding-cake, 
  heavy with useless experience, rich 
  with suspicion, rumor, fantasy, 
  crumbling to pieces under the knife-edge 
  of mere fact.  In the prime of your life.      
 
  Nervy, glowering, your daughter 
  wipes the teaspoons, grows another way.  (7-13) 
 
The Rich of the Fifties might have continued in the somewhat disinterested vein of the first 
stanza, her description of the older woman salted with the disappointed, almost mocking 
irony of “the prime of your life.”  In “Snapshots,” her speaker is unabashedly angry, and the 
introduction of the figure of the daughter—not, here, a daughter-in-law—and her own 
“nervy, glowering” anger animates the lines.  The poet has commented upon the importance 
of articulating anger to the development of her project.  She writes in “Blood, Bread, and 
Poetry” that “to take women’s existence seriously as a theme and source for art [. . .] placed 
me nakedly face to face with both terror and anger [. . .].  But it released energy in me [. . .]  
I felt for the first time the closing of the gap between poet and woman” (182).  I will return 
to the importance of this gap for Rich and her readers alike, but here I want to emphasize 
that her use of the phrase “poet and woman” refers not just to different elements within 
herself but also to the ideas of “the poet” and “the woman,” which patriarchy has rendered 
almost mutually exclusive. 
“A thinking woman sleeps with monsters,” the speaker says in the first line of the 
third section (26).  This line marks a sea change in the poem and in Rich’s career.  The 
adjective implies that the patriarchal subjugation of women is so insidious that other, 
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perhaps “unthinking” or unaware women might perceive patriarchy as normalcy.  To be 
aware means in part to be aware of monsters who—perhaps unaware themselves—offer a 
chain in the guise of a wedding ring, and to be aware of the monstrous ways in which 
patriarchy turns women against each other and themselves.  If the first section offers a 
snapshot of the mother, and the second a snapshot of the daughter, here Rich widens her 
focus to take in—as much as any one eye or “I” can do so—a thinking everywoman.  Here, 
too, Rich extends the Cartesian understanding of thought as the essence of existence: to be 
aware of the self in such a way is, for Rich, to be awake to the oppression women experience 
merely in attempting to be a thinking individual in a society that demeans female 
individuality and femininity itself.  This awareness breeds terror and anger, as Rich has 
noted here and elsewhere.   
The poem’s next line depicts a grotesque metamorphosis: “The beak that grips her, 
she becomes” (27).  In this image, the chain that fetters the thinking woman grows into her 
own flesh, until she herself has become a self-consuming monster.  If we imagine this to be 
the fate of the mother figure from the poem opening lines, then we may also read the 
speaker’s attitude toward her as more complicated than contempt or pity: she begins to 
understand this individual woman as individual and as exemplar of an abstract, collective 
“women.”  Impoverished by masculine expectations and demands for a certain sort of 
femininity, she is “rich” instead in “suspicion, rumor, fantasy” (8-9).  She becomes a 
monstrous harbinger of what the “thinking woman” of the third section might become.  Just 
as the individual women of the poem’s first section develop into the abstract “thinking 
woman” of the third, so this thinking woman also becomes woman mythologized.  In 
“becom[ing]” “the beak that grips her,” she is the Leda of Yeats’s poem, caught in the 
violent “embrace” of Zeus.  In this metamorphosis, Rich is able to unite individual, idea, and 
myth in a single figure.  Yeats’s Leda finds “her thighs caressed / By the dark webs, her nape 
caught in his bill,” “mastered by the brute blood of the air” (1-2, 12).  In short, Yeats’s Leda is 
powerless in the swan’s grip.  Rich’s thinking woman, in becoming the beak that grips her, 
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can empower herself, but only by participating in her own subjugation.  For Rich, this 
realization is also poetically resonant.  Through this allusion to (and revision of) Yeats, to 
which I will return, Rich accesses masculine literary and mythopoeic traditions, and 
positions herself to remake them. 
 A series of snapshots may suggest a narrative, but the narrative they offer is marked 
as much by the breaks between each photograph as by the continuities among them.  Rich 
uses the breaks between the sections of “Snapshots” in a similar way, establishing an 
associative rather than a linear narrative.  These associations are amplified by her liberal 
quotation from and commentary upon lines and sentences from other writers.  “Snapshots” 
represents one of the early examples of Rich’s use of this technique, to which she returns as 
her career develops.  These quotations may at first resemble the associative shifts from one 
language and writer to another in T. S. Eliot’s The Waste Land.  Where Eliot uses such 
language(s) to fracture and reassemble a cultural narrative, however, Rich uses them to 
amplify and undercut the voices of different predecessors, revising the tradition as she uses 
it.  This is not to say that Eliot does not revise the tradition he has found.  The contrary is 
true, as he emphasizes in “Tradition and the Individual Talent.”  Rich’s use of quotation, 
however, is more openly hostile, more vehemently dismissive of what she perceives as the 
patriarchal or misogynistic perspectives of male writers.  To this end, Rachel Blau DuPlessis 
calls “Snapshots” “like a feminist Waste Land in its ‘loaded gun’ allusiveness [. . .]” (125).  Here 
Rich quotes from Charles Baudelaire, Horace, Thomas Campion, Denis Diderot, and 
Samuel Johnson, modifying, challenging, and satirizing them in turn.  The subtle implication 
of “Aunt Jennifer’s Tigers” has opened into sarcasm and righteous indignation.   
Rich opens section nine, for instance, by quoting Samuel Johnson’s famous remark 
on the notion of a woman preaching.  Rich turns Johnson’s words against him in order to 
critique the misogyny of the statement and of a culture that treats such a statement as wit:5 
                                                
5 The full quotation is as follows: “Sir, a woman’s preaching is like a dog’s walking on his hinder legs.  
It is not done well; but you are surprised to find it done at all” (Boswell 327).  
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 Not that it is done well, but 
 that it is done at all?  Yes, think 
 of the odds! or shrug them off forever. 
 [. . .] 
 Sigh no more, ladies. 
    Time is male 
 and in his cups drinks to the fair.  (86-8, 95-6) 
The identification of “time” as male recalls the gendered personifications of “Father Time” 
and “Mother Nature.”  Time’s toast to the fair reminds us that women have been primarily 
objects in the literature and history written primarily by men.  Mary Daly’s claim that the 
feminine power to name has been stolen returns here, as the speaker of the poem uses the 
language of great male authors—even their very lines—to condemn the uses to which they 
have put the language.  In Rich’s revision of literary history, women have been practically 
forbidden to speak, except for the lines men have written for them.  “When to her lute 
Corinna sings,” the speaker says in section six, quoting Thomas Campion, “neither words 
nor music are her own” (53-4).  Corinna’s words are Campion’s; she sings as the male poet 
imagines her singing: as Christina Rossetti wrote a century before Rich, “not as she is, but as 
she fills his dream” (14).  And, as Rich observes, when women have dared to write and to 
pursue a selfhood independent of male prerogative, they have become objects of scorn.  In 
the poem’s seventh section, Rich quotes from and comments upon Mary Wollstencraft’s 
Thoughts on the Education of Daughters.  That section in full: 
  “To have in this uncertain world some stay 
  which cannot be undermined, is 
  of the utmost consequence.” 
          Thus wrote 
  a woman, partly brave and partly good, 
  who fought with what she partly understood. 
  Few men about her would or could do more, 
  hence she was labeled harpy, shrew and whore.  (69-76) 
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Wollstonecraft—the only female writer Rich quotes in “Snapshots”6—represents a model 
for the poet, and potentially for all women, but she also serves as a reminder of the price of 
seeking selfhood or of articulating that self.  The loaded words Rich invokes are only three 
of the many labels attached to women who have dared to be something other than objects 
for male consumption, whether as an idealized figure in a poem or as a person whose 
appearance has not traditionally been toasted by a “Father Time.”  In the opening lines of 
section eight, Rich quotes Denis Diderot’s observation—“You all die at fifteen”—to 
emphasize the objectification and subjugation implicit in Time’s drunken toast (77).  Time is 
an ogler of young women, who learn to appease his whims: the female figure in section five 
“shaves her legs until they gleam / like petrified mammoth-tusk” (51-2).  This “she” subverts 
nature in shaving her legs to win male approval; the legs that become mammoth’s ivory in 
this image become museum pieces for the male gaze.  That is, they are objects to be mused 
at rather than parts of the body of a thinking, breathing woman.  Considered in this 
manner, the “snapshots” of a title are not only the glimpses of the poem’s ten sections but 
also the familiar photographs that idealize, sexualize, and objectify women. 
Time’s masculine priorities are clear enough here, but the role of the personified 
Mother Nature in the poem remains more complicated.  As Hacker notes, the only 
daughter-in-law named as such in “Snapshots” appears in the poem’s sixth section, in which 
the mother-in-law in question is Nature “herself.”  In this section, the speaker returns to the 
second person address with which she began the poem, but the mother figure of the 
opening sections has become, here, the “daughter-in-law”:  
  Poised, trembling and unsatisfied, before 
an unlocked door, that cage of cages, 
tell us, you bird, you tragical machine— 
is this fertilisante douleur?  Pinned down 
  by love, for you the only natural action, 
                                                
6 To be exact, the tenth section of the poem alludes to but does not quote directly from Simone de 
Beauvoir’s The Second Sex. 
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  are you edged more keen 
  to prise the secrets of the vault? has Nature shown 
  her household books to you, daughter-in-law, 
  that her sons never saw?     (60-8) 
 
Here the image of the monstrous beak—and the allusion to Yeats’s “Leda and the Swan”— 
from the poem’s third section returns in the form of a caged bird.  DuPlessis comments 
upon the earlier image: “When Yeats asks, ‘Did she put on his knowledge with his power / 
before [sic] the indifferent beak could let her drop?’ Rich responds, ‘A thinking woman 
sleeps with monsters. / The beak that grips her, she becomes’ [. . .]” (125). If, following 
DuPlessis, Rich “answers” Yeats’s rhetorical question with this declarative in the third 
section, then in the sixth section she complicates matters by answering the question with a 
question of her own.  The violent rape imagery of this section presents a troubling contrast 
to the self-consuming woman of the third.  When Yeats asks, “Did she put on his 
knowledge with his power / Before the indifferent beak could let her drop?” Rich responds, 
“has Nature shown / her household books to you, daughter-in-law, / that her sons never 
saw?”  Maternal “Nature” may stand idle or may even participate in the subjugation of her 
daughters-in-law in favor of her sons, but she may instead offer a glimpse of her “household 
books.”  She may initiate those daughters into a secret knowledge, the accounting—in both 
the senses of numeration and of reckoning—of the house and beyond. 
Do subjugation, rape literal and figurative allow access to a secret knowledge 
unavailable to others?  Do the oppressions of the oppressor’s language engender eloquence 
in the oppressed? and if so, then at what cost?  The poem proposes no answer to these 
questions, only a vague promise of a coming goddess-figure rendered in the disintegrating, 
fragmentary lines that end the poem: 
   poised, still coming 
  her fine blades making the air wince 
 
  but her cargo 
  no promise then: 
  delivered 
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  palpable 
  ours.     (116-22) 
 
Albert Gelpi remarks that these “‘Snapshots’ comprise an album of woman as ‘daughter-in-
law,’ bound into the set of roles which men have established and which female acquiescence 
has re-enforced. [. . .] The self-image projected here is archetypal, at once individual and 
collective: a signal of forces which would become a national movement within the decade” 
(286).  In that movement the anger Rich articulates finds its proper conduit into action; for 
Rich, this is the proper destiny of a poem such as “Snapshots.”  If the Western literary 
tradition begins with the wrath of Achilles, “Snapshots of a Daughter-in-Law” establishes 
Adrienne Rich’s wrath at what that tradition has built, her attempt to topple and rebuild it.   
 One more notable aspect of “Snapshots” is its postscript: from this volume on, Rich 
dates each of her poems in publication.  What is often supplied as a reading aid in 
anthologies of literature thus becomes an extension of the poem itself.  David Kalstone 
reads this habit as “a way of limiting [poems’] claims, of signaling that they spoke only for 
their moment.  The poems were seen as instruments of passage, of self-scrutiny and resolve 
in the present” (148).  Kalstone’s point is sound, but I would extend his argument to say that 
while the act of dating the poems may limit their particular claims, it also serves to 
document that moment as one in a continuing process of creating or recreating the self 
since, as Rich had written in “North American Time,” “Poetry never stood a chance / of 
standing outside history.”  In identifying the date of the poem, Rich also notes the historical 
moment of the person who wrote it; that self is one among many who might be identified by 
the same name, who might be thought of as the same poet even as the poems she writes are 
tools for extending and enriching the process of becoming something more.  Rich 
articulates as much in a comment on “Snapshots”: “It strikes me now as too literary, too 
dependent on allusion.  I hadn’t found the courage yet to do without authorities, or even to 
use the pronoun ‘I’—the woman in the poem is always ‘she,’” she writes eleven years later, in 
“When We Dead Awaken” (45).  
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In “Snapshots,” then, Rich has begun to articulate the taboo anger over the 
subjugation of women, but she has not yet begun to articulate it as herself.  Problematic 
though these notions may be—to speak on behalf of a culture, a subculture, a self—she must 
nevertheless engage them in her own poems, with her own vocabulary and mythology.  Even 
in “Snapshots” she has borrowed the language of patriarchal authors and of demeaned 
women writers, but she must learn to speak in a language of her own in order to propose a 
new way through her anger and the injustice that is its source.  The breakthrough comes in 
“Diving into the Wreck,” in which Rich finds the proper metaphor and voice to express the 
need for salvage and reconstruction.  Wendy Martin writes: 
In contrast with Snapshots of a Daughter-in-Law, published a decade earlier, 
Diving into the Wreck represents a major shift in attitude.  [. . .] Snapshots of a 
Daughter-in-Law is written from the perspective of an outsider—a daughter-
in-law—who observes but does not affect the world around her.  The voice in 
the poems of Diving into the Wreck is strong and resolute; Rich has abandoned 
the indirect strategies of Bradstreet and Dickinson in order to engage in 
direct, public confrontation.  (196-7) 
Martin’s allusion to Dickinson is apt: Rich no longer wishes to tell the truth “slant,” as 
Dickinson advises; she is willing to let its light blind (Dickinson 1, 8). 
Rich’s pursuit of a usable language—personal but also more public, individual but 
archetypal—becomes a mythical quest in “Diving into the Wreck,” in which Rich’s speaker 
descends into the sea, returns to the womb of terrestrial life in order to be reborn.  Martin 
comments that Rich 
decides to return to her primal origins, to plunge into the depths of her 
psychic and cultural past. [. . . I]n the depths of the sea, the origin of life, Rich 
explores the wreck of a ship, a multivalent metaphor for the remains of 
Western culture, the poet’s past, and her subconscious life.  As Alicia 
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Ostriker observes, this watery submersion is an inversion of heroic male 
ascents and conquests. (Martin 189, Ostriker 113) 
That Martin conflates the speaker of the poem with Rich herself serves to prove Rich’s own 
point about articulating a personal vision, a personal mythology.  While I concur with 
Ostriker that Rich’s descent inverts the myths of male ascent and conquest, I also read 
“Diving into the Wreck” as a variation on the theme of mythic descents into the 
underworld.  The heroes who delve into the sterile realm of the dead—Odysseus, Aeneas, 
Orpheus—return chastened, sadder and wiser.  The shades they seek there slip through 
their fingers or disappear at a glance.  But Rich’s “underworld” is anything but sterile; it is 
the maria so often gendered female in “the oppressor’s language,” the origin of all life to 
which she must return in order to speak to this life, hers and ours.  In order to find—or 
create—a salvageable myth, language, and self that she can articulate in the world, as 
Whitman might, Rich must turn inward, as Dickinson does.  In other words, in “Diving 
into the Wreck” Rich chooses Dickinsonian means to achieve Whitmanesque ends. 
The poem opens not with water but with the “book of myths,” the language, history, 
and literature of patriarchal culture.  This is not a book of the woman’s “experience” but of 
the world’s “auctoritee,” as Chaucer’s Wife of Bath has called it (Rich 1, Chaucer 1): 
  First having read the book of myths, 
  and loaded the camera, 
  and checked the edge of the knife-blade, 
  I put on  
  the body-armor of black rubber 
  the absurd flippers 
  the grave and awkward mask.  (1-7) 
 
These are tentative lines: the non-finite clause of the opening three lines delays the action 
of the sentence long enough to emphasize the meticulous preparation required for the dive 
to come.  The speaker offers a checklist of sorts—book of myths, camera, knife—but the 
book of myths hardly squares with her other cargo.  The latter objects are tools to be used 
on the dive; the book of myths functions as the impetus for the dive as well as the wreck she 
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has come to explore.  The main clause of this first sentence occupies just three words—“I 
put on”—the shortest line of the opening stanza.  The rest of the stanza is given over to the 
inventory of equipment.  By the time the speaker is prepared to dive, she may appear to be 
someone or something else entirely in her body-armor, her flippers and her mask.  She is 
someone or something “put on.”  This is the first metamorphosis the poem portrays, as the 
speaker transforms herself into a figure—armored, masked, equipped—capable of exploring 
the wreck of history, mythology, and herself.  She must descend into a sea in which she 
cannot breathe on her own, in which an unequipped, unmasked swimmer could not speak. 
If, returning to Wittgenstein, “the limits of language are the limits of my world,” 
then Rich’s speaker must move beyond the limits of her body, and of her world, in order to 
change that world.  The mask supplies the speaker with the oxygen necessary to breathe and 
to speak; the mask of persona allows the poet to continue her descent toward the wreck 
itself: 
  I came to explore the wreck. 
  The words are purposes. 
  The words are maps.   
  I came to see the damage that was done 
  and the treasures that prevail. 
  [. . .] 
 
  the thing I came for: 
  the wreck and not the story of the wreck 
  the thing itself and not the myth [. . .] (52-6, 61-3) 
 
Although Rich’s speaker does not explicitly conflate her “book of myths” with the “words” 
of the stanza I quote, I read them—“purposes” and “maps”—as both the map of the wreck 
and the wreck itself.  This doubling is possible (or inevitable) because, although the words of 
patriarchal language have wrecked society and themselves, they remain the only available 
maps to allow this explorer to discover that wreck.  To do more—to salvage society, history, 
even language—requires a new language, a new book of myths and set of maps.   
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Although Martin emphasizes the shift in tone and technique from “Snapshots of a 
Daughter-in-Law” to “Diving into the Wreck,” I want to suggest that “Diving” also 
continues the Eliotic project of “Snapshots” in a different mode.  Like The Waste Land, 
“Diving into the Wreck” is an attempt to return a sterile world to its proper fertility.  What 
I have called Rich’s attempt to salvage resembles Eliot’s “shor[ing] of fragments,” a 
collecting of the usable fragments of the past in an attempt to ensure the future (The Waste 
Land 430).  As Eliot (and the Rich of “Snapshots”) uses the lines of predecessor poets to 
forge a new poetic language, this speaker uses the book of myths to get beyond myth.  Here 
too this book of (masculine) myths is a useful contrast to the feminine “household books” of 
“Snapshots.”  A more balanced accounting, a truer reckoning of “the wreck” of patriarchal 
society can be accomplished only through the metamorphoses of self and language.  If the 
words are purposes and maps, then words—like the myths they constitute—reveal the 
priorities and values of a culture.  As Rich writes in Of Woman Born: “In the interstices of 
language lie powerful secrets of the culture. [. . . W]e have no familiar, ready-made name for 
a woman who defines herself, by choice, neither in relation to children nor to men, who is 
self-identified, who has chosen herself” (249).  In the context of the poem, the figure of the 
wreck supposes a foundered culture that has excluded women from any active role in its 
language and myths, relegating them to the position of the objects of male purposes.   
To explore the wreck—and to find anything salvageable there—Rich’s speaker has 
armored and masked herself.  Now she slips that skin and morphs into another, double-
gendered form, as 
    the mermaid whose dark hair 
  streams black, the merman in his armored body. 
  We circle silently  
  about the wreck 
  we dive into the hold. 
  I am she: I am he [. . .]     (72-7) 
 
In these lines the nature of the previous metamorphoses themselves changes.  In a striking, 
Whitmanesque turn, instead of being altered from one to another, Rich’s speaker becomes 
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both at once.  The “I” speaking the poem becomes a “we;” these pronouns shift to include 
“I,” “she,” and “he” within these few lines.  The speaker is mermaid and merman, male and 
female, androgynous and—to adapt a botanical term—gynandrous.  She “reads” the wreck 
by seeing herself among its ruins, identifying herself as the drowned sailor as well as the 
female figure carved into the prow.  In the poem’s final stanza, “she” again dissolves 
grammar and gender in claiming: 
We are, I am, you are  
[. . .] 
the one who find our way 
back to this scene 
carrying a knife, a camera 
a book of myths 
in which 
  our names do not appear. (87, 89-94) 
 
Our sense of grammatical gender and number dissolves here; the new language Rich seeks 
does not adhere to the familiar divisions imposed and enforced by the oppressor’s language, 
the language in which the book of (male) myths is written and in which “our names”—the 
pronoun here seems to me specifically feminine—“do not appear.”  Rich’s speaker seeks the 
wreck but, as Milton’s Satan brings his Hell within him, so she carries the wreck with her.  
“Our names” do not appear in this book of myths because the power to name, as 
Daly suggests, has been stolen from women.  “If the source of an oppressor’s language is a 
set of false perceptions,” Ostriker supposes, “it is necessary to begin at the beginning.  The 
poem suggests a place, a scene, where our iron distinctions between perceiver and perceived, 
subject and object, he and she, I and you, dissolve” (114).  Those distinctions are linguistic as 
much as they are conceptual or philosophical, so to dissolve them requires dissolving the 
conceptual divisions between grammatical persons.  For Rich, this dissolution also suggests 
a new conception of selfhood, based in community rather than the individual, “we” instead 
of “I.”  Under patriarchy, the women who have sought for themselves the individuality 
allotted to men have been, as Rich notes in “Snapshots,” “labeled harpy, shrew, and whore.”  
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We might oppose these labels to the roles expected of women under patriarchy—mother, 
teacher, nurse—in which women have been required to put the needs of family and 
community ahead of their own individual needs, much less their wants.  “Institutionalized 
motherhood,” Rich writes in Of Woman Born, “demands of women maternal ‘instinct’ rather 
than intelligence, selflessness rather than self-realization, relation to others rather than the 
creation of self” (42).7 
In “Diving into the Wreck,” Rich begins to imagine a new language; she may even 
have written the first verses of a new “book of myths” in which a more inclusive, universal 
“we” may find our names.  To “dream of a common language,” as Rich has titled another 
volume, is to attempt to transcend the individual in favor of the collective.  But the 
“creation of self” Rich describes in Of Woman Born presents a different problem.  Implicit in 
the refiguring of selfhood as a social, communitarian model is the issue of inclusion: who is 
the “we” of Rich’s poem?  One may attempt to dissolve grammatical gender and number in a 
poem, but how can one presume to speak for the “many,” much less the “all”?  These 
questions are ethical as well as poetic; they are the questions of persons whose voices have 
                                                
7 Although Rich articulates most succinctly the imposed selflessness of institutionalized 
motherhood in the passage I have quoted above, she returns to the theme elsewhere in Of Woman 
Born: 
 
The child that I carry for nine months can be defined neither as me or as not-me.  Far 
from existing in the mode of “inner space,” women are powerfully and vulnerably 
attuned to both “inner” and “outer’ because for us the two are continuous, not polar.  
(64) 
 
Woman did not simply give birth; she made it possible for the child to go on living.  
Her breasts furnished the first food, but her concern for the child led her beyond 
that one-to-one relationship.      (101) 
 
Typically [in birth labor] under patriarchy, the mother’s life is exchanged for the 
child; her autonomy as a separate being seems fated to conflict with the infant she 
will bear.  The self-denying, self-annihilative role of the Good Mother (linked 
implicitly with suffering and with the repression of anger) will spell the “death” of 
the woman or girl who once had hopes, expectations, fantasies for herself—especially 
when those hopes and fantasies have never been acted-on.  (166) 
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been silenced, suppressed, or mocked, those from whom the power to name has been 
stolen.  Moreover, these are some of the questions that have complicated Rich’s project of 
proposing a new self, and which animate so many of the poems that follow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 183 
THE WOMAN IN THE POEM 
 
Rich’s sense of the lives women have led—and have been kept from living—under 
patriarchy is apparent from her earliest poems onward, but she articulates her grievances 
against patriarchy more overtly and complexly as she develops as a writer and thinker.  
Moreover, as Craig Werner observes, “As her understanding of patriarchy clarified, Rich in 
fact came to feel that concentrating on patriarchy—even to repudiate it—indirectly 
reinforced patriarchal power.”  In turning her focus from patriarchy to what Werner calls 
“cultural solipsism,” Rich “encourages a thorough re-vision of the relationship between self 
and other on both personal and political levels” (37, 41).  As she does so, however, she 
remains conflicted about what sort of self and selves women should create out of the 
wreckage of patriarchy.  In Of Woman Born, Rich argues that at least since the Industrial 
Revolution, men of certain means have been able to pursue their senses of individuality (in 
professional, philosophical, or spiritual terms), while women have been expected to act and 
think in terms of a wider community, specifically in the care of others, and more specifically 
in the care of children (48-52).  Of particular interest here for my purposes is Rich’s 
ambivalence about how to proceed as a poet from this political understanding.  In some of 
her work, Rich suggests that the female “I” must be free to pursue her own individuality on 
equal terms with men.  Rich has said in essays and interviews, moreover, that the 
elimination of distance between poet and poetic speaker was of great importance to her 
poetic and political development, allowing her to articulate emotions—anger, in 
particular—that patriarchal taboos had kept unvoiced.8  Elsewhere (as in “Diving into the 
                                                
8 In “Blood, Bread and Poetry” (1984), Rich writes: 
  
To write directly and overtly as a woman, out of woman’s body and experience, to 
take women’s existence seriously as a theme and source for art, was something I had 
been hungering to do, needing to do, all my writing life.  It placed me nakedly face to 
face with both terror and anger; it did indeed imply the breakdown of the world as I had 
always known it, the end of safety, to paraphrase [James] Baldwin again.  But it released 
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Wreck”), however, Rich has expressed the desire to refashion the self as a plural, collective 
entity: “we” instead of “I.”  The tension between these feminist visions of selfhood has been 
a recurrent subject of concern for Rich as well as for her critics.  As I have said, Rich does 
not resolve these tensions intellectually, but creates her own version of a poetics of 
indeterminacy.  
This notion of the poetic vocation as a self-actualizing pursuit squares with Rich’s 
claim that “poetic language—the poem on paper—is a concretization of the poetry of the 
world at large, the self, and the forces within the self; and those forces are rescued from 
formlessness, lucidified, and integrated in the act of writing poems.”  But, as she continues, 
Rich is similarly drawn to “a more ancient concept of the poet, which is that she is endowed 
to speak for those who do not have the gift of language, or to see for those who—for 
whatever reasons—are less conscious of what they are living through. It is as though the 
risks of the poet’s existence can be put to some use beyond her own survival” (“Vesuvius at 
Home” 181).  This model of the poet’s role resembles the explorer Rich portrays in “Diving 
into the Wreck,” which Diehl has called “a more inclusive yet specifically female-identified 
vision.”  Such a vision of the role of the poet, however, conflicts with some feminists’ 
skepticism of illusory inclusivity, versions of “we” that prove compulsory rather than 
inclusive.9  In a remembrance of her relationship with Rich, Cathy Park Hong writes: 
                                                                                                                                                       
energy in me, as in many other women, to have that way of writing affirmed and 
validated in a growing political community.  I felt for the first time the closing of the 
gap between poet and woman.      (249) 
  
9 For instance, here is Julia Kristeva:  
 
[. . .W]e must use ‘we are women’ as an advertisement or slogan for our demands.  
On a deeper level, however, a woman cannot ‘be’; it is something which does not 
even belong in the order of being.  [. . .] In ‘woman’ I see something that cannot be 
represented, something that is not said, something above and beyond nomenclatures 
and ideologies.     (“Woman Can Never Be Defined” 137) 
 
Shoshana Felman expresses a similar sentiment in “Women and Madness: The Critical Phallacy”: 
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I had a period when I reacted against her in college.  This was when 
multicultural relativism was having its swan song in the late 90’s.  I was taking 
a feminist lit theory course and the pronoun we was poison.  Don’t include me 
in your we.  It was a reaction against white bourgeois feminism [sic] who 
assumed their plight was universal.  What about working-class women?  
Marxist?  Queer?  Chicano?  The disabled?  We cannot speak for each other 
with all our differences.  Don’t assume your common language is mine.  
(“Memories and Thoughts on Adrienne Rich”) 
Hong concludes, “I misread her, of course [. . .] and I realized that her poetry was so 
breathtaking and powerful because of her commitment to the collective.”  I think Hong 
demurs too much in her claim to have misread Rich.  Hong’s admonition—“don’t assume 
your common language is mine”—reminds us that the dream of a common language, while 
difficult in its own right, is far easier to imagine than to achieve.  Neither Hong nor I doubt 
the aesthetic and ethical power of Rich’s commitment to the collective, but the poetic and 
political implications of such a commitment are no less complicated for these reasons.   
The “multicultural relativism” to which Hong refers might have been influenced, for 
instance, by the questions Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak raises in “French Feminism in an 
International Frame” (179): “[. . .] I see no way to avoid insisting that there has to be a 
simultaneous other focus: not merely who am I? but who is the other woman?  How am I 
naming her?  How does she name me?”  To speak for more than oneself is always to risk 
excluding the possibility of other voices.  To speak only for oneself is to risk the 
                                                                                                                                                       
[. . .I]f ‘the woman’ is precisely the Other of any conceivable Western theoretical 
locus of speech, how can the woman as such be speaking in this book?  [. . .]  Is it 
enough to be a woman in order to speak as a woman? [. . .]  With the increasing 
number of women and men alike who are currently choosing to share in the rising 
fortune of female misfortune, it has become all too easy to be a speaker ‘for women’.   
         (3) 
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individualistic, patriarchal selfishness and solipsism against which so much of Rich’s work 
reacts.  As Rich herself writes in “Notes toward a Politics of Location”: 
The difficulty of saying I—a phrase from the East German novelist Christa 
Wolf.  But once having said it, as we realize the necessity to go further, isn’t 
there a difficulty of saying “we”?  You cannot speak for me.  I cannot speak for us.  
Two thoughts: there is no liberation that only knows how to say “I”; there is 
no collective movement that speaks for each of us all the way through. 
And so even ordinary pronouns become a political problem. [. . .]  
Once again: Who is we?”  (Rich 224, 231, Wolf 174) 
The problem is political, indeed, but it is also poetic and philosophical.  How does one 
conceive of the self?  What alternatives to the “prestige of the individual” might we—that 
difficult pronoun again—consider?  And what aspects of one’s individuality might one lose 
in turning toward a more collective understanding of the self?  How might a poet represent 
a collective speaker in a poem, given how problematic as it is to represent a unified self?  
The “dead white males” of the patriarchal canon have long written in a first person plural 
that seems to assume universality.10  Such a “we” is necessarily, and sometimes dangerously, 
presumptuous, as Des Pres argues: “One of the more successful illusions of high culture has 
been the usage of the humanistic ‘we’ in reference, supposedly, to all of us or ‘man’ in 
general.  But this ‘we’ has always been the property of an educated, elite, male, white, and 
eurocentric [sic].”  In Rich’s poetry, Des Pres continues, she  
accepts what humanists would rather escape: that even poetry (or especially 
poetry) is positioned for and against, that the political problem of us-and-
them is the poet’s limit as well.  The poetry of utopia might someday 
                                                
10 If this habit has lapsed somewhat in the contemporary poetry of the United States, the fact of its 
lapse has not gone unlamented.  In a recent and much-discussed essay for Harper’s, Mark 
Edmundson argues that “most of our poets now speak a deeply internal language [. . .]. [F]ew are the 
consequential poets now who are willing to venture [Robert Lowell’s poetic] ‘our’ or, more daring 
still, to pronounce the word ‘we’ with anything like conviction” (62). 
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transcend these divisions; here and today, meanwhile, divisions continue in 
force, and Rich will not be fooled by “humanity” or “the human condition” 
when such terms are used to mask discord. (206-7) 
Des Pres may not give “humanists” enough credit for understanding the limits of poetry or 
of humanism for that matter, but I take his point as it relates to Rich’s poetry: Rich believes 
that a reimagined poetry may help to achieve—if not utopia—then at least a more inclusive 
and creative society.  To do so requires a reconsideration of both “I” and “we” in the search 
for a more collective self.  Inherent in this search, though, is the risk of reinforcing the very 
oppressions the seeker wishes to undo.  She who would speak as individual and collective 
may find herself caught in a poetic and ethical paradox. 
As tempting as it may be to pursue a plural or collective self of the kind Rich 
imagines in “Diving into the Wreck,” such a conception would be rooted in what Seyla 
Benhabib calls the “binary opposition” of public and private spheres and the corresponding 
gender roles patriarchal societies have assigned to each sphere.  To question that division, 
Benhabib believes, has been one of the “chief contributions of feminist thought to political 
theory in the western tradition” (108, 12).  She continues: 
Because women’s sphere of activity has traditionally been and still today is so 
concentrated in the private sphere in which children are raised, human 
relationships maintained and traditions handed down and continued, the 
female experience has been more attuned to the “narrative structure of 
action” and the “standpoint of the concrete other.”  Since they have had to 
deal with concrete individuals, with their needs, endowments, wants and 
abilities, dreams as well as failures, women in their capacities as primary 
caregivers have had to exercise insight into the claims of the particular.  In a 
sense the art of the particular has been their domain, as has the “web of 
stories,” which in Hannah Arendt’s words constitutes the who and the what 
of our shared world.  (14) 
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Here Benhabib echoes Rich’s claim that the “mother’s telling, if not the mother tongue, is 
the source of literature.”  Paradoxically then, in being “concentrated in”—even relegated 
to—the private sphere, women’s concerns and sense of identity have necessarily been 
public, even generational.  As we have seen in each of my case studies, we approach the self 
most successfully by tangling ourselves in its paradoxes.  What so many of us feel 
constitutes our individual and unique essence is conceivable only in relationship to others.  
To efface or mock the self only masks its endurance in poetry and thought.  To flee the self 
for the promise of divinity only renders the self more achingly present.  And to seek to 
define the self as a collective entity, to trouble the binaries between self and other, risks 
erasing the very differences—some oppressive, some precious, some both—by which we 
have defined ourselves.  Collective and even historical concern begins, for Benhabib, in the 
individual woman, and for Rich, in each woman’s individual body: 
We need to imagine a world in which every woman is the presiding genius of 
her own body.  In such a world women will truly create new life, bring forth 
not only children (if and as we choose) but the visions, and the thinking, 
necessary to sustain, console, and alter human existence—a new relationship 
to the universe.  Sexuality, politics, intelligence, power, motherhood, work, 
community, intimacy will develop new meanings; thinking itself will be 
transformed.  (Of Woman Born 285-6) 
To reduce Rich’s articulation rather crudely for my own purposes, then, the possibility of 
transcending an individual conception of selfhood must begin with each woman’s individual 
body.  What remains unclear, however, is what conceptions, practices, and expressions of 
selfhood will allow our collective thinking to be transformed.   
The lack of intellectual and emotional clarity has been the condition out of which 
Rich has created her greatest, most clarifying poems.  Like any other thinking woman, the 
monsters with whom she sleeps include those of self-doubt, and here in particular, doubts 
about how to construe the self.  At the same time, this doubt is an essential part of the 
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process of what Rich calls “creation of self.”  Charles Altieri writes that in Rich’s effort “to 
unite the woman speaking the poem with the woman writing it[, . . . p]oetry then becomes 
in part a process of self-criticism, in part a process of adapting these criticisms into plausible 
idealizations of states of mind and stances” (178).  If Altieri is correct here, then the process 
of uniting poetic speaker with self—an aspect of “creation of self”—is also an ethical process 
in its intent to become a more something constituent of a larger community.  Reviewing 
The Dream of a Common Language, Olga Broumas remarks (specifically, of “Nights and Days”): 
[i]t may seem paradoxical that the way back toward a common language 
begins with a fantasy, a speech to one’s self; and yet, commonality is an ethics, 
and as such concerned with value—from the Latin root val—indicating 
courage, discernment, and praise—which, though it does not exist until it is 
manifest and tested in the world, must be envisioned and revisioned in the 
mind, the heart, the most private quarters. (285). 
It is significant that Broumas should include the word “back” in her sense of Rich’s vector 
“toward” a common language.  In such a conception of language, then, Rich is seeking to 
rectify what has gone wrong, to retrieve a linguistic golden age in which language might 
unite rather than oppress.  If Rich is “radical,” as she has often been described (and—in the 
sense of “radical feminism”—as she has identified herself), she is radical in the sense of 
returning to the radix—the root—of language, which is commonality (OED). 
Even as I discuss the implications of Rich’s ongoing quarrel with herself, I do not 
want to lose sight of the literary-historical context in which this argument arises.  Rich’s 
claim for the elimination of the distance between poet and speaker—a break from New 
Critical poetic decorum—may seem to share common purpose with the work of the 
Confessional poets.  While this proposition is true insofar as it concerns the technique of 
speaking “as oneself,” the stakes are demonstrably different.  The watershed book of the 
Confessional mode (and the book under review when M. L. Rosenthal coined the term) was 
Robert Lowell’s Life Studies (1959), in large part because of the break in decorum represented 
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by the “confessions” of a Boston Lowell about the troubles of his Brahmin family and his 
own mind.  The stakes in Rich’s development are different: she speaks not as a member of a 
patrician family, but as a member of an oppressed group.  In doing so she “betrays” herself 
as an Antigone or a Medea, a female figure whose actions earn the censure of the arbiters of 
her culture.  Despite the praise Rich received for the new direction of her work since 
Snapshots of a Daughter-in-Law, one must not underestimate the risk of the seismic break 
from the work that had earned Auden’s condescending praise.  Rich had to become a poet 
who not only did not tell fibs, to paraphrase Auden, but who refused to speak anything but 
her understanding of truth, one who insists on holding to account her elders and 
contemporaries.  Rich’s concern in uniting poet and speaker is less the opportunity to speak 
about her own life (although she does more of this from Necessities of Life onward, too) as 
might have been the case in the work of Berryman, Lowell, and her near-contemporaries 
Ginsberg, Plath, Sexton, and Snodgrass.  The collapsed distance between Rich’s poet and 
speaker also allows her to articulate herself more clearly to a wider public.  As she does so, 
the distance between “I” and “we” becomes muddied, and the slippage between these 
pronouns in her poems becomes both problematic and resonant. 
Thus far I have spoken of Rich’s struggle with “I” and “we” as she and others have 
articulated the matter in prose.  Of “Planetarium,” for instance, Rich recalls that in the 
composition of the poem “at least the woman in the poem and the woman writing the poem 
became the same person.  [The poem] was written after a visit to a real planetarium, where I 
read an account of the work of Caroline Herschel, the astronomer, who worked with her 
brother William, but whose name remained obscure, as his did not” (“When We Dead 
Awaken” 47).  Rich’s revelation about the epiphanic experience of writing the poem is not 
necessarily apparent in the poem itself, the form of which is similar to others from this era 
in her career.    
“Planetarium” is composed of sentences and fragments broken into irregular couplets 
and tercets.  Punctuation is sparse and irregular, and Rich’s own lines are threaded with 
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quotations from Caroline Herschel and the sixteenth century Danish astronomer Tycho 
Brahe.  Rich’s epigraph to “Planetarium” reads: “Thinking of Caroline Herschel, (1750—
1848), astronomer, sister of William; and others.”  So the poem, even before establishing its 
terms as a lyric voiced by a female speaker, establishes itself as a meditation on another 
woman, “and others.”  Despite Rich’s own sense of having unified poet and speaker in the 
composition of the poem, the speaker of “Planetarium” is not easily identifiable as 
“Adrienne Rich.”  Indeed, in the climax of the poem the speaker transforms herself (in the 
manner of Whitman, and in anticipation of Rich’s metamorphoses in “Diving into the 
Wreck”) into a “galactic cloud” (39).  The “I” of “Planetarium,” and of so many of Rich’s 
most significant poems, is not fixed but in flux, always in the osmotic process of becoming 
something else.  
The poem proper begins with an image of some of the “others,” a word whose heft 
carries both the senses of alia and alien, the others who are “other”:  “A woman in the shape 
of a monster / a monster in the shape of a woman / the skies are full of them” (1-3).  The 
repetition of “monster” recalls Rich’s line from “Snapshots of a Daughter-in-Law”: “A 
thinking woman sleeps with monsters.”  The difference seems to be one of reality and myth: 
in the legends of their origin, these constellations are not monsters per se—Cassiopeia, 
Andromeda, Virgo—but they are monstrous in their capacity as harbingers, warnings.  
Cassiopeia’s vanity earns the wrath of Poseidon; her daughter, Andromeda, is subsequently 
offered as a sacrifice to appease the angry earthshaker.  The women in the skies are helpless 
princesses or queens who must be saved either from other monsters or from themselves.  
“Galaxies of women, there / doing penance for impetuousness,” Rich writes (13-14).  The 
heaven of male imagination becomes, for the women set in stars there, a purgatory in which 
to do penance.  Rich need not comment on the cruel irony of the fact that history has 
preferred to remember figures such as those set in the sky to the real triumphs of work like 
Caroline Herschel’s, “she whom the moon ruled,” Rich writes, “like us,” suggesting the 
monthly “rule” of the moon over a woman’s menstrual cycle as well as the classical 
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mythological lunar goddesses’ Diana / Artemis’ “rule” of the moon (9-10).  Here, as in 
“Diving into the Wreck,” Rich turns the metaphors of male myth on their heads.  If male 
mythmakers will portray women as monsters in the sky, Rich will engage and subvert the 
metaphor by emphasizing the parallel between the stellar origin of life on earth and the 
feminine origin of human life: “I am bombarded yet       I stand,” “I am a galactic cloud so 
deep   so invo-/luted that a light wave could take 15 / years to travel through me” (34, 39-41).  
The poem as a whole may have provided Rich the opportunity to unite author and speaker, 
but in these lines the speaker expands beyond herself, into the celestial matter (mater) of a 
cosmic nebula. 
But the poem also proffers an “us,” and this “us”—as is so often the case with Rich’s 
pronouns—is still more complicated.  The first instance of “us”—“she whom the moon ruled 
/ like us”—serves to establish the network of commonality among speaker, Caroline 
Herschel, the female monsters in the sky, and an intended, female audience.  The “us” 
recurs in the speaker’s comparison of a supernova explosion (as observed by Brahe) and the 
female experience of giving birth: “every impulse of light exploding // from the core / as life 
flies out of us” (21-3).  In this line, “life” is both the new life of birth—the maternal power of 
women—and a figurative “life,” akin to “vim,” that which is taken from women.  But the 
quotations from Brahe and the poem’s cosmic concerns suggest a larger sense of “us” that 
might include “all humanity” or even “all life.”  In fact, the more nebulous this “us” is, the 
more inclusive it may prove: to pin down the pronoun as this or that “us” requires a 
corresponding “them.”  As the poem closes, the loose couplets, tercets, and quatrains 
concentrate into an unpunctuated eleven-line stanza: 
I have been standing all my life in the  
  direct path of a battery of signals 
  the most accurately transmitted most 
  untranslateable language in the universe 
  I am a galactic cloud so deep    so invo- 
  luted that a light wave could take 15 
  years to travel through me    And has 
  taken    I am an instrument in the shape 
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  of a woman trying to translate pulsations 
  into images    for the relief of the body 
  and the reconstruction of the mind.  (35-45) 
 
This perorational closure offers a brief ars poetica—and another metamorphosis—as the 
speaker becomes “a galactic cloud” and then “an instrument in the shape / of a woman” 
whose purpose is translation, carrying over, change and exchange.  She does so “for the relief 
of the body / and the reconstruction of the mind” (my emphasis). In these last two lines, the 
definite article creates a poetic indefiniteness: whose body and mind?  To assume that these 
nouns refer to Rich, to a general “women,” or even to humanity would underestimate Rich’s 
ambitions.  The attempt to reconstruct the human mind supposes ecological, even cosmic 
implications, concerning not only the cosmic origins of life but its endurance on this planet.  
Rich identifies “Planetarium” as a “companion poem” to “Orion,” written three years 
earlier and published in Leaflets (1969).  I am more interested, however, in the comparable 
aspects of “Power,” a poem composed in 1974 and published in 1978 as the opening poem of 
The Dream of a Common Language.  I call “Power” a companion to “Planetarium” in part 
because Rich uses the text of the poems to situate them in the context of “thinking of” or 
“reading about” women in the sciences, whose contributions have been overshadowed or 
outright ignored by their male counterparts (“Planetarium” epigraph, “Power” 6).  
Moreover, Rich’s techniques in “Power”—irregular or absent punctuation, the expansion of 
typographic space between certain words or phrases—mirror those of “Planetarium.”  As 
Caroline Herschel represents the presiding spirit of “Planetarium,” the intellectual 
grandmother of “Power” is Marie Curie.  Far from Curie, however, the poem opens with an 
image of the unearthing of “one bottle   amber   perfect   a hundred-year-old / cure for fever   
or melancholy   a tonic” (3-4).  The image of the bottle “divulged” from earth—Rich chooses 
a verb often associated with the telling of secrets—may seem a strange “cold open” to the 
material of the poem, much of which concerns Curie, unless we look at the bottle and the 
scientist both as artifacts, figures that offer a way of knowing the past that might be used to 
rectify the present or ensure the future.  The first five lines of the poem depict only images 
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of excavation; the remaining seventeen abandon the images of the bottle of tonic for 
speculation about Curie.  The abrupt transition from one image to the other suggests the 
jarring juxtapositions of a haiku, but these shifts also allow a glimpse into the flux of the 
mind whose thoughts are spoken in the poem.  In both “Planetarium” and “Power,” Rich’s 
poet/speaker writes not just as a speaker “for herself” but for and through the figures of 
other women; we experience those figures, though, through the prism of Rich’s concern.  
This impulse appears in the earliest stages of Rich’s career—in “Aunt Jennifer’s Tigers” or 
“Snapshots of a Daughter-in-Law”—but these later poems demonstrate the urge toward a 
poetic speaker that is larger, more inclusive and outward-minded than the personal “I.” 
The prevailing metaphor of “Power” is that of the Marlovian adage quod nutrit me 
destruit me: what nourishes me destroys me.  The “tonic” that might once have been sold in 
the unearthed bottle probably was a charlatan’s snake oil, as likely to harm as to heal.  
Curie’s discoveries brought her the fame and esteem of two Nobel Prizes, but prolonged 
exposure to the elements she discovered also caused her death. Rich’s speaker supposes that 
Curie must have understood the nature of the illness she suffered: 
  It seems she denied to the end 
  the source of the cataracts on her eyes 
  the cracked and suppurating skin    of her finger-ends 
 till she could no longer hold     a test-tube or a pencil    
 She died a famous woman denying 
 her wounds 
 denying 
 her wounds came from the same source as her power (10-17) 
 
Of these closing lines (although her observations are just as applicable to Rich’s techniques 
in “Planetarium”) Diehl writes: 
[I]n the poem’s closing lines, Rich uses physical space and the absence of 
punctuation (an extension of Dickinson’s use of dashes) to loosen the 
deliberate, syntactic connections between words and thus introduce 
ambiguities that disrupt nominative forms.  The separation between words 
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determined through the movement of the reader’s eye—the movement past 
the ‘wounds’ where it had rested the first time—the emphasis on the activity 
of denial and its necessary violation.  (144-5) 
In “Power,” the “prestige of the individual” and individual suffering are inseparable.  The 
easy rejoinder to such an observation would concern the utilitarian good Curie’s discoveries 
provided for generations of a larger public, but this rejoinder would render private and 
public spheres too easily opposable.  I am more inclined to agree with Altieri’s observation 
that “[i]n poems one aligns oneself with other women and one tries to dramatize one’s 
capacity to take power through and for them.  If Curie died ‘denying / her wounds came 
from the same source as her power,’ then one can use her life to see how the two aspects 
might be united” (179).  Altieri reads “Power” as an especially significant poem in Rich’s 
oeuvre because it suggests a way out of the dichotomies that, for Rich, have resulted from 
and poisoned patriarchal intellectual systems.  
I have called “Power” a companion to “Planetarium,” but I also consider it, with its 
imagery of wreckage and salvage, expedition and excavation, to be a companion poem to 
“Diving into the Wreck.”  “Living in the earth-deposits of our history,” the first line of 
“Power,” refers then to the “divulged” amber bottle as well as what part of our history might 
be salvageable (1, 2).  The confluence of Curie’s power and suffering also suggests the 
conundrum depicted in “The Burning of Paper Instead of Children,” in which Rich’s 
speaker considers the necessary use of “the oppressor’s language.”11  “Planetarium” and 
“Power” both demonstrate the unifying of speaker and poet not only as a crux in the process 
of the poet’s “creation of self,” but also as an attempt to use that process to expand the 
concern of the poetic speaker beyond herself and toward a more public presence.  I want to 
                                                
11 Although Diehl does not specifically mention “The Burning of Paper” in the context of “Power,” I 
do want to acknowledge my debt to her observation that, “like Curie, [. . .] the woman poet must 
recognize a similar repression of her knowledge that what she is doing involves a deliberate rejection 
of the borrowed power of the tradition, the necessity of incurring the self-inflicted wounds that 
mark the birth of an individuated poetic voice” (145). 
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look briefly at two other poems, one roughly contemporary with “Planetarium” and 
“Power,” and one from more than a decade later, both of which demonstrate the gravity of 
the self that threatens to prevent the “I” from ever becoming “we.”  Located somewhere 
between or beyond those pronouns is “The Stranger,” published in Diving into the Wreck. 
The title of “The Stranger” refers to its speaker, a stranger in a room where other 
“others” are “talking in a dead language” (12).  The speaker is an “I”—and, to quote the 
Strand of The Monument, “this pronoun will have to do”—who can only be understood as 
such, despite being somewhat more or less than an individual.  By “more or less” I mean that 
in the first stanza the speaker appears as archetype, an anonymous walker in the streets of 
an unspecific city.  In this depiction she is at once stranger and familiar: “walking as I’ve 
walked before / like a man, like a woman, in the city / my visionary anger cleansing my sight” 
(6-8).  The vagueness of “a man,” “a woman,” and “the city” presents a moment of near-
solidarity with men and women in all cities.  But the similes are declensions from sameness, 
too.  The speaker of “Diving into the Wreck” can claim “I am she: I am he,” but the speaker 
of “The Stranger” can be only “like a man, like a woman.”  She is someone else: a stranger for 
whom this cityscape and these feelings only seem familiar.  The force that clarifies the 
speaker’s experience is the feeling of anger, which Rich herself has named as a liberating 
emotion in her own experience.  The speaker’s experience of anger becomes epiphanic: 
“my visionary anger cleansing my sight and the detailed perceptions of mercy / flowering 
from that anger” (8-10).  Her anger steadies and focuses her until, as if a fever were breaking, 
the line and stanza break, and the speaker turns to a hypothetical—but much more 
specific—attempt to identify herself: 
  if I come into a room out of the sharp misty light 
  and hear them talking a dead language 
  if they ask me my identity 
  what can I say but 
  I am the androgyne 
  I am the living mind you fail to describe 
  in your dead language 
  the lost noun, the verb surviving 
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  only in the infinitive    (11-19) 
 
A lost noun contradicts itself.  The phrase recalls Daly’s indictment that the female power 
to name has been stolen.  A lost noun names nothing.  An infinitive verb is hypothetical 
action, merely potential energy that remains inert until enacted.  In these lines, the dead 
language is wrenched to reveal its own impotence.  The speaker—the stranger—cannot 
answer the questions of this imagined tribunal because they and she speak different 
languages.  The stranger’s existence cannot be expressed in the old, dead grammars, but she 
must use the dead language in order to be understood—if not by the questioners, then by a 
reading or listening audience.  This is a trouble that Rich’s urge toward a new language 
cannot escape, and a theme she explores more completely in “The Burning of Paper Instead 
of Children.”  Alternatively, in order to articulate what she is, she must use the figurative 
language of poetry, an idiom in which the speaker/stranger/Rich herself might use language 
to explore the possibility of transcending language. 
 Rich returns to the implications of grammar for the conception of selfhood in the 
later poem “In Those Years,” in which she strives toward an imagined future in order to ask 
through what lens we might consider the present.  Written in 1991 and published in Dark 
Fields of the Republic (1995), the poem’s fourteen lines and structure of argumentative claim 
and rebuttal recall the sonnet form, that genre of the most intense search for personal 
connection and the most painful reminders of each individual’s ultimate solitude.  I quote 
“In Those Years” in full: 
In those years, people will say, we lost track 
of the meaning of we, of you 
we found ourselves 
 
reduced to I 
and the whole thing became 
silly, ironic, terrible: 
we were trying to live a personal life 
and, yes, that was the only life 
we could bear witness to 
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But the great dark birds of history screamed and plunged 
into our personal weather 
They were headed somewhere else but their beaks and pinions drove 
along the shore, through the rags of fog 
where we stood, saying I 
 
1991          (1-14) 
 
To adapt the question of Roland Barthes with which this study began: Who speaks “In 
Those Years”?  The speaker is an “I,” a “we,” a “they,” all of whom ruminate on the trouble 
of being any of the above.  The poem is set up as an anticipatory history: the future tense 
looks backward, speculates what “people will say” about “we” and “you” and “I.”  Whoever 
the speaker is, s/he looks forward to a future in which the present through which s/he lives 
now will seem a sad, if necessary, chapter in a larger narrative.  The speaker’s speculation 
recalls Des Pres’s observation that the “poetry of utopia might someday transcend [human] 
divisions; here and today, meanwhile, divisions continue in force [. . .].”  Those divisions are 
enacted in the cruelly ironic break between the first and second stanzas.  “[W]e found 
ourselves” suggests the process of “creation of self” of which Rich has written elsewhere, but 
the line and stanza break offer just enough time to find that the noun “ourselves” will be 
modified, “reduced to I”: reduced in number and reduced in the scope of its vision. 
To return to Rich’s proposal in “Notes toward a Politics of Location,” “there is no 
liberation that only knows how to say ‘I’; there is no collective movement that speaks for 
each of us all the way through.”  Neither does any individual person—as Rich argues about 
poetry itself—stand a chance of standing outside of history.  Each of us lives in and through 
history, and in various degrees of connection and disconnection with one another.  The 
speaker’s rhetorical, almost conciliatory “yes” in the poem’s eighth line admits the quarrel 
with herself, admits her own defensiveness about how she (and we) once thought and how 
we might think in the future about how we thought in the past.  When in the last stanza the 
speaker introduces the “great dark birds of history,” the poem shifts from discursive and 
speculative to an allegorical register.  The birds that scream and plunge recall the raptor that 
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every day tore out the liver of the chained Prometheus, the titan whose name means 
“forethinking” (OED).  The desire to think or hope about the future also demands enduring 
the suffering of the present.  In the poem’s final line, the speaker portrays the “we”—
become “silly, ironic, terrible”—lost in the fog, saying “I.”  Here the grammatical “I” 
becomes the senseless AI of grief.  In Ovid’s telling of Phoebus and Hyacinthus, the cry is 
Phoebus’ final wail for his lover; even the god of poetry can articulate nothing more apropos 
than this open vowel of pain (X.247-330).  The cry of one grieving for another is no longer 
communicative.  In the addressee’s absence the word signifies only the pain of the 
remaining individual.  This AI/I is inscrutable and, more frighteningly, potentially 
insurmountable, at least in the dead language we still speak. 
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THE OPPRESSOR’S LANGUAGE 
 
One of the problems of formulating a “new language” is that the language in which it 
is envisioned cannot accommodate it.  If Wittegenstein is correct that the limits of one’s 
language are the limits of one’s world, then we cannot speak adequately of a new language in 
this language, the “dead language,” the “oppressor’s language,” because a new language would 
exist beyond our intelligible world.  Even if we treat the idea of a new or common language 
as purely metaphorical, as the stuff of poetry, and dream that poetry can serve as the new 
language we need, we still find ourselves tangled in doubts over what form that poetry might 
take and whose interests it would serve.  So it would seem that Rich can envision but cannot 
enact a new, common language.  Neither she nor we might say with any certainty how it 
would function, who would speak and comprehend it, and how it would refashion the self 
and society.   
I have identified the tensions between individual and community, traditional and 
open form, old and new languages as animating forces in Rich’s poems.  Marjorie Perloff 
identifies them as moments of hesitation that compromise both Rich’s poetic and political 
achievements.  Perloff is an eloquent advocate for the historical avant-gardes whose 
aesthetic she has called the “poetics of indeterminacy,” including the Language poets whose 
ideas I have discussed in my introduction.  Although Perloff sympathizes with and often 
shares Rich’s political commitments, she critiques the poet’s “conservative rhetoric,” 
implying instead that Language poetry might serve as the new language Rich seeks.  Perloff 
believes that to speak the oppressor’s language serves only to further its power to oppress.  
Rich’s own conclusion—most fully realized in her poetry in “The Burning of Paper Instead 
of Children”—is that to speak in the oppressor’s language is necessary in order to 
communicate with speakers, readers, and listeners in contemporary society.  I want to 
demonstrate in this section that “The Burning of Paper” represents not only an anticipatory 
rebuttal to Perloff’s critique but that the poem also contains moments that resemble—but 
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ultimately resist—the “speakerless” model of writing proposed in some poststructuralist 
theory and Language writing. 
Perloff articulates her critique of Rich most forcefully in a 1983 review of Rich’s A 
Wild Patience Has Taken Me This Far.  Having quoted lines from Rich’s “Culture and 
Anarchy” juxtaposing human suffering and women’s suffrage, Perloff remarks caustically: 
“Men, it would seem, are immune from suffering” (131).  Perloff’s skepticism about Rich’s 
project is not rooted in antipathy toward the radical politics of Rich’s work, but her sense 
that Rich perceives male suffering myopically extends to her disapproval of Rich’s 
“conservative rhetoric”: 
  One could argue, in defense of such polemical and didactic poetry, that, at  
  this particular moment in our history, what is needed is not the negative  
  capability, the free play of the mind Rich formerly spoke of [specifically, in  
  “When We Dead Awaken”] as a good denied to women by their secondary  
  status, but a straightforward, readily comprehensible call to action.  Curiously, 
  however, that call to action is undermined [. . .] by Rich’s conservative   
  rhetoric, a rhetoric indistinguishable from that of the Male Oppressor.  It is  
  as if Rich, the radical lesbian poet, cannot shed the habit, learned by the time  
  she was 21, a Radcliffe graduate and the winner of the Yale Younger Poets  
  Award for A Change of World, of having to write a poetry that would win the  
  approval of the judges. (131-2) 
Perloff speculates that “Rich, the radical lesbian poet,” still writes for the approval of male 
“judges,” as Rich herself remembers having first written to please her father and other male 
figures of authority (“When We Dead Awaken” 38-9).  Such psychobiographical speculation 
and throwaway sarcasm like “Men, it would seem, are immune from suffering” distract from 
the crux of Perloff’s argument, which is that Rich has chosen the wrong tool for the task she 
has set for herself.  For Perloff, the notion that “old” poetic forms cannot serve new 
poetries, much less new societies, is almost a commonplace.  That Rich employs those old 
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forms threatens the reach of her political commitments in addition to her poetic 
achievement.  “How does it happen,” Perloff asks, (136), “that a poet as committed to radical 
feminism as Adrienne Rich should cast her poems, perhaps quite unwittingly, in the very 
masculine modes she professes to scorn?”  
If Perloff’s major charge against Rich is that she employs a “rhetoric 
indistinguishable from that of the Male Oppressor,” Rich has already anticipated such a 
criticism.  In fact, for Rich this is the crux of her own political poetics, and an issue she 
interrogates in “The Burning of Paper Instead of Children,” as we shall see.  Rich’s 
comments in an interview with David Montenegro elaborate on the gravity of the question 
of the “old forms” in a “new poetry,” and she adduces her suspicion that the techniques the 
Language poets present as “new” are retreads of past avant-gardes: 
If you were going to be writing a truly new poetry, could you use the old 
forms?  It’s a question that is being asked now in a feminist context—for 
instance, in the work of the Feminist Language poets, [. . . ] what has always 
been labeled experimental poetry, in the sense of undercutting traditional 
syntax, emphasizing typography as part of the statement of the poem, using 
more open field arrangements on the page. 
I have a real question about it though because it feels to me like 
experimental poetry from the early twenties, or of Black Mountain [sic].  It 
does not feel particularly experimental now.  The fact that women are doing it 
is interesting, but women were doing that kind of thing in the twenties too, 
people like Mina Loy, for example, Gertrude Stein obviously.  I guess what 
I’m searching for is a way of staying linked to the past, pulling out of it 
whatever you can use, and continuing to move on.  (270) 
As we have seen her enact in “Snapshots,” “Diving into the Wreck,” and “Power,” Rich here 
emphasizes her sense of the archaeological mission of poetry and history.  Her poetics, as I 
have argued above, owes as much to T. S. Eliot’s Modernism as to Loy’s and Stein’s.  Rich 
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suggests that the Language poets’ claims for their own novelty obscures rather than secures 
their inheritance of the achievements of the experimental women of Modernist poetry. 
In these selections from Perloff and Rich we return to versions of the arguments 
over Language poetry I sketched in my introduction to these case studies.  On one side of 
the false binary stand the Language writers who claim that the subjective, expressive, 
individual nature of poetry ignores “the arbitrariness of signification and the constructive 
character of meaning-making” (Izenberg 784).  In Rich’s vision of the poem as part of the 
process of “creation of self,” a devotee of Language writing might see a delusion about the 
work of poetry and the nature of our language-bound and –mediated existence.  On the 
other side of the debate, a “mainstream” poet might claim that the constructs and 
disjunctions of Language and other experimental writing exclude audiences who have not 
been educated to read them instead of including them in the process of stripping away the 
old, capitalist ideologies, as is the Language theorists’ goal.  For instance, although Ange 
Mlinko is not particularly sympathetic either to Rich’s or to Perloff’s aesthetic, she 
recognizes the poetic and rhetorical achievements made possible in a synthesis of their 
separate approaches.  Mlinko quotes Rich’s “Tonight No Poetry Will Serve,” a poem in 
which Rich meditates on and offers metaphors for the materiality of language and the 
functions of syntax: 
 verb force-feeds noun 
 submerges the subject 
 noun is choking 
 verb     disgraced     goes on choking  
 
now diagram the sentence   (15-19) 
 
Of these lines Mlinko writes: 
 
The conflation of torture with syntax (the executive order to diagram involves 
disarticulating the parts of speech) recalls the Language Poets’ insistence that 
the tyranny of syntax mirrors the tyranny of imperialism—and that if we 
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could smash the former, we would free ourselves from the latter (the pun on 
sentence reinforces this).  But the deferred or indeterminate meanings of 
Language poems don’t have the dramatic power that Rich’s poem does.  Here, 
at last, is the vitality that I’d been missing [in Rich’s more overtly polemical 
poems], and it comes, as I thought it would, with a twist: diagram this, she 
says—and suddenly I remember that “grammar” and “glamour” share an 
etymology in the Scots word for “magic.”  (37) 
In such a case the distinctive power of poetry’s figurative, metaphorical language provides 
an opportunity for synthesis that the argumentative claims of critical prose cannot easily 
match.  I do not intend to suggest here some facile distinction between poetry and prose, 
praxis and theory, but I do believe that the logical impossibility of being two things at once 
(quantum theory notwithstanding) is the root of metaphor and of the force of poetry to 
compel us in ways that other modes of language cannot easily match.  “You can refute 
Hegel,” Yeats remarked, “but not the Saint or the Song of Sixpence” (“Letter,” qtd. in 
Ellman 289).  I believe that Rich manages to bridge the apparent chasm between these 
different ideas of poetry—poetry as voice, poetry as the selfless expression of language—
most successfully in “The Burning of Paper Instead of Children.” 
I want to look at “The Burning of Paper” in some depth, in part because I think the 
poem articulates Rich’s sense of conflict about the form(s) of her writing with greater 
complexity than Perloff’s or Mlinko’s readings of Rich allow.  In fact, the poem 
demonstrates affinities with the Language poets’ techniques even as it illustrates the 
shortcomings of such techniques.  Even the writer who believes that “only where there is 
language is there world” also concedes the failures of language and literature as lenses 
through which to understand human experience: “there are books that describe all this / and 
they are useless” (74-5).  The speaker of the poem imagines “a time of silence / or few words 
/ a time of chemistry and music,” but such a time remains a distant, utopian, perhaps 
quixotic vision (23-5).  She speaks the poem in a time of speech, a time when she (and 
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potentially we) need “the repair of speech / to overcome this suffering” (48-9).  The poem’s 
ambivalence about the power of language is complicated by its frequent quotation from 
both cited and uncited sources, beginning with its title and epigraph, both taken from 
Daniel Berrigan, the Jesuit priest whose public opposition to American military 
involvement in Vietnam included the use of homemade napalm to burn draft cards in a 1968 
protest in Catonsville, Maryland (Polner and O’Grady 195-217).  Although most of the 
papers we see burning in the poem are the pages of books, the burning of the title refers to 
draft cards, and derives from Berrigan’s commentary on his Catonsville protest: 
Our apologies      good friends 
for the fracture of good order the burning of paper 
instead of children   the angering of the orderlies 
in the front parlor of the charnel house 
We could not      so help us God  do otherwise 
For we are sick at heart our hearts 
give us no rest for thinking of the Land of Burning Children 
and for thinking of that other Child of whom 
the poet Luke speaks       (93-4) 
 
The specter of Vietnam, and specifically of the American use of napalm in its operations 
there, haunts the poem, as does the image of fire in general.  Rich quotes Berrigan in her 
epigraph: “I was in danger of verbalizing my moral impulses out of existence.”  Berrigan’s 
conundrum is Rich’s: if language fails us—or worse, if language compels consent when moral 
impulses demand otherwise—then what good is language?  How can one use language so as 
to acknowledge its failures in the attempt to transcend them? 
The poem proper begins with more paraphrase and quotation, lines of prose that set 
the specific scene of the poem’s meditation: 
My neighbor, a scientist and art-collector, telephones me in a state of  
violent emotion.  He tells me that my son and his, aged eleven and twelve, 
have on the last day of school burned a mathematics textbook in the 
backyard.  He has forbidden my son to come to his house for a week, and has 
forbidden his own son to leave the house during that time.  “The burning of a 
book,” he says, “arouses terrible sensations in me, memories of Hitler; there 
are few things that upset me so much as the idea of burning a book.” (1-8) 
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The poem opens with three fires: the burning of draft cards, of books, and of children.  The 
“instead” of the poem’s title, translated into the text of the poem, implies that the neighbor 
has overreacted despite his good intentions.  “Bothered by an abstract idea, Craig Werner 
writes, “he shows little interest in the boys’ hatred of the educational institution or their 
choice of a math book, itself a symbol of abstract systemization.  While she refuses to 
romanticize the boys’ action, Rich perceives a complexity invisible to her neighbor” (65).  
Werner reads the speaker of the poem here as “Rich”—and although I agree that in this 
first section the speaker is roughly equivalent with the historical Adrienne Rich, the poem 
will shift from “her voice” in productive and complex ways.  In this instance, the phone call 
provokes the speaker to consider a library of her childhood home and her incipient 
fascination with the books there, especially with the Trial of Jeanne d’Arc: 
and they take the book away 
  because I dream of her too often 
 
  love and fear in a house 
  knowledge of the oppressor 
  I know it hurts to burn  (18-22) 
 
Here is the first instance in the poem of the word “oppressor,” which occupies a crucial 
space in the context of the whole poem.  The line bridges the speaker’s recollection of the 
book having been taken away from her, and her notion “I know it hurts to burn.”   
To what, then, does “knowledge of the oppressor” refer in this instance?  The phrase 
recurs throughout the poem, but its first appearance here suggests a number of possible 
valences.  I suppose that the speaker positions the line in this manner in order to juxtapose 
the drastic oppression—the burning—of Joan of Arc with the smaller-scale oppression of 
taking away a book from a child, an act that suggests the male regulation of the female 
intellect and the male relegation of the female to a sphere of emotion instead of intellect.  “I 
know it hurts to burn,” the speaker says, but “know” here occupies a slippery position.  Is 
this the “know” of experience, knowledge gained from having been burned? or the “know” 
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of an intellectual recognition that is separate from experiential understanding?  The poem 
does not answer these questions, but the first infinitive verb of the next section is “To 
imagine”—an act that books, language, and the structures they reinforce can both encourage 
and suppress (23).  The burning of the textbooks is the symbolic act of the schoolchildren on 
the brink of summer’s apparently endless freedom, having been “freed” from the daily 
routine of institutional education.  That education is a privilege, of course, but when Rich’s 
speaker emphasizes the failures of language, she also emphasizes the power to coerce and 
oppress inherent in any education. 
The second section of the poem turns away from the phone call, the children, the 
recollection of the speaker’s own childhood, and to the intimacy of an erotic encounter.  
The speaker imagines “relief”—the word floats in its own line, its own stanza—“from this 
tongue         this slab of limestone / or reinforced concrete” (30-2).  Instead of verbal 
interaction, she imagines the touch of the body and the lay of landscape.  As in “Power,” 
when the speaker shifts abruptly from the images of excavation to her meditation on Marie 
Curie, here she wrenches herself from this tactile fantasia to conclude: “knowledge of the 
oppressor / this is the oppressor’s language // yet I need it to talk to you” (38-40).  In my 
reading of “In Those Years,” I rephrased Barthes’s famous question to ask who are the “I,” 
“we,” and “they” of the poem.  I must ask the same question of the “you” in “The Burning of 
Paper.”  Does this second-person pronoun refer to the neighbor of the first section, the 
lover of the second and fourth sections, or an intended audience for the poem that could 
potentially include any speaker of the oppressor’s language, male or female? 
Just as “The Burning of Paper” complicates the matter of the “you” to whom it is 
addressed, in its third section the poem demands a reconsideration of who speaks the poem.  
The third section is divided into two stanzas, one of italicized prose, the other of short lines 
for the most part broken across syntactical clauses.  The italics imply a speaker other than 
the one who has spoken the poem until now, but the poem offers nothing to specify who 
speaks.  Later editions, including the Norton volume of Adrienne Rich’s Poetry and Prose 
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edited by Barbara and Albert Gelpi, identify the speaker of this section as “one of Rich’s 
students in the Open Admissions Program at City College of New York” (41): 
People suffer highly in poverty and it takes dignity and intelligence to overcome 
this suffering.  Some of the suffering are: a child did not had dinner last night: a child 
steal because he did not have money to buy it: to hear a mother say she do not have 
money to buy food for her children and to see a child without cloth it will make tears in 
your eyes.         (41-5) 
 
Here is another instance of the collage effect Rich achieves in so many of her poems by 
blending the speech and writing of others with her own words.  The difference between 
Rich’s and the student’s quoted words seems obvious, but the implications of that 
difference are complicated and troublesome.  When Rich “breaks the rules” of grammar and 
syntax, the act may seem to us a gesture of poetic license.  As Rich herself notes, such acts 
are parts of the tradition of experimental poetry.  If, however, one assumes that the 
grammatical deviations from “standard English” in the section of quoted prose indicate 
something of the writer’s education or lack thereof, one participates in the power of 
language to oppress by signifying the socioeconomic, educational, or intellectual status of its 
speaker.  Such an assumption provides a striking example—with dangerous practical, ethical 
consequences—of the poststructuralist idea that language speaks us.  What Pierre Bourdieu 
says of taste—that it “classifies, and it classifies the classifier”—is true of language and 
dialect as well (6).  Our language becomes shibboleth: our dialect, our pronunciations and 
slang betray us as members of one group or another.  The three parenthetical lines of verse 
that follow this selection of prose are themselves fragments: “(the fracture of order / the 
repair of speech / to overcome this suffering)” (46-8).  The juxtaposition of “poetic” and 
“illiterate” uses of language forces us to examine assumptions—perhaps unconscious 
assumptions—about what constitutes eloquence and literacy, and how either of these 
abstract notions constitute our humanity. 
 The poem’s fourth section returns to the scene of the lovers’ encounter, but the 
fantasy of “a time of silence” has passed, not only because their lovemaking is over, but 
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because the specter of the third section and its wrenching depiction of suffering haunt the 
pleasures of sex.  The two lovers are 
speaking 
of loneliness 
  relieved in a book 
  relived in a book      
 
  [. . . ] 
 
  still it happens 
 
  sexual jealousy 
  outflung hand 
  beating bed   (50-3, 67-70) 
 
Speech subsides to gesture, gesture to silence, and none of it suffices to span the loneliness 
the lovers experience, the sense of alienation in the midst of the would-be absolute 
connection of lovemaking.12  The lovers’ words fail and the books that would salve their 
loneliness or at least explain it “are useless” (73-4).  For all the supposed wisdom of 
literature—and, by extension, for all the supposed wisdom of a poem such as the one we are 
reading—none of what we find in those books can explain enough.  If we grow wiser in 
reading them, we grow into the Socratic wisdom of knowing that we know nothing: 
  no one knows what may happen 
  though the books tell everything 
 
  burn the texts   said Artaud  (82-4) 
 
                                                
12 Rich’s understanding of the paradox of intimacy and the failures of language to transcend or even 
describe solitude recalls the litotes with which Philip Larkin concludes his “Talking in Bed”: “ 
 
At this unique distance from isolation 
 
    It becomes still more difficult to find 
    Words at once true and kind, 
    Or not untrue and not unkind.   (9-12) 
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The quotation is necessarily paradoxical.  To call upon the authority of an artist who “called 
for the destruction of the values and structures that inform Western culture” demonstrates 
how thoroughly those values and structures are ingrained in us, and we in them (Gelpi and 
Gelpi 42, note 6).  Rich’s speaker invokes and rejects at the same time: in recalling Artaud’s 
call to “burn the texts,” the poem perpetuates the texts even in endorsing the call to burn 
them. 
 In the first four sections of the poem, Rich’s speaker quotes from or appropriates 
the voices of Daniel Berrigan, her angry neighbor, her lover, an anonymous sufferer 
(revealed in footnotes as a student), and Antonin Artaud.  In these sections she has 
distinguished typographically between “her” words and “their” words, italicizing as she 
quotes.  In the fifth and final section of “The Burning of Paper,” the poem achieves a 
transcendent crescendo; all of these voices blend in an associative prose paragraph, speaking 
to and beyond each other across time and distance.  In this paragraph she alludes to 
Frederick Douglass, John Milton, Joan of Arc, and Emily Dickinson.13  When the ostensible 
speaker of “The Burning of Paper” says “I am composing on the typewriter late at night,” we 
understand her to be the same speaker who spoke on the telephone with her angry 
neighbor.  But this understanding is fundamentally compromised by the intervening voices 
of the poem.  Now the speaker blurs composition and quotation by blending the words of 
others into her own final stanza: 
In America we have only the present tense.  I am in danger.  You are in 
danger.  The burning of a book arouses no sensation in me.  I know it hurts to 
burn.  There are flames of napalm in Catonsville, Maryland.  I know it hurts 
to burn.  The typewriter is overheated, my mouth is burning, I cannot touch 
you and this is the oppressor’s language   (90-4) 
 
                                                
13 Dickinson’s phrase “I am in danger, sir,” is unattributed here but derived from a letter to T. W. 
Higginson (“Letter” 168).  Rich uses the phrase as the title of a poem published in Necessities of Life 
(1966).   
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In these final, ventriloquized lines, the speaker(s) of the poem become(s) almost 
unidentifiable.  The root of the original speaker—whom I have equated with the historical 
Adrienne Rich—remains here, but her words are others’ words.  The poem ultimately 
locates itself between, on the one hand, the unifying of speaker and poet, and the 
speakerless model of Language poetry on the other.  Mlinko alludes to the “dramatic power” 
of Rich’s “Tonight No Poetry Will Serve,” and I want to echo her claim here in regard to 
“The Burning of Paper.”  The poem achieves its climactic effects through its employment of 
multiple voices through—and despite—the original association of the poem’s speaker with 
Adrienne Rich herself.  Much as Whitman’s “Song of Myself” begins with “I” and attempts 
to merge that “I” with the “you” with which it concludes, “The Burning of Paper” 
dramatizes the osmosis of voices among individual, historical speakers.  In weaving together 
these voices, Rich transcends even the Dickinsonian attempt to speak as “Nobody” by 
speaking as both nobody and somebody at the same time.  
Theorists of Language poetry may indeed be correct that the words of a printed 
poem represent merely the illusion of the voice of a specific speaker.  Rich’s poem suggests 
that since we live in this illusion, much as we live in the oppressor’s language, we must make 
the most of it.  “The Burning of Paper” demonstrates—to my mind as powerfully as any 
“Language poem”—that the possessives I use above: “her words,” “others’ words,” are 
inadequate and illusory.  We speak language and are spoken by it.  Even as we use language 
to oppress, language oppresses us, and oppresses some of us, as the poem demonstrates, far 
more than others.  Language is the extent of our knowable world but remains insufficient to 
our needs.  In this final instance of “the oppressor’s language,” the previous addendum—“yet 
I need it to talk to you”—is omitted.  To repeat it would be tautological: we need the 
oppressor’s language; we may even be the oppressor’s language.  Most disturbingly, the poem 
demonstrates that we who use the oppressor’s language are ourselves the oppressors. 
 In her critique of Rich’s “conservative rhetoric,” Perloff argues that Rich “tends to 
forget that form is itself a political statement [. . .].  Rich, as anyone who has read her prose 
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knows, is a powerful thinker, a brilliant intellectual.  Her current impasse as a poet is that 
she has not yet found a form, a language that might be equal to her hard-won insights” 
(136).14  I hope to have shown above that, contra Perloff, Rich is constantly aware of the 
political implications of the poetic forms she chooses.  I hope to have shown, moreover, 
that Rich’s “current impasse as a poet” is neither current nor exclusively Rich’s.  The 
impasse Rich faces, and out of which she makes her poetry, is that language is never 
sufficient to the expressive needs of the users whose expressive identities are created out of 
language itself.  For Rich the problem is still more complex, because the whole history of 
human language has been concurrent with and complicit in the history of patriarchy.  Her 
“impasse” is that she wishes to change the nature of language and the nature of thought; no 
language, new or common or otherwise, is quite adequate to that task.  Her achievement 
meanwhile is to have modeled a path from adherence to “old forms” to the reimagining of 
them. 
The poems of Adrienne Rich—more than those of any other poet under 
consideration here—enact a radical critique of the notions of the individual self that have 
dominated Western thought since the Enlightenment.  Rich also affirms more vehemently 
than any of these poets the dignity of the individual, and the individual woman’s need for 
physical, emotional, and intellectual independence.  The privilege of selfhood has been 
denied women living under patriarchy; only when women can enact their own “creation of 
self” can the problematic, collective “we” improve the dignity of all individuals.  The issue of 
                                                
14 Mlinko calls Perloff’s critique of Rich on these grounds “an arresting reversal of the usual terms—
‘art for art’s sake’ is supposed to be quietist; ‘feminist art’ is supposed to be revolutionary—and it 
depends on an assumption about the relationship between poetic form and politics as questionable 
as Rich’s likening of traditional forms to asbestos gloves” (36).  I suspect that Mlinko’s choice of the 
word “quietist” alludes to Ron Silliman’s coinage of the term “school of quietude” for the “traditional” 
poetic practices he understands as those that Language writing opposes (Silliman, “Monday”).  
Mlinko seems here to reject the premise that inheriting a poetic forms means necessarily inheriting 
its corresponding political implications.  Although Rich uses the metaphor of traditional forms as 
asbestos gloves, I believe that her work demonstrates a thoughtful and powerful remaking of those 
inherited, traditional forms. 
 
    
 213 
the self is especially problematic in Rich’s poems because in no other poet’s work is that 
idea so interwoven with the most fundamental aspects of everyday existence.  Even as Rich 
attempts to envision a new conception of self, based in the community rather than the 
individual, she remains a fierce defender of female individuality.  This is the crux of her 
political and ethical commitments and of the achievements and shortcomings of her poetry.  
Rich’s poems can indeed be strident, polemical, shrill and sneering, but they have always 
depicted her quarrel with the self just as much as her quarrel with the world.  Those quarrels 
have of course been political, but they have also engendered a poetry of profound self-
critique and have demonstrated the aesthetic power of such critique.  By looking within 
with the fierce self-scrutiny of Dickinson, Rich attempts to achieve a “Song of Myself” that 
rivals Whitman’s in its power to include and to reconsider the boundaries between self and 
community.  By writing in the oppressor’s language, she forges an idiom and an ethics that 
are distinctly her own. 
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Chapter Four 
 
 
Divided to the Vein: Derek Walcott 
 
 
 In my previous chapters I have examined the methods and stakes of various poetic 
deployments of the self: strategic and theoretical in Mark Strand, existential and formal in 
Charles Wright, personal and political in Adrienne Rich.  In the poetry of Derek Walcott, 
the work of crafting a self in and through poetry is as existential as it is for Wright, as 
political as it is for Rich, and as strategic as it is for Strand.  The stakes of self-craft are, for 
Walcott, simultaneously individual and national, historical and mythical.  In Walcott’s 
poems, as in Rich’s, the self is a position of privilege to which both individuals and cultures 
may aspire but which historically cannot be assumed.  Walcott’s attempt to establish a 
personal identity in his poems is concomitant with his ambition to use poetry—specifically 
his marriage of Caribbean landscape, seascape, and human history to classical and British 
forms and figures—to establish a cultural identity for the West Indies.1  The identity that 
Walcott seeks to forge is a consequence of his (and his islands’) colonial history, but in 
poetry, Walcott believes, neither the individual nor the culture must be bound by history.  
“It is the language which is the empire,” he writes, “and great poets are not its vassals but its 
princes” (“The Muse of History” 51).  Walcott takes up the task of liberating his islands, his 
                                                
1 Although Paul Breslin does not explicitly identify Walcott’s process of self-fashioning with his 
effort to fashion an identity for the West Indies, he does argue that “the successful definition of an 
authorial ‘I’ and the imagining of a society in which the poem can take place are part of the same 
process, informing and enriching each other.  The imagined society need not literally exist, but it has 
to be derived from one that does, as a potential latent within it” (2). 
 
    
 215 
language, and himself from that history of colonization and enslavement, refashioning it 
into the mythic history of the “nowever” present tense of poetry.   
Walcott begins his poetic career with the self-imposed onus of forging identities for 
himself and his homeland from the poems he writes.  Walcott “creates” his West Indies in 
his own image: “divided to the vein” ethnically, racially, linguistically (“A Far Cry From 
Africa” 27).  St. Lucian by birth, Walcott has spent much of his life in the United States; of 
mixed English and West Indian ancestry, he has wrestled with one island’s “standard 
English” and another’s “patois.”  Walcott’s self-conscious embrace of the vestiges of the 
Western poetic tradition, from “standard” English and iambic pentameter to epics in the 
modes of both Wordsworth and Homer, represents a double choice to claim that tradition 
for himself and to validate the place of the West Indies within it.  Moreover, this decision 
contrasts Walcott with poets who have chosen for various reasons to write in opposition to 
the canonical traditions of Anglophone poetics, including in the Caribbean the “Nation 
language” of Barbadian poet Edward Kamau Brathwaite and others, as well as the 
constructivist aesthetic of the North American Language Poets.  Walcott rejects such 
approaches, instead arrogating to himself the task of “purifying the language of the tribe” 
(“What the Twilight Says” 9).  Although I call this task a choice, for Walcott the choice is 
also not to have to choose between (and thus oppose one or more) traditions, since he 
himself embodies multiple traditions and different registers of those traditions’ languages.  
“Standing ‘between’ the conflict to choose sides,” Rei Terada writes, “[Walcott] 
simultaneously contains the conflict as a difference within his own identity” (9).  
Consequently, the self that Walcott deploys in poems is divided and ambivalent, formed in 
the flux between places, ancestries, languages and poetic forms.  His understanding of self in 
terms of place—particularly the places between places—contributes to a poetry of 
geographical, biographical, and linguistic betweenness. 
The importance of place in Walcott’s poetics has been well documented in available 
scholarship on the poet’s work.  Less attention has been paid, however, to the specifics of 
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Walcott’s use of place as the basis for and method of crafting an individual and cultural 
identity.  In this chapter, I shall demonstrate a narrative relationship between place and 
poetry, a mode of poetic imagining and narrating in terms of place that binds the poet to 
place(s), individual histories to cultural and national histories, via the figurative linguistic 
and imagistic valences of the poem itself.  To describe this process in Walcott’s poetry, I 
borrow the term “chorography” from Richard Helgerson’s scholarship on Early Modern 
England.  Helgerson speaks of the emergence of a national consciousness through the 
“chorographic” imagining and narrating of place.  Distinct in scale from the whole-earth 
study of geography and in focus from the topographic attention to surface, chorography is 
quite literally the writing (graphia) of place (choros), and thus the term carries with it the 
inseparable relationship between a particular place and the people who name and map it.  In 
Helgerson’s notion of chorography, the chorographer not only maps a place but places 
himself within that map, and in doing so he (re)creates both the place and himself.  So the 
poet, in the case of Walcott, inscribes himself in the place he describes in his poems.  This 
process becomes still more complex when the poet leaves that place for others, 
complicating habitation and representation with the work of memory.  Through my 
anachronistic invocation of “chorography,” we may understand more completely Walcott’s 
attempt to create in terms of place a poetic identity for himself and a cultural identity for 
the West Indies. 
That the West Indies, as Paul Breslin writes, “exists as an imagined community, but 
one that has not achieved political embodiment” offers an opportunity for Walcott to 
imagine (and thus, create) the community in his own poetic language (2).  Walcott writes his 
own divisions into the characters in whom he sees the region embodied.  It may be 
appropriate then that the most famous of Walcott’s thousands of lines are voiced by one of 
his characters, Shabine, the sailor-speaker of “The Schooner Flight”: 
I’m just a red nigger who love the sea, 
  I had a sound colonial education. 
  I have Dutch, nigger, and English in me, 
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  and either I’m nobody, or I’m a nation.  (40-3) 
Despite the either/or formulation of these possible identities, Walcott’s poetry 
demonstrates the bothness of the Caribbean as he understands it, here marrying the 
colloquial language of a West Indian sailor with the marching, “colonial” English iambic 
pentameter.  Jahan Ramazani describes this bothness as a kind of poetic “hybridity,” 
modifying a term common in postcolonial discourse: 
Educated as imperial subjects yet immersed in indigenous traditions and 
customs, these postcolonial poets grew up in the potentially productive 
tension between an imposed and an inherited culture—productive, that is, for 
the powerful literary mind that can create imaginative forms to articulate the 
dualities, ironies, and ambiguities of this cultural in-betweenness.  (6) 
 The sense of “in-betweenness” to which Ramazani refers is amplified (or 
exacerbated) in Walcott’s work by his own evolving sense of himself as a “traveller” or a 
“prodigal.”  As the circle of Walcott’s professional ambition widens to match his poetic 
ambition, he finds that his effort to establish himself as the poet of the West Indies 
requires him to leave those islands and to relocate to the United States, and specifically to 
New York City and, later, Boston.2  As Walcott’s poetry becomes more and more marked 
by travel (including longer and longer relocations), the sense of division that animates his 
early poems deepens and spreads; he becomes a cosmopolitan, and in doing so he finds 
himself further divided from even the divided identity he has forged.  Adam Kirsch notes 
this phenomenon in his review of The Prodigal (2004): “The paradoxical result of this success 
[. . .] is that Walcott now feels at home everywhere and nowhere.  The poem is the record 
                                                
2 In his biography of Walcott, Bruce King argues that the poet felt he needed to “make it” in New 
York.  Despite the fact that London might have seemed the more obvious choice for someone who 
“might think of himself as British,” it was apparent that “New York [. . .] was by 1959 the centre of 
the modern cultural world.”  Moreover, Walcott had been warned “of how easy it was to earn a 
literary reputation in the West Indies and settle into satisfaction without the competition of 
publishing abroad” (159).  Thus, Walcott’s eventual move to New York represented both a 
professional opportunity and an aesthetic challenge. 
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of a journey—or, since it has no real beginning or end, of a wandering, a self-imposed exile” 
(“The Odyssey”).3  As Walcott has said: “All their betrayals are quarrels with the self, their 
pardonable desertions the inevitable problem of all island artists: the choice of home or 
exile, self-realization or spiritual betrayal of one’s country.  Travelling widens this breach”  
(“What the Twilight Says” 35).  Thus, Walcott has crossed a gulf in order to validate himself 
and his archipelago, but in doing so he has opened another between himself and his home.  
What neither Kirsch nor Walcott makes explicit here, however, is that since the land is so 
thoroughly implicated in Walcott’s identity (and he in the land’s literary identity), to be 
separated from that place—physically, psychologically—is also to be exiled from himself.  
Again, as I will show, the idea of chorography is of particular use here to describe the 
relationship among the poet, the land, and the poetic creation that also creates them.  But 
we must also clarify the somewhat muddy vocabularies of itinerancy that are often applied 
to Walcott’s poetics.    
Walcott’s sense of division is evident in the language he has employed to describe his 
experience.  In different poems, essays, and interviews, Walcott is an “exile,” a “traveller,” a 
“prodigal.”  This lexicon demands more rigorous critical attention than it has previously 
received.  Throughout his career, Walcott has both used and chastised himself for using the 
term “exile.”  More recently, he has adopted the term “prodigal” instead, even using the 
word as the title of his 2004 book length poem.  Walcott does not choose lightly the figure 
of “the prodigal,” but neither he nor his critics have unpacked the metaphor as thoroughly 
as it demands.  In Walcott’s work and in much of the critical work about Walcott, the idea 
of the “prodigal” is deployed exclusively to describe one who departs home, repents, and 
returns, following the Christian parable from the Gospel of Luke but in fact missing an 
essential aspect of the parable (Gregerson, Conversation).  In acquiring the sense of one 
who has lived away from home “but subsequently made a repentant return,” the term 
                                                
3 Kirsch’s phrase “the poem” refers specifically to The Prodigal here, but I would extend his point to 
“the poem” in Walcott’s work more generally. 
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“prodigal” has been divested of its original meaning of “recklessly wasteful of one’s property 
or means,” a valence that I wish to restore here (OED).  In other words, what makes the 
second son in the parable “prodigal” is not that he departs and returns, but that between his 
departure and return he squanders his inheritance and brings himself to shame, living among 
pigs as a hired swineherd (Luke 15:11-32).  In order to understand the divided inheritance of 
Walcott’s ancestry and the ambivalence of his poetry in which he considers himself a 
“prodigal,” we must attend to both of these lineages of the prodigal son parable.  Walcott 
has indeed implicated himself in a cycle of departure from and return to his home island, 
but we must also understand his ambivalence about this cycle as an anxiety about the uses to 
which he has put the “gift” of the English language, which he has claimed as his birthright 
and inheritance. 
Despite the variety of Walcott’s poetic and personal travels, his aesthetic compass 
remains fixed on the polestar of the Anglophone canonical tradition, bringing him into 
aesthetic and philosophical conflict with more “radical” poets in the Caribbean and the 
United States.  Walcott has been explicit in his suspicion of some Caribbean poets’ 
“servitude to the muse of history [that] has produced a literature of recrimination and 
despair, a literature of revenge written by the descendants of slaves or a literature of 
remorse written by the descendants of masters” (“The Muse of History” 37).  As the most 
visible and forceful advocate of “Nation language,” the Barbadian poet Edward Kamau 
Brathwaite (Walcott’s exact contemporary) is often identified as a figure oppositional to 
Walcott.  Patricia Ismond, for instance, refers to “Edward Lucie-Smith’s pronouncement 
that the West Indies must choose between Walcott and Brathwaite [. . .]” (220).  The 
opposition of Walcott and Brathwaite may make for a useful critical fiction—sometimes 
even for the poets themselves—but it also represents another example of a false binary in 
Anglophone poetry, another impossible choice between old and new, tradition and 
innovation, repression and liberation.  Although I do not linger on this particular binary in 
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this chapter, I do want to note it in the context of the specious opposition of Language 
poetry to official verse culture. 
Although Walcott has become a poet of both the West Indies and the United 
States, his place in the poetics of the latter is more difficult to define.  Walcott has 
identified himself as “on the perimeter of the American literary scene,” “not really 
committed to any kind of particular school or body of enthusiasm or criticism,” but he has 
also expressed disdain for what he considers the pretensions of “the avant-garde, which I 
despise” (“The Art of Poetry” 228-9, Kjellberg).  Walcott’s reverence for the Anglophone 
tradition—and specifically his attempt to establish an identity for himself and for his 
homeland within that tradition—represents an implicit rejection of the claims of American 
avant-gardes such as the Language Poets.  The very techniques that the Language Poets 
identify as falsely naturalistic (e.g., traditional meters, poetic narrative) are those that 
Walcott uses to demonstrate that he and the West Indies belong(s) to the Western literary 
tradition, and that the tradition belongs to him and them.  The African American poet 
Marilyn Nelson expresses a similar sentiment in her essay “Owning the Masters”: 
I know, I know: The tradition is the oppressor.  The tradition doesn’t include 
me because I’m black and a woman.  [. . .] Yet the once enslaved are heirs to 
the masters, too. [. . .] Too often we ignore the fact that tradition is process. [. 
. .] The Angloamerican tradition belongs to all of us, or should. As does the 
community into which the tradition invites us.  That means the metrical 
tradition, too. (10, 12, 14, 15) 
Moreover, because Walcott feels that the Anglophone tradition is his own inheritance, he is 
wary of those poets who would seek to depart from that tradition, as if “the tradition” were 
a Hell for Satan to fly from instead of something he carries within him.  “We know that the 
great poets have no wish to be different,” he writes, “no time to be original [. . .].”  “[. . . I]n 
any age a common genius almost indistinguishably will show itself, and the perpetuity of this 
genius is the only valid tradition, not the tradition which categorizes poetry by epochs and 
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by schools” (“The Muse of History” 62).  One of the contributions of this chapter, then, is 
to provide a more thorough understanding of how Walcott facilitates the process that is 
tradition, how his longing to enter the canon reshapes the canon itself. 
The Language critique of “official verse culture” (and the capitalist system with 
which official verse culture is identified) is a critique of the bourgeoisie compromised in 
part by its own position within the bourgeoisie.  The critique of the self as a social 
construct, of the lyric voice as an illusion of falsely “naturalistic” poetry is based in the 
assumption that these constructs and illusions themselves are fundamental assumptions.  I 
do not wish to suggest that the Language critique is without merit; as I have written, I 
consider this critique necessary for understanding and reshaping Anglophone poetics over 
the last thirty years.  The Language argument, however, critiques privilege from a position 
of privilege, whereas Walcott (especially in his early poems) writes from a position of 
aspiration.  Like Adrienne Rich, he wants access to the privileged position of selfhood for 
himself and for his homeland.  The desire for such “access” to selfhood, as Walcott’s work 
demonstrates, should not be misunderstood as naïve; on the contrary, Walcott’s 
biographical circumstances and his own poetic intelligence make him especially qualified to 
aspire to a Western, even bourgeois idea of selfhood and to critique or undermine that idea 
at the same time.  As Ramazani writes: 
the idea that the poetic ‘I’ represents either an inviolably private interior or 
an ideological sham bears little on the first-person pronoun in a short poem 
about the linguistic tear of the Middle Passage. [. . .] Neither poetry 
conceived of as the lyric expression of personal feeling nor as the postmodern 
negation of commodified language is sufficient to help us enter the work of 
[postcolonial poets].   (3) 
Ramazani stakes out a position between both the assumptions of official verse culture the 
Language Poets critique and the assumptions of the Language Poets’ critique itself.  This 
third way resembles the approach to poetic language that Walcott endorses in “What the 
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Twilight Says,” where he imagines himself called “the mulatto of style.  The traitor.  The 
assimilator” (9).  Walcott would adopt these curses as he would adopt, and adapt, the curse 
of history.  As fine as Ramazani’s reading is, his sharp focus on Omeros (touching here and 
there on other significant poems in the Walcott canon) also threatens to distort our sense 
of the immense scope—Walcott has been publishing volumes of poems for more than 65 
years now—of the poet’s work.  In this chapter, I seek to offer a more accurate sense of the 
breadth of Walcott’s career, especially regarding the process by which the poet creates a 
poetry of the divide he feels within himself, then finds himself divided again by the poetry 
he has created.  I invoke and reinvent the vocabularies of chorography as a potential answer 
to Ramazani’s call for “a more flexible language” necessary to describe the complexities of 
Walcott’s poetics (63).  If Joseph Brodsky is correct, in speaking of Walcott, that “[p]oets’ 
real biographies are like those of birds, almost identical—their real data is in the way they 
sound,” then Walcott would use the sounds he makes to enter the Western poetic tradition, 
and to remake it in his—and in his islands’—image (164). 
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PRELUDE 
  
Derek Walcott may consider himself a prodigal, but he began as a prodigy.4  His 
earliest published poems, gathered and self-published when he was eighteen, offer glimpses 
of the talent he would develop as he matured.  They also display the self-consciousness of 
the novitiate, a self-consciousness that does not subside (though it alters in form) in 
Walcott’s later work as it so often does in many other poets.  But most young poets, whose 
work can seem too embarrassed or too proud by half, do not bear the weight of the poetic 
tradition as keenly, nor do they tend to take on the history and myth of their homelands as 
explicitly as Walcott does.  The details of Walcott’s origins have been well documented, not 
least by the poet himself, so I will not recapitulate them here.  What I want to emphasize is 
the metaphor of origin that Walcott emphasizes in his own work: a “schizophrenic” or 
“double” identity—split among cultures, nations, histories, and languages—which Walcott 
views as both endemic to St. Lucia and embodied in his own genetic ancestry (“What the 
Twilight Says” 4).  I choose the word “schizophrenic” because Walcott himself has chosen it 
more than once to describe his boyhood as well as his life as a writer.5  If one takes the word 
literally—the German and Greek origins of “schizophrenia” mean “split mind”—then my 
phrase “schizophrenic identity” is a contradiction in terms (OED).  Schizophrenia defined as 
such is a “split,” or a disordering of stable identity (hence the ease with which it is 
misidentified as “multiple personality disorder” in popular culture); for Walcott, this split is 
an opportunity to create an identity for himself and for St. Lucia on—and in—his own 
                                                
4 The pun is Rita Dove’s, from her essay “‘Either I’m Nobody, or I’m a Nation,’” in which she 
observes the process by which “The Prodigy Turns Prodigal” (66). 
 
5 Although Walcott has described his origins as “schizophrenic,” at other times he has distanced 
himself from that terminology.  “We [members of Walcott’s generation] were quite aware of the 
fact that the background of the Caribbean was a background of slavery.  But my generation was not 
schizophrenic about the heritage of the Empire and the heritage of the Caribbean.  It was a double 
rather than a split thing” (“Interview,” Rowell 123).   Instead of canceling each other, however, these 
apparent contradictions should serve further to emphasize the sense of plurality in Walcott’s 
background, whether that plurality proceeds from the splitting of a unified whole or its doubling. 
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terms.6  As he writes in “The Antilles: Fragments of Epic Memory,” “Break a vase, and the 
love that reassembles the fragments is stronger than the love which took its symmetry for 
granted when it was whole” (69).7  
This particular statement of fragmentation recalls the fact that the history of 
colonization in the Caribbean and the Americas has never not been an instance of profound 
rupture.  Nevertheless, Walcott advocates an approach to the historical and mythical past 
that would allow him to continue in a line of poets, “[t]he great poets of the New World, 
from Whitman to Neruda,” whose “vision of man in the New World is Adamic” (“The 
Muse of History” 37).  Of course the very phrase “New World” recalls that the project in 
question—whether the twentieth-century poetic ambitions of Walcott or the seventeenth-
century political and religious aims of John Winthrop and others—is more redemptive than 
original, more Christlike than Adamic.  Although the endeavor to achieve an earthly 
paradise is thoroughly vulnerable to mockery or historical critique, it remains central to the 
myth of the New World, the “archipelago of the Americas” “from Alaska right down to 
Curacao” (“The Muse of History” 64, “The Art of Poetry” 212).  This knowledge is neither 
lost on Walcott, nor does it deter him: “Fact evaporates into myth,” he writes.  “This 
[Adamic vision] is not the jaded cynicism which sees nothing new under the sun, it is an 
elation which sees everything as renewed” (“The Muse of History” 38).  The oxymoron built 
into the word “renew” suggests a process of mythic recreation that obeys poetic logic even 
as it defies the facts of history.  Walcott’s deliberate choice to envision these myths as ripe 
for revision is neither naïve nor ignorant of the facts of history.  In fact, his efforts toward 
an Edenic (re)naming of his own garden suggests a deliberate rejection of and alternative to 
V. S. Naipaul’s claim that “[h]istory is built around achievement and creation; and nothing 
                                                
6 I deliberately keep to the broadest possible definition of the term “schizophrenia” here, as my 
interest in its etymology and possible valences is literary rather than psychological. 
 
7 In his chapter on Walcott, “The Wound of History: Derek Walcott’s Omeros,” Jahan Ramazani 
reads the poet’s sense of his own art as an attempt to mend the wound of history, a wound embodied 
in the character of Philoctete in Walcott’s Omeros (49-71). 
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was created in the West Indies” (29).8  Walcott refuses the apparent self-loathing in such a 
statement just as readily as he does the “masochism” of Caribbean writers too caught up, in 
his opinion, in the sorrows of the region’s colonial history.  Nevertheless, Naipaul’s claim 
looms behind much of Walcott’s effort to mythologize the history—or alleged lack 
thereof—of the West Indies.9  The story of Adam, after all, is a story of exile too.   
Walcott’s Adamic persona, however he might wish to name the New World in his 
own way, nevertheless speaks the language of the English canon.  Or, to be more precise, 
Walcott writes the language of the English canon.  This distinction is necessary because the 
“schizophrenia” of which Walcott has written extends to and is born of his experience of 
language.  “My real language,” he has said, “and tonally my basic language, is patois.  Even 
though I do speak English, it may be that deep down inside me the instinct I have is to 
speak in that tongue.”10  These competing instincts are aspects of what Walcott calls “not 
only a dual racial personality but a dual linguistic personality” (“A Conversation” 29).  The 
                                                
8 Walcott has responded to this claim of Naipaul’s on several occasions, among them in a 1962 
review of “The Middle Passage,” in which Walcott imagines a dialogue between himself and 
Naipaul: 
 
“[. . .] and nothing was created in the West Indies . . .”  Nothing?  Come, come, 
Naipaul.  V. S., know your literature, how about “A House for Mr. Biswas?” 
 “Sir, that book was not created in the West Indies.” 
 “Where was it created?” 
 “In England, sir.” 
 “My apologies, again.  You may sit down, Naipaul.”   
       (“History and Picong” 19) 
 
9 In “The Art of Poetry” interview with Edward Hirsch, Walcott responded more explicitly to 
Naipaul’s claim: “Perhaps it should read that ‘Nothing was created by the British in the West Indies.’  
Maybe that’s the answer” (213).  Nevertheless, I am not convinced that Walcott would stand by this 
claim, as he has also insisted on the benefits of the “sound colonial education” he received in St. 
Lucia, to borrow a phrase from “The Schooner Flight,” and of the pleasure of working in the English 
language itself. 
 
10 Bruce King is more specific in his biography of Walcott: “People [in St. Lucia] spoke English and 
French Creole.  Alix [Walcott, Derek’s mother] could speak Creole, but Derek and his friends spoke 
good English at home, at school, or with equals: Creole or Caribbean English was used when 
speaking with servants, maids, joking on the street, or at the market” (31).  
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poetic aspect of Walcott’s linguistic personality was formed in large part in the British 
Commonwealth system of education, in which “what you were taught was the same syllabus 
as all the colonies and protectorates of the empire and England itself. [. . .] But in addition 
to that, it was not, for some reason, incongruous to do Latin in a place where you could look 
outside the window and see bananas” (“Interview,” White, 153).  Lacking significant St. 
Lucian precursors, Walcott felt the Adamic necessity and opportunity to name things for 
the first time; that same lack, however, ensured that Walcott would look primarily to 
Europe—Homer, the King James Bible, Shakespeare, and others—for his poetic models.11   
Walcott has nonetheless refused to be characterized as a colonial poet aspiring to a 
colonizer’s English; rather, he has arrogated that English to himself.  In this choice inheres 
Walcott’s ambition for himself as a poet and for the West Indies as a culture: to refuse no 
aspect of their history, and to use those histories and landscapes to generate a myth of 
themselves.  “I do not consider English to be the language of my masters,” Walcott has said.  
“I consider [the] language to be my birthright.  I happen to have been born in an English 
and a Creole place, and I love both languages.  It is the passion, futility, and industry of 
critics to perpetuate this ambiguity” (Interview, Sjöberg 82).  Indeed, critics and other 
poets, too (the poet’s dear friends among them) have perpetuated the idea that Walcott 
writes in an English to which he must lay claim.12  Paula Burnett comments on the peculiar 
                                                
11 King provides a more detailed account of Walcott’s cultural education: “Walcott was brought up 
culturally as a European, reading Hawthorne’s ‘Tanglewood Tales’ and Charles Kingsley’s ‘The 
Heroes.’  He wrote Greek-styled epics in unrhymed pentameters, using as a model Kingsley’s myth 
of Perseus.  He was reciting verse in school, drawing and painting about the European world he read 
about. [. . .] He saw the world in terms of Europe, then the United States.  In his teens he read 
American novels by Steinbeck, Faulkner, Hemingway, and Sinclair Lewis” (32). 
 
 
12 One of the earliest major endorsements Walcott received from the literary world beyond the 
Caribbean was that of Robert Graves, who wrote of Walcott’s volume In a Green Night: “Derek 
Walcott handles English with a closer understanding of its inner magic than most (if not any) of his 
English-born contemporaries” (Jacket copy).  Joseph Brodsky—another poet whose biographical 
circumstances brought him “into” English—speaks of Walcott as “having English.”  In this 
expression language is construed as a possession, even as it possesses, even as it creates us ourselves: 
“[. . .] from this height of ‘having English’ [. . .] that the poet unleashes his oratorial power in ‘either 
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position in which Walcott finds himself because of his insistence on his dual European and 
African inheritance: 
Since an ambiguous refusal of fashionable views has marked his aesthetic 
choices, it is perhaps not surprising that he has often projected himself in his 
works as an isolated figure.  He has felt the need to counter not only colonial 
discourse but the first phase of oppositional discourse, thus marginalizing 
himself for many years from both sectors of his community, those oriented to 
Europe and the West and those oriented to Africa. (35) 
Walcott feels no need to aspire to the English language itself; born into it, it “belongs” to 
him as much as it does to any other speaker of English.  Nevertheless, his poems (especially 
his earliest work) depict an aspiration to the Anglophone literary tradition as well as 
Walcott’s struggle to find a poetic idiom in which to represent—to celebrate and to sing—
himself. 
Consider, for instance, the simultaneous self-aggrandizement and self-mockery of 
“Prelude” (1949), published when Walcott was eighteen.13  The poem starts, stops, and starts 
again, with relative clauses filigreeing an otherwise simple sentence: “I, with legs crossed 
along the daylight, watch / The variegated fists of clouds that gather over / The uncouth 
                                                                                                                                                       
I’m nobody, or I’m a nation.’  The dignity and astonishing vocal power of this statement are in direct 
proportion to both the realm in whose name he speaks and the oceanic infinity that surrounds it” 
(166).   
But one can hardly separate this pleasure in the “possession” of language from an acknowledgment 
of the fact that the spoken patois of St. Lucia is not the English of the English.  This Caribbean 
patois is a definite marker of race, class, and provinciality.  Thus, to “have English” means to lay 
claim to something from which the poet has been separated.  At a round table discussion with 
Brodsky, Heaney, Walcott, and Les Murray, Michael Schmidt asked: “Is there a British poet who 
should be here amongst us?”  Walcott responded: “I think all the British poets are here” (“Poets’ 
Round Table” 45).  The poets of the “mother tongue” are borne in these poets for whom the 
mother—an adoptive mother tongue at that—are borne in these poets from the provinces.   
13 I refer to “Prelude” by its title in Collected Poems 1948—1984 (1986) and Selected Poems (2007), in 
both of which it is the opening poem.  In The Poetry of Derek Walcott 1948—2013 (2014), the poem is 
retitled according to its first line, “[I With Legs Crossed Along the Daylight Watch].” 
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features of this, my prone island” (1-3).  Already the speaker’s posture—literal and 
figurative—connects him and distances him from his homeland.  The pose is that of 
sophistication amid a beautiful, if “uncouth,” island.  The poem begins with “I,” then 
retreats from it, detailing instead a scene from “my prone island” that juxtaposes tourists 
visiting the island to the island’s natives.  The latter are: 
 Found only  
 In tourist booklets, behind ardent binoculars; 
 Found in the blue reflection of eyes 
 That have known cities and think us here happy. (6-9) 
The speaker imagines himself and his fellow St. Lucians under the gaze of visiting tourists, 
seeing himself in their blue eyes.  Here, the Europeans see while the West Indians are seen; 
the Europeans find and the St. Lucians are found.  The self that the speaker sees reflected in 
the tourists’ looking eyes is of course a distortion of what he perceives himself to be.  But 
the act of writing the poem, of fixing the moment in poetic language, allows the speaker to 
gain some measure of self-determination for himself and for his island.  In the poem, the 
West Indies can look back; they can speak. 
The next time the lyric “I” appears in the poem, in the third stanza, it is again 
stopped with a comma and elaborated upon in a relative clause, before the speaker turns to 
the central crisis of the poem: “Time creeps over the patient who are too long patient, / So 
I, who have made one choice, / Discover that my boyhood has gone over” (11-12).  Similarly, 
these lines betray a world-weary pose common enough in young poets, but they also reveal a 
skill for phrase-making, for rhythms and rhetoric, uncommon in poets of any age.  The 
young Walcott is talented enough to write these lines, but he is also canny enough to 
suspect them.  After a stanza break, he contradicts himself, even scolds himself for taking 
up the mantle of the poet; in doing so, he allows himself to write the grandiose line and to 
undercut it in the same breath: 
  And my life, too early of course for the profound cigarette, 
  The turned doorhandle, the knife turning 
  In the bowels of the hours, must not be made public 
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  Until I have learnt to suffer 
  In accurate iambics.     (13-17) 
   
The speaker’s ambivalence extends to his assertion, simultaneously humble and self-
aggrandizing, that he must not “publish” his life until he first can suffer adequately in 
accurate—and thus publishable—iambics.  Of course, the publication of the poem—in 
Walcott’s 1962 collection In a Green Night, and often republished with the year of its 
composition noted—brings the life, the talent, and the pose all into the public sphere; or 
rather the poem’s publication claims the public sphere as part of Walcott’s own individual 
purview.  At the same time, Walcott’s allusions to the Anglophone tradition (“accurate 
iambics”) and to Dante (the “reluctant leopard of the slow eyes” in the poem’s last line) 
establish that purview as part of a tradition about which the poet, as we have shall see, 
remains ambivalent, if aspirational (26).  Indeed, the title In a Green Night, an allusion to 
Andrew Marvell’s “Bermudas,” suggests the recasting of the Anglophone literary tradition in 
a New World context.  The choice of the title “Prelude” for this individual poem suggests 
Walcott’s self-conscious sense of beginning in the poetic vocation.  
 As Walcott develops as a poet, he will begin to marry the aspirational quality of 
“Prelude” with a more self-determined vision of his own place, and that of his island, in the 
world.  How to portray St. Lucia seems to become more important to him than how to 
portray himself, yet in portraying—even mythologizing—St. Lucia he finds a way to invent 
himself as a poet.  As we shall see, this creation of one’s identity via the creation of a land’s 
identity (and vice versa) is one of the most important chorographic aspects of Walcott’s 
poetics.  An early attempt at this self-creation is evident in “As John to Patmos” (1949), 
another poem from Walcott’s first collection.  Here, the poet uses the ambitious titular 
comparison to establish himself—and to proclaim an earthly paradise—on his own island:  
  So I shall voyage no more from home; may I speak here. 
 
  This island is heaven—away from the dustblown blood of cities; 
  See the curve of bay, watch the straggling flower [. . .] 
  [. . .] 
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     For beauty has surrounded 
  Its black children, and freed them of homeless ditties.  (8-10, 12-13) 
Although the speaker’s youthful certitude softens with age, his commitments are 
complicated rather than changed.  Walcott of course does voyage from home again and 
again, even to the point that his late poems might be called (if somewhat simplistically) 
“homeless ditties.”  Nevertheless, through his literal and figurative travels, the idea of home 
remains the fixed point of his arcing compass.   
In poems, drama, essays, and interviews, Walcott wrestles with the question of how 
to portray this place, often contradicting himself in the process.  He is more clear in 
distinguishing his own position from that of precursors in the Western and Anglophone 
literary traditions.  In a 1975 conversation with Robert D. Hamner, Walcott compared the 
situation of the postcolonial writer in the West Indies from those artists emerging from 
somewhat similar circumstances in the early nineteenth-century United States or late 
nineteenth-century Ireland: 
[W]hat [those writers] have there [. . .] is an ideal called America and an ideal 
called Ireland. [. . .] The only historical legends that one individual writer [in 
the West Indies] would have are ethnic legends of sorts.  Each one of them is 
separate because the Indian would have India, the African would have Africa.  
But the point is that all of these have been erased from the memory or 
experience of the writer.  So, what has not yet been created or is actually 
being created by its absence, by the chaos, by the necessity for it to be 
created—is a West Indies, a West Indian literature.  Now that is being made 
out of the very knowledge that there is not one.  (“Conversation” 28) 
Although this ambition for self-determination would seem to fit the template of much 
postcolonial theory, Bruce King describes Walcott as being ambivalent or even hostile 
toward such theory, and Ramazani writes that the usual vocabularies of postcolonial theory 
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are insufficient for interpreting Walcott’s poetry.14  Because Walcott and his work, as 
Ramazani argues, refuse to be glossed by the common lexicon of postcolonial studies, “we 
need a more flexible language to describe how a poet like Walcott can put into dialectical 
interrelation literary and cultural influences that may seem incompatible” (63).   
                                                
14 King mentions Walcott’s distrust of “literary theory” several times throughout his biography, and 
in moments when he allows himself to editorialize, he seems to share Walcott’s skepticism.  Some 
examples: 
The new literatures must be more than corrections of the old.  It would be as or more 
provincial to have a rewritten canon by blacks and browns, no longer exotic natives, staring 
back.  What is needed is a greater compassion that crosses divides and hierarchies, a 
humility towards the craft of art, a humility toward nature, descriptions of the world through 
art which make you see your world better.  This is Walcott criticizing the Hemingway he 
admired in his youth; it is also Walcott’s response to recent claims that the Western literary 
canon is imperialist, culturally exclusive, and that all post-colonial literature is essentially 
Caliban answering back, cursing Prospero in Prospero’s language.  (351) 
Although Mosher agreed that the play is not about race he ended his piece with an even 
more American perspective on the world, which he claims to be divided into 18 per cent 
whites and 82 per cent ‘that is not.’  Mosher’s ‘is nots’, echoing ‘have nots’, assumes or at 
least associates all non-whites with issues of black power, race, colonialism, and otherness.  
This is post-colonialism as anti-white cultural imperialism.  The great Western person learns 
that ‘There is not a superior wisdom at all.’  I doubt Walcott would be happy with the kind 
of American Third Worldist politics that imagines all non-Europeans to be black victims of 
imperialism or the kind of sloppy relativism that fails to distinguish superior wisdom even if 
European. (411) 
He was unconcerned with post-modernist and post-colonialist arguments about how 
standards and reputations change at various times and places, that nothing lasts, and 
uninterested in claims that was somehow bad to be ambitious or part of an imperial 
language. (499) 
After Walcott moved to Boston his poetry took on a different emphasis, which might be 
considered more political while being opposed to the basic assumptions of post-colonial 
theory.  (583) 
Ramazani is much more willing to credit the significance of postcolonial theory, if not as an 
influence on Walcott’s poetry, than at least as a lens through which we might consider the work of 
Walcott and other artists emerging from colonized places.  He is careful nonetheless to mention 
Walcott’s own influence on those theories and theorists: “[d]ecades before the academic 
dissemination of such concepts as hybridity, creolization, cross-culturality, postethnicity, 
postnationalism, métissage, and mestizaje, Walcott argued vehemently for an intercultural model of 
postcolonial literature” (63). 
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I would propose, then, introducing “chorography” to the theoretical language 
regarding Walcott’s assimilation of influences, his representation (and recreation) of local 
and personal identity.  Although chorography as Richard Helgerson defines it is related to 
geography, topography, and other studies of natural physical features, he also identifies the 
chorographic “concern with place” as its most important distinguishing feature (132).  Here I 
want to distinguish the idea of “place” as individual and particular, as opposed to the more 
general and indistinct “space.”  Spaces tend to become places when they are named, when 
they are mapped, and when they are understood in a human context.  Helgerson calls “such 
local particularism and local prerogative [. . .] the very stuff of chorography” and argues that 
“the dialectic of general and particular that is built into the structure of a chorography in 
the end constitutes the nation it represents” (137, 138).  Thus, the idea of chorography 
implies narrative relationships between place and space, part and whole, habitat and 
inhabitants, and ultimately between the chorographer and the place he or she depicts and, 
in depicting, creates.  Helgerson writes: 
[. . .T]he self gives the dumb and inanimate land voice and life, in exchange 
for which the land grants the self an impersonal and historically transcendent 
authority.  In this mysterious and thoroughly mystified relationship—after all, 
dirt and water cannot really speak and authority can never escape history—
authors are enabled by the authority they confer on the land they describe.  
(124) 
I want to suggest here that the same is true of the chorographic poetry of Derek 
Walcott.  Walcott uses poetic language to “map” St. Lucia and the West Indies, to 
constitute an idea of his place and of himself.  Helgerson anticipates such a relationship in 
his attention to the Early Modern maps of England that, he argues, constitute an emerging 
idea of England and even a “discovery of the self”:  “Not only does the emergence of the 
land parallel the emergence of the individual authorial self,” he writes, “the one enforces and 
perhaps depends on the other” (122).  Helgerson’s words here also describe Walcott’s poetic 
    
 233 
project as I read it.  In fact the language of chorography allows more supple ways of 
interpreting and describing just how Walcott uses the poem to establish narrative 
relationships among places, their inhabitants, and the chorographer poet himself.  In my 
conception of chorography, the poem forms a tenuous bond between person(s) and place(s), 
much as a poetic metaphor itself seems briefly to unite the two nouns it compares.  That is, 
if the metaphor is the locus where ground and figure unite, then the poem (or map) serves a 
similar function for chorographer and place.  Walcott’s own talent for depicting the natural 
features of St. Lucia and their human significance demonstrates his suitability for the role of 
a poetic, if anachronistic, chorographer of the West Indies.  Moreover, his figuring of his 
island as a geographic manifestation of himself, and vice versa, suggests the implications for 
self-fashioning inherent in such a role.  “The poet is not a king,” Helgerson writes, “but he, 
like the cartographer and the chorographer, has a power and represents a power that kings 
might well envy” (144).  In such a context, Walcott’s claim that the language is the empire 
and that poets are its princes seems less rhetorically far-fetched.   
As Helgerson writes, the chorographer “is exploring his own native land, the land on 
whose identity his is founded.  The chorographic project is a project in self-description—
and, indeed, in self-making” (143).  Because Walcott’s own identity is founded not only on 
his native land, but on the histories and traditions of Europe and Africa, his particular 
project represents a still more complex sort of chorography.  His work to legitimize his 
Afro-Caribbean heritage in an Anglophone literary context, and to legitimize that literary 
tradition for skeptical West Indians, requires of him a strange poetic alchemy.  One of the 
most reliable ways in which Walcott has accomplished this task—so often throughout his 
career, in fact, that the technique risks self-parody in his late work—is to figure landscape as 
poetic figure itself. 15   Just as the ploughed furrows of “boustrophedon” (literally, “ox turn”) 
                                                
15 Walcott has used this technique so frequently that even an abbreviated survey of his work 
provides the following examples:   
 
“To a sea which is crueler than any word / Of love [. . .]” (“The Fisherman Rowing  
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become lines of verse, Walcott renders the familiar scenes of the Caribbean (and later, 
other landscapes too) as poetic devices (OED).  “Formal, informal,” he writes in “Homage to 
Edward Thomas,” “by a country’s cast / topography delineates its verse” (1-2).  In this way 
Walcott writes the Anglophone tradition into the Caribbean landscape, an act that 
accomplishes the converse at the same time.  Landscape is poeticized; the figures of poetry 
are concretized in physical space.  In a similar way, Walcott renders the mythic archetypes 
                                                                                                                                                       
Homeward . . .” 10-11). 
 
As the journals report, the prologues of spring 
Appear behind the rails of city parks, 
Or the late springtime must be publishing 
Pink apologies along the black wet branch [. . .]  
(“Letter to a Painter in England” 8-11) 
 
“When I am twisted like yesterday’s paper” (“Canto II” 72). 
 
“I learnt your annals of ocean” (“Origins” 6). 
 
      I seek, 
As climate seeks its style, to write 
Verse crisp as sand, clear as sunlight, 
Cold as the curled wave, ordinary 
As a tumbler of island water [. . .] (“Islands” 6-10) 
 
“I looked for some ancestral, tribal country, / I heard its clear tongue over the clean stones /  
Of the river [. . .]” (Another Life 7.1.34-6). 
 
“I must put the small clear pebbles from the spring / upon my tongue to learn her language, /  
to talk like birch or aspen confidently” (“Upstate” 38-40). 
 
“A drop punctuates / the startled paper” (“The Hotel Normandie Pool” 31-2). 
 
“In autumn, on the train to Pennsylvania, / he placed his book facedown on the sunlit seat /  
and it began to move [. . .]” (The Prodigal 1.I.1-3). 
 
“[. . .] while the small plow continues on this lined page [. . .]” (White Egrets 43 [‘Forty Acres’]  
11) 
 
I am not the first to notice that Walcott’s reliance on this figure—Wes Davis calls it “a shuttling 
between landscape and text”—tends toward “self-parody” in his later work (249). 
 
    
 235 
of Ancient Greece in particular characters in his poems.  This method too can risk self-
parody: one might wish for more symbolic rigor in, for instance, Walcott’s tendency to 
transform into a Helen, a Nike, any young woman on whom his eye falls.  I want to claim 
here, however, that the impulse toward mythology and mythologizing is a chorographic 
parallel to the impulse toward cartography.  The cartographer maps a particular place, but in  
mythologizing those places, he may also locate them within a human context that 
includes—but is not bound by—history.  If one of the essences of chorography is the 
establishment of a narrative relationship between a place and its inhabitants, then Walcott 
also extends that narrative relationship to incorporate resonances with the familiar 
characters and settings of the Western literary canon. 
In his early poems, Walcott positions the West Indies—figuratively, if not 
geographically—between Europe and Africa, as we shall see in “A Far Cry from Africa.”  
Refusing to choose between the two, he instead ventures a third way to stand among—and 
also to contain or embody—the various cultures of his homeland and history.  In “Prelude,” 
Walcott seems almost embarrassed of St. Lucia, at once vain and shy about the work of 
poetry.  By the time Walcott writes his first major poem, “A Far Cry from Africa,” eight 
years later, he has emphasized the importance of his archipelago in its position “between” 
Europe and Africa.  Moreover, he has learned to capitalize on his own ambivalence as a 
rhetorical technique and poetic gift.  “A Far Cry from Africa” introduces more explicitly the 
theme of existential ambivalence that will come to characterize Walcott’s work as a whole.  
From the title onward, Walcott plays with the idiomatic expression of “a far cry,” the phrase 
suggesting, first, the significant distance between the speaker of the poem and the 
continent of Africa.  But we may also understand the “far cry” to come from Africa, where 
the events of the poem are situated.  In the poem’s opening lines, Africa is portrayed as 
bestial; even the Kikuyu of the second line (which places us more immediately in the 
historical context of the Mau Mau Uprising) are rendered as one group of animals buzzing 
about the body of another: “A wind is ruffling the tawny pelt / Of Africa.  Kikuyu, quick as 
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flies, / Batten upon the bloodstreams of the veldt” (1-3).  We might read these lines as 
examples of a speaker’s condescending, racist attitude toward the continent in general and 
the anti-colonial militia in particular, or we might read them as an adoption of those 
attitudes in order to undermine them.  I want to suggest that to take either position is to 
miss Walcott’s own struggle between those positions, dramatized in these opening lines of 
the poems and stated more explicitly as the poem moves toward its conclusion.   
In portraying the Kikuyu as “quick as flies”—striking quickly and dying just as 
quickly—Walcott can simultaneously compare the African soldiers to animals and to 
illuminate the beastliness of the comparison itself.  The colonial British fare little better in 
Walcott’s view, figured here as “the worm, colonel of carrion” (5).  Here Walcott seems to 
play with the false cognates “colonel” and “colony”: the former derives from the Italian 
colonna (column), the latter from the Latin colonia (tiller, farmer, settler in a new country) 
(OED).  Whether commanding a military “column” or settling a new country, both the flies 
and the worm feast upon the dead.  But the speaker also characterizes the British as coldly 
rationalizing:  “‘Waste no compassion on these separate dead!’ / Statistics justify and 
scholars seize / The salients of colonial policy” (6-8).  These sibilant lines practically hiss 
with indignation toward the British colonists and their “policy” toward the “savage” Kikuyu.  
Toward both groups the speaker poses unanswerable questions, juxtaposing the calculations 
of “colonial policy” with real atrocities, consequences of colonization (9-10): “What is that 
to the white child hacked in bed? / To savages, expendable as Jews?”  Between the end of the 
first stanza and the beginning of the second, the speaker retreats from this interrogative, 
rhetorical pitch.  He broadens his focus to seem to encompass both human and animal, 
present and past: “the long rushes break / In a white dust of ibises whose cries / Have 
wheeled since civilization’s dawn [. . .]” (11-13).  I say “seem to encompass” because the 
speaker’s concern lies not with the long rushes or ibises but with the human scene they 
foreground; this is why the history he presents dates back only to “civilization’s dawn.”  
Here “civilization” carries a bitter irony, as the speaker contrasts the brutality of “natural 
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law” with that of “civilization”: 
 The violence of beast on beast is read 
 As natural law, but upright man 
 Seeks his divinity by inflicting pain. 
 Delirious as these worried beasts, his wars 
 Dance to the tightened carcass of a drum, 
 While he calls courage still that native dread 
 Of the white peace contracted by the dead. (15-21) 
The speaker distances himself from the British, the Kikuyu, and—via the title of the 
poem—from Africa itself.  But the gap between human and animal in the scene he portrays 
is troublingly slim. The act of reading animal violence as “as natural law” involves both the 
human act of “reading,” the human concept of “natural law” (whether natural law is in fact 
natural law is one thing; the idea of it is nevertheless human), and a false distinction 
between the human and the animal.  Those distinctions collapse here, as the human is 
imbued with bestial deliriousness, the animal with human worry.  Even the “white peace” of 
the dead is “contracted” as one contracts a disease or contracts a legal agreement.  The 
speaker’s ambivalence situates him between these various, false poles: Africa and Caribbean 
(if we allow Walcott’s biography into the reading), Kikuyu and British, animal and human. 
 If “A Far Cry from Africa” were to end here, the poem would still have established 
the political ambivalence that will characterize Walcott’s mature period.  The presence of 
the third and final stanza, however, suggests that for Walcott political ambivalence is also 
ancestral, linguistic, and even existential ambivalence.  This ambivalence seems to imbue the 
speaker with the particular confidence to implicate himself in the scene he depicts, refusing 
to choose sides but also implying a certain complicity in his unwillingness to choose: 
  I who am poisoned with the blood of both, 
  Where shall I turn, divided to the vein? 
  I who have cursed 
  The drunken officer of British rule, how should I choose 
  Between this Africa and the English tongue I love? (26-30) 
In this confusion of states of being I hear again the echoes of Milton’s Satan, coming to the 
awful realization that “which way I fly is Hell; myself am Hell” (IV.75).  The speaker is not 
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simply refusing to choose but is unable to choose, as to choose would mean to deny some 
aspect of himself.  European and African, colonel and Kikuyu, “human” and “savage” are 
presented as potential opposites, only to be proven constitutive elements of a separate 
figure.  The speaker implicates himself as both of Africa and far from it—unable to abdicate 
the English language and thus unable entirely to abjure British colonial rule, sympathetic to 
the Mau Mau even as he condemns their own techniques.  In not knowing which way to 
turn, Walcott finds a path; from his ambivalence about himself, he begins to fashion an 
identity for himself and his homeland. 
 The maturation of Walcott’s self-fashioning, for himself and for St. Lucia, coincides 
paradoxically with Walcott’s departure from the island.  In 1948, Walcott won a scholarship 
to the University College of the West Indies in Jamaica, where he drafted much of “A Far 
Cry from Africa” (King 80, 94).  From this point onward Walcott’s biography is marked by 
geographic itinerancy, first among the islands of the West Indian archipelago, then between 
the Caribbean and the United States.  Moreover, the chorographic work of Walcott’s 
poems shifts from inventing himself via the land- and seascapes surrounding him to 
recreating himself based on remembered or imagined places.  King’s comment about 
Walcott’s state of mind as he prepared to depart St. Lucia is appropriate to the poet’s 
lifelong sense of geographic ambivalence: 
Walcott was of two minds about leaving.  He loved St. Lucia and had already 
decided that he was to be its artist, but as a Methodist there was little chance 
of advancement at St. Mary’s [the Catholic school where Walcott studied and 
later taught], which remained the only secondary school; and the truth was he 
was becoming bored and anxious to move on.  [. . .] Although he would always 
be nostalgic for the world of his childhood, [. . .] most of his life from now on 
would be as an exile.  He became the Odysseus of his imagination, his life a 
journey.  His poetry and plays became the home he lost, and exile was to 
become one of his themes.  (81) 
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Although it is a shorter lyric than many of Walcott’s major poems, “Codicil” (1965) 
represents the flux in which the poet feels adrift.  From its title through its last line, the 
poem looks backward and forward, to Walcott’s home and to versions of “elsewhere.”  
Despite the poem’s brevity, I read “Codicil” as a major poem in Walcott’s oeuvre, as the 
hinge between the younger poet always looking elsewhere and the older poet still looking 
elsewhere but also looking back.  Is this codicil—“a supplement to a will [. . .] for the 
purpose of explanation, alteration, or revocation of the original contents” (OED)—a 
document the speaker has received, or which he has prepared?  Just whose inheritance the 
poem represents—and what is to be done with such a bequest—is unclear.   
In the poem’s first lines, the speaker identifies himself as “schizophrenic;” here he is 
not caught just between cultures or continents but between ways of writing: “wrenched by 
two styles, / one a hack’s hired prose, I earn / my exile” (1-3).  Again, as in “Prelude,” the 
speaker betrays the self-consciousness of aspiring to a certain position.  In “Prelude,” he 
aspires to the role of the poet; in “Codicil,” he aspires to a romanticized idea of the poet as 
noble exile.  Walcott has conjured Ovid, Osip Mandelstam, and other poets of exile in his 
poems, but he has also chided himself for referring to himself as an “exile,” saying that the 
term more properly characterizes writers such as his friend Joseph Brodsky.16  As he ages, 
Walcott will take upon himself the mantle of “prodigal,” a term no less complicated than 
“exile,” if for different reasons.  In these lines the speaker adds another dimension to his 
sense of ambivalence.  Departure from home—whatever his current sense of home—is a 
choice with personal, aesthetic, and professional implications.  The speaker feels separated 
from what he is—better than his prosasic hackery, but also less than his idealized vision of 
exile poet, a position to which the young Walcott aspires (and about which he grows more 
                                                
16 Walcott “imagine[s] the death of Mandelstam / among the yellowing coconuts” in “Preparing for 
Exile,” and a colloquy with Ovid in “The Hotel Normandie Pool” (“Preparing” 1-2).  In “The Art of 
Poetry XXXVII” interview with Edward Hirsch, Walcott remarks that “I’ve got to stop using the 
word ‘exile.’  Real exile means a complete loss of home.  Joseph Brodsky is an exile; I’m really not an 
exile.  I have access to my home” (116).  
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ambivalent still as he matures): “[I] burn / to slough off / this love of ocean that’s self-love” 
(4-6).  Here is another, complex example of Walcott’s chorographic impulse: the speaker 
identifies himself with the ocean, lending the surrounding sea a poetic identity from which 
he might create his own.  But this is a love he simultaneously seeks “to slough off,” 
chastising himself for “self-love.”  In the long index of Walcott’s ambivalences, his love of 
and skepticism for rhetorical flourish, metaphorical grandeur are often present, as in 
“Codicil,” within a single image.  In this he resembles Charles Wright, another master of 
the art of undermining his own grandest images and lines.  As with Walcott’s depiction of 
himself as an exile, the speaker identifies himself with the ocean even as he disapproves of 
himself for doing so.  As we have seen in “Prelude” as well, the speaker’s self-incrimination 
works to enable his aspiration to a particular stature.    
“Codicil” turns on its axiomatic seventh line: “To change your language you must 
change your life” is significant in part for its clear iambic pentametrical rhythm (7).  Here is 
the antipode, as old as Chaucer, that opposes the “hired prose” of the first stanza.  Given 
the “given” of the poem—the speaker’s sense of schizophrenia—the inverse of the 
statement may also be true.  To change your life you must change your language.  This is less 
beautiful, less metrical, but no less valid, as in Walcott’s work “life” and “language” are 
almost interchangeable.  Both senses of change resound in the next lines, in which the 
speaker laments both his present circumstances and endless cycles of travel and return.  “I 
cannot right old wrongs” is vague enough to be read as the speaker’s personal life, the crimes 
of history, both, or neither (8).  The following lines do not clarify the “wrongs” in question, 
even as they entrench him in the Caribbean.  Until this point the speaker has identified his 
immediate surroundings only as a “sickle, moonlit beach” (3).  The images of decay and 
poison in the poem’s fourth and fifth stanzas serve both to situate the speaker in a specific 
place and to project his own state of mind onto the landscape: 
  I cannot right old wrongs. 
 
Waves tire of horizon and return. 
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Gulls screech with rusty tongues 
  
Above the beached, rotting pirogues, 
they were a venomous beaked cloud at Charlotteville. (8-12) 
 
That the poem is set in Charlotteville—a beachside village in northeastern Tobago—
represents another example of looking forward and backward in the same glance.  Walcott 
moved to Trinidad in 1953; by 1959, according to King’s account, he was already considering 
a life in the United States (“Derek Walcott,” King 159).  The original title of “Codicil,” King 
writes, was “Postcard,” a title which suggests the poem’s—and speaker’s—sense of 
wandering, as a missive document from a temporary stay (220). 
 As the poem looks back—perhaps at the ambitious, committed poet of “As John to 
Patmos”—its speaker seems more embittered: 
Once I thought love of country was enough, 
now, even if I chose, there’s no room at the trough. 
 
I watch the best minds root like dogs 
for scraps of favour.    (13-16) 
These lines recall the bestial imagery of “A Far Cry from Africa,” but here the speaker 
characterizes himself and his compatriots as scavenging pigs and dogs.  American readers in 
particular may find themselves hearing echoes of Allen Ginsberg’s outrage in the opening 
lines of “Howl” (1956): “I saw the best minds of my generation destroyed by madness, 
starving hysterical naked, / dragging themselves through the negro streets at dawn looking 
for an angry fix, / angelheaded hipsters burning for the ancient heavenly connection to the 
starry dynamo in the machinery of night [. . .]” (1-3).  In these lines, Ginsberg seethes at a 
homogenous, materialistic America.  Walcott looks to his own home and finds such 
mediocrity and corruption that it no longer seems like home.  “I am nearing middle- / age,” 
he writes, now recalling Dante’s nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita (“Codicil” 17-18, Dante 1).  
In “Prelude,” the Dantescan image of the “reluctant leopard of the slow eyes” seems forced, 
an appendage to the rest of the poem.  By contrast, the sense of betweenness the speaker 
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conveys—further emphasized by breaking the line in the middle of “middle-age”—squares 
with every aspect of “Codicil’ and with Walcott’s own state of mind.  He portrays himself 
between cultures, islands, styles, and even between lives.  I have said that I consider 
Walcott to be at his best when he draws poetic energy from this betweenness, but in 
“Codicil” his sense of betweenness is akin to nothingness: The speaker’s now-jaded sense 
that commitment to his homeland is insufficient parallels his sense of personal emptiness.  
If, as he fears, love of country is not enough, he shall have to turn either to other countries 
or other loves.  In essence this means beginning anew, as the final lines of the poem imply: 
  At heart there’s nothing, not the dread 
of death.  I know too many dead. 
They’re all familiar, all in character,  
 
even how they died.  On fire, 
the flesh no longer fears that furnace mouth 
  of earth, 
 
  that kiln or ashpit of the sun, 
  nor this clouding, unclouding sickle moon 
  whitening this beach again like a blank page. 
 
  All its indifference is a different rage.   (21-30) 
 
This is one of the more resonant instances of Walcott’s tendency to poeticize landscape: 
the beach whitens “like a blank page,” into a simultaneous symbol of authorial struggle and 
possibility.   
As much as Walcott writes himself into “his” landscape, and as much as he seeks to 
embody the physical features of his homeland, the blank page of the beach remains 
indifferent.  Worse, even its indifference is an invention of the poet’s.  Whether the 
“different rage” of the closing line of “Codicil” is the beach’s or the speaker’s is unclear, just 
as one cannot say definitively whose is the will and testament of the poem.  In “Codicil,” 
Walcott’s ambivalence becomes a spiritual exile that the poet will match with his physical, 
geographical departure from St. Lucia and the West Indies in general, as he begins to spend 
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the majority of his time living, working, and being celebrated in the United States.  Despite 
the ensuing cycle of departure and return, those returns can never be true homecomings.  If, 
as King suggests, Walcott becomes the Odysseus of his imagination, he is as much 
Tennyson’s Ulysses as he is Homer’s: 
    Come, my friends, 
  ‘T is not too late to seek a newer world. 
  Push off, and sitting well in order smite 
  The sounding furrows; for my purpose holds 
  To sail beyond the sunset, and the baths 
  Of all the western stars, until I die.  (56-61) 
 
One of the remarkable paradoxes of Walcott’s career is that he “exiles” himself into 
empire—the United States—instead of finding himself dispatched to the provinces.  
Moreover, he finds himself in the capitals of a new empire rather than in those of the realm 
in which he received his education, his language, and his sense of self.  Walcott’s Odysseus 
finds himself always homing but always deterred; even looking from the window of the 
home he thought was his, he stands again considering his fortunes on the sea. 
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MY PAGES THE SAILS 
  
From a critic’s perspective, the Odysseus metaphor is too good to be true.  
(Reviewing Walcott’s Collected Poems, James Dickey remarks—a bit cynically, in my view—
that Walcott “was quite literally born into a major theme” [Dickey].)  Real, inchoate lives do 
not so easily fit the shape of archetypal myths.  They may, however, be shaped to fit those 
myths in the language of poetry or, as in Walcott’s case, the myth may be also reshaped to 
fit the particular situations of individual persons or even a nation.  We recall that Walcott 
makes himself the Odysseus of his own imagination, and that his imagination is steeped in 
the myths—Odysseus, Caliban, Crusoe—of European literature.  Walcott’s Adamic vision 
of the “New World” is adapted from the existing cultural vocabulary of Europe, and of 
England in particular.  Making his “exile” in America, he takes his version of a European 
myth to a place which itself is a real, inchoate vision of a European myth.  The New World’s 
newness is an invention, even a delusion—and perhaps a necessary one—of the old world. 
Adam himself was free to name everything but himself.   
The turn to Odysseus also seems a conscious turning away from the metaphors of 
Walcott’s early career—John prophesying in exile on Patmos or Crusoe the castaway.  If 
Walcott now casts himself as Odysseus, he also imagines himself as the “No One” Odysseus 
claims to be in his encounter with the Cyclops Polyphemus (Breslin 1).  When Shabine, the 
speaker of “The Schooner Flight,” declares “I had no nation now but the imagination,” we 
can hear in his alienation the ambitions of the poet (146).  We may also note that the 
picture of an imagined nation may well be nobler than the state itself, as the self of one’s 
own mythology is often nobler than the “real” life.  The real St. Lucia remains Walcott’s 
nation, but he increasingly imagines it as a mythical Ithaca.  He no longer “has” St. Lucia, as 
(in Joseph Brodsky’s words) he “has” English, the language that Walcott claims is the empire 
whose expanse he traverses (“The Sound of the Tide” 166, “The Muse of History” 51).  From 
this crucible emerges the Odyssean, the “prodigal” Walcott.  Walcott departs the West 
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Indies and works in the United States in order to bring the West Indies, and his own work 
in particular, into the literary consciousness of Americans and other speakers of English.  
Here the parable of the prodigal son—considered in full—is of particular value to our 
discussion.  Although the template of departure and return is a resonant figure for 
Walcott’s own relationship to his island(s), that metaphor is enriched when we return to it 
the poet’s fear of being a “prodigal” in the word’s original sense of squandering one’s 
inheritance through foolishness and extravagance.  Walcott’s own “inheritance” is 
something more precious than coin: he has often described the English language, and the 
Anglophone poetic tradition, as his “inheritance,” his skill for poetry as his “gift.”  Unlike 
the second son of the parable, Walcott can spend his inheritance without squandering it, as 
the language itself is an inexhaustible inheritance.  As Walcott writes, “It is the language 
which is the empire, and great poets are not its vassals but its princes.”  As one of its 
“princes,” it is Walcott’s privilege as well as his duty to the language to deal judiciously with 
its expressive wealth.  This wealth, paradoxically, is put to its proper use only in being 
lavished at every opportunity. 
At the same time, Walcott’s poems betray the guilt of departure and the fear of 
having to return to his island as the prodigal son returns to his father—as a failure, a 
supplicant.  Both Odysseus and the prodigal son come to live among swine, stricken with 
guilt and far from home.  To leave St. Lucia and the West Indies is Walcott’s chosen way to 
create a literary identity for them and for himself, but to fail in the endeavor would mean to 
betray his home twice over.  Rita Dove observes that 
the fate of any member of a minority who ‘makes it’ is double-edged. [. . .]  As 
a special case, he or she is envied, even reviled.  Move away from the home 
court and you’re accused of being ‘dicty’; return and you’re a prodigal.  Write 
about home and you blaspheme; choose other topics and you’re a traitor. [. . .]  
Even before leaving for study abroad, Walcott felt the first twinges of the 
Prodigal Syndrome: envy from the outside, insecurity and guilt from within.  
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It doesn’t matter if the prodigal returns in shame or glory—the time away 
from ‘home’ will always be suspected and interpreted as rejection. (67) 
Perhaps Walcott has chosen an impossible task.  Perhaps the possibility of failure has been 
inscribed in the work of this poet since his first poems.  Lest he fail in the poetic endeavor, 
then, Walcott incorporates this fear of failure into his poems and characters, suffering 
publicly (as the speaker of “Prelude” might have admired) and “in accurate iambics” as well.   
The sense of having betrayed a home pervades “The Schooner Flight,” in which 
Shabine has abandoned a wife and a lover as well, Maria Concepcion, for the other mar, the 
sea: 
  The pain in my heart for Maria Concepcion, 
  the hurt I had done to my wife and children, 
  was worse than the bends.  In the rapturous deep 
  there was no cleft rock where my soul could hide 
  like the boobies each sunset, no sandbar of light 
  where I could rest, like the pelicans know, 
  so I got raptures once, and I saw God 
  like a harpooned grouper bleeding, and a far 
  voice was rumbling, “Shabine, if you leave her, 
  if you leave her, I shall give you the morning star.” (134-43) 
 
The passage is rich with complicated and potentially contradictory religious imagery.  
Despite the resonance of her name, Maria Concepcion is neither the Virgin of Christian 
iconography nor even the speaker’s wife; she is in fact Shabine’s mistress, whom he leaves in 
the poem’s opening lines.  In his raptures, Shabine thinks he sees God “like a harpooned 
grouper bleeding,” but the voice he hears sounds more like that of a tempter than a 
redeemer.  In return for leaving Maria Concepcion, whose name also echoes the Marian 
epithet Stella Maris, “star of the sea,” the voice offers Shabine instead “the morning star.”  
Throughout the poem, Shabine laments the exchange but also seems to understand it as 
inevitable.  Near the end of the poem, Shabine imagines Maria Concepcion “marrying the 
ocean, then drifting away / in the widening lace of her bridal train / with white gulls her 
bridesmaids [. . .]” (425-7).  Each in his or her way, then, Shabine and Maria Concepcion 
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both wed the sea.  Here we see Shabine figure his abandonment of his home as a man 
abandoning his domestic ties.  Later in the poem, he figures “History” as an absent 
patriarch, a philandering master who has abandoned Shabine and refused to acknowledge 
any of his “illegitimate” children.  So we may understand Shabine’s anxiety as that of a man 
who fears continuing a cycle of abandonment, but who nevertheless seems unable to do 
otherwise.  The cycle of engagement, abandonment, and guilt continues in historical, 
religious, and familial terms, even as the speaker exchanges “Maria” for “mar,” his “nation” 
for “the imagination.” 
As Walcott’s own sense of his place changes from physical presence in the Caribbean 
to metaphorical “presence,” so the chorographic aspects of his poetry must change too.  
Instead of mapping the islands of his daily life, he instead maps places in his mind, shaping 
the poetic language of the European canon to write himself into the observed and imagined 
landscapes of both the Caribbean and the United States.  The idea of chorography still 
applies to Walcott’s poems of itinerancy, but it must be understood more fluidly, as if 
Walcott were attempting to map the constant flux of the sea, trying like Keats to write his 
own name in the water.  As Shabine says in the first section of “The Schooner Flight”: 
    Well, when I write 
this poem, each phrase go be soaked in salt; 
I go draw and knot every line as tight 
as ropes in this rigging; in simple speech 
my common language go be the wind, 
my pages the sails of the schooner Flight.17     65-76 
Having departed both St. Lucia and Trinidad, Walcott is again between worlds and between 
lives.  Having put his Ithaca behind him (and thus, before him), he may now reinvent it, and 
reinvent himself as a traveler on a mythic journey. 
                                                
17 One can hear the echoes of Shabine’s speech in part XXV of Walcott’s Midsummer: “My palms 
have been sliced by the twine / of the craft I have pulled at for more than forty years. / [. . .T]he lines 
I love have all their knots left in” (11-12, 15). 
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I have already alluded to “The Schooner Flight,” which I consider the first major 
poem of Walcott’s “prodigal” period, and which a consensus of readers has canonized as the 
poet’s finest lyric.  The poem, a 472-line dramatic monologue in eleven sections, opens 
Walcott’s 1979 collection, The Star-Apple Kingdom.  Written in loosely rhymed iambic 
pentameter, “The Schooner Flight” represents one of Walcott’s rare forays into a more 
relaxed vernacular, even at some points approaching West Indian dialect or “nation 
language.”  The language is not quite patois, not quite the elevated English of Walcott’s 
poetic diction, but a creole of both.  Walcott’s protagonist is an alter ego, a figure who is 
simultaneously individual and composite in the most fundamental aspects of his identity: 
  a rusty head sailor with sea-green eyes 
  that they nickname Shabine, the patois for 
  any red nigger, and I, Shabine, saw 
  when these slums of empire was paradise. 
  I’m just a red nigger who love the sea, 
  I had a sound colonial education, 
  I have Dutch, nigger, and English in me, 
  and either I’m nobody, or I’m a nation.  (36-43) 
It is perhaps appropriate that the latter four lines in my quotation, so often cited as a kind 
of shorthand for Walcott’s entire career, are spoken by the sailor-poet Shabine.  In the 
context of the poem, they remind us that, but for Shabine’s life as a sailor, he could easily be 
mistaken for Walcott himself.  Shabine, as Rei Terada writes, “meets Walcott halfway, 
being half autobiographical, half fictive; half creator, half creation; half poet, half sailor; half 
individual, half communal” (112).  To Terada’s incisive observation I would add that Shabine 
is both a catch-all for certain physical and ethnic characteristics (a red-headed West Indian 
of European and African ancestry) and an individual, a word from a divisive vocabulary 
recast as the name of this eloquent speaker.  Walcott’s characters and speakers are often at 
once individual and composite; in naming this character, moreover, Walcott names a 
phenomenon:  
[. . .] almost inventing a new word, Shabine, from a term which existed in  
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French, in Haiti, and in Trinidad with other ranges of meanings.  After ‘The 
Schooner Flight’ every educated West Indian would use ‘Shabine’ for a ‘red’ 
male as if they always had.  A meaning had been invented, something named, 
which corresponded to a new West Indian recognition of the many cultures 
of which the region consists and that not all shades of black were ‘black.’”  
(King 375) 
Shabine is individual and composite, and like Walcott he is notable for his “doubleness.”  
Here is a sailor-poet who has abandoned one home with a wife and children, and another 
with a mistress, for the homelessness of the sea.  Through the voice of Shabine, who cuts a 
fellow sailor for “fuck[ing] with [his] poetry,” Walcott can thread “simple speech” into his 
usual rhetorical grandeur without seeming to apologize for using either register or for using 
them together (294).  Not all shades of black were black in the Caribbean, King reminds us, 
and registers of language—both spoken and literary—are similarly various, and similarly 
politically charged. 
Indeed, a keen awareness of the various shades of whiteness and blackness pervades 
the poem, and shadows Walcott’s own sense of unease, in the West Indies as well as about 
leaving the West Indies.  In Part 3, “Shabine Leaves the Republic,” the poet-sailor says: 
  After the white man, the niggers didn’t want me 
  when the power swing to their side. 
  The first chain my hands and apologize, “History”; 
  the next said I wasn’t black enough for their pride. (147-50) 
The choice of the word “pride” here suggests the complexity in which Shabine finds himself 
caught.  The collective noun “pride” denotes a group of lions; in this instance, the lion is 
both an African symbol of strength and a bestial metaphor reminiscent of those Walcott 
uses in “A Far Cry from Africa.”  In the same breath, Shabine puns on the phrase “black 
pride,” a political and cultural movement of which he has grown skeptical.  Finding 
corruption and in-fighting among the people he might otherwise consider “his own,” 
Shabine exiles himself to the sea.  Like Walcott’s, Shabine’s rhetorical energy flows from 
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national, ethnic, and racial ambivalence.  Walcott himself “felt that he too was an exile, even 
a political exile, and he had also left a family and life behind.”  King writes that “Walcott 
had not been directly forced out, but he had felt that the lack of support for [the Trinidad 
Theatre] Workshop, his inability to support himself as a writer in Trinidad, were due to his 
being mulatto [. . .]” (358).  With Shabine, then, Walcott can say “I had no nation now but 
the imagination,” a line that echoes the earlier declaration of the nationhood that Shabine 
(with Walcott) embodies (146).   
As Shabine embodies a nation, he also meets the embodiment of History, an 
encounter he recalls in this same section: 
  I met History once, but he ain’t recognize me, 
  a parchment Creole, with warts 
  like an old sea-bottle, crawling like a crab 
  through the holes of a shadow cast by the net 
  of a grille balcony; cream linen, cream hat. 
  I confront him and shout, “Sir, is Shabine! 
  They say I’se your grandson.  You remember Grandma, 
  your black cook, at all?”  The bitch hawk and spat. 
  A spit like that worth any number of words. 
  But that’s all them bastards have left us: words.  (160-69) 
 
Here “recognize” carries multiple valences: in its common vernacular usage, “recognize” 
means “to cognize again,” as one understands another face as familiar.  The word’s older 
resonances connote an odd etiquette of power and oppression, as “recognize” in an obsolete 
form refers to a feudal superior resuming possession of land or, only slightly more recently, 
“to accept the authority, validity, or legitimacy of; esp. to accept the claim or title of (a 
person or group of people) to be valid or true” (OED).  History’s spit in “The Schooner 
Flight” constitutes facial recognition and familial, legal, and political disavowal in the same 
gesture.  All History has left Shabine is words, but History finds himself at a loss for words 
when confronted with his children and grandchildren, who are inevitably darker and poorer 
than he might like to recall, and whose memories are far longer than his own. 
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When History hawks and spits, I cannot help hearing in that guttural noise the 
echoes of the citizen in the Cyclops episode of James Joyce’s Ulysses.  Walcott follows Joyce 
in his chosen exile from and obsession with his homeland, and in his desire to compose the 
as-yet unwritten epic of his nation.  As his name/title indicates, the citizen is both individual 
and composite, a xenophobic Fenian who wordlessly refutes the Jewish Leopold Bloom’s 
claim that his nation is Ireland: 
—A nation? says Bloom.  A nation is the same people living in the 
same place. 
—By God, then, says Ned, laughing, if that’s so I’m a nation for I’m 
living in the same place for the past five years. 
So of course everyone had a laugh at Bloom and says he, trying to 
muck out of it: 
—Or also living in different places. 
—That covers my case, says Joe. 
—What is your nation if I may ask, says the citizen. 
   —Ireland, says Bloom.  I was born here.  Ireland. 
The citizen said nothing only cleared the spit out of his gullet and, 
gob, he spat a Red Bank oyster out of him right in the corner.  (331) 
In both Walcott’s and Joyce’s texts we find a similar conflation—although with differing 
degrees of earnestness—of the idea of nationhood and of the individual who may embody or 
constitute a nation.  Bloom’s people, like many among Walcott’s, constitute a diaspora, first 
uprooted and then made unwelcome.  As Joyce depicts an Ireland of corruption and 
fecklessness, Walcott presents Shabine as disenchanted with both political administration 
and rebellion in Trinidad.  “I have seen things that would make a slave sick / in this 
Trinidad, this Limers’ Republic,” he says, but nevertheless, he “no longer believed in the 
[Black Power] revolution” (110-11, 170).  Just as Joyce’s Stephen Dedalus declares that 
“[h]istory [. . .] is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake,” soon Shabine experiences 
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his own nightmarish encounter with history in a literal, if spectral, sense (34).  In Walcott’s 
mythology of the New World, Homer’s Odysseus wanders alongside Joyce’s Ulysses.  But 
since neither they nor he can escape the events of history (as opposed to the poem’s 
personified History), Walcott must find a way to face them, and to integrate them into his 
own map of the world. 
 The fifth section of “The Schooner Flight,” subtitled “Shabine Encounters the 
Middle Passage,” depicts the apparition of ghostly ships, eternally retracing the routes of 
the Atlantic slave trade.  Shabine’s description of the first appearance of the ships is apropos 
of Walcott’s own poetic treatment of the Caribbean’s colonial history: “it was horrors, but it 
was beautiful” (207).  Among the “sails dry like paper,” Shabine sees two visions of his own 
heritage (209): 
     high on their decks I saw great admirals, 
Rodney, Nelson, de Grasse, I heard the hoarse orders 
they gave those Shabines, and the forest  
of masts sail right through the Flight [. . .] 
[. . .] 
Next we pass slave ships.  Flags of all nations, 
our fathers below deck too deep, I suppose, 
to hear us shouting.  So we stop shouting.  Who knows 
who his grandfather is, much less his name?  (215-18, 228-31) 
But Shabine already knows the answer to this question.  His grandfather’s name is History, 
whose mistress was his black cook, and History does not recognize the red-headed, dark-
skinned grandson he sees in the streets of Port of Spain.  In this moment we can see just 
why Walcott feels that the idea of a self is something to which he and other West Indians 
must aspire rather than a privilege he and they can take for granted.  In cultures where one’s 
surname is traditionally passed along patrilineal lines, what becomes of one whose father or 
grandfather refuses to acknowledge them?  The illegitimate children of “History” are denied 
both a home and a proper name.  No wonder, then, that characters in “The Schooner Flight” 
are named according to their looks (Shabine), or to their home (St. Vincent, called “Vince”), 
or to some combination thereof (Maria Concepcion).  For Walcott, such familiar ruptures, 
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misrecognitions, and injustices are also opportunities—political and aesthetic alike—for 
new tissue to seal up the historical wound.18  We can hear murmurs of Shabine’s voice in the 
remarkable last sentences of Walcott’s essay “The Muse of History,” which represent both a 
radical break from the bonds of absolute historical event: 
I accept this archipelago of the Americas.  I say to the ancestor who sold me, 
and to the ancestor who bought me, I have no father.  I want no such father, 
although I can understand you, black ghost, white ghost, when you both 
whisper “history,” for if I attempt to forgive you both I am falling into your 
idea of history which justifies and explains and expiates, and it is not mine to 
forgive, my memory cannot summon any filial love, since your features are 
anonymous and erased and I have no wish and no power to pardon. [. . .]I give 
the strange and bitter and yet ennobling thanks for the monumental groaning 
and soldering of two great worlds, like the halves of a fruit seamed by its own 
bitter juice, that exiled you from your own Edens you have placed me in the 
wonder of another, and that was my inheritance and your gift.  (64) 
This passage notwithstanding, all of Walcott’s poems of travel seem just as haunted by the 
historical events of the Middle Passage as they are informed by the mythical events of The 
Odyssey.  What Ramazani has called the “wound” of the postcolonial writer, or what we 
might here call the wound of the prodigal, smarts in the ocean’s saltwater, but it begins to 
be healed there too (49-71).  From this point in his career onward, the chorographic attempt 
to unite poet and landscape, even in the tenuous bonds of metaphor, has as much to do with 
remembered and imagined places, remembered and imagined selves, as with the concrete 
facts of maps and chronicles.  “[A] man lives half of life,” he writes in Another Life, “the 
second half is memory” (15.IV.23-4).  By the end of this section of “The Schooner Flight,” we 
understand that it hardly matters whether Shabine’s encounter with the ghost ships is 
                                                
18 For a more complete treatment of the trope of colonial history as wound, see Ramazani’s chapter 
on Walcott and the “wound” of history in The Hybrid Muse. 
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supposed to be “real,” hallucinated, or purely allegorical.  What matters is that it persists in 
his memory and becomes part of the myth he creates of himself, the myth of this salt-
soaked poem. 
 Shabine’s experience of the Middle Passage represents the first of two climaxes for 
this dramatic monologue.  In the poem’s tenth section, a looming storm panics Shabine and 
his mate, St. Vincent (383-5): “‘Be Jesus, I never see sea get rough / so fast!” Shabine 
exclaims.  “That wind come from God back pocket!”  Indeed this storm, like those 
summoned by the gods in Homer, is loaded with divine implication.  The storm is the third 
apparition of “history” in this poem that both recalls and attempts to transcend historical 
events, in which myth and history churn over each other like the confluence of two 
currents.  Here the veil between the poet Shabine and the poet Walcott is at its thinnest, as 
Shabine recalls “the faith / that had fade from a child in the Methodist chapel / in Chisel 
Street, Castries,” where Walcott attended religious services in his youth (404-6, Breslin 211).  
Personal history and poetic artifice entangle in this storm that also weaves the nightmare of 
history with Shabine’s own premonitions of drowning: 
  “I’m the drowned sailor in [Maria Concepcion’s] Book of Dreams.” 
  I remembered them ghost ships, I saw me corkscrewing 
  to the sea-bed of sea-worms, fathom pass fathom, 
  my jaw clench like a fist, and only one thing 
  hold me, trembling, how my family safe home. 
   
[. . .] 
 
  proud with despair, we sang our how our race 
  survive the sea’s maw, our history, our peril, 
  and now I was ready for whatever death will. (395-9, 408-10) 
The resignation implicit in “I was ready for whatever death will” is an understated 
resolution to the storms of the poem, but it also represents the achievement of the distance 
(physical and psychological alike) necessary for Shabine to live with “history,” the same 
distance to which Walcott appeals in “The Muse of History.”  This position of distance 
differs from the “cool” that Walcott disavows in “A Far Cry from Africa” in that here he 
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refuses to turn away from history, but he also refuses to be in its thrall.  Nevertheless, such 
distance offers its own perils, as we shall see in The Prodigal. 
After the storm, Shabine’s tone is more relaxed, even disinterested.  If he does not 
necessarily welcome the notion of endless travel upon the seas, neither does he lament it: 
“Though my Flight never pass the incoming tide / [. . .] I am satisfied / if my hand give voice 
to one people’s grief” (439, 441-2).  Whereas the epic journeys of Odysseus and the rather 
less heroic wanderings of Leopold Bloom both end in returns home, Shabine’s travels 
continue despite the poem’s ending: 
  the flight to a target whose aim we’ll never know, 
  vain search for one island that heals with its harbour 
  and a guiltless horizon, where the almond’s shadow 
  doesn’t injure the sand.  There are so many islands! 
  As many islands as the stars at night 
  on that branched tree from which meteors are shaken 
  like falling fruit around the schooner Flight.  (452-8) 
 
In this moment, the islands of the Caribbean become a cosmos in their own right.  The 
comparison between islands and stars is apt, as “The Schooner Flight” represents the 
Walcott’s ongoing shift from a Caribbean poet with cosmopolitan aspirations to a 
cosmopolitan poet with nostalgia for a lost, or maybe only imagined, home. 
 If “Codicil’ is a poem of departure and “The Schooner Flight” a poem of the journey, 
then those of The Fortunate Traveller (1982) are poems of arrival and adoption.  Walcott’s 
continuing struggle with multiple identities grows only more complicated as he begins to 
“[fall] in love with America,” as he writes in “Upstate” (37).  Although Walcott’s title for the 
collection plays on Thomas Nashe’s Elizabethan picaresque The Unfortunate Traveller (1594), 
The Fortunate Traveller is as American (with all the varied implications of that problematic 
adjective) as any of Walcott’s work.  Many of the poems bear dedications to the friends who 
helped welcome Walcott to the United States and to an international literary community 
with its nucleus in New York City, including Robert Giroux, Anthony Hecht, Susan Sontag, 
and Mark Strand.  More significant than the dedications is Walcott’s attempt in certain 
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poems to adopt a colloquial, almost folksy, idiom reminiscent of Robert Frost: “No soap,” 
Walcott writes in “The Man Who Loved Islands,” a poem that Teju Cole singles out as one 
of Walcott’s “poor attempts at American vernacular” (Walcott 28, Cole).  The corrugated 
tin, the galvanize, the lexicons of oceanic hues so familiar from many of Walcott’s poems 
are conspicuously absent from these.  Instead, Walcott applies the same painterly attention 
to the humid continental climate in which he finds himself, as if he could get the whole idea 
of America into a single sentence: 
  The hillside is still wounded by the spire 
  of the white meetinghouse, the Indian trail 
  trickles down it like the brown blood of the whale 
  in rowanberries bubbling like the spoor 
  on logs burnt black as Bibles by hellfire.  (“Old New England” 13-17) 
 But this dream of America is not Trinidad or St. Lucia, much less Ithaca.  Walcott 
still considers himself to be in exile.  His individual predicament may be more personal than 
political—in “The Hotel Normandie Pool,” for instance, he claims to “have learnt that 
beyond words / is the disfiguring exile of divorce”—but it is nevertheless a geographic and 
psychic rupture from his idea of home (71-2).  That said, “exile” remains a choice that 
Walcott has made, as he has made himself in the image of an exile.  The choice to live and 
work in the United States means for him a different kind of conflict than the “true” exile of 
Ovid or Joseph Brodsky.  The forced exile has no choice, and this is the source of her or his 
lament, but the lack of choice may also alleviate the exile’s guilt.  She or he who chooses 
exile, by contrast, may lament the fact of the choice, as Walcott implicates himself in the 
guilt of having departed and the fear of having to return a prodigal, a supplicant who has 
wasted his gifts.  Walcott has said that “it is harder / to be a prodigal than a stranger” 
(Another Life 23.II.9-10).  In his biography of the poet, King is more specific: “Going to the 
United States had meant betrayal of the [Trinidad Theatre Workshop],” he writes, “leaving 
his children, spending three-quarters of the year in a foreign land with grey skies and snow” 
(468-9).  Living in the Caribbean, Walcott had felt pulled by the necessity to “make it” in 
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New York.  Living so much of the year in the United States, Walcott risks losing the sense 
of self forged elsewhere. 
 These contradictions are evident in Walcott’s interviews as well as in his poems.  He 
has insisted on being “primarily, absolutely a Caribbean writer,” although in the same 
interview he claims “America” as the New World of which he is a citizen, too: 
In places that are yet undefined the energy comes with the knowledge that 
this has not yet been described, this has not yet been painted. [. . .] My 
generation of West Indian writers, following after C. L. R. James, all felt the 
thrill of the absolute sense of discovery.  That energy is concomitant with 
being where we are; it’s part of the whole of America.  And by America, I 
mean from Alaska right down to Curaçao.  (“The Art of Poetry” 212) 
Walcott is downright Whitmanesque here in his attempt to contain contradictory 
multitudes.  In one moment he speaks of having spent so much time in the United States 
that, upon his returns to St. Lucia, he feels like “a tourist myself coming from America;” in 
the next he reasserts his roots: “I’ve never felt that I belong anywhere else but in St. Lucia.”  
And finally, as if coming to terms with his own contradictions—as he continues to attempt 
in his poems—he says: “I don’t think of myself as having two homes; I have one home, but 
two places” (220, 223, 225).  I want to linger on Walcott’s use of the possessive “have” here, 
as I have done elsewhere, and as Brodsky and other critics have both spoken of the poet’s 
“having” English.  In English, “to have” a home is a common enough idiomatic expression.  
“To have” a place seems a contradiction, unless we speak of “having” a place within a larger 
institution or structure.  One can “have” a home, a place, or a language only to the extent 
that homes, places, and languages too possess, create or recreate us. 
 So in “Upstate” and other poems in The Fortunate Traveller we may observe Walcott’s 
attempt to create a new place for himself, if not a new home, in America.  Written on a 
Trailways bus between Oneonta (where Walcott had read poems at Hartwick College) and 
New York City, the poem opens with the sharp image of “[a] knife blade of cold air [that] 
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keeps prying / the bus window open.  The spring country / won’t be shut out” (King 382, 
“Upstate” 1-3).  The spring country here is as much an idea of America, still fresh enough to 
Walcott’s speaker, as it is the landscape through which the bus travels.  The speaker 
projects his annoyance with his present circumstances onto those around him—the “stale-
drunk or stoned woman,” the “Spanish-American salesman,” and the “black woman folded 
in an overcoat” (5-7).  Then he turns to the villages he sees through the bus window and 
imagines the lives of the people living in them: “fields, wide yards with washing, old 
machinery—where people live / with the highway’s patience and flat certainty” (11-12).  The 
word “villages” is not especially remarkable unless one considers its frequency in Walcott’s 
poems about the Caribbean.19  Here the word functions as a kind of psychological fulcrum 
from skepticism to an inevitable, if imperfect, love of America.  This imaginative move 
seems to mollify the speaker—as landscape is so often the means through which Walcott 
apprehends himself and other people—allowing him to move from the elegiac “the Muse is 
leaving America” to the eventual moment of epiphany: “I am falling in love with America” 
(14, 37).  
 The process of falling in love—Walcott compresses it into two stanzas—remains as 
much a mystery in the poem as it is elsewhere.  At the beginning of the second stanza, the 
speaker seems almost worried: “Sometimes I feel sometimes / the Muse is leaving, the Muse 
is leaving America” (13-14).  It is as if the speaker himself needs to repeat these lines, as if he 
is only half-convinced of them.  As the bus travels on the speaker imagines the Muse as “a 
chalk-thin miner’s wife with knobbled elbows, / her neck tendons taut as banjo strings, / she 
who was once a freckled palomino with a girl’s mane” (17-19).  This daydream, this 
“departure comes over me in smoke / from the far factories” (23-24).  The daydream is the 
departure, but so is the change it has brought into the speaker through this redemptive 
                                                
19 Consider, for instance:  “O sea, leaving your villages of cracked mud and tin [. . .]” (“Origins” III.5), 
“[. . .] or follow the path / of the caked piglet through / the sea-village’s midden [. . .]” (Another Life 
21.I.10-12), “Those villages stricken with the melancholia of Sunday [. . .]” (“Sabbaths, W. I.” 1).   
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vision of the Muse-as-miner’s wife.  It seems to be she, a Liberty figure, who allows the 
speaker to move more easily between villages, who intercedes on behalf of the country so 
that, by the end of the third stanza, the speaker can accede: “I am falling in love with 
America” (37).  Walcott’s speaker falls in love with the landscape, with imagined if not real 
persons, and with a myth of America in which he now participates, whose next lines he 
seems ready to write himself.  What follows this confession is an unconditional embrace of 
landscape and language:  “I must put the cold small pebbles from the spring / upon my 
tongue to learn her language, / to talk like birch or aspen confidently” (38-40).  This is a new 
chorography for Walcott.  Having mapped sea grapes and almond trees into his poems, onto 
himself, he now wishes to talk the talk of the trees native to the northeastern United States.  
This language, this “talk” becomes the speaker’s key to the landscape and to the people 
within the landscape, even the motley crew of the bus.  The speaker imagines himself in love 
with this lady Liberty: 
I will knock at the widowed door 
of one of these villages 
  where she will admit me like a broad meadow, 
  like a blue space between mountains, 
  and holding her arms at the broken elbows 
  brush the dank hair from a forehead 
  as warm as bread or as a homecoming.    (41-47) 
 
The poem begins with a “knife blade of cold air” and ends “as warm as bread or as a 
homecoming.”  For Walcott, the use of the word “homecoming” is especially resonant given 
the itinerant imagery of much of his work.  The women in Walcott’s poems—frequently 
idealized, sometimes objectified—have often seemed to be goddesses or muses in the 
disguise of human clothes.  In Midsummer XXV, “a girl slapping sand from her foot” almost 
becomes “Nike loosening her sandal” (22, 21).  In Omeros, Helen works in a beachside bar.  
The American muse—Liberty or Columbia or a new vision altogether—waits like Penelope 
for the traveler to come home.  The image survives its grandiosity perhaps only because we, 
with the speaker, know such a homecoming to be purely imaginary or mythical.  The poet 
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for whom she serves as muse knows that he has two places, but only one home, and that 
home now is as mythical as Ithaca, even as it (or lack of it) continues to define him. 
 The Fortunate Traveller may be something of a misnomer for a collection that traffics 
so thoroughly in Americana; likewise The Prodigal (2004), a book length poem in eighteen 
sections, features as many heartsick leave-takings as it does homecomings.  A travelogue 
constantly shifting between narrative of the travels and lyric meditation on travel, the poem 
mentions more than fifty different cities in North and South America and Europe.   Even 
before Walcott’s 1992 Nobel Prize in Literature canonized him as a writer of international 
stature, the increasing frequency and range of his travels suggested his impending 
ascendance to such a role.  As King writes: “For several decades Walcott had been 
commuting between his jobs in the United States and homes in the West Indies, and in 
more recent years he had been commuting as well between England and the United States.  
Now Continental Europe became part of his market, requiring frequent trips” (533-4).  
King’s record of Walcott’s life after the Nobel—despite the poet having built a new house 
in St. Lucia—reads more like a travel itinerary than a biography.  For a poet so invested in 
rendering landscape in his poems as a conduit for self-fashioning, it is difficult to distinguish 
where the itinerary ends and the biography begins.  At the risk of belaboring the Odysseus 
metaphor, the Walcott of The Fortunate Traveller is momentarily at rest en route rather than 
permanently so at home.  I have called the female muse of “Upstate” a Penelope figure, but 
more appropriate may be the myth of Circe, in whose bewitching company the travel-
wearied Odysseus passes a year before continuing his journey.  The “home” opened to 
Walcott’s speaker at the end of “Upstate” may be a home, but it is not his home.  Welcome 
though he may be, his rest there must remind him of his restlessness.  Sick of journeying, he 
nevertheless continues the journey.  The Walcott of The Prodigal is again traveling, by sea 
and air and across the rails, where the poem opens: 
  In autumn, on the train to Pennsylvania,  
  he placed his book face-down on the sunlit seat 
  and it began to move.  Metre established, 
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  carried on calm parallels, he preferred to read 
  the paragraphs, the gliding blocks of stanzas 
  framed by the widening windows—   (1.1.1-6) 
The unspecific pronoun “it” in the third line refers to the face-down book, to the train 
itself, and to the poem we read here.  We do not know what the speaker is reading, but we 
know that he has established the meter of his own poem by the time the words “metre 
established” click into place as the final two feet of this iambic pentameter line.  Then 
follow the paragraphs and stanzas of the landscape through which the train travels in its 
own inevitably iambic rhythm.  Walcott again reads the landscape as figures of (and for) 
poetry, again writes himself into aspects of the visible world, and again looks to his 
immediate surroundings to attempt to fashion himself from them.  “[. . .W]andering 
[Greenwich] Village in search of another subject / other than yourself, it is yourself you 
meet. / A old man remembering white-headed mountains” (1.II.11-13).  In these lines, 
Walcott’s speaker finds himself wherever he looks, but when he does, the “double” he finds 
is remembering a different landscape, his own white hair mirroring the remembered 
mountain’s snows.  This technique might seem merely self-derivative if Walcott’s treatment 
of “himself” were not so complicated here, through his use of the third person pronoun 
“he.”  The poem oscillates between “I” and “he” almost interchangeably, here “at home” in a 
version of the lyric “I,” and there at the distance of the narrative third person.  In the third 
stanza of the opening section, the speaker addresses his perception of a widening gulf 
between himself and his notion of himself: 
With others in the car, 
he felt as if he had become a tunnel 
through which they entered the idea of America— 
familiar mantling through the tunnel’s skin.  (1.1.20-3) 
The poem plays with the senses of doubleness of which Walcott has spoken throughout his 
career, here especially in the apparent ease with which the speaker slides between “I” and 
“he.”  The “prodigal” who speaks the poem is explicit about one specific aspect of 
“doubling” in Walcott’s own life: he returns to the memory of his identical twin, Roddy, 
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whose failing health and eventual death are depicted (if only at a glance) in the poem: 
“Diabetic, dying, my double,” the speaker remarks, almost offhandedly, in the poem’s third 
section (3.1.17).  The death of the poet’s genetic double, his “real” doppelgänger, haunts the 
poem as its speaker sits in Europe remembering the Caribbean or vice versa, always as much 
“in” the place he imagines as in the place he inhabits, and subsequently within and without 
himself. 
 Although The Prodigal, like so many of Walcott’s poems, compels with its self-
conscious multiplicity, the poem also demonstrates that the identity-switching between “I” 
and “he,” person and poet, is as much a psychic burden as a poetic device.  “In my effort to 
arrive at the third person / has lain the ordeal[,]” he writes, “because whoever the ‘he’ is, / he 
can suffer, he can make his spasms, he can die” (15.II.1-3).  It is no great imaginative feat for 
an “I” to envision the demise of a “he,” but the “I” cannot fathom its own non-being, even 
given the knowledge of the death of one’s double.  This attempt to see the self clearly for 
whatever it may be is further complicated by the widening distance between poet and 
person.  I want to be careful to distinguish this distancing effect from that of “The 
Schooner Flight,” in which the speaker Shabine allows Walcott to speak both more grandly 
and more idiomatically than he might otherwise be able to do.  By the time he writes The 
Prodigal—“an old man’s book,” Walcott seems much more willing to write unapologetically 
in a grandeur that risks bombast (1.III.7).  He appears at once more brazenly proud of his 
“gift” and more circumspect about the worth of his poetic accomplishments.  The Prodigal is 
indeed an old man’s book, a laureate’s retrospective, and it betrays the shift in identity 
inevitable for the poet whose individual language becomes an international concern: what 
Seamus Heaney has called one’s name becoming a name “in inverted commas,” or what 
Jorge Luis Borges describes as the split in identity between “Borges and I” (Hartigan, Borges 
246).  “A conspiring pen / had brought him this far,” Walcott writes, notably using the third 
person.  “Now both lives had met / in this achievement” (2.II.18-19, 23-4).  How does one 
meet one’s double?—not the genetic double of his twin, Roddy, but the idea of the poet to 
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which the person Walcott has so long aspired?  That hypothetical question may recall the 
fabulist alienation of Strand’s doppelgänger poems, and in this instance of Walcott’s own 
alienation we may hear echoes of Strand’s deployment of the self as commodity.  Or, more 
distant but just as relevant, we may hear echoes of Borges speaking of “the other one, the 
one called Borges” in “Borges and I” (246).  Walcott’s depiction of varieties of doubleness 
evinces a sympathy with the Borges who can say: “I do not know which of us has written 
this page” (247). 
The mythologizing of the self—becoming nobody, or a nation; becoming an Antaeus 
drawing strength from the earth on which he stands or a Proteus forever shifting form—
deludes the “I” about its end.  All one’s travels lead one to the same place, or lack of place, a 
“monstrous map that is called Nowhere / and that is where we’re all headed [. . .]” (3.II.29-
30).  “I” knows this, but it cannot quite believe.  The knowledge of coming extinction—
coming sooner than later—compels the speaker to attempt an articulation of just what his 
existence is for.  The death of his brother, and the summative attitude toward his own 
achievement and inevitable decline, render the questions of last things all the more urgent 
in The Prodigal, a book that the speaker assumes (wrongly) “will be your last” (17.V.10).  He is 
as ambivalent as ever about his own identity and its constant correlative, his allegiance to 
place.  In remembering Roddy, he asks: “What was our war, veteran of threescore years and 
ten? / To save the salt light of the island / to protect and exalt its small people” (9.II.11-13).  
In this moment, his home, his family, and the craft of poetry itself are paramount.  In the 
poem’s twelfth section, the speaker questions himself again: “Prodigal, what were your 
wanderings about?  The smoke of homecoming, the smoke of departure” (12.I.1-2).  Here he 
depicts himself as a Keatsian chameleon, changing as the scene around him changes: 
   On the warm stones of Florence 
  I subtly alter to a Florentine 
  till the sun passes, in London 
  I am pieced by fog, and shaken from reflection 
  in Venice, a printed page in the sun 
  on which a cabbage-white unfolds, a bookmark. (12.I.23-8) 
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The speaker finds himself altered as his surroundings alter, but both he and his surroundings 
undergo further metamorphoses as they become, as people and places so often do in 
Walcott’s poems, figures for poetry itself.   In the final lines of the poem, place and poetry 
again converge in a moment that marries the constant change of the sea to the changes of a 
language and the poet’s impossible attempt to “have” it: 
  And always certainly, steadily, on the bright rim 
  of the world, getting no nearer or nearer, the more 
  the bow’s wedge shuddered toward it, prodigal, 
  that line of light that shines from the other shore. (18.IV.24-7) 
 
This prodigal, like the prodigal Shabine, continues his wanderings even after the poem ends.  
But if so much of Walcott’s sense of himself is emblematized in the idea of doubleness, the 
travels by which he has also defined himself only divide by two, like Zeno’s paradox, so that 
he is only approaching but never reaching the end.   
Since his earliest poems, Derek Walcott has been a poet of rare ambition and of the 
still rarer talent to realize it.  Despite James Dickey’s claim, Walcott might seem to us “born 
into a major theme” only because he has written himself so thoroughly into that theme, and 
written the theme so inseparably into his own biography.  The cost of Walcott’s poetic 
ambition for his home as well as for himself is the loss of his own sense of home.  The 
prodigal’s fear of returning a failure has gradually evolved into resignation to the idea of 
never returning: the home to which he would return has been forever changed by his own 
poetry.  So successfully has this poetic chorographer written himself into his own land that 
maps of Castries now show at town center “Derek Walcott Square.”  His myth of himself, 
of his archipelago, and of a poetry that validates both, ebbs and flows with his own 
circumstances, his own place in any given place.  It becomes ever more difficult for Walcott 
to define the boundaries of those myths, just as the shifting tides and sands obscure the 
place where the land ends and the sea begins. 
 
    
 265 
 
 
 
Coda 
 
When Jahan Ramazani called for “a more flexible language to describe how a poet 
like Walcott can put into dialectical interrelation literary and cultural influences that may 
seem incompatible,” he was speaking most urgently of our understanding of Walcott’s and 
other postcolonial poets’ cultural and poetic “hybridity.”  He might just as well have been 
speaking of the need for a fresh picture of the changing poetics of the United States in these 
early years of the twenty-first century.  Our present moment demands the recognition that 
the divisions by which we have classified our poets are outdated and inadequate.  We need a 
more flexible language to describe what Charles Simic has called “the time of minor poets,” 
in which we “welcome you whose fame will never reach beyond your closest family, and 
perhaps one or two good friends gathered after dinner over a jug of fierce red wine . . .” (58).  
Indeed, we need a more flexible language to acknowledge and describe the emergence of our   
contemporary poetics from a remarkable historical moment in the 1970s and 1980s, when 
the work of poststructuralist critical theorists and of practicing poets came into contact, 
and often into productive conflict.  I hope that one of the significant contributions of this 
dissertation is to have begun to articulate the importance of that contact and its lasting 
influence in contemporary poetics.   
What began for me as an attempt to understand the persistent question of the idea 
of the self in contemporary poetics has become, in retrospect, a period study of the role of 
that question in the poetic debates of the 1970s and 1980s.  If I have stretched the limits of 
the term “contemporary,” I hope nevertheless that I have demonstrated some of the ways in 
which these questions are both antique and absolutely current.  Moreover, I hope that this 
dissertation prompts further thinking and discussion of other poets whose work in that 
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particular period exemplifies the fertility of the intellectual and poetic contact I describe.  
What, for instance, are the poetic, philosophical, and political stakes of the idea of the self 
in the work of Amiri Baraka?  In Lyn Hejinian?  To what extent has their work been in 
conversation with the work of critical theorists?  To what extent has this work changed the 
terms of those conversations?  How might it provide us with a vocabulary flexible enough to 
discuss the poems of this decade, the problems of the next one?  I hope that the necessary 
dissolution of a false binary might reveal both the lasting influence of a specific historical 
moment as well as the beautiful chaos of the contemporary scene.  I am also aware as I write 
this that, in all likelihood, the proper language to describe our age will be available only after 
this age, whatever it is, has aged into another. 
In my introduction, I venture a provisional and rather rudimentary definition of the 
self as the object of one’s own consciousness, a unique essence of individual personhood.  In 
the course of this study, however, I have more frequently referred to the even more elusive 
concept of the authorial self or the lyric “I,” the words on the page or in temporal space that 
we take as the product, if not the essence, of the intelligence that ordered them.  
Recapitulating these definitions now makes explicit just how unsatisfactory they are, and 
returns us to one of the questions that haunts this project: Roland Barthes’s “Who is 
speaking thus?”  Or, more flippantly, to D. H. Lawrence’s mock interrogation of Walt 
Whitman:   
  Well then, it just shows you haven’t got any self.  It’s a mush, not a woven  
thing.  A hotch-potch, not a tissue.  Your self. 
Oh, Walter, Walter, what have you done with it?  What have you done 
with yourself?  With your own individual self?  For it sounds as it if had all 
leaked out of you, leaked into the universe.  (173)   
And so it has.  For the dissolution of the self—of the individual human body or the 
articulate intelligence—is both the goal and the fear of so many writers who concern 
themselves with the issues I have addressed here.  To the extent that we are our bodies, 
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Lawrence’s image of a mushy, leaking self is a quite literal vision of a universal fate.  To the 
extent that we are our intelligences, Lawrence might be understood metaphorically: our 
words remain the records of those intelligences—however imperfect, however problematic 
those records may be—as long as the words themselves remain.  Thus the poem, whatever 
its speaker is or is not, preserves both Whitman’s illusion that “They are all alive and well 
somewhere” and Dickinson’s that “the Brain—is wider than the Sky—” (“Song of Myself” 
6.125, “[The Brain—is wider than the Sky—” 1).  These are questions for both philosophy 
and poetry.  These questions demand productive contact, even productive conflict, between 
the two.   
What is it that we encounter when we read a poem?  The most basic answer is that 
we encounter language (although even that definition, once ventured, demands its own 
exception).  And since language, to adapt one of Grossman’s definitions of poetry, is a 
“thing made which makes its maker”—we also seem to encounter an apparition of the 
“maker” of that artifact of language.  The language of which poems are made is not 
fundamentally different from the language of which STOP and THANK YOU signs are made, 
but we tend to find these experiences of reading to be radically different.  The criteria by 
which we call language “poetic”—metaphorical figure, prosodic and rhythmic patterning, 
and so on—often coincide with the phenomena—tone, diction, attitude—by which we 
identify an “individual voice.”  Anyone who has read and reread the letters of a lost loved 
one knows the frisson of apparition, of individual human encounter, experienced in the 
encounter with even “ordinary” language.  Poems, of course, are not people, but the power 
of poetic language to create the illusion of personal encounter in these apparently arbitrary 
marks on a page remains, for me, one of the astonishing mysteries of poetry.  I locate that 
mystery primarily in the power of metaphorical language, the “carrying over” in which one 
noun paradoxically becomes another, and the same process by which the historical person 
who wrote the poem somehow “carried over”—“translated,” to use Strand’s term and the 
etymological cousin to the Greek “metaphor”—in the language of the poem.  In these 
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versions of carrying over we find what I call here the illusion of personal encounter.  I use 
the word “illusion” intentionally, cognizant of its roots in the Latin verbs illudere and ludere, 
its kinship both to deceit and to play (OED).  In poetry we are willfully illuded; we have put 
on a different self as we read, as we watch and listen—indeed, we are at play.  All of this, 
perhaps, we know already.  All of it bears repeating. 
When we speak of the self, we may speak of nothing more than a set of discursive 
habits for narrating our individual existences and our encounters with written language.  But 
this is precisely why Barthes’s questions, Lawrence’s and—I hope—my own are so 
important.  To argue about the self in poems is to argue about what we believe we are 
reading and what we believe it means to us, whoever we are.  I do not delude myself that 
this dissertation has provided a sufficient answer to the question(s) of the self in 
contemporary American poetry.  Nor am I content with having attempted to dismantle an 
inaccurate model of our poetry, only to fail to offer a useful replacement.  But I am also 
cognizant that at a certain point the wisest action I can take is to concede what I do not 
know, what I hope to address in the future.  These are separate projects, separate 
conversations in which I hope to take part, and which I hope my work here might advance.  
I hope to have opened some new opportunities for perceiving the variety of writing and 
thinking across the spectrum of poetic practice in the United States, especially as we seek to 
understand what we mean by authority and identity in poetry.  Moreover, I hope to have 
enriched our sense of the achievements—some aesthetic, some intellectual, some political—
of four poets whose work seems to me as major as this “age of minor poets” might allow.  I 
look forward to the conversation to come.  
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